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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the provocative claim by Performance Studies theorist Philip 
Auslander (1999) that there is no ontological distinction between live and mediatised forms 
because they participate in the same cultural economy. This claim has led to something of a 
stagnation of debate between, on the one hand, scholars who privilege the live over the 
mediatised and on the other those who extinguish the live in favour of mediatisation.   
 Moving beyond the limitations of ontology, this project proposes and develops a 
phenomenological aesthetics in order to investigate the essential structures and modes of 
experienced phenomena from within audience. The phenomenological approach understands 
the complexity and dynamism of the relationship between bodies and technologies in 
performance, reorienting the investigation away from a rehearsal of established and unhelpful 
ontological positions.   
 The methodology for the project draws primarily upon methods from the North-
American tradition of practical phenomenology (Herbert Spiegelberg, Edward S. Casey, Don 
Ihde, and Anthony Steinbock), and the transcendental philosophy of Edmund Husserl. 
Through a series of specially designed workshops, in which audience participants are trained 
in phenomenological techniques of bracketing and attention, A Poetics of Reception tests the 
potential of practical phenomenology to break the ontological impasse set up by Auslander. 
The method elicits the grasping of experiences of embodiment, kinesthetic empathy, 
temporality, orientation, imagination and poetic language. Participants were trained and 
required to write their experiences of the interaction between bodies and performance 
technologies, creating texts that then underwent hermeneutic analysis. 
 The results of this interpretation yielded six interactive encounters, and revealed the 
constituted structures and modes of the relational phenomena experienced in performance by 
the participants. 
 This study’s methodology has both practical and philosophical implications, including 
its proposed use as an audience-based dramaturgy for digital performance, and a method of 
inquiry into the kinesthetic dimensions of aesthetic experiences.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The story of this research began in 2004 when I encountered the work of Philip 
Auslander in his book Liveness: performance in a mediatised culture. While reading this 
seminal text for performance studies, I became puzzled by his claim that there is no 
ontological distinction between live and mediatised forms because they participate in the 
same cultural economy (Auslander 1999, 5).  
 In 2006 I decided to problematise this claim, and had many questions to consider and 
conceptual clarifications to make. In my experience of attending dance performance, the 
corporeality of a breathing, perspiring performer’s body, appeared (in my surface reception) 
to be constituted with great qualitative differences to their distributed two-dimensional 
projected image on a screen. To conflate a live thing with a mediatised thing just seemed 
counter-intuitive. Auslander’s claim became categorically problematic, but an experientially 
and conceptually meaningful phrase to examine.  
 Initially I was interested in understanding what he meant by ‘ontology’ and an 
“ontological distinction” in the discipline of performance studies. I also wondered what these 
live and mediatised forms were, and for whom they were significant. It was also important to 
know who was claiming the distinction, and what notion of “cultural economy” Auslander 
was employing to abrogate ontological distinctions between these forms. Once I could 
answer these fundamental questions, I still needed to define a purpose for research beyond 
my affection for problems; and so the story develops. 
 
The Debate 
Auslander’s position is a reactionary one. He challenges the claims of those who view 
liveness as necessarily and ontologically distinct from mediatised events. Proponents of 
liveness venerate the live in its ability to disappear, leaving “no visible trace afterward” 
(Phelan 1993, 149). Liveness, described as original, authentic, immediate, and truthful, is 
conceived as a place of political and ideological resistance in a capitalist cultural economy 
for the flesh and blood performer standing present with bonafide presence, sharing this 
moment with an equally live audience. In this view, live performance overcomes all forms of 
reproduction, repetition and distribution, which characterise the malevolent spawn of 
capitalist society that manifests in recorded performance. Even though the debate revolves 
around the question of political resistance and/or transgression in a capitalist cultural 
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economy, the claim in and of itself provokes a problem of experience rather than one 
regarding the efficacy of political art. In fact, for the discipline of performance studies, this 
debate has created an ongoing aporia about the relationship between liveness and 
mediatisation. In philosophy, an aporia is a difficult puzzle or irresolvable problem that 
creates ongoing doubt and confusion; it is an intellectual impasse. Is the live and mediatised 
debate an irresolvable aporia? It is certainly confused; and if deemed so, do we let it slip 
away as a difficult, unable to be negotiated moment in performance studies relatively young 
history? Performance studies scholars tend to yawn at the mention of it. But if we consider 
other disciplines, are the problems of the self in philosophy or identity in political science no 
longer motivations for research? My contention is that performance studies as a new 
discipline needs its own aporiai to generate problem solving, new directions in thinking, and 
experimental methodologies in order to frame new discourse. The live and mediatised debate 
is indeed one of these. My overall point is that since this particular debate began in the late 
nineties, it has continued to be a foundational moment of scholarship within the discipline, 
and ready for other scholars to take up in their own way.  
 It seems that Auslander’s motivation for challenging the valorisation of liveness is to 
combat theories of suspicion about technologies in an age of mediatic mayhem where 
communication technologies distally scatter our voices, faces and hereness to other 
destinations, or surveillance technologies watch our every move in public spaces in a 
dialectic of protection and perverse exposure. To quibble over whether corporeal bodies are 
the same as or different from two-dimensionally represented ones, or that live performance is 
at risk of disappearing, seems to be a path to pathological implosion. Because I am no agent 
of suspicion or a cyborgian fanatic, one of my motivations for examining bodies in 
relationship to technologies is to carve out a unique pathway from problem and debate, to 
reorientation, design and construction.  
 My position corresponds with that of Matthew Reason’s, outlined in his book 
Documentation, Disappearance and the Representation of Live Performance (2006).          
We both concede the importance of the live and mediatised debate, but wish to see it recast in 
a more positive light through constructive approaches for understanding the relationship 
between technology and performance. Reason recognises the debate to be a “central motif in 
an important and ongoing dialogue within Performance Studies”, but argues that it has 
proliferated into incontrovertibly entrenched sides since Auslander’s attack on Phelan’s 
metaphysical claims of presence and disappearance that are valued over the representational 
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and recorded (Reason 2006, 14). As a consequence, these aspects are never constructively 
developed outside of the debate. Reason’s study of disappearance and documentation in 
performance manages to keep the debate in the background while not detracting from the 
experiential importance of liveness and mediatisation. Rather than perpetuating a politically 
charged scrap, Reason wishes to “explore, adopt and develop approaches and interpretive 
strategies that allow us to use these representations [recorded documentation] as an insightful 
and self-questioning form of knowledge and way of seeing” (Reason 2006, 4).  
 My first movement and delimitation in this research is to turn from problem to debate, 
then reorient to focus upon the relationship between live and mediatised forms within dance 
technology events.1 In Liveness, Auslander argues that in performance there is only 
mediatisation: media is all-pervading. In sporting stadiums we watch bodies running around a 
field projected on to a large screen, while in the courtroom a corporeal body elsewhere and/or 
at another time provides a mediatised, televisual testimony. Implicit in all of Auslander’s 
examples is a relationship between two forms, a relation of interaction. This prompts my next 
movement of delimitation in this reorientation: the collapse of the oppositional distinction 
(live versus mediatised) to form a conjunction between bodies and digital media (live and 
mediatised). In these events, the interactions of body and media may be live in the sense of an 
‘at the same time and place’, but presented and received in different dimensions. 
Dimensionality is a significant structural theme in my study, and is a reorientation towards 
the relational. Interactions are diverse and many; they are relations becoming new relations 
and constitute an array of forms for experiential reflection. Throughout my research it 
quickly became apparent that ‘liveness’ is not only characteristic of three-dimensional 
breathing, sweating bodies able to be touched in the here and now, projected media can also 
breathe and be touched in the here and now. The spatio-temporal aspects of liveness in 
mediatisation are shown to be qualitatively and experientially different, but not distinct or 
divorced from each other. Taking this into account, the original distinction is 
terminologically reformulated to speak of events as live, mediatised. Viewing this whole 
business as a relational conjunction, rather than a conflation, or a more violent 
subsumption—as Auslander tends towards in his rejection of “the validity of any ontological 
definition of live performance”—I am able to consider the richly complex experiences of 
technology use within performance events (Auslander in Reason 2006, 15). My approach                                                         
1 In Chapter 1, I refer to the relationship as live and mediatised. In my later formulations the relationship is 
termed ‘bodies and media’, and ‘bodies and performance technologies’. The phenomena themselves never 
changed over the course of study; there was only a shift in terminology. 
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involves contemplating the variances of experience while seeking structural clarification 
about these shifting relations between bodies and media. Disoriented by the power play of 
concepts brought on by a fixed polemic, I reorient myself from problem to the design and 
construction of a method. I do this by focusing on the relationship between bodies and digital 
technologies in live, mediatised dance performances.  
 Despite my strong critique of Auslander, I never venerate liveness, nor recapitulate 
stock arguments to salvage a fleshly presence from the fragmentation and simulations of a 
mediatic world. Influenced by contemporary theorists of digital art and performance practices 
I construct a framework for understanding the experiences of bodies interacting with new 
digital technologies. Understanding, here, is a transition from what Aristotle called theoria, 
(contemplation of a problem in and by itself without an end) to praxis (a process not devoid 
of contemplation, but with practical ends).  
 A third delimitation in my study is to focus upon dance performance, and more 
specifically, dance technology events. Although Susan Kozel, Johannes Birringer, Scott 
DeLahunta, Sita Popat, Susan Broadhurst, Carol Brown, Steve Dixon, et al., wrote on the 
relationship between dance and technology in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new 
millennium, scholarship and publications on phenomenology, dance, and technology are rare. 
Three exceptions are Susan Kozel’s book Closer: performance, technologies, phenomenology 
(2007), which has been a seminal text and point of reference throughout my research, and the 
two books on performance and technology co-edited by Susan Broadhurst and Josephine 
Machon, Performance and Technology: Practices of Virtual Embodiment and Interactivity 
(2006) and Sensualities/Textualities and Technologies: writings of the body in 21st Century 
performance (2009). In the area of phenomenology and dance Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s 
The Primacy of Movement (1999), and her earlier work Illuminating Dance: Philosophical 
Explorations (1984) have been invaluable resources for thinking about dance and movement 
in a phenomenological way, and these texts have also been inspirational in my own work. 
 Lately the emphasis on technology use within the field of dance studies has been in 
neuroscience. Mirror neurons—neurons that fire during a specific action and also during the 
watching of that same action performed by another—are a burgeoning area of interest for the 
dance scholar and choreographer alike, while dance and choreography have become activities 
of interest for the cognitive scientist. The discovery of mirror neurons seems to help us 
account for an experiential phenomenon like kinesthetic empathy in relation to watching 
dance performance: how we feel and “dance along even without moving overtly” when in an 
  11 
audience (Foster 2010, 1).2 Studying dance phenomena from within audience naturally makes 
kinesthetic empathy an important theme within my research, but like Susan Leigh Foster, I 
am suspicious of the idea that the cognitive sciences have adequately explained the 
experience of kinesthetic empathy. However, I do not trace an historical genealogy of the 
terms kinesthesia or empathy, as Foster does in her most recent publication Choreographing 
Empathy: kinesthesia in performance (2010), where she reveals the historical/culturally 
contingent nature of our conceptualising these phenomena. And I prefer to call on the vast 
phenomenological literature on embodiment to develop a framework for understanding these 
phenomena in performance events, including Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Gertrude Stein, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Shaun Gallagher, and Donn Welton. I also refrain 
from empirical studies of neurological processes and creative cognition in choreographic and 
audience research, and call upon classical humanist tools for engaging aesthetically with such 
events; tracing aisthēsis, movement and embodied imaginings through practical 
phenomenology and the written word. Rather than the referential glitter of firing “synaptic 
connections in the cortex” (Foster 2010, 1), rich poetic language represents experiential 
variations of the embodied connection between performer, audience, and interactive media in 
my research. 
 A further delimitation in my study that needs to be acknowledged is the concentration 
on the aesthetic in dance performance. I follow dance scholar Laurence Louppe, who uses an 
aesthetic approach in the study of contemporary dance. Her aesthetics is a poetics understood 
as “the thought of sensuous and emotional experience” (Louppe 2010, 6). If the gesture, 
affectivity and movement of dance is “the body’s poetry”, and the “deepest roots of the 
individual” are expressed through the dance itself, is it also not purposeful to engage with a 
poetics of language when describing aesthetic interactions that poetically form an artwork? 
(Louppe 2010, 5). Louppe argues that dance is “an expressive field that is still obscure and 
poorly explored by the science of aesthetics” (Louppe 2010, 5). My project answers this call 
by offering a style of aesthetics that engages the poetry of bodies in complex dances with 
new media. From theoria to praxis, my project (as Aristotle would see it) is also a poiesis. 
                                                        
2 I do not wish to say that the term ‘kinesthetic empathy’ is or has always been a central concern for dance (as 
Susan Leigh Foster argues in her study), but the term is prominent in the contemporary literature on dance and 
has become common parlance in discussions about dance audiences. Critical of the concept, Graham McFee 
refutes kinesthetic empathy as being central to the meaning of dance on the basis that “kinaesthesis” itself is a 
“myth” (McFee 2011, 271).     
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The participants’ phenomenological writings produced for textual analysis demonstrates this 
movement. 
 Finally, the history of material technologies, their invention, development, uses and 
impact, falls outside the scope of my study. I also do not provide an historical survey of 
perspectives in the philosophy of technology by tracing the thought of contemporary thinkers 
on the subject. To forge a new phenomenological path in studies of performance technologies 
in the twenty-first century, I do not view technology through a lens of suspicion, as one might 
following in the tradition of a Heideggerian meta-critique of the essence of technology. I 
follow Don Ihde in his suggestion that “[j]ust as technologies may become antiquated and 
abandoned, so . . . should “philosophies of technology” be seen to become antiquated and be 
abandoned!” (Ihde 2010, 13)  
 In Heidegger’s essay of 1954 “The Question Concerning Technology”, the essence of 
technology is purported as non-technological. Technology draws man towards nature in a 
practical manner and also towards truth. Heidegger empowers technology with the capacity 
to reveal the truth (‘unconcealment’, aletheia) insisting that man is challenged forth to 
undertake technological activity (‘enframing’, Ge-stell), thus having no control over this 
process of unconcealment (Heidegger 1977, 323). Technology revealed as autonomous leads 
Heidegger (and many others in his wake) toward a dystopic view of technology as a set of 
forces that are out of control and unable to be “stopped”.  
  
 These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon 
 man under the Gestalt of technological installations and arrangements—these forces, since man has not 
 made them, have moved along since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision 
 (Heidegger in Ihde 2010, 19).3 
 
Hedidegger’s view is problematic in its conflation of all forms of technology: all technologies 
are made the same because of their essence as non-technological. Don Ihde argues that this 
kind of essentialism ignores particularities and so robs technology of its contextual and 
cultural differences (Ihde 2010, 21). I extend this point to my own investigations of the 
essential structural relations between bodies and technologies in live, mediatised 
performance. To conflate all technologies (say older analogue media with digital processing                                                         
3 When I add an emphasis using italics when citing quotes, I will indicate, italics mine. Otherwise all other 
emphases found in quotes (italics, underlining and bold) are from the original text cited. This occurs frequently 
in the translations of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s texts.    
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media) on the basis of their non-technological essence would entail a view of essentialism 
that is homogenous, static and lacking distinctions. This view is unlike the one I develop in 
my studies here. To forge my phenomenological path in studies of performance technologies, 
I prefer, like Ihde, to experientially understand through “concrete analysis” particular 
technologies in their use, sense formation and reception (Ihde 2010, 19). 
 A major reason for reorienting the debate and unmooring the oppositional lock 
between liveness and mediatisation is to do phenomenology. My reasons for choosing 
phenomenology as the approach with which to examine the relationship between bodies and 
digital technologies in live, mediatised dance performances go beyond a mere predilection for 
this philosophical perspective. As Paul Majkut suggests: 
 
 [t]he strength of phenomenology has been its concentration on the audience and the aesthetic 
 experience, not content or aesthetic evaluation in terms of formal analyses of the object in its own 
 terms (Majkut 2010, 201). 
 
Phenomenology is a unique mode of study that inquires into the constitution of things as they 
appear in the world. Constitution is an account of how things in the world take on sense. In 
phenomenology, this appearance is the givenness of a thing. These things may be objects, 
mental acts, or—as this study concentrates upon—the givenness of a relation. My project 
attends to how the relations between bodies and media take on sense as constituted 
phenomena, and explores the processes of constituting: the structural dimensions of how we 
experience the experience.  
 In Section 1: Problem and Debate, and Section 2: Reorientation, I clear the ground for 
the development of my phenomenology. In Chapter 1, I closely examine Auslander’s main 
contentions offered in Liveness (1999), assessing both the logic of his argumentation and his 
appropriation of certain concepts. I critically consider his claims alongside specific 
disciplines that are concerned with bodies, technological media, performance and interaction, 
drawing from performance studies, philosophy, the history and theory of art, new media, and 
communications studies. 
 Before I move onto the process of praxis explained in Chapters 5 and 6, I challenge 
Auslander’s understanding of ontology in his approach to the live and mediatised debate. In 
Chapter 2, I ask the question: what is ontology? This is a question not simply answered in the 
space of a chapter, nor even a dissertation. But, delimited by my interest in performance and 
phenomenology, I feel I can begin quite late within the Western story of ontology with 
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Heidegger and his fundamental ontology where he asks the question: what is Being? Since I 
am examining a relation in representation, the question of Being, or the positing of a priori 
structures from outside experience, do not seem to support what essentially and 
methodologically appears to be a project of phenomenological aesthetics.4 But the primary 
issue for me in this dissertation is not Being, but understanding the aesthetic dimensions of 
experiencing an artwork. By the close of Chapter 2, the question, definitions and practice of 
aesthetics is more of an issue than the question of Being or ontology. This leads me to consult 
Hans-George Gadamer on aesthetics and reprise the role of reception in the tripartite structure 
of producer (artist), artwork, and receiver (spectator). Emphasising the role of the spectator 
through Gadamerian aesthetics, I follow current trends within performance and dance studies 
that highlight the importance of audience experience in the study of performance and 
aesthetic phenomena. Audience becomes pivotal. 
 The interaction between bodies and technologies triangulate with audience. By 
foregrounding audience receptivity, I examine mediatised performance events through a 
unique frame that differs from other traditional and contemporary approaches that critically 
appraise the relationship between machines and bodies, and the subsequent impact on 
(wo)man and world. 
 In Chapter 3, “The Phenomenological Ground”, I provide an exposition of Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology, and look closely at some basic tenets of his philosophy 
drawn from the breadth of his translated manuscripts and published works, seeking assistance 
from leading scholars of his phenomenology to clarify particular concepts and procedures 
within his method that supports the design of my phenomenological framework. In Chapter 3, 
I specifically follow the thinking of Anthony J. Steinbock, with whom I had the honour of 
working closely across 2010-2011. I take up Steinbock’s identification of three 
methodological movements in Husserl: the static, genetic and generative. As such I 
understand my phenomenological approach in light of a static (constitutional) and genetic 
(self-temporalising) analysis. In this chapter, the theoretical background to my development 
of an original method for the study of performance forms can be seen.  
 In Chapter 4, I explore some of the seminal literature on embodiment within 
phenomenology, embodied cognition, and dance studies. Embodiment is a significant theme 
in this study, not merely because I attend to bodies moving, but because I am a body moving                                                         
4 For a survey of approaches in phenomenological aesthetics in a range of creative mediums see the Handbook 
of Phenomenological Aesthetics Sepp & Embree (2010). 
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amongst other bodies, and this triangulation within the experience affirms a-lot-of-body. 
Embodiment is a difficult area to merely motion towards in a pseudo-framing sense, such that 
I could say: “yes my study is embodied” “my procedures are embodied” and “I don’t think 
without my body—for God forbid that I be thought a dualist!” So, where to begin?  
  In sorting through what I acknowledge to be only a Western view of embodiment, I 
develop the conceptual relation embodiment—embodied imaginings—writing embodiment in 
order to attend to the bodily from every side: bodies kinaesthetically empathising and 
imagining with other bodies in their receptivity of stage bodies in two dimensions and three. 
The relation weaves in and out of the framework’s design, application and analysis. 
Embodiment is approached at the level of a transcendental aesthetic, but remains for the most 
part—as Maxine Sheets-Johnstone points out in criticism of and as a direct citation of 
Husserl writing on the body from his Ideas II—a “vague localization” (Sheets-Johnstone 
1999, 120). I attempt, through somatic-based preparations for doing phenomenology, to 
register embodied experience as more than this “vague localization”.  
 For the remaining sections and chapters of this dissertation, I proceed with an 
explanation of the iterative development of the design, application and evaluation of my 
practical framework. When you are doing phenomenology there is, as Don Ihde attests, no 
explicit end (Ihde 1977, 193). While writing, practising, watching others practise, and reading 
as much as I could about doing phenomenology, I discovered just that, that there was no end. 
Husserl’s entire oeuvre is testament to the idea of phenomenology as an endless task. 
  On doing phenomenology, I took Edward S Casey at his word when he said: “[t]hose 
who can do phenomenology do it; those who can’t talk about it” (Casey 1997, 171). In my 
attempt to “do”, I looked to North America, specifically to the work of Herbert Spiegelberg, 
Edward S Casey and Don Ihde, and drew on experiences from my ongoing participation in 
the Phenomenology Research Group on the Emotions Project with Anthony J Steinbock 
(Southern Illinois 2008, 2010-11), and across the Pacific, my work with Stuart Grant on his 
project Gathering to Witness: a phenomenology of audience (Sydney 2004, Grant 2005). 
These experiences informed the development of my method for practising phenomenology in 
a performance context that is introduced in Section 3: Constructing. In Chapter 5, I outline 
both the background to practical and group phenomenology and the design of my framework 
for an applied phenomenology. The ‘relationship between bodies and media in live, 
mediatised dance performances’ is the phenomenon, appositely, I have called my practice the 
Poetics of Reception Project: phenomenological writings from within audience. 
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  The Poetics of Reception Project consists of a series of phenomenological 
workshops for teaching participants how to conduct a phenomenological reduction (the 
suspension or bracketing of presuppositions and judgments) and an attentional reduction 
(how to focus on selected phenomena) while attending and writing their experiences of a live, 
mediatised dance event. The first pilot session of the Poetics of Reception Project 
commenced in 2007, and was followed by two group workshops, with each group consisting 
of four participants. The design, procedure and implementation of my project’s framework 
are outlined in Chapter 5, where all documents provided to participants before and during the 
workshop are explained in detail.  
 Living in the southernmost part of Illinois for the final period of this project, I spent 
the transitional seasons (Spring to Summer, Autumn to Winter) on the turbulent edges of 
Tornado Alley. During my most distracted period, when I was gripped with tornadophilia 
(funnel cloud spotting!), I suddenly began to see the structure of a ‘multivortex tornado’ and 
its multiple funneling movements in the phenomenology that I was writing. Metaphorically it 
seemed that a number of smaller phenomenologies were taking place internally, propelling 
my bigger phenomenology. Graphically this is represented by the Peter Garfield image on the 
title page of this dissertation. As a result, my Chapter 6, “Phenomenological Method: a case 
of iterative design”, documents these multi-internal turns in a series of case studies that are 
preparatory for my third workshop Transmission Laboratories and final stage analysis 
presented in my Section 4: Discovering. In Chapter 6, I also discuss the iterative nature of the 
Poetics of Reception method, along with its limitations, problems, refinements, and insights 
emerging from each instance of its application, and present two other case studies of 
performance and research where I was an observer, and which contribute to my eventual 
analysis of the Poetics of Reception studies.  
 The final stage of my project, presented in Chapter 7, involved the textual analysis of 
writings collected from participants during the workshops. These writings are a rich and 
poetic source of experiential engagement with the interactions between performing bodies 
and stage media. These texts were taken as instances of imaginative variation, a step within 
Husserl’s procedure of eidetic analysis in phenomenological method. The eidetic reduction in 
Husserl is the distilling of the eidos or essence, understood as the essential structure of a 
thing. Another formulation—and one that I prefer—is seeking invariance in variation. 
Indeed, variation takes on equal significance, for without it, the pursuit of invariance would 
be impossible. In strict Husserlian terms, to do an eidetic analysis is to do a style of ontology. 
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Ontology, taken as a noun, is the essential structure of a thing. By pursuing eidetic analysis, 
rather than presenting experiential variances as a range of loose descriptions, one could argue 
that ontology is at play in my project. But the scope of my work does not lend itself 
comfortably enough to affirm the practice of ontology. The relation between bodies and 
technologies changes dynamically in a representational context; as a result, my study could 
not exhaust all possible experiences and structures that this relation could elicit. 
 The phenomenon of this relation is an ongoing movement that makes it impossible to 
pin and preserve like a butterfly. I am revealing structures; Section 3 demonstrates this. But 
the grasping of essences in this phenomenology is a dynamic distillation of fast-moving 
structures within reception and expressed through a poetics. In this final section, I look to the 
actual experiences of selected performance events to distill the constitutive structures and 
varying modes of interactions. In my analysis nothing is imposed from outside of the 
experience other than the phenomenologist bringing a phenomenon to the fore and describing 
it. During this stage, explained in Chapter 7: Poetics of Reception: Textual Analysis, I 
identified six ‘Interactive Encounters’: (1) Digital Touch, (2) Dancing with Other, (3) 
Hybrids, (4) Transmorphing, (5) Environment and Other Worlds, and (6) Expressing the 
Inner. Interpretation plays its part, and so I played the hermeneut. Massaging language, 
concepts and meaning in a phenomenological way stirs the structures of relations co-
constituted in and by themselves. Interpretation is a friendly decipherer of essences.    
 In Chapter 7, I also describe the process of disclosing eight co-constitutive structures 
and several modes of interaction. Many distinctions are made that elucidate, at a structural 
level, the dimensions of relational action, identity, presence, spatio-temporal dimensionality, 
orientation, the grammar of interactions, transcendence, the imagination and the moving 
empathetic body in reception. These insights deepen and clarify the relationship between 
bodies and performance technologies as experienced from within audience and understood 
with a phenomenological attitude. The role of audience in the sense formation of meaning is 
reaffirmed in several instances of triangulation with performer and media. My analysis 
reveals the phenomenon of kinesthetic empathy; I attend to those “firing synapses” as a 
synthesis of the temporal, spatial and linguistic in embodied perception.  
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Future Research 
 
 No final presentation in the flesh is ever reached in the mode of appearance as if it would present the 
 complete, exhausted self of the object. Every appearance implies a plus ultra in the empty horizon . . . 
 The empty pointing ahead acquires its corresponding fullness. It corresponds to the more or less rich 
 prefigured possibilities; but since its nature is determinable indeterminacy, it also brings, together with 
 the fulfillment, a closer determination (Husserl 2001, 48). 
 
An empty pointing ahead; I steal this phrase from Husserl. More than an empty phrase, empty 
here means the potential to be full, a horizon full of possibility. My method developed and 
articulated in this dissertation points emptily ahead, and is the paradox of my ending. I did 
not set out to solve a problem. Instead, I made one from a spurious claim, that of Auslander, 
and then reoriented myself towards constructing a method to examine phenomena. From the 
design of a methodology and its practice, I open upon a new horizon and propose a working 
method for making performance: phenomenology as dramaturgy. I concur with Louppe’s 
suggestion that 
 
 [t]he object of a poetics, like that of art itself, is at one and the same time knowledge, affect and action. 
 But poetics also has a more particular mission: it does not only tell us what a work of art does to us, it 
 teaches us how it  is made (Louppe 2010, 4). 
 
I believe my method, iterative by nature, has the potential for use within a performance 
design process because it reveals, at a deeper structural level, how something is made. At the 
very least the results from the phenomenology presented in the following pages promise such 
a beginning. Phenomenology as dramaturgy is analogical. Both are involved in the practice of 
revealing the internal structure of a thing, or things in relation. Phenomenology is happy to 
identify. Dramaturgy—avoiding claims to ontology—reconstitutes the structure elsewhere.  
 A second thread emerged from the results of my Poetics of Reception Project. It is a 
much larger thread that involves the examination of how we constitute scalar movements in 
kinesthetic encounters of the miniature and the monolithic. From my participants’ writings of 
their encounters with tiny objects in performance, I came to speculate on the embodied 
significance of playing with objects or immersing oneself in spaces that are tiny or 
monolithic: experiences that shrink or expand our bodily senses in imagined movements of 
scale. My methodology offers an approach to inquire into such experiences, whether 
aesthetically based (objects, film or literary material), or in relation to how the very small, 
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tiny (toy trains, doll houses) and very big, monolithic (built environment, nature, our earth) 
impact upon our everyday spatio-temporal selves. Such a study could consider the 
phenomenon of how we constitute body image, and the implication of our eco-egological 
relationship to others, world and the earth. As a future project, I am interested in developing 
this analysis at the level of a transcendental aesthetic, drawing together Husserl’s manuscripts 
on self-temporalisation, imagination, image and the lived-moving body.  
 
 
Phenomenology in Performance Studies 
 I hope that my reorientation from this problem and debate to the creation of a new 
method is recognised as a constructive approach to an important relationship we strike as 
audience members and practitioners: the relationship between bodies, performance 
technologies and the language of experience. For the most part, this dissertation should be 
read as a methodological contribution to the study of performance. It is a phenomenological 
aesthetics that engages with Husserlian transcendental methods and the practical 
phenomenology tradition developed through an embodied poetic approach. Phenomenology 
is surfacing as one preferred method amongst younger scholars in the study of bodies, 
movement, audience experience, space, temporality and place within performance studies. 
Tracing the rich, though scattered, history of the uses of phenomenology in the discipline has 
become the interest of scholars, particularly in Australia. Its uses in creative practice are on 
the increase, enriching critical discussion and deepening an understanding of performance 
elements. The methods of scholars and practitioners vary greatly. It can be said that there are 
as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists; here, I present but one approach.  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SECTION 1 
PROBLEM AND DEBATE 
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CHAPTER 1  THE LIVE AND MEDIATISED DEBATE 
 
 Philip Auslander’s claim that “there is no ontological distinction between live and 
mediatised forms because they participate in the same cultural economy” is the point of 
departure for my phenomenological examination of bodies interacting with technological 
media in a performative context. Before establishing the ground and methods of this task, I 
will in the first part of this chapter address what I see as the main problems with Auslander’s 
position, providing several arguments that point out his contradictions, narrow scope, and 
misappropriations of certain concepts borrowed from postmodern and media theory. This 
deconstructive phase will be followed by a survey of my preferred frameworks for 
understanding the relationship between bodies and media in performance that neither 
privilege the live or mediatised nor conflate them.  
 
 
§1.1.1  AUSLANDER’S CLAIM  
 
Auslander’s position on the nature of liveness in a performance context is hinted at in 
the title of his book Liveness: performance in a mediatised culture (1999) and its suggestion 
that in performance, liveness is inextricably bound to technological media. In an earlier 
research paper “Against Ontology: Making Distinctions between the Live and the 
Mediatised” (1997a), Auslander argues that liveness itself originated with the emergence of 
technological media possessing the capacity to record. His claim implies that prior to 
recording media (i.e. television) there was no such thing as live performance, problematically 
begging the question: if not live, then what?  
 
 Through an examination of what may be called the ontological characteristics of live and 
 mediatised performances…I will argue against intrinsic opposition and in favour of a view 
 that emphasises the mutual dependence of the live and mediatised and that challenges the 
 traditional assumption that the live precedes the mediatised (Auslander 1999, 11). 
 
Nowhere in the literature does Auslander provide an alternative explanation of what 
performance was prior to the introduction of recording technologies. His position is based on 
the premise that liveness as a phenomenon only came into existence as a ‘category of 
meaning’ in relation to an opposing possibility: “mediatisation”, identified as mediating 
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technologies with the capacity to record and reproduce (Auslander 1997a, 55). This purported 
historical argument is made on very weak theoretical grounds with Baudrillard’s claim: “the 
very definition of the real is that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction” 
(Baudrillard in Auslander 1997a, 55).5 A strong deconstructionist tone is evident in 
Auslander’s idea; however it seems he grasps at the sense of the concept and manipulates it 
without explanation, consequently weakening his theoretical ground. But in turning to 
Derrida’s notion of differánce (the foundational moment in deconstruction) we see that 
within language the difference between two terms is perceived from the perspective of one of 
the terms. One term only exists in relation to another term: deferring to and differing from 
(Derrida 1976). Deconstruction, observes Broadhurst, “does not engage in the annulment of 
neutralization of opposites; rather, it aims at foregrounding the asymmetrical nature of its 
object of inquiry” (Broadhurst 2007, 32). Auslander, by contrast, seeks the annihilation of 
liveness (as one of the terms) in the logic of opposing categories, loosely appropriating 
Baudrillard to support the claim that it is “not at all clear that live performance has a 
distinctive ontology” (Auslander 1997a, 55). However, in pronouncing the not-at-all-clear in                                                         
5 In Liveness Auslander admittedly appropriates the term mediatisation “somewhat loosely”: “[m]ediatized 
performance is performance that is circulated on television, as audio or video recordings, and in other forms 
based in technologies of reproduction" (Auslander 1999, 5), and loosely follows Frederic Jameson's explanation 
of the term. For Jameson, mediatisation is a process or reflexive relationship between media within a mediatic 
system. Mediatic describes a synthesis of different media that does not produce a "superproduct or 
transcendental objectGesamtkunstwerk" that the term 'mixed media' represents (Jameson 1991, 162). 
 
 [T]he traditional fine arts are mediatized: that is, they now come to consciousness of themselves as various media 
 within a mediatic system in which their own internal productions also constitutes a symbolic message and the 
 taking of a position on the status of the medium in question (Jameson 1991, 16).  
 
It is not clear from Liveness how Auslander makes this parallel between “mediatic system” and “cultural 
economy” to qualify his use of the term mediatisation (Auslander 1999, 5).  For my purposes, the term denotes 
the deliberate incursion of technology into performance events, and is somewhat influenced by Jameson's 
definition, which posits a dynamic relationship between media as they reflexively constitute themselves as the 
medium. Mediatisation has its theoretical roots in Jean Baudrillard’s text Simulacra and Simulation (1983). 
Here Baudrillard challenges the notions of representation and reality amongst other Western so-called truths and 
beliefs including: the nature and truth of God; the objects and objectivity of science; the power of capital; the 
politics of deterrence; the immorality of morality; and more bleakly, the death of society (Baudrillard 1983, 1-
79). In his chapter “The Precession of Simulacra”, Baudrillard seductively shakes the foundations of Western 
thought with his invention of the simulacrum, defined as: not real, but not unreal. He provides an example to 
explain this paradox, using the distinction between someone who simulates illness, and someone who feigns or 
pretends to be ill. The simulator of illness will “produce in himself some of the symptoms”; whereas the 
feigning person will pretend some of the symptoms (Littre in Baudrillard 1983, 5). The feigning example leaves 
the reality of non-illness intact, the difference is always clear; non-illness is only masked. For Baudrillard, 
simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and ‘false’ and the ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ (Baudrillard 
1983, 5). The relationship of truth to falsity, real to the imaginary, and representation to the represented is 
unhinged in his logic of simulation. As will be discussed here in my introduction, my study forms a conjunct 
between the interactive experiences of a corporeal body and technological media in many forms in order to 
overcome the opposition imposed between liveness and mediatisation. The terms bodies and media, or bodies 
and technologies will be interchanged throughout the remaining document. 
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respect to ontologically understanding live performance and its mutual dependence on media 
technologies, Auslander’s approach fails to make clear the phenomenon he proposes to 
examine. Born from Baudrillard’s questionable logic of opposing categories, his inquiry 
skates on the surface of understanding.6 At no point is there a rigorous experiential 
investigation of an actual event: Auslander never writes from within audience.  
 It is not the case that Auslander denies the presence of live things. Evie Sirloin, his 
dog, is in fact thanked for her “live presence” during the writing of Liveness (Auslander 
1999, ix). Rather, his intention is the parochial extinguishment of liveness as an experience 
within performance—especially theatre, sporting events and rock concerts. In failing to 
consider audience accounts in his various case studies, Auslander provides me with the 
appropriate moment for developing a phenomenologically motivated, audience-centered 
study.  
In Liveness, Auslander describes the relationship between live and mediatised forms 
within the contexts of the sporting event, the rock concert and the courtroom (Auslander 
1999). In these examples, the live bodies involved with kicking balls, singing, playing 
instruments and providing court testimony are recorded, projected onto large screens, 
amplified through speakers and made into televisual representations for later viewing. In his 
overall critique, Auslander opposes presuppositions that formulate an ontological distinction 
between liveness and mediatisation. For him the problem with an ontological view is that it 
operates on an a priori set of assumptions. He has no problem with making distinctions on 
the basis of experiences. This means that a phenomenological examination is possible, as 
long as it does not pose as ontology. However, the types of experiences he alludes to are 
already entangled within his presupposed concept of ‘cultural economy’.7  
                                                         
6 When I use the term ‘understanding’, here and elsewhere, I do not mean in the more general sense ‘to make 
comprehensible’. Rather, I invoke the traditional hermeneutic regard for understanding, which can be traced 
from Friedrich Schliermacher to Wilhelm Dilthey, through to Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. Gadamer 
considers Heidegger’s description of the hermeneutical circle and how interpretive understanding is achieved, 
noting that: 
 
[a] person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as 
soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading 
the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning is, understanding what is there 
(Gadamer 2004, 269). 
 
7 In his article “Against Ontology”, Auslander qualifies his use of the term cultural economy. Cultural economy 
describes “a realm of inquiry that includes both the real economic relations among cultural forms and the 
relative degrees of cultural prestige and power enjoyed by different forms” (Auslander 1997a, 50). 
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In challenging the traditional opposition of the live and mediatised, I am not suggesting that we cannot 
make phenomenological distinctions between respective experiences of live and mediatised 
representations, distinctions concerning their respective positions within cultural economy, and 
ideological distinctions among performed representations in all media. What I am suggesting is that 
any distinctions need to derive from careful consideration of how the relationship between the live and 
mediatised is articulated in particular cases, not from a set of assumptions that constructs the relation 
between live and mediatised representations a priori as a relation of essential opposition (Auslander 
1999, 54). 
 
There are two points to be made from this paragraph. The first entails a contradiction: 
Auslander rejects ontological distinctions that are made from an a priori set of assumptions, 
but presupposes conditions upon liveness and mediatisation from a concept of cultural 
economy informed by postmodernist notions. Any phenomenological investigation that he 
suggests is possible only within the presupposed condition of this given cultural economy. 
The live and mediatised are always already participating in a non-essentialist, historically 
contingent ground, and are prescribed by a set of conditions that conflates and/or subsumes 
them. These ideas rely on the assumption that before recording technologies we had no 
concept of the live; liveness as a phenomenon only came into existence as a ‘category of 
meaning’ in relation to an opposing possibility, mediatisation. Auslander is unable to 
convincingly weaken any claim to a priori assumptions, especially when his claim is always 
already presupposed by an even stronger set of assumptions.  
 Clearly Auslander does not refute the possibility of making phenomenological 
distinctions between live and mediatised forms, yet a discussion of ‘how’ these particular 
cases are different is never attended to, thus forming my second point. It is never clear as to 
precisely what kind of phenomenology he proposes. He seems to suggest a “subjectivist-
relative” approach with his interest in the relationship being articulated through particular 
cases. This is different to a Husserlian transcendental ‘back to the things themselves’ 
approach that inquires into the essential invariant structures of experience.8 Despite the 
promise of a phenomenological investigation of live and mediatised forms, there is no 
explication of what could be an adequate method. In all likelihood, the loosely-described 
experiences would remain loosely-described experiences, leading us no closer to 
understanding the matters at hand. Husserl would politely redress this weak use of the term 
phenomenology:                                                         
8 Inquiring into the essential structures of things (or in my case a relation) is a different style of ontology than 
what Auslander posits ontology to be. This is to be discussed with more detail in Chapter 2.  
  25 
 
[f]or without having seized upon the peculiar ownness of the transcendental attitude and having 
actually appropriated the pure phenomenological basis, one may of course use the word 
phenomenology; but one does not have the matter itself (Husserl 1989, 211). 
 
As a final rejoinder to this point, Auslander’s claim to distinct experiences as a further basis 
to challenge any ontological distinction forces him to appeal to a soft phenomenological 
approach, first in order to avoid essentialism, and second, to argue against ontology for 
methodologically creating this distinction. In order to show that there is no ontological 
distinction between these forms, Auslander would—in the very first instance—benefit from 
undertaking a transcendental phenomenology. When considering liveness, transcendental 
phenomenology would help argue toward the kind of evidence Auslander needs for his de-
ontology program.9  
A sustained transcendental phenomenology would offer a more rigorous and 
methodologically consistent path than the undeveloped deconstructive move Auslander 
makes in order to posit cultural economy. For instance, Auslander uses certain characteristics 
of recorded media to challenge the ontological value of liveness, thereby contradicting his 
position that live and mediatised forms possess no ontological characteristics. For example, 
Auslander rejects an essentialist thesis regarding the nature of repetition in mediatisation.  
 
Repetition is not an ‘essence in the medium’ [for] ‘the possibility of repetition is only a possibility’; the 
actual use of the medium is determined by the ‘imaginary relation of viewer and tape. Repetition is not 
an ontological characteristic of either film or video that determines the experience that these media can 
provide, but a historically contingent effect of their culturally determined uses (Auslander 1997a, 54). 
 
But foregrounding repetition as an “effect” (historical or otherwise), or as a “possibility” in 
the experience of mediatisation to refute evidence of a distinction, presupposes that 
mediatised forms have essential characteristics to help in this conceptual process of 
conflating forms and de-ontologising. Auslander argues that liveness (like mediatisation) is 
characterised by repetition and reproduction because live and mediatised forms are made 
                                                        
9 The use of the term ‘de-ontology’ in relation to Auslander issues from scholars commenting on his strategy to 
rid the ontological distinction that exists between live and mediatised forms, and is different to its usual 
meaning in the domain of ethics. See Giesekam (2007, 6). In its proper use, de-ontology is a normative theory 
“regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted” (Alexander and Moore 2008). When I 
use the term de-ontology/de-ontologising it will be in relation to Auslander and his strategy for an anti-
ontology/ontologising. 
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within the same cultural economy, and so possess the capacity to be repeated and reproduced. 
The live does not escape the forces of a capitalist cultural economy, as Peggy Phelan (1993) 
Patrice Pavis (1992), and other proponents of the live insist.  
On Auslander’s account, theatre has historically separated itself from other cultural 
forms on the basis that it was essentially an original, non-reproducible form. As a result, it 
could not participate in a contemporary cultural economy where the main currency of 
communication is in the mass media. To keep live performance as an active competitor in 
this war of cultural production—that is, to win its audiences back—Auslander argues that 
“the general response of live performance to the oppression and superiority of mediatised 
forms has been to become as much like them as possible” (Auslander 1999, 7). Interestingly 
Auslander’s assessment of the relationship between the live and mediatised as not 
“determined by immutable differences”, relies heavily on a phenomenon of difference in 
competition. This competitive difference is read as a necessary motivation for live 
performance to become as much like mediatised forms as possible. He undertakes a historical 
examination of the relationship between theatre and the intentions of early television, and 
notes that a “consequent displacement of live performance by television” occurred in early 
broadcasting’s attempt to be “theatrical” (Auslander 1999, 12). This was despite the well 
documented fact that cinema during the 20s and 30s depleted significant numbers of 
spectators attending live performance, a phenomenon well underway before television’s first 
broadcasting period in the U.S from 1939 to 1945 (Auslander 1999, 14). Ironically, 
Auslander maintains that it was television’s own modeling of its properties on theatre, rather 
than cinema, which ultimately “strangled its host by offering itself not as an extension of the 
theatrical experience but as an equivalent replacement for that experience” (Auslander 1999, 
23). He argues that cinema lacked the immediacy and intimacy which theatre possessed. 
Film, as opposed to television, represented a “realm of memory, repetition and displacement” 
in its editing techniques and capacity for reproducibility in subsequent screenings (Auslander 
1999, 15). The question of why a camera-bound medium such as television would not model 
itself on cinema and embrace theatre, which had already suffered a devastating cultural-
economic blow from the emergence of cinema, is answered by Auslander with the following: 
 
[t]elevision’s essence was seen in its ability to transmit events as they occur, not in a filmic capacity to 
record events for later viewing (Auslander 1999, 12). 
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Again, Auslander in contradiction to his program of de-ontology and anti-essentialism posits 
the ontological premise that “television’s essential characteristics as a medium are immediacy 
and intimacy” (Auslander 1999, 15); more succinctly, he corroborates the essence of the 
televisual as immediate with: television “broadcast[s] events exactly when and as they 
happen” (Lohr in Auslander 1999, 15).  
 
 
The History of Technology use in Performance 
 In Liveness, Auslander only engages with the older forms of media like film, 
television and radio in order to draw the link between television and theatre and comment on 
liveness in performance. It is beyond the scope of his earlier study to consider the different 
types of mediatised events and technologies we experience in performance today.10  
 The use of technology in the theatre can be traced back to the theatres of Greek 
antiquity (Baugh 2005).11 Chris Salter points out that the Greek stage was a technologically 
ordered “physical” and “perceptual” space; it was an “[a]rchitectural zone where the 
spectator sat to watch the drama unfold, and a perceptual one that mediated the visual and 
acoustic relationship between the worlds of stage and audience” (Salter 2010, xxii).  
 Experimental use of technology was already present in both theatre and dance 
performances from the late nineteenth century (Dixon 2007, 4). American born and Parisian-
based dance technologist Loie Fuller (1852—1928) experimented with electrical lights in her 
lavishly-costumed dance performances. She is reported to have used fifty electricians (one for 
each light) in a stage performance while touring the U.S in the early 1900s (Ullman West 
1996, 1). Anna Kisselgoff claims “every mixed-media artist today owes a debt to [Fuller’s] 
pioneering use of electrical lighting and her synthesis of music, color, light and fabric” 
(Kisselgoff 1988, 1). Notwithstanding these earlier incarnations of mediatisation in 
performance, technology in theatre, dance and art exploded in these areas during the 1960s.                                                         
10 Auslander looks to digital forms of technology in later writings, in particular the ‘chatterbot’, a computer 
program that “mimics human response via words typed at a computer terminal” (Brown 2006, 3). Kevin Brown 
points out that Auslander continues his discussion of liveness in his 2002 article Live from Cyberspace: or, I 
Was Sitting at My Computer this Guy Appeared and Thought I Was a Bot. The ontological origin of the live 
performer is still denied but Auslander argues on temporal grounds that “a live performance is not live because 
the performer is alive; it is live because it takes place in real time” (Brown 2006, 4). Interestingly, time becomes 
an aspect to consider in his discussion, although still not from the perspective of audience receptivity. See also 
Auslander in Krasner & Saltz (2006, 87-104).  
11 In his book Theatre, Performance and Technology, Christopher Baugh looks at the development of 
scenography in the Twentieth Century and considers the complex uses of technology in the theatre. He draws 
out the “potent link between technology and spectacle, ownership and the rights of governing powers” (Baugh 
2005, 1).  
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Founding member of Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T), Billy Kluver (1967), 
believed that “all the most important developments in the conjunction of technology with 
theatre, dance and performance” took place during the 1960s and 1970s (Kluver in Dixon 
2007, 5).  
 Following on from his major research project The Digital Performance Archive 
(DPA) (1999 to 2001), Steve Dixon traces the history and development of computer 
technologies used creatively in art and performance in his compendium Digital Performance: 
A History of New Media in Theater, Dance, Performance Art, and Installation (2007).12 Here 
he considers a diverse set of theoretical and historical approaches to understanding digital 
technology use, examining several performances, artists, engineers, and designers from 
Europe, Australia and the United States. Dixon broadly defines digital technology “to include 
all performance works where computer technologies play a key role rather than a subsidiary 
one in content, techniques, aesthetics, or delivery forms” (Dixon 2007, 3). Similarly, Susan 
Broadhurst, a leading practitioner and academic in digital practices within the field of 
creative arts, defines digital performances as those that “cross and blur the boundaries 
between dance, film, theatre, installation, sound, and biotechnology” (Broadhurst 2006, xv). 
Some of the more sophisticated and innovative technologies that interest Broadhurst include 
motion tracking, artificial intelligence, electronic sound technology for real-time interaction, 
and biotechnology. In her co-edited book Performance and Technology: Practices of Virtual 
Embodiment and Interactivity (2006), Broadhurst synthesises various authors’ and theorists’ 
writings and ideas on digital performance. The emotive, the intuitive, the ludic, and the 
sensate are foregrounded in studies of the corporeal in relation to digital media. What comes 
to the fore is the immediacy of the physical/virtual body within these digitised events.  
Despite the fact that an array of analogue and digital technology systems have been 
present within live performance since the 1960s, Auslander has chosen television as the 
medium and the televisual as the context in which to ‘de-ontologise’ the relationship between 
live and mediatised forms. Since no ontological distinction can be made because they 
participate in the same “mediatic system” one immediately asks: what other media forms 
participate in this mediatic system? (Auslander 1999, 5). By expanding Auslander’s mediatic 
system to include media technologies interacting, rather than replacing live bodies in 
performance contexts, it may be possible to create a more apposite frame for answering                                                         
12 The Digital Performance Archive was conducted in collaboration with Barry Smith between 1999 and 2001. 
See DPA website: http://ntu.ac.uk/dpa/. 
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Auslander’s question (1999): “what is live performance and what can it mean to us now?” 
(1).13  
Both Dixon and Broadhurst have made significant contributions to the theorisation of 
digital performance, which are not debilitated by the live, mediatised debate. Consequently 
their research illumines experiences of the medium more expansively than those embroiled in 
valorising one form over the other. I will consider the more relevant aspects and examples of 
performance that Dixon, Broadhurst (and others) provide as a motivation towards my own 
examination of audience experience in digital performance. But first I will take a step back in 
history to consider the moment when ‘mass media’ as a cultural phenomenon was identified. 
 
 
§1.1.2   UNDERSTANDING MASS MEDIA 
 
As Auslander suggests, our cultural lives are dominated by the mass media, 
particularly those forms that show an immense capacity for reproducing. As a medium of 
communication, mass media “implies reciprocity, exchange and a minimal degree of 
interaction” on a large scale (Kroker 1997, 13). It is a medium exponentially growing in 
proportion to newer improved digital technologies in tandem with a technologically educated 
population of users. The whole field may be characteristised by impermanence and 
disappearance, two related motifs reoccurring within a wider, trans-historical discussion of 
photography (Sontag 1979; Barthes 1981; Benjamin 1992), the televisual (Fry et al. 1993; 
Auslander 1997a, 1999); and newer digital forms of media (Broadhurst 2007; Dixon 2007; 
Salter 2010). In the so-called “Age of Information” (Lapham 1994, x), the themes of 
impermanence and disappearance rouse debate over the negative repercussions of mass 
media on human subjectivity and agency. Within the literature, the impact of technology 
(predicated as exploding, often with a consequent effect of imploding) on human life and 
ecological systems has affected a discourse of paranoia and anxiety in the social, cultural, 
political and ontological commentator.14 These debates centered on the relationship between 
humans and technology in design, production and communication constitute a vast and 
discordant domain, well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, where possible, I will                                                         
13 For the purposes of this thesis I take these media technologies to broadly include digital interactive systems 
with audio and visual outputs, non-interactive projections, and traditional stage lighting. 
14 The idea of technology exploding in a quantitative sense is inverted by Marshall McLuhan in 1964, and later 
by Jean Baudrillard in 1983, into a movement described as a technological implosion.  
  30 
highlight the dystopic position of particular thinkers as they relate to performance, art and 
technology.15  
 Performance and the visual arts are salient subject areas for interrogating and 
ontologically understanding the effects of technology on the human condition. Performance 
and art events function like tiny apertures, discontinuous and ahistorical, articulating the 
positive and negative effects of technological development and its impact on human 
subjectivity and agency. These events occur within what has been acknowledged as the 
mechanical and digital ages.16 These apertures, narrow and wide, provide key experiences for 
our analyses and interpretation resulting in existential, social, cultural and/or political 
discourses about the impact of mediatic forms. Conceptual motifs like impermanence and 
disappearance operate to draw out relevant perspectives in the various literature presented 
here, they point to other related motifs (like presence and absence), and provide the 
opportunity to assert an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between live 
and mediatised forms.  
 
 
Understanding Media: the context for understanding liveness?  
 In his introduction to Marshall McLuhan’s infamous and novel excursion into the 
complex realm of mass media, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, Lewis Lapham 
points out that in 1964 McLuhan brought the terms ‘mass media’, ‘global village’ and the 
‘age of information’ into our general vernacular almost overnight. Rather than the 
epistemological systems of a philosophical past, McLuhan’s prophetic ideas emerged from a 
thick, elegant prose grounded in literary “idols of the age of print”, including James Joyce, T. 
S. Eliot, and William Blake (Lapham 1994, xiii). Through gross pontification and 
exaggerated prediction, McLuhan evinced ideas that set the scene for the entire discipline of 
media and communication studies and laid the theoretical ground for understanding the 
debate between liveness and mediatisation in terms of a medium.  
                                                        
15 I take art to include all visual, sonic, installation, and conceptual forms.  
16 Following Walter Benjamin, the mechanical age is identified in terms of materiality and mechanical 
reproduction. The first mechanical reproductions occurred with the Greeks and their “[t]wo procedures of 
technically reproducing works of art: founding and stamping. Bronzes, terra cottas, and coins were the only art 
works which they could produce in quantity. All others were unique and could not be mechanically reproduced” 
(Benjamin 1992, 212). 
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 I will now delineate key aspects of McLuhan’s theory in a manifesto-like style. I will 
then discuss these primary tenets in relation to the concept of remediation proposed by media 
and communication theorists Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin.  
 
 
1. Simulation 
  
  Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man – the technological simulation of 
consciousness (McLuhan 1994, 3). 
 
For McLuhan, his book Understanding Media 
 
[e]xplores the contours of our own extended beings in our technologies, seeking the principle of 
intelligibility in each of them (McLuhan 1994, 6). 
 
2. The Medium is the Message 
 
This is merely to say that the persona and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any 
extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each 
extension of ourselves, or by any new technology (McLuhan 1994, 7). 
 
3. The Content of a Medium is another Medium 
 
The “message” of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it 
introduces into human affairs (McLuhan 1994, 8). 
 
McLuhan uses the electric light as an example to articulate this idea. 
 
Whether the light is being used for brain surgery or night baseball is a matter of indifference. It 
could be argued that these activities are in some way the “content” of the electric light, since they 
could not exist without the electric light…The electric light escapes attention as a communication 
medium just because it has no “content”. And this makes it an invaluable instance of how people 
fail to study media at all. For it is not till the electric light is used to spell out some brand name that 
it is noticed as a medium. Then it is not the light but the “content” (or what is really another 
medium) that is noticed (McLuhan 1994, 8-9). 
 
4. Technology as the Extension of Man 
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Against the claim by General David Sarnoff that “[t]he products of modern 
science are not in themselves good or bad; it is the way they are used that 
determines their value” (Sarnoff in McLuhan 1994, 11), McLuhan retorts: 
 
[t]here is simply nothing in the Sarnoff statement that will bear scrutiny, for it ignores the nature of 
the medium, of any and all media, in the true Narcissus style of one hypnotized by the amputation 
and extension of his own being in a new technical form. It has never occurred to General Sarnoff 
that any technology could do anything but add itself onto what we already are (McLuhan 1994, 
11). 
 
Taking McLuhan’s four manifesto points on the nature of mass media as a frame, I reiterate 
Auslander’s question: in a culture dominated by mass media and television “what is live 
performance and what can it mean to us now?” (Auslander 1999, 1). McLuhan’s account of 
the genesis of mass media is understood through the technological media that affect human 
perception and action in the mechanical and electronic ages. In 1964, McLuhan was clearly 
pioneering an approach to the study of media. He claimed that the content of media, the 
cultural context of the medium, and the medium itself was the triadic schema for 
understanding the complexity of media in this epoch of information. McLuhan’s perspective 
offers a broad framework for understanding the complexities of media in terms of being a 
medium, and a concentration upon the reception of these media within the contexts where 
they operate. Central to his account are the psychological factors of media as extensions of 
the senses and perceptual structures of mankind. The experiences of those using and 
participating in technologies are significant factors in the overall understanding of any 
medium. McLuhan’s ideas are not systematically organized, and at times he borders on 
lunacy, but nonetheless, his attendance to the phenomena (the media in and by themselves) 
suggests experiential depth well beyond the parochial view of ontology as merely a “set of a 
priori assumptions” (Auslander 1999, 54).  
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§1.1.3  REMEDIATION 
 
 Almost thirty years after the publication of McLuhan’s now-infamous text, Bolter and 
Grusin published their work on the nature of digital media with the title Remediation: 
Understanding New Media (1999). Auslander appropriates Bolter and Grusin’s central 
concept remediation in order to explain how early television modeled itself on live theatre for 
its properties of immediacy and intimacy. He appropriates this concept to show how live 
performance eventually reversed this remediation process to model itself on television once 
its economic and cultural position became jeopardised. In the following section, I will draw 
out additional inconsistencies with Auslander’s position through a brief exposition of Bolter 
and Grusin’s concept of remediation. This will be done firstly with respect to Auslander’s 
treatment of live performance as a medium in the same mediatic system, and secondly by 
demonstrating the differences between Bolter and Grusin’s understanding of immediacy in 
the context of remediation and Auslander’s temporal extrapolation of the characteristic. 
 
 
The Logic of Remediation 
Bolter and Grusin’s concept of remediation develops McLuhan’s idea that the content 
of any medium is another medium. Firmly situated in the age of proliferating digital 
technologies, remediation is “a defining characteristic of the new digital media . . . it is the 
representation of one medium in another” (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 44-5); a medium “is that 
which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and attempts 
to rival or refashion them in the name of the real” (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 65). A medium 
remediates. 
 The real in this sense is the viewer’s experience: an authentic, emotional response to 
all media (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 53). In Bolter and Grusin’s account, a clear lineage in the 
remediation process of technological media can be made, starting with painting, then 
photography, closely followed by cinema, then television, toward the newer digital 
technologies like the World Wide Web. Remediation relies upon a double logic of immediacy 
and hyperimmediacy. Immediacy is the transparency of a medium. The design and intention 
of the medium’s makers is to make the medium itself disappear.17 The artwork or thing                                                         
17 Bolter and Grusin’s use of the term transparency, to make the medium disappear, is counter-intuitive to my 
understanding. To make something transparent would be to show how something works, to show its medium. 
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presented or represented gives the viewer, user, or visitor the sense that both the artwork and 
they are the only players present within that mediatic presentation (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 
5-6). In new media, the term audience is often replaced by the terms user, visitor or viewer. 
Each of these terms denotes the kind of activity that the receiver of the artwork is 
undertaking. For example, a ‘user’ will generally be involved in some computer-based 
interaction like in Australian artists James Cunningham and Suzon Fuks’ on-line performance 
piece Calling Home. In a recent email I was directed as a user to:  
  
[g]o to the Activelayers website http://67.228.194.2/~activela/ for all the info about the project and 
instructions, and links to the stages. There are 4 stages which you can open from the ActiveLayers 
website into separate tabs or windows. They will all be active simultaneously 15 minutes before the 
performance, so just jump between the stages and interact with the 4 characters by typing through the 
chat on the right side of each stage. Don't forget to have your speakers or headphones on! (Igneous, 
personal communication, 31 March 2008) 
 
The desire for an immediacy of the real started with the painted image around the time of the 
Renaissance. The spatial mathematics of perspective in painting was a combination of Leon 
Alberti’s linear perspective and René Descartes’ single vantage point perspective, and created 
“the illusion of three dimensional space within which things appeared to exist as our eyes in 
reality see them” (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 25). On this account, photography in the 
Nineteenth Century remediated painting in terms of its desire for perfect linear perspective: 
“a technique that effaced itself” (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 24). Transparency was achieved 
through a process of automaticity using the technology of a camera obscura: a single point of 
light reflecting an image. In all cases, the artist and process disappeared (Bolter and Grusin 
1999, 24-25). Today, the more sophisticated digital attempts for transparency include virtual 
reality, where the goal is for the participant to have a completely unmediated visual 
experience (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 4). 
 Hyperimmediacy is immediacy’s “cultural counterbalance” (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 
33) best described as “a visual style” privileging “fragmentation, indeterminacy, and 
heterogeneity”, and emphasising “process or performance, rather than the finished art object” 
(William J Mitchell 1994, in Bolter and Grusin 1999, 31). A hypermediatic combination 
takes as its raw elements, images, sound, text, animation and video, multiplying its mediation 
as it strives for immediacy. In the name of the real, hyperimmediacy “ultimately claims our                                                         
As a consequence, my later use of the term transparency in relation to technological media does not follow their 
meaning.  
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attention as pure experience without needing to refer to anything beyond itself”, whereas a 
medium that attempts to conceal its mediation points to worlds and spaces beyond itself 
(Bolter and Grusin 1999, 54). Examples of hypermediatisation include the multi-windowed 
user interfaces of World Wide Web pages, the personal PC desktop, multimedia CD-ROMs 
and video games (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 31); and had they been writing in the second 
decade of the 21st century, Bolter and Grusin would have no doubt included the smartphone 
and iPad. Hypermediated interfaces behave differently to those employing the principles of 
immediacy. They function to display multiple representations to the viewer/user and are 
accessible for interaction so that the user may select what they want to see or listen to. The 
processes are visible and usually the presence of the viewer/user is foregrounded.    
 Remediation unfolds as a double logic of immediacy and hyperimmediacy. According 
to Bolter and Grusin, most visual media in the digital age pertain to both, because they almost 
always refer to other media within the process of remediation (i.e. virtual reality is a medium 
of immediacy, but remediates television which has become hyperimmediate in its 
remediation of the World Wide Web) (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 185-194). The lineage of 
remediation includes newer media remediating older media and, as Auslander picks up, older 
media remediating newer forms. However, theatre and/or types of live performance as a 
clear-cut medium within this culture of ubiquitous media do not enter into Bolter and 
Grusin’s analysis at any point, particularly not in the sense of calling live performance a 
medium within the logic of remediation.18 Arguably this is the result of their concept being 
grounded in the technological determinism of McLuhan. Bolter and Grusin speak of media in 
terms of technologies within a visual culture and the process of remediation itself as a 
genealogical history of technological processes, from linear perspective in photography, 
camera lucida and subsequent techniques in photography to motion picture techniques, 
television broadcasting and beyond. Moreover, the theoretical perspective of Bolter and 
Grusin echoes Frederic Jameson’s understanding of postmodern culture. The mediatic system 
that these three theorists are concerned with when describing the process of remediation 
belongs to the tradition of fine arts. It is problematic to subsume live performance into the 
process of remediation as proposed by Bolter and Grusin because their (and Jameson’s)                                                         
18 Bolter and Grusin do discuss the remediation of the body in performance. They include examples of 
performative acts by Stelarc, Orlan, and Kate Bornstein who are all involved in cyborgian notions of extending 
or transfiguring the body and gender identity through technology (Bolter, Grusin 1999, 236-40). Live and/or 
performance art is mostly an ideological response to concepts and/or mediums of fine art, and so sits within this 
tradition. However, it is not apparent that the body presented in this way is what Auslander means by live 
performance engaged in a process of remediation with television.  
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mediatic system is more technologically determined and derives from the various media 
involved within the tradition of the fine arts or general visual culture. Live performance, as 
Auslander ostensibly hints at in the following quote, is always already a problematic form in 
a mediatised culture.  
 
I intend to describe both live performances’ cultural-economic competition with other forms and the 
position of live performance in a culture for which mediatisation is a vehicle for the general code in a 
way that live performance is not (or is no longer) (Auslander 1999, 5, italics mine). 
 
For Auslander, we can only talk about live performance as mediatised or mediated 
because the case of live performance as an ontologically specific form does not exist: “is not 
(or is no longer)”.  If live performance “is no longer”, does this entail it existed before? From 
this excerpt we find a striking ambivalence in Auslander’s claim that liveness did not exist 
prior to mediatisation. Where accounts claim ubiquitous mediatisation, it is untenable to 
make liveness the subject of a story that presupposes its inexistence.  By adopting the 
unchallenged concepts of remediation and mediatisation under these theoretical conditions, 
aspects of Auslander’s project appear spurious, particularly given his misconstrual of the 
logic of remediation. Auslander appeals to this concept to bolster his claim for the inevitable 
playing out of the historical logic between the mediums of live performance and television 
but does not acknowledge the specific lineage of remediation outlined over the last few 
sections, which firmly places it in the tradition of the fine and contemporary arts (Auslander 
1999, 7). Live performance, as understood by Auslander, is conveniently slipped into the 
process as a medium remediated by television.19  
 
 
                                                        
19 Bolter and Grusin declare outright that “[t]he prime target of televsion's remediation has been film". However, 
they do acknowledge—and interestingly through reference to Auslander's "forthcoming" text Liveness also 
published in the same year—that television drew on "vaudeville and the stage play" (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 
185). Acknowledging this point does not prevent them from emphasising film as the main influence on 
television in the remediation process (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 185-194).  
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§1.1.4  RECEPTIVITY AND IMMEDIACY 
 
So what of the ontological differences in discussions of television and film? Bolter 
and Grusin register these differences in terms of receptivity, while for Auslander the aspect of 
temporal immediacy (rather than the more complex form of transparent immediacy found in 
Bolter and Grusin) is foregrounded in the relationship between television and live theatre 
devoid of any interest in receptivity. Sandy Flitterman-Lewis suggests that the relationship 
between film and television is a difference with respect to receptivity.  
 
 Films are seen in large, silent, darkened theatres . . . there is an enforced and anonymous collectivity 
 of the audience . . . all viewers are physically present at the same time in the relatively enclosed space 
 of the theatre. In contrast to this cocoonlike, enveloping situation is the fragmentary, dispersed and 
 varied nature of television reception (Flitterman-Lewis in Bolter and Grusin 1999, 186). 
 
Even though television now pervades public spaces—especially in pubs and clubs televising 
sports and other programs—television is mostly viewed in the intimacy of the home. The 
significance of Flitterman-Lewis’ point is that she introduces the role of receptivity in her 
analyses of film and television, an important experiential aspect overlooked in Auslander’s 
study. At a film event, the co-gathering of audience members share in an at-the-same-time 
and same-place experience, predominately with strangers. A television event (watching the 
same channel) is experienced at-the-same-time (when not home recorded) between a distally 
dispersed audience, and within the intimate confines of the home, business, pub or club.20 We 
can see that both film and television share an at-the-same-time with respect to temporal 
immediacy. Their differences relate to the spatial distances between the corporeal bodies 
engaged in the same experience, and the locations within which the viewing takes place. 
When the corporeal and proximal features of receptivity in the discussion on immediacy are 
taken into account, then we can argue that television does not remediate film on the basis of 
immediacy. Following this line of argumentation, what can be said about live performance 
and television? Live performance is (mostly) experienced at-the-same-time, immersively 
between strangers. The temporal reception experienced by audience members in a live 
performance is similar to film, and less like television. We can sit with friends/family, or                                                         
20 A distal experience is one had remotely and at an unspecified distance from the source of an event. In digital 
technology terms, distal experiences contrast with simulacrumum experiences that refer to technologies or 
systems that immerse the user or visitor. A simulacruma experience would be a virtual reality or interactive 
cinema event. Ken Goldberg includes television among other remote technologies which “provide knowledge at 
a distance”, like the telescope and telephone (Goldberg 2000, 3). 
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even know other people in the audience, but we are for the most part sharing in the event with 
strangers. Extending this reasoning to the live, mediatised event, it shares in the same spatial 
and temporal features of reception that theatre (live performance) and film do: experienced 
at-the-same-time immersively between strangers.   
 So what can we make of Auslander’s claim that sees television remediate theatre in 
the first instance, and then theatre (live performance) remediate television on the basis of 
immediacy? Influenced largely here by Flitterman-Lewis, live performance is an immersive 
experience of the now-and-here, whilst television promotes a distal temporality of the now- 
and-there. In considering the spatio-temporal aspects of immediacy in relation to audience 
receptivity, the preliminary seeds are laid for a much deeper analysis of receptivity in terms 
of dimensionality, temporality, and spatiality in my phenomenology to come.  
 Stepping away from this concentrated critique of Auslander, the purpose of my next 
section is to engage with three different approaches that do not rely on the logic of 
remediation, and that suggest the relevance of receptive, embodied experience in the aesthetic 
examination of digital media practices involving a range of media. 
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§1.1.5  DIGITAL PERFORMANCE IN ITS OWN RIGHT 
 
In Mutant Media: Essays on Cinema, Video Art and New Media (2007), critic and 
cinephile John Conomos investigates the convergence between new media and traditional 
cinema in artistic practice and academic analyses. He is particularly interested in the presence 
of film as installation in the museum/gallery world and its relationship to cinema. He asks: 
“[h]ow do we critique and relate to these new hybrid dynamic artworks of analog and digital 
media? And where is cinema in this vertiginous cultural landscape?” (Conomos 2007, 15) 
From this concern he implores that: 
 
[w]e need to remember that cinema, from its early funfair origins in the 19th Century till the 1960s, uses 
numerous concepts, effects and techniques that were first articulated in that art form and are not 
necessarily evident in the new media arts (Conomos 2007, 16). 
 
On this point, Conomos declares that new media art requires its own ahistorical model for 
analysis and criticism. Before experimental film of the 1960s, cinema was an art form unto 
itself with a tradition and system of analyses inadequate for understanding video, film and 
interactive installations in their contemporary form. Conomos discusses a trend of new media 
artists who use old film in new contexts: an “intertextual alchemy that is occurring between 
old and new media on the same plane of multimedia creativity” (Conomos 2007, 16). He is 
critical of approaches that attempt to critique or understand new media within screen arts 
through older models of film criticism.  
 
This is one of the most critical tasks facing anyone who is interested in the screen arts today. We need 
to become switchboard operators across culture, space and time, and between analog and digital media; 
and we need to always question our own cultural baggage . . . This means becoming ‘empirical’ and 
less theoretically certain of ourselves, letting go of our dogmatic certainties about the Cartesian method 
of philosophising and becoming more intuitive, self critical and non authoritarian (Conomos 2007, 17). 
 
To “question our own cultural baggage” resonates with the phenomenological method of 
bracketing and/or suspending our predispositions and presuppositions.21 In the spirit of 
                                                        
21 I do not directly engage with Film Studies, or its vast tradition of thinkers and scholars with their diverse 
philosophical perspectives, in this study. However, it is worth noting that cinema has experienced the same 
complex relationships to new digital forms as live performance and, as this section highlights, there is an 
ongoing demand for approaching these hybrid forms with newly formed frameworks for critical analyses and 
interpretation. 
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McLuhan, Conomos is interested in embracing the medium in order to develop frameworks 
that involve a more “intuitive” recognition of experience.    
 Likewise, Susan Broadhurst calls for a “new aesthetics” in the academic study and 
understanding of new media practices in live performance, asking: 
 
 [a]s digital technologies are becoming increasingly prominent in art practices, does the resultant 
 physical/virtual interface give rise to a new aesthetics? What are the theoretical and practical 
 implications of this? (Broadhurst 2007, 1) 
 
The “transference of linguistic interpretation to the non-linguistic” phenomena encountered 
in events involving bodies and performance technologies fails to explain the presence of 
bodies, whether as physical or virtual agents (Broadhurst 2007, 16). Broadhurst 
acknowledges that “[u]nless the immediacy of the body (both physical and virtual) is made 
the focus of interpretation, such performances as the digital cannot be fully appreciated” 
(Broadhurst 2007, 16). The immediacy of the corporeal or virtual body is privileged over any 
notion of the ephemeral or transient live body (as proponents of the live would insist), or the 
negation of a body made absent through mediatisation. Broadhurst provides formal 
suggestions for developing an all-encompassing account of the body in digital practices 
without recourse to a process of remediation that will not break with the past. 
 In following the processes of remediation, media theorist Steven Holtzman eloquently 
discusses the early development of new media as a “repurposing” or “refashioning” of older 
media. 
 
In the end, no matter how interesting, enjoyable, comfortable, or well accepted they are, these 
approaches borrow from existing paradigms. They weren’t conceived with digital media, and as a 
result they don’t exploit the special qualities that are unique to digital worlds. Yet it’s those unique 
qualities that will ultimately define entirely new languages of expression. And it’s those languages that 
will tap the potential of digital media as new vehicles of expression. Repurposing is a transitional step 
that allows us to get a secure footing on unfamiliar terrain. But it isn’t where we’ll find the entirely new 
dimensions of digital worlds. We need to transcend the old to discover the completely new worlds of 
expression. Like a road sign, repurposing is a marker indicating that profound change is around the 
bend (Holtzman in Bolter and Grusin 1999, 49).  
 
Even though Conomos and Broadhurst do not explicitly engage with the concept of 
remediation in understanding the rise of new media in their respective fields of cinema and 
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performance, they wish to forge (or see forged) new critical frameworks to navigate this 
“unfamiliar terrain” and account for these “new vehicles of expression”. 
 Caroline A. Jones in her book, Sensorium: embodied experience, technology, and 
contemporary art, remains aloof to the imposition of critical frameworks that attempt to 
capture the complexity and diversity of relations between artists, audiences and technologies 
in art practices. Nonetheless, Jones tables a taxonomically shaped schema, characterising 
these complex relationships (Jones 2006, 6): 
 
Immersive  The ‘cave’ paradigm, the virtual helmet, the black-box video, the earphone set 
 
Alienated 
 
Taking technology and “making it strange”, exaggerating attributes to provoke shock, using 
technologies to switch senses or induce disorientation 
 
Interrogative 
 
Work that repurposes or remakes devices to enhance their insidious or wondrous properties; 
available data translated into sensible systems 
 
Residual 
 
Work that holds onto an earlier technology, repurposes or fetishises an abandoned one 
 
Resistant 
 
Work that refuses to use marketed technologies for their stated purpose; work that pushes 
viewers to reject technologies or subvert them 
 
Adaptive 
 
Work that takes up technologies and extends or applies them for creative purposes, producing 
new subjects for the technologies in question 
 
 
These aspects, immersive, alienated, interrogative, residual, resistant and adaptive, describe 
something essential about what the work does, how it relates to former technologies (much 
like remediation), what it induces within the spectator, how it innovatively serves to create 
new purposes, and how it provides new experiences. Jones' list is skeletal, but she clearly 
triangulates the artist, work of art (media), and audience in this unique frame for 
understanding the uses of digital media.  
 Conomos, Broadhurst and Jones each desire a new critical framework or alternative 
aesthetic approach to understand the emergence of new media technologies within cinema, 
performance and the visual arts. I too desire an all-encompassing, dynamic approach to 
examine the relationship between bodies and technologies in complex interactions. 
Embracing their spirit, I proposed in my research to design and implement a methodology 
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that could describe, analyse, interpret and engage critically with digital performance practice. 
I see this as a potent and experientially rigorous alternative to methods that are non-
responsive to the receptivity of the phenomena at hand and exemplified by Auslander’s 
approach critically addressed throughout this chapter. 
 Despite my criticisms of Auslander, I acknowledge his claim as a fruitful point of 
departure for a rigorous experiential investigation of media and bodies. What I see to be 
Auslander’s omissions in his study of liveness have irrefutably inspired my project and 
influenced its orientation; for this, I am indebted to him. I do not presuppose a distinction, 
sameness, a unity, or any leading relation, or association between live and mediatised forms. 
Even though distinctions and points of sameness may be found amongst relations and 
associations in the resulting phenomenological analysis, they will never be assumed in any 
determinative way, nor evaluated in hierarchical terms. I avoid vacillating between sides in 
this indissoluble debate, fought out between proponents of the live and those of the 
mediatised even while Auslander remains as a spectral background detractor in his program 
to de-ontologise. By not taking sides, I am able to invest in the experience of the relationship 
from a new perspective, focusing upon encounters that allow me to inquire in a deeper way 
the structure of a performance based object-event, and so constructively move away from 
taking, at face value, claims that support either side of the debate. 
 There are two explanations for the conjunctive term object-event; one is self-evident, 
and the other philosophically motivated. Taken prima facie, the relationship between bodies 
and performance technologies are sensible objects interacting to co-constitute together with 
audience an event. This is simple reasoning. The philosophically motivated explanations are 
rooted in the phenomenological sense of object. A phenomenal object (that which appears is 
given) does not entail a hard-nosed distinction between object and subject, such that subjects 
only act upon objects taken as distinct from themselves; or that an object is only subject to a 
subject—as in Aristotelian logic where the predicate of a subject is a mere attribute or 
property. Taken more radically, Jean-Luc Marion implores that a phenomenal object “shows 
itself”, and so has a self “such that it takes the initiative of its own manifestation” (Marion 
2002, 30). Such a self-determined manifestation on the side of the object resists the need for 
any form of subject, self, or ‘transcendental I’ to affirm it.    
 The dyad form object-subject is engaged in what Husserl calls a constitutive duet, 
whereby the constituted (object) and constituting (subject) are in a co-relative dance of 
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affection and attention.22 In a phenomenology inspired by methods that deal exclusively with 
objects of perception (constitutional phenomenology), it is impossible for me to refrain from 
using the word object.23 To mitigate, I hyphenate it with the word event, where event carries a 
less ontic character than object. My usage has the same sense as the Stoics who viewed 
events as “incorporeal”. Paradoxically, an event is not a being, but a non-being, and is the 
result of the “activities of bodies [objects]” (Bréhier in Romano 2009, 6).24 Drawing on 
Claude Romano’s characterisation of event: the incorporeal “occurs, happens, or, more 
rigorously . . . “is encountered” (huparchei)” (Romano 2009, 7). As a concept, ‘event’ has a 
rich and complex history in Western philosophy, which I do not attend to here. My encounter 
of the ‘live, mediatised object-event’ is a confluence of non-being (incorporeality), beingness 
(corporeality), subjectivity and objectivity.  
 And so it is towards a transcendental phenomenology that I turn in order to seek the 
structural depth, intricate layers, and dynamic movements of experiencing phenomena within 
selected object-events. But first I must clarify the various uses of ontology, considering its 
purpose and limits in the study of bodies and technologies. 
 
            
                                                        
22 For the role of affection and attention in Husserl’s phenomenology, see Steinbock (2004, 21-43). 
23 I discuss elsewhere in this dissertation the phenomenon of performer taken as object. 
24 For more on the Stoics and Hellenistic Philosophy see Long & Sedley (1987). 
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CHAPTER 2   RESTORING ONTOLOGY IN STUDIES OF THE LIVE AND MEDIATISED  
   THE ROLE OF AUDIENCE 
 
   That which has been sought from old and now  
   and in the future and constantly,  
   and that on which inquiry founders over and over again,  
   is the problem What is being? 
  
    Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z, 1.1028b2 ff (M. Heidegger, Trans. 1982 (15)) 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented several arguments against Auslander’s claim that there is no 
ontological distinction between live and mediatised forms, and attempted to destabalise his 
subsequent program and strategies for a de-ontology against the theoretical background of 
media and communication studies. I will now directly address the role of ontology in 
performance in terms of its potential and suitability for understanding the relationship 
between bodies and technologies experienced in an aesthetic context. While my initial quest 
was to consider an adequate ontology for performance using phenomenology, in writing this 
chapter the identification of such an approach became overshadowed by the dilemma of 
whether an ontology of performance is even possible. And if possible, to what extent could 
ontology illuminate the relationship between bodies and media in a live, mediatised 
performance event?   
 Following a brief explication of the tradition of ontology understood as a theory of 
Being in the Western Philosophical tradition from Aristotle through to Heidegger, I will 
discuss the problems of a philosophical ontology that formulates the question ‘What is 
Being?’ from the standpoint of classical logic.25 This movement away from a purely 
Heideggerian ontology is a strategic move towards Hans Georg Gadamer’s concept of play in 
order to reinstate the spectator in the aesthetic understanding of the mode of being of an 
artwork. Gadamer shows how an ontology of art and representation is possible in 
phenomenological, rather than metaphysical terms. In pursuing this methodological thinking, 
I am then able to consider the problems and limits of ontology more generally while 
examining the relationship between live and mediatised forms. Rather than carry the weight                                                         
25 For consistency throughout the text, I will capitalise the word Being to distinguish this more easily from 
‘being’. It is almost impossible to avoid the repetitious use of Being and being in the exposition of Heidegger’s 
existential work. To introduce ‘ego’, ‘subject’ or ‘self’ as substitutes is firstly erroneous in definition, and 
secondly would confuse my later use of these terms when introducing other phenomenological thinkers. 
I also note upfront that I will present a more contemporary, analytic view of ontology through the work of Dale 
Jacquette (pp. 50-1), where ontology is understood to be the study/analysis of the kinds of ‘things’ there are and 
the differences between them. Things may include beyond the concrete, relations, events and ideas. This is 
different to a philosophical ontology that posits a ‘theory of being’.  
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of ontology in a project dealing with aesthetic representations, I release the live and 
mediatised debate from only being understood in terms of pre-determined, presupposed a 
priori categories such as disappearance, reproduction, repetition and distribution. Only within 
the polemical spirit to ontologise or de-ontologise liveness and mediatisation are these 
aforementioned categories unreflectively thematised. Throughout this section, I move away 
from the question of whether an ontology is useful or not (in some ways joining Auslander in 
his program to de-ontologise the debate) and turn towards a phenomenological investigation 
of this aesthetic relation between bodies and technologies. My reorientation towards a 
phenomenological aesthetics is enabled by the reinstatement of the spectator, who is a crucial 
figure in the aesthetic constitution of the object-event. I end the chapter by introducing this 
‘spectator-analyst’, and discuss the spatio-temporal modes of their embodied reception while 
participating in the phenomenological examination of the object-event.26 
 
 
                                                        
26 Despite the grammatical concern for using a plural pronoun (i.e. they, their) for singular nouns (i.e. ‘the 
dancer’, ‘the spectator-analyst’), I adopt the contemporary approach of using a non-specific/gender-neutral 
pronoun to avoid the awkward use of gendered pronouns (i.e. his/her, she/he).   
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§2.2.1   WHAT IS ONTOLOGY? 
 
By not accepting any one version of ontology put forward by either side of the live and 
mediatised debate, the question of what is an adequate ontology for performances involving 
the interaction of live bodies and technology becomes central to the task at hand. But before 
considering an alternative, it is necessary to explain what ontology is and how it relates to 
aesthetic problems. The narrative begins with Heidegger and his recovery of the traditional 
problem of ontology from Aristotle, and more precisely, with the existential question of the 
meaning of Being: what is Being? 
 
Heidegger’s Ontology 
For Heidegger, Being is essentially different from beings. Even though Being belongs 
to beings, it is not a being itself. Even though working out, or dealing with the question of 
Being is not my central concern in this thesis, I will briefly consider this question over the 
next few sections. In providing an exposition it is necessary to distinguish between the two 
uses of Being and being as their distinction is maintained throughout the literature. A being is 
“something, a table, a chair, a tree, the sky, a body, some words, and action” (Heidegger 
1962, 13). To relate these ideas back to my task, the beings are the bodies, projections, stage 
objects in relationship with each other during a performance. It is, however, important to note 
that when referring to the Heideggerian thesis of Being, this Being belongs to beings, even 
though “Being is not itself a being” (Heidegger 1962, 17). “Every being is something; it has 
its what and as such has a specific possible mode of being” (Heidegger 1962, 18). 
 In Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), Heidegger undertakes an existential analytic of 
Dasein: the nominated special being who is able to ask the question of the meaning of Being 
(Seinsfrage) and undertake its own analysis. Exposition of Dasein’s basic constitution (the 
‘formal indicators’) is worked out early in Division I of Being and Time, where Heidegger 
attempts to “lay bare” the structures of existence, at first in part, but always with a view to 
understanding the “totality-of-the-structure-of-Being” in general (Heidegger 1982, 227). In 
his introduction to Division II, Heidegger posits that the primordial ontological basis for 
Dasein’s existentiality is temporality. 
 Heidegger’s distinction between Being and beings is his most significant maneuver to 
set up the ontological difference: the distinction between the ontic (beings) and the 
ontological (many modes of Being). This differentiation presupposes the problem of 
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ontology: where ‘Being as modalised’ becomes a theme for inquiry (Heidegger 1962, 17). 
For Heidegger, in taking Being over beings, we transcend or surmount beings in order to 
reach Being (Heidegger 1962, 17). Heidegger is careful to point out that ontology understood 
as a transcendental science does not move down the path of a Kantian supersensible 
metaphysics, such that we are dealing with some Being behind beings.27 Rather, it is a 
phenomenological explication of Being in our everyday comportments towards beings and 
Being in the world. This questioning is possible only in our capacity as that special character 
Dasein. And because the most basic structure of Dasein is temporality, it is “temporality 
[that] makes possible the distinguishability between Being and beings” (Heidegger 1962, 18).  
Heidegger is also aware that “ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological 
manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to something ontical [a what-ness]” 
(Heidegger 1982, 19). With being as ground, ontology will lay emphasis on the multiple 
ways Being is expressed. 
 
Every being has a way-of-[B]eing. The question is whether this way-of-[B]eing has the same character 
in every being—as ancient ontology believed and subsequent periods have basically had to maintain 
even down to the present—or whether individual ways-of-[B]eing are mutually distinct. Which are the 
basic ways of [B]eing? Is there a multiplicity? How is the variety of ways-of-[B]eing possible and how 
is it all intelligible, given the meaning of [B]eing? How can we speak at all of a unitary concept of 
being despite the variety of ways of [B]eing? These questions can be consolidated into the problem of 
the possible modifications of [B]eing and the unity of being’s variety (Heidegger 1982, 18).                                                         
27 Heidegger faces his own dilemma of concealment with Dasein, that special exemplary character that not only 
asks the question of the meaning of Being, but is the being for whom Being is an issue. The structure of Dasein 
in relation to its own being and its average everydayness is trapped in a circular condition, never in fact able to 
disclose the totality of this structure, and perpetually moving towards its own death. Heidegger’s promise for 
disclosing the structures of Being is undermined by minor formal hermeneutic realisations within his 
preliminary analysis of Dasein.  
 
The analysis of Das-ein is not only incomplete but at first preliminary. It only brings out the [B]eing of this being without 
interpreting its meaning. Its aim is rather to expose the horizon for the most primordial interpretation of being. Once we have 
reached that horizon the preparatory analytic of Das-ein requires repetition on a higher, genuinely ontological basis (Heidegger 
1996, 15) (Hyphenated version of Das-ein used in Staumbaugh’s translation). 
 
A further analytic of Dasein’s structures is required, “this time as modes of temporality”. However, this analytic 
never takes place in Division III as promised in the introductory chapters to Being and Time. Dasein remains 
further away from Being than anticipated in the pre-ontological. Arguably Kant’s inability to access noumenal 
existence (the world in itself) from the phenomenal world of appearance is not so divorced from the hiddenness 
of Heidegger’s Being for Dasein.  
 
The ontico-ontological priority of Das-ein is therefore the reason why the specific constitution of the [B]eing of Das-ein—
understood in the sense of the “categorial” structure that belongs to it-remains hidden from it. Das-ein is ontically “nearest” to 
itself, ontologically farthest away; but pre-ontologically certainly not foreign to itself (Heidegger 1996, 14). 
 
It appears that Dasein remains at a structural distance despite Heidegger’s analytic project for the worldly 
disclosure of Being. 
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Heidegger’s questioning of the ways of Being is, however, formally a fundamental ontology, 
and so constitutes a more complex structural question of the meaning of Being, that I will not 
elaborate upon in this project. Despite Heidegger’s later attempt to overcome metaphysics 
and ontology, I will focus on his earlier methodological insistence that phenomenology is the 
only proper way to do ontology. 
  
 Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way 
 of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible  
 (Heidegger 1962, 60). 
 
In accepting this basic approach, the question of Being—the main question of ontology in 
this tradition—becomes less significant. However, it is important to distinguish my project 
from being a phenomenology in the service of ontology, than as a phenomenology that is 
concerned with aesthetic experiences. By and large, I share Auslander’s desire to avoid 
ontology, but do so in a radically different way. Auslander at no point considers the tradition 
of philosophical ontology, and, most notably, the origins of ontology as first philosophy in 
the study of Being and/or substance. It is, I suggest, remarkably negligent to overlook the 
history of ontology in one’s strategy to challenge claims of an ontological difference, 
especially if one’s purpose (historically motivated or not) is to discount any meaningful role 
for ontology in understanding the relationship between live and mediatised forms. In 
pursuing an adequate version of ontology grounded in the phenomenological tradition, I look 
to Dale Jacquette’s analytic critique of Heidegger to provide a means for de-ontologising (to 
use Auslander’s term) the debate between liveness and mediatisation in an historically cogent 
and philosophically specific manner.  
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Problems with Philosophical Ontology 
Jacquette discusses two distinct approaches to ontology: the first philosophical, the 
second as applied science. Philosophical ontology is conceptually focused upon the problem 
of why there exists something rather than nothing, the meaning of the concept of Being, and 
the question of why there exists only one logically contingent actual world. Applied scientific 
ontology concerns itself with “explicating a system of categories of existent entities” 
(Jacquette 2002, 5). Unlike philosophical ontology, applied scientific ontology relies upon 
real existents in the world while still concerning itself with a theoretical component. 
Concepts applied to real existents in the world will endeavour to describe, categorise, or list. 
For Jacquette, this distinction between philosophical and an applied scientific approach to 
ontology is important for maintaining his movement towards a “combinatorial” approach to 
ontology, an approach that indicates a strong interdependence between substance and 
concept.  
 Jacquette’s criticisms of Heidegger’s philosophical ontology, and the more formal 
logical approach that does not concern itself with real existents, convincingly presents the 
problems that traditional ontology can bring to the methodological discussion about aesthetic 
phenomena. His combinatorial ontology grafts a “preferred existence domain onto a 
satisfactory analysis of the concept of being”, and unites the theoretical demands of science 
(the existent domain) with the questions of philosophy (what is meant by being) on the 
grounds of classical logic (Jacquette 2002, 273). Jacquette acknowledges Heidegger for 
correctly making the distinction between the ontological (what it means to be) and the ontic 
sciences that deal with existents rather than concepts, but criticises Heidegger’s privileging of 
the phenomenological approach to philosophical ontology. According to Heidegger, the ontic 
sciences, in and by themselves, narrowly establish the whatness of a thing, and must be 
preceded by a fundamental ontology to lay bare the a priori structures of Being. The 
combination of a pure philosophical approach with an applied scientific is the ontological 
difference (the distinction between ontological and ontic) that Heidegger makes in Being and 
Time. Jacquette views this as an acceptable approach to ontology, but then rejects 
phenomenology as the only methodological approach to an a priori-based philosophical 
ontology. His solution is to return to classical logic. 
 For Jacquette, the ultimate question for pure philosophical ontology is what is being? 
Or, what does it mean to be? (Jacquette 2002, 1). Assertions of existence and nonexistence 
cannot be made without inquiring into the meaning of existence in general. The question of 
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being “[e]nquires into the precise meaning of the words ‘being’, ‘to be’, ‘exist’, ‘existence’, 
to be ‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘present’, ‘manifest’, and like cognates” (Jacquette 2002, 2). As an 
analytic philosopher, Jacquette is critical of the circularity implicit in conceptual explanations 
of Being, which rely on the use of synonyms to describe existence—viewing predicative 
statements such as “to be is to be existent or to be present” as ineffective “metaphysical 
puzzles” (Jacquette 2002, 12). He argues that logic is the only theoretical approach capable of 
rebalancing the dizzying effects of such circular tautologies, rejecting Heidegger’s 
predicative approach to the meaning of Being.  
 Jacquette’s preferred method for philosophical ontology is pure logic. However, 
systematically on its own, logic is unable to answer the question of what is meant by being. 
Logic is problematic, insofar as it is a system of abstraction and so remains troubled by 
existence. The logical form “If P, then P” (P⊃P) of the statement “If camels, then camels” 
neither proves that there are camels, nor that there are not. The form adequately deals with 
the logical possibility of existence through validity, but does not prove the existence of 
something out there in the world. If P, then P is true, then nonexistence for any instance 
substituted as P for this logical statement in the form ‘if not P’, then ‘not P’ (~P⊃~P) is also 
true. However, the truth of the statement is only validated by virtue of the logical form and 
not on whether the thing could be represented by P or ~P in each case, or if it exists or does 
not exist in the world. Moreover, such positing of existence or nonexistence through logical 
formulation does not resolve the existence of the ‘who’ that is making the claim: that is, the 
subject/speaker behind the statement. As a formal relation, pure logic on its own is unable to 
deal adequately with the actual existence of human beings, “human psychology, sense 
experience, perception, introspection, emotional attitude, existential situatedness or other 
phenomenological categories”, and so presents no solution to the question of what is meant 
by Being (Jacquette 2002, 43). 
 I share Jacquette’s concern about the ability of Heidegger’s existential analytic to get 
at the Being behind being. I further worry about the question of the copula ‘is’ in logical 
statements about logical objects that correspond to actual objects, and the subjectivity of the 
person who is thinking/uttering the statement. In fact, Jacquette’s analysis problematises 
logical and philosophical approaches as adequate ontological methods for understanding 
aesthetic phenomena. Can a firm metaphysical claim behind accepting something rather than 
nothing (or having access to the meaning of being itself) adequately deal with aesthetic 
relations? Finding myself in this position I, like Auslander, am on the path to de-ontologising 
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the relationship between live and mediatised forms. However, unlike Auslander, I reinstate 
audience in order to understand the relationship of bodies and technologies in aesthetic 
experience. 
 Leaving Heidegger and his Dasein well alone in my study, I now turn to the work of 
Hans Georg Gadamer who provides a more apposite frame for thinking through ontology in 
the aesthetic domain by restoring audience to the question of the ontological status of an 
artwork. In the following sections, I trace Gadamer’s concern with Western aesthetic theory 
from Plato and draw out his concept of play in aesthetic experience. As an ontological 
framework for understanding art, the influence of Gadamer on my project is less burdened by 
an address to a putative truth of art and aesthetic experience, but more aligned with the 
phenomenological reinstatement of the spectator in Gadamer’s attempt to aesthetically 
understand an artwork. In my reading of Gadamer, phenomenology precedes ontology: 
essence comes before existence. I will now briefly outline some important points in the 
history of the ontology of art presented in Gadamer’s 1960 text Truth and Method.  
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§2.2.2  ONTOLOGY of ART and AUDIENCE  
 
Gadamer on Play 
According to Gadamer, the ontological status of an artwork and its hermeneutic 
significance is a study of the mode of being of the artwork itself: the self-presentation of an 
artwork in its representation. Where representation is intended, the true nature of a painting, 
dramatic play or dance is the presentation of its representation and not the thing it is 
representing.28 To contemporise Gadamer’s idea (given that he wrote at a time when most 
performance forms were representational), the Being of the artwork is either self-presentation 
of the representation, or self-presentation of its non-representation. For Gadamer, “the being 
of the representation is more than the being of the thing represented” (Gadamer 2004, 114): 
the naturalistic sketch of a tree as the presentation of a representation, and not the tree out 
there in nature, is the mode of being of that artwork. The multi-directedness of a 
representation means that the artwork is representing for someone and cannot be understood 
as a case of simple mimesis, insofar as the artwork represents something, someone else, or 
itself, as is the case with some performance forms.29 An engagement with the relationship 
between an object represented and that which represents it does not account for the 
ontological status of an artwork.  
 In keeping with Heidegger, Gadamer understands Being through the concept of play. 
In art, play is always representing for someone. All works of art contain in themselves “an 
essential relation to everyone for whom the representation exists”, but Gadamer warns that 
one must be careful to not locate play’s Being (the mode of the being of the artwork itself) in 
the player’s “consciousness or attitude”, as it is never simply a case of subjective reflection 
(Gadamer 2004, 114). The object of examination is the interactive phenomenon of play 
between players; play is maintained to be the mode of Being of the artwork in ontological 
investigations. Play transforms into a structure, and thus possesses its own essential 
structures. This transformation causes the identity of the players to no longer exist outside of 
play itself. Transformation here functions in terms of recognition in the Platonic sense.                                                         
28 Representation is a topic of endless debate in a number of different disciplines. In performance studies, 
representation questions and problematises underlying theories of the self. Postmodern forms of dance challenge 
balletic representations and modernist principles of mimesis and abstracted shape. This is seen through physical 
methodologies grounded in presenting the process of a task-based exercise and the natural effort involved in 
moving the body as a consequence. For more on dance as non-representational see Claid (2006).  
29 Performance improvisation and some postmodern or postdramatic forms of theatre are artforms where the 
presentation of the performer self is preferred over representations of character. For more on this see Morrish 
(1995) & Lehmann (2006).   
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The ‘known’ enters into its true being and manifests itself as what it is only when it is recognised. As 
recognised it is grasped in its essence, detached from its accidental aspects. This is wholly true of the 
kind of recognition that takes place in relation to what is represented in a play. This kind of 
representation leaves behind it everything that is accidental and unessential, e.g. the private particular 
being of the actor . . . But even that which is represented, a well-known event of mythological tradition, 
is raised by its representation, as it were to its own validity and truth (Gadamer 1975, 103). 
 
The truth of the representation (or whether it discloses reality) is not a central concern for my 
study. Rather, my focus is upon the role of the spectator in the experience of an artwork that 
is aesthetically thematised. Aesthetic understanding is only possible through the play of a 
presentation between various players: artist (production), work of art (the work) and the 
spectator (reception). These three players form an intersecting tripartite structure as a model 
for understanding aesthetic experience. A useful diagram identifying these three delimited 
regions is sketched below (Figure 1). Traditionally this relationship has been emphasised 
differently within aesthetic theory. 
 
 
Figure 1: Model representing Gadamer’s tripartite structure of aesthetic understanding 
 
Gadamer arrives at his concept of play in response to the dominant aesthetic systems within 
the Western tradition for understanding beauty, taste, nature and art. The overlapping central 
union of all three spheres on the diagram (the darker shade of green) visually represents 
Gadamer’s position. In the following section I will present a brief synopsis of aesthetic theory 
as it relates to this model. In order to provide a backdrop to Gadamer’s ontology, I consider 
two historical conceptions of aesthetics within the Western philosophical tradition of art—
Production 
Reception Work 
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those of Plato and Kant—before developing a more holistic aesthetic system that reinstates 
the spectator.  
 
The Western Philosophical Tradition of Aesthetics 
In order to draw out the significance of Gadamer's concept play and develop the role 
of audience in my undertaking of a phenomenological aesthetics, it is worth bearing in mind 
the history of aesthetic theory from Plato's dialogue the Philebus, skipping a number of 
centuries to then focus on Immanuel Kant. This will permit me to consider the concepts of 
beauty, nature, pleasure, taste, the sensuous and intelligible, aesthetic judgement, disinterest 
and role of the artist genius. 
 Plato’s concept of beauty, or the beautiful, is best explained in his Philebus from the 
third group of dialogues written between 380 and 370 BCE, a dialogue in which he attempts 
to explain the ‘good life’ (Waterfield 1996, vii). Plato explains that beauty is caught up with a 
sensory type of pleasure not necessarily associated with art. For Plato, aspects of nature are 
beautiful. This sensory type of pleasure is associated with the appreciation of sensuous 
qualities, but is essentially different to the pleasures experienced in the gratification of a 
bodily desire. This distinction between sensory pleasure and pleasures derived from the body 
(often explicated as purposeful and dependent, e.g. the itching of a scratch) qualifies another 
distinction between ‘intelligible’ and ‘sensuous’ knowledge, and is a very important 
epistemological distinction in the Western tradition of aesthetic thinking from Plato through 
to postmodernity. 
 In the Philebus, ‘sensuous quality’ is best described in the following excerpt through 
the voice of Socrates in dialogue with Protarchus: 
 
By the beauty of shape. . . I mean. . . something straight or round and what is constructed out of these 
with a compass, rule, and square, such as plane figures and solids. Those things I take it are not 
beautiful in a relative sense, as others are, but by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves 
(Plato 1993, 60).  
 
The Platonic account of beauty is non-relational. Colours and sounds are not beautiful in 
relation to anything else, but are beautiful in and by themselves. True pleasures derived from 
qualities are non-dependant. Ideas of dependent and non-dependent beauty, relational and 
non-relational beauty are mapped accordingly and respectively upon the dichotomy sharply 
drawn between the sensuous and intelligible. Over the course of several centuries, these two 
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modes of pleasure with respect to the beautiful have been variously retained as distinctions, 
mediated by some third or fourth aspect, or conjoined. The latter is evident in the application 
of Kant’s synthetic a priori to aesthetic experience and his theory of taste.30 Confined to 
conceptually manipulating the relationship between the sensuous and intelligible leads to a 
simplified view of traditional and modern systems of aesthetics.  
 Seventeenth-century rationalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued that our sensory 
ideas (say the idea of redness in our perception of blood as red) are just confused versions of 
the kinds of ideas we have when we understand what is being perceived in abstract 
mathematical terms. For example, our sensuous apprehension of music is just confused 
knowledge of mathematical relations, and our apprehension of dance is nothing but a 
confused walk. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant reframed this 
relationship between ‘sense knowledge’ (the sensuous) as empirical, and ‘rationalist 
knowledge’ (the intelligible), moving towards an understanding of an innate quality of mind. 
Kant saw knowledge as relying on both the mind’s active contribution and the constraints of 
a world we can never know, passively received through our sensuous faculties. In coming to 
know the world, we rely on the free or spontaneous activity of the mind in its application of 
certain innate conceptual frames to experience. Bertrand Russell provides an excellent 
metaphor for understanding Kant’s relationship between the free play of imaginative faculties 
and the pre-given world of appearance: the world existing out there causes us to receive it 
both passively and sensuously through perception. The mind, likened to a pair of spectacles, 
supplies concepts (categories) not unlike differently-coloured and shaped lenses through 
which to see the world. The mind’s innate concepts (provided to us at birth) generate either 
different judgements and allow us to organise phenomena in our understanding of such things 
as time and space, logical truths, morality, God, and aesthetics (Russell 1961, 680).  
 Kant turns to the question of aesthetic judgement in The Critique of Judgement (Kritik 
der Urteilskraft 1790), and outlines what has become a foundational moment in the                                                         
30 In the history of philosophy, or epistemology to be more precise, propositions, statements or concepts about 
the world if derived from reason were analytic. Analytic propositions are born from first principles without any 
need for experience; they are necessary and knowable a priori. Following empiricist David Hume, Kant became 
critical of rationalistic dogma and the tradition that expelled experience in the forming of metaphysical 
knowledge of the world. Hume was more skeptical in his complete rejection of the idea that rationalists touting 
necessity with their analytic truths could tell us anything about the world or provide knowledge (for Hume we 
should not even trust the laws of causality). As a natural scientist, Kant was more sympathetic to the physical 
laws of science, like those discovered by Newton. They are necessary laws discovered through experience, a 
case of a posteriori knowledge. Since these laws are not derived from reason alone but still necessary, they are 
not sufficiently analytic propositions. Kant characterised these propositions as synthetic a priori. The dynamic 
of Kant’s formulation was the basis for his system of categories that constitutes the phenomenal world, the 
accessible world of appearance, and estranges us from the noumenal world, the world in itself (Kant 1987). 
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development of Western modern aesthetics: an analysis of the judgement of taste. The 
critique begins with Kant asking: how do we decide whether something is beautiful or not?  
 
 
If we wish to decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the 
presentation to the object so as to give rise to cognition; rather, we use imagination (perhaps in 
connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure. Hence a judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement and so is not a logical judgement 
but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgement whose determining basis cannot be other than 
subjective (Kant 1987, 44). 
 
 
Taste is the ability to judge an object by means of a liking or disliking. The object of such a 
liking is called beautiful. A judgement of taste is devoid of all interest and derives from the 
subjective meaning that we give a representation (Kant 1987, 53), and is unlike Gadamer’s 
concept of play, which operates beyond subjective reflection. For Kant, matters of taste are 
not dependent on the existence of objects (Kant 1987, 51). Such a position echoes Plato on 
the non-relational, non-dependent characteristics of beauty in respect to aesthetic judgement. 
From Kant’s critique I take two propositions:  
 
1)  The perceptual presentation of an object to the mind has both sensory content 
 contributed by the object, and form contributed by the mind (the Russell 
 metaphor of spectacles). 
 
2)  Aesthetic beauty is ‘disinterested’, meaning that the existence and practical 
 interest of the object is of no consequence to aesthetic understanding. During 
 aesthetic experience, the Kantian sense of mind is not constrained by those 
 types of concepts occurring in theoretical judgements. Thus, the mind is free 
 to traverse its imaginings in the free play of all its cognitive powers.  
 
However, Kant’s “grounding of aesthetics on the judgement of taste”, when taste itself 
supplies no knowledge like other judgements, does not offer a theory of art, but a critique (an 
account) of aesthetic judgement (Gadamer 1975, 38-9). Noël Carroll succinctly captures 
Kant’s position on aesthetic judgements: 
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The free and harmonious play of cognition and imagination, independent of the claims of purpose, 
practicality and knowledge [a non-dependency], give rise to a special form of pleasure, aesthetic 
pleasure (Carroll 2001, 31). 
 
Two important criticisms of the influential Kantian system yield criteria for reflecting upon 
the aesthetic experience of mediatised dance. The first relates to Kant’s aesthetic disinterest, 
where a practical interest in the object (its context, ideas, and association with life) is 
excluded from the harmonious free play of the mind in aesthetic exaltation.31 Such 
experiences disavow artworks that are conceptual, and so targets the entire history of modern 
art since Duchamp’s ‘readymades’.32 These works cannot be accounted for by a theory of 
beauty, and so fall outside aesthetic determination when viewed through Kantian spectacles.    
 Let us take the case of a dance performance using a motion tracking system. A 
decision must be made regarding whether the technology that produces certain visual and 
audio outputs will be transparent or hidden to the audience. Where non-transparent, the 
illusion of the world created by these outputs in relation to moving bodies is maintained by 
an attempt to mask the material and technical structures that permit the complex relationships 
between live and mediatised forms. In such cases where the intention is to hide the 
technology, I raise the problem of Kantian disinterest. First, we could ask: is having a 
‘practical interest’ in the object co-foregrounded with the free play of the lower faculties of 
the mind in its imaginings—as Kant would only have it? Or second, do we lose access to 
‘practical interest’ if the processes are tucked away from our visual perception? And if so, 
what are we left with: aesthetic experiences that are non-dependent on technical processes, 
and only beautiful for beauty’s sake? Or more radically, if not beautiful, then, no aesthetic 
experience at all? 
 Drawing upon my experiences of media art and digital performance, the first question 
appears to hold true across the various encounters where the relationship between body and 
technology is made explicit, and I have been a spectator. I usually want to know where the 
cameras are positioned, or body sensors located; where the projector is, what software they 
might be using; what is a live feed image, modified image done in real-time (VJ-ing), or a 
post-produced image pre-recorded and played back; and finally, how integrated are the screen 
image or graphic (depending on the kind of system) with the moving live figure(s). For me,                                                         
31 Kant’s interest is in the pure judgement of aesthetics as an analytic of transcendence, not a general theory of 
art (Gadamer 2004, 39). 
32 Marcel Duchamp’s infamous work The Fountain of 1917 is the most theorised of his conceptual pieces. See 
http://arthistorian.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/duchamp_fountain.jpg. 
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these are all aspects that contribute to the fullness of my aesthetic experience, regardless of 
whether I am sensorially struck by the technological relationship, or can think and/or declare 
the performance beautiful. To announce a performance just beautiful is a rarity in my 
experience. I am more satisfied by digital performance when I can ask questions about the 
set-up and processes, whether they are transparent or not. If these processes are hidden, then I 
would still answer ‘no’ to my second question; we do not lose access to practical interest.  
 Over time my practical interest has become more pronounced as my knowledge of 
digital technology in performance has deepened—like understanding the processual 
relationship between an infrared camera picking up a live image and then feeding it into a 
computer that processes the algorithmic data for visual or audio outputs via projection and 
sound amplification. Non-transparent technological processes provide no leading clue to 
accepting Kantian disinterest in the practical, nor any clue to meaningful judgements of 
beauty in aesthetic experience—if the performance is indeed determined to be aesthetic. 
Practical disinterest in the processes that make performance is a problematic position, and 
arguably more so in technological performance events where the play of technology is a 
foregrounded aspect of the artwork. Kantian practical disinterest has not stood the test of 
time, with visual art practices evolving beyond the two-dimensional painting.  
 The second well-noted criticism of Kant is that his theory of taste and beauty 
perpetuates the veneration of the artist genius, and therefore, the substitution of taste—the 
original dominating category in experiences of art—by that of the genius. The consequences 
of shifting emphasis from taste to genius were significant in the development of many 
theories of art. With taste receding in importance, an artwork was highlighted in terms of the 
artist possessing the spirit of genius. According to Gadamer, the notion of the artist genius 
was transformed by a misreading of Kant’s “Third Critique” by members of the Sturm und 
Drang.33 With the rise of the genius, the ontological status of the artwork is reduced to 
production alone (see blue circle on Figure 1, p 54).  
 
                                                         
33 Key figures of the Sturm und Drang, Hamman, Herder and Goethe, found “a point of contact for their self-
understanding only in the concept of genius validated by Kant’s aesthetics” (Gadamer 2004, 47-8). 
Gadamer, however, is adamant that Kant did not mean for the notion of genius to overtake taste, arguing “that 
for Kant the concept of genius was really only a complement to what was of interest to him ‘for transcendental 
reasons’ in aesthetic judgement” (Gadamer 2004, 47-8). For a comprehensive overview on the meaning and 
history of the artist genius in relation to the Western philosophical and classical music tradition including Kant’s 
aesthetics see Eisen & Keefe (2006, 190-195) & Murray (1991).  
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Kant says of artistic beauty that “in judging such an object one must consider the possibility of spirit – 
and hence of genius – in it” and in another place he makes the obvious point that without genius not 
only art but also a correct, independent taste in judging it is not possible. Therefore the standpoint of 
taste, insofar as it is practised on its most important object, art, passes inevitably into the standpoint of 
genius. Genius in understanding corresponds to genius in creation (Gadamer 2004, 49). 
 
What is problematic about the subjectivisation of art through the concept of the artist genius? 
Besides ignoring the existence of the art object itself (where aesthetics as a system of taste is 
also responsible), the role of the receiver (spectator) is further diminished. On Gadamer’s 
account, through particular figures emerging from the Sturm und Drang movement, an 
emphasis on the artist genius and prominence of the subjective as a priori to aesthetic 
judgement eventually led to the twentieth-century death of the subject in European Western 
thinking: arguably this misappropriation precipitated early poststructural and postmodern 
notions of the subject and a multitude of programs for desubjectivication and fragmentation. 
More radically dire consequences were felt with respect to ‘freedom’, ‘will’, ‘self 
determination’ and presuppositions of difference (or differance) in the subject following the 
end of the Enlightenment.  
 With the emphasis on production over the work and its reception, the artist became 
the basis for judgements of aesthetic value. It is against this understanding that we must read 
Gadamer’s model. Restating the three regions involved in Gadmer’s conception of aesthetic 
play, we can isolate production: associated with the making of the work by the artist, the 
artwork contains the spirit of the ‘artist genius’; work: the artwork in and by itself as ‘object’ 
or object event, including performers; and reception: the reception by a spectator or audience, 
‘audience experience’. 
 Gadamer declares that in order to gain an adequate understanding of an artwork, the 
play between production, work and reception must be taken into account. The resulting play 
is demonstrated by the intersection of these three aspects as a unity visualised in Figure 1 on 
page 53. My investigation of the relationship between specific aesthetic phenomena using 
phenomenology follows on from Gadamer’s holistic thinking about the role of artist, the 
work and spectator in aesthetic understanding. The reinstatement of spectator against a 
background of subjectivist theories of art is highlighted in my dissection of the following 
passage from Gadamer:  
 
Once the aporias of this subjective turn in aesthetics have become evident to us, 
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That is, the ongoing problems associated with Kant’s theory of taste and emergence of the 
artist as genius. 
 
 [W]e are forced to return to the older tradition. 
 
The Platonic understanding of art and nature 
 
If art is not the variety of changing experiences whose object is filled subjectively with meaning like an 
empty mold we must recognise that ‘presentation’ is the mode of being of the artwork. 
 
The true nature of the painting, dramatic play (or more relevantly, the dance) is the 
presentation of its representation and not the thing that it is representing. For example, as 
suggested earlier, the true being of the charcoal etching of a tree is not the tree it represents, 
but rather the mode of presentation. 
 
In being played the play speaks to the spectator through its presentation and it does so in such a way 
that, despite the distance between it and himself, the spectator still belongs to play (Gadamer 2004, 
115). 
 
The being of the artwork (the dramatic play, painting, symphony or dance) in aesthetic 
understanding involves the participation of the spectator in their belongingness to play; with 
this, Gadamer reinstates reception.  
 In fact, the relationship between players involved in live, mediatised events is more 
complex than the theatrical and musical performances Gadamer speaks of in Truth and 
Method.34 In his examples, the structural relations and representations between performers 
and audience are more defined. Technology as a player in play adds complexity to the 
relations between performer, audience and the representational, and so requires an expanded 
framework for dealing directly with these diverse aesthetic forms in unique systems of 
interaction.  
 Situated at the forefront of contemporary philosophical aesthetics, Dominic Lopes 
understands the need to account for the growing frontier of digital practices in the visual arts. 
With the ongoing emergence of new technologies, art experiences are becoming more                                                         
34 Even though Truth and Method was published in 1960, and Gadamer did not pass away until 2002, his 
performance examples are traditional, pre-modernist and devoid of digital technology as a player or artwork. 
This is despite the digital amplification of voice and music and other technologies in the theatre.   
  62 
complex and so require a different kind of analytical attention to previous models of art 
theory. As Lopes states: “[n]o account of evaluating a picture as a picture will be complete if 
it ignores the part played by experiences of the picture and the scene it depicts” (Lopes 2005, 
4). 
 In the field of interactive art, aesthetic experiences are structured differently to those 
produced through viewing art on walls or proscenium style performances. The spectator can 
no longer be held “synonymous with empty gaping” (Lopes 2005, 4). Rather, the spectator is 
(for the most part) responsible for the realisation of the artwork; and more prevalent in these 
experiences are their embodied interactions.35 With this expanded attention toward embodied 
experience within the context of interactive art, Lopes’ call for ontology becomes interesting. 
 
While interactive art raises many interesting questions that a full account of it must address, a good start can 
be made by examining its ontology. Indeed, most questions about interactive art cannot be properly 
addressed absent a rough outline of its ontology (Lopes 2001, 65). 
 
Lopes attends to the ontology of art by analysing concepts. However, at no point in his article 
“The Ontology of Interactive Art” (2001) does he attend to the phenomenological datum of 
specific art experiences. Since it is the purpose of this dissertation to undertake an adequate 
study of phenomena that discloses their essential structure from various experiences 
communicated through language, an inadequate beginning would be to focus upon a fixed 
framework of concepts as a leading clue for disclosure. Surprisingly, analytic philosopher of 
art Noël Carroll resists a framework of analysable concepts in his comments about our 
interaction with art.36 He notes that artworks “[a]re most essentially ‘experiential’ or 
‘perceptual’ where those terms are generally understood by contrast to responses mediated by 
the application of concepts or reasoning” (Carroll 2001, 5). 
 My study foregrounds audience and is a movement towards balancing the relationship 
between artist, artwork and reception. Thus, by giving an account of ontology—or any 
meaningful explanation of existence: ‘what is it to be’ or, ‘what is the being of these 
forms’—becomes a byproduct, rather than a leading clue in the understanding of these types 
of performances. As stated earlier: phenomenology precedes ontology. I will now discuss the                                                         
35 For more on interdisciplinary art practices and academic research within the growing field of interactive art, 
within an Australian context, see Cleland (2008, 4-7) & Edmonds & Muller (2009, 141-151).  
36 In an earlier text Philosophy of Art: a contemporary introduction (1999), Carroll historicises the philosophy 
of art through concepts such as mimesis, representation, expression, aesthetic form and aesthetics. He conducts 
an analytic investigation of concepts that are fundamental to art practices (Carroll 1999). 
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role of audience in aesthetic play within the confines of a phenomenological study, and 
delineate the spatio-temporal modes of embodied reception. 
 
  
§2.2.3   AUDIENCE: SPECTATOR-ANALYST 
 
 Receptivity can be understood phenomenologically as the spectator’s embodied 
experience.37 The spectator for the purposes of my study is of a special kind, trained in the 
techniques of practical phenomenology.38 As a consequence, their experience is essentially 
modified from ‘normal spectatorial’ experiences. Performance studies semiotician Gay 
McAuley recognises that performance analysis “is not simply an extension of normal 
‘spectatorly’ practice” (McAuley 1998, 8). In semiotic approaches to performance analysis, 
the spectator is crucial for interpreting the semiosis (meaning) of the performance in terms of 
its material production and narrative content. Extending McAuley’s spectatorly practice, I 
take this to mean a spectator informed by any method that is underwritten by a philosophical 
perspective. Thus for my purposes, the preferred approach is phenomenological.39 However, 
the task for the spectator-analyst is not so straightforward: they are expected to adhere to a 
suggested framework for experiencing selected phenomena whilst attending to the 
performance in a genuinely immersed way. This raises the problem of what it means to be 
genuinely immersed. Gadamer, with Heideggerian diligence, describes the participation of a 
spectator attending a theatrical play or musical concert.  
 
The being of the spectator is determined by his “being there present” (Dabeisein). Being present does 
not simply mean being there along with something else that is there at the same time. To be present 
means to participate. If someone was present at something, he knows all about how it really was. It is 
only in a derived sense that presence at something means also a kind of subjective act, that of paying 
attention to something (Bei-der-Sachesein). Thus watching something is a genuine mode of 
participating (Gadamer 2004, 121-2).                                                         
37 I will now use the term spectator rather than audience to describe this special kind of audience member who 
has the dual occupation of being in audience as a spectator and analyst.  
38 I dedicate an entire chapter on the background and continuing tradition of practical phenomenology in my 
upcoming section on methodology. See Chapter 5. 
39 For a discussion regarding the differences in critical approaches to the “moment-by-moment-existence” of 
performance art and theatre’s mimetic, discursive and narrative based tradition see Carlson (1996, 123-144). 
Phenomenology is more adequate than structural semiotic approaches to questions regarding the immediacy and 
being-there of the performer and audience alike. For more on the different critical approaches in Performance 
Studies see Reinelt & Roach (1992), Fortier (1997) and McAuley (2001, 5-19). 
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A spectator is an immersed player in play, and not a non-participating bystander to a 
performance event. The crucial role of the spectator in a participatory being-present arguably 
centres them as an essential factor for making analysis. Consequently there are problems with 
their full immersion in play if the spectator takes on the dual occupations of spectator and 
performance analyst. The selected method of analysis must address this problem.   
 The trained phenomenologist, undertaking particular practical techniques while in the 
act of being a spectator, will experience the tension between these two types of receptive 
participation: audience member and analyst. Appropriating Husserl’s structure of perceptual 
synthesis, I identify these two types as modes of passive and active perception. However, in 
order to avoid the dangers of identifying spectatorial participants as ‘passive’ agents within 
audience, I mitigate the term with a modal spectrum of receptivity that stretches with fine-
grained distinction between the two poles of passive and active perception: 
 
    Passive - - - - Passive-Active - - - - Active-Passive - - - - Active  
 
The spectator trained in performance analysis is located more decidedly at the active end of 
the spectrum. Husserl’s genealogy of logic, however, reveals a structural process that starts in 
‘pre-predicative experience’, the lowest level of activity for the ego, and moves toward the 
structure of predicative thought where higher order judgements form our conceptual 
systems.40 In Husserl, the origin of conceptual thought is a movement from experience to 
judgement; it is a process of becoming, moving away and upwards from the most passive 
activity in perception, receptivity.41  But here I turn Husserl’s (vertical, arboreal) structure of 
passive and active synthesis on its side to avoid engaging a hierarchical schema. A sideways 
or traversing movement in the processes of coming to a judgement assists in avoiding any 
evaluations that prioritise more active cognitive states of thinking over pre-predicative 
experiences in the ego.  
My spectrum of receptivity allows for possible movement by the spectator in their 
modes of receptivity during performance as both audience member and analyst. The idea of                                                         
40 As was noted earlier with my use of the terms Being and being in relation to Heidegger’s philosophy, I will 
now use the term ego in my discussion of Husserl’s work. It is important to remain consistent with the author’s 
terminology during my exposition of their work, as each author means these terms in a very specific ontological 
and existential sense. 
41 For an excellent overview to Husserl’s systematic account of the relationship between the base layers of 
experience working towards higher-order judgement in general perception, see Spencer Churchill’s Translator’s 
Introduction (1972) in (Husserl 1973, xxi-xxxi). 
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passivity in spectating is anathema to current perspectives in studies of the spectator, which is 
why this spectrum, outlined above, indicates the genetic and synthetic processes of a highly 
dynamic passive and active relation within receptive states. Even for Husserl, at the lowest 
levels of reception, the ego is active in its relation to objects in the world, which is: a 
pregiven field of prominences affecting a seductive allure on the ego. The ego is “struck”, it 
“yields” and actively “turns towards” these prominences antecedent to any cogitation. This 
active turn of regard is “the being-awake of the ego” (Husserl 1973, 71-9). Placed vertically 
or horizontally, the passive--active spectrum is a useful representational tool for 
understanding Husserl’s thinking on perception, experience and horizonal consciousness as it 
relates to world and other subjects.  
 Gadamer suggests that for the spectator sitting in a proscenium-style theatre, their 
‘being present’ is a passive act of attention: a genuine and normal mode of spectatorship 
(Gadamer 2004). By being attentive to something, the spectator is able to forget their 
purpose; they are ultimately carried away by what they see. This understanding promotes a 
Gestaltian shape in perception, foregrounding that which we pay attention to and 
withdrawing our thoughts or purposes into the background. Gadamer’s thought is distinctly 
Heideggerian. Heidegger’s ‘ready-to-hand’ concept explicates Gadamer’s point and gives the 
Gestaltian movement a lived-world flavour.42 To emphasise the Gestaltian structure of 
foreground/background relations, Merleau-Ponty (interestingly) uses the theatre as a 
metaphor to explicate the spatiality of one’s body in relation to external space.  
 
Bodily space can be distinguished from external space and envelop its parts instead of spreading them 
out, because it is the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance, the background of 
somnolence or reserve of vague power against which the gesture and its aim stand out, the zone of not 
being in front of which precise beings, figures and points can come to light. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 115) 
 
The issue of Gadamer’s privileging of sight in his explanation of spectators ‘being present’ at 
a theatrical play needs to be reconsidered. Many analytical approaches of the twentieth 
century in theatre and dance studies have placed an emphasis on ‘seeing’ or ‘sight’, and this 
is an ongoing theme in respective methodological debates.43 In reception, a spectator of                                                         
42 See (Heidegger 1962, §16, 102-7)  
43 Gay McAuley identifies an inadequacy in theatre studies for its ongoing emphasis on the ‘visual’ and/or 
‘sight’ in spectatorial practice, entailing that we ignore the body’s entire sensorium in what is an essentially 
embodied experience. Unlike theatre studies or traditional cinema studies, performance studies is equipped to 
address this visual preponderance with its variegated critical practices formed from inter-disciplinary interests 
(McAuley 200, 10).  
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performance is carried away by what they think, hear, feel, smell, emote and imagine. Their 
experience is not limited to what they can see, nor are they entirely motionless. These aspects 
of reception are inextricable from visual reception, but can be isolated through attentional 
practices for the purposes of analysis. For example, if I wish to only understand what I am 
hearing, I can focus all my attention on the words of the performance, the vocal quality of the 
performer, the sound of objects and noises of the auditorium, the music and/or sound score. 
In extending Gadamer’s spirit of spectatorial play, we discern that our entire embodied 
consciousness is involved in reception. The structure of embodied consciousness as a spatial 
and temporal concern in spectatorial participation will be considered over the next two 
sections. 
  
The Spatiality of Audience 
Following Alan Read, Gay McAuley emphasises the spatial dimension of the 
spectator in the following passage. 
 
Seeing, watching and looking at theatre do not begin to explain what happens between an audience and 
a performer, and I have argued that the spectators’ experience in the theatre is spatial rather than visual, 
that they experience the performance with all their senses, and they are there in the space, not looking 
at it (McAuley 2001, 16). 
 
In contrast to McAuley’s placement of a spectator ‘in’ the space (but nonetheless deepening 
the idea that in fact a spectator’s experience is spatial) I turn to Merleau-Ponty, who 
challenges the psychologistic and empirical misconception that a body is objectively in space, 
ascribed with a set of coordinates or points, and/or symbolically understood through a shared 
language expressing predetermined knowledge about this body behaving in the world. 
Merleau-Ponty maintains through an extensive and unique “existential analysis” that the body 
“inhabits space and time” and is not in a relation of being in, beside or in front of space 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 161). 
  
 I am not in space or time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with 
 them and includes them. The scope of this inclusion is the measure of that of my existence  
 (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 162). 
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Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the distinction between abstract and concrete movement in the 
case study of the neurologically-deficient patient Schneider in contrast with specific 
movement scenarios of a normal functioning patient develops this thesis. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of existence is unlike the formalist ontology of Heidegger in 
which Dasein, as a symbol of existence and temporally owning oneself, is hermeneutically 
understood in and by a set of predetermined a priori structures expressing Dasein’s relation 
and being in the world. On the contrary, the particularity of a body moving and understanding 
this belonging to an external world of objects, both animate and inanimate, presents the 
ongoing, synthesising disclosure of both a habituated and spontaneous world maker through 
our everyday comportments and intentional activities. These world-horizons, to invoke 
Merleau-Ponty again, are generated in and by ‘us’ as nothing other than our body: we are 
ourselves our bodies. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of a body’s relation to space problematises 
the distance implied by the statement ‘I am because I think’ (famously, the Cartesian Cogito), 
along with other epistemological approaches that posit notions of self and self-identity from 
thought or other intellectual variations that pose solutions to self-knowledge. We cannot take 
for granted that spatiality always already belongs to us in our open negotiations with the 
world, including our unique spectatorial experiences in the theatre. To understand space is to 
understand the experience of our moving bodies, and due to this entwinement, the reverse 
logically holds true. 
 
The Temporality of Audience 
 The study of ‘space’ and ‘place’ are significant with respect to understanding 
audiences. Within performance studies there has and continues to be a great deal of work in 
this area, whether through semiotic approaches to space or those inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of spatiality.44 However, little research has been devoted to the temporality or 
time experience of audiences in theatre and dance contexts, especially studies that draw upon 
thinkers from the phenomenology of time tradition. Investigation and debate about the 
‘problem of time perception’ and the ‘question of the possibility of time experience’ occurred 
                                                        
44 For more on space and place in Performance Studies see McAuley (1999); for a number of articles from 
authors with different philosophical perspectives directly addressing space and place in performance also see 
McAuley (2006). For a discussion of performer space, spatiality, place and landscape with particular references 
and influence from Merleau-Ponty see Kozel (2007), Hope (2010) & Shih-Pearson (2012). For more on 
phenomenological perspectives of space and spatiality from within audience see Sobchack (1992) and Grant 
(2007). 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within the European phenomenological tradition amongst such eminent thinkers as Franz 
Brentano, Alexius Meinong, William Stern, William James and Edmund Husserl.45 In 
reaction to Brentano’s psychologism, Husserl attempted to further develop his thesis of 
intentionality through the “exposition of the intentional character of time-consciousness” 
(Heidegger 1928, 15).46 The idea of subjective time is overlooked in its non-measurability 
within the physical sciences, where time is only understood in its objectively measured 
constitution.47 Metaphysical and subjective notions of time remain a philosophical problem. 
There are numerous schools of thought that pertain philosophically to the concept and 
experience of time, and the Western philosophical tradition has problematised both in a 
number of ways. The relationship between objective and subjective time has been the topic of 
ongoing conceptual debate between different schools of thought since the early Greeks. 
Time, that slippery, ephemeral dimension has continued to elude definition. Within this 
tradition, the phenomenological view explicates the structure of temporal experience as lived 
phenomena. From this perspective, the question ‘what is time’ is understood in terms of the 
‘how’ or ‘way’ of time: the constituting temporal process of thinking and being-in-the world 
itself.  
 Time, timings and temporality are prominent aspects of audience experience, 
necessitating research rich investigations that are not foreshadowed by studies of space or 
place.48 Phenomenological reflections on the relationship between bodies and technologies in                                                         
45 For a detailed discussion of time debates amongst these thinkers see Kortooms (2002). 
46 Husserl critiqued Brentano’s assertion that the origin for the perception of time was psychological. 
Psychologism was the dominant empirical system of thought to explain the processes of thinking; Husserl 
became critical of its empirical approach, and the relegation of logical thinking to the subjective processes of 
thought. “The basic tendency of psychologism consisted in dissolving the tension in understanding truth one-
sidedly in favour of subjectively situated achievements” (Held 2003, 11). Accordingly, psychologism denied 
universal logical truths an independent, objective existence from the mind.  
47 Physical scientists investigate time only in terms of its ability to objectively measure events. Subjective 
descriptions of time are vehemently disputed between relativists and quantum physicists, and frequently tied up 
with the problem of free will. Even though understanding the nature of time is a constant issue for physical 
scientists, they tend to leave this phenomenon aside. Einsteinian relativists maintain that the subjective feeling 
of time passing is an illusion, and yet, they are unable to account for the disjuncture that occurs in experience 
between apprehensions of clock time and feelings of time coming to pass.   
48 An event that did explore the potential of such analysis was the first International Academic and Art 
Conference time · transcendence · performance held in October 2009, presented by the School of English, 
Communications and Performance Studies at Monash University, Victoria, Australia. The purpose of this 
conference was to gather together artists, designers and thinkers who thematise time, timings or the temporal 
within their work. The three-day event tabled such questions as: How do performers think time? How do 
thinkers perform time? What shared or different understandings are at work in the different practices? Is time 
real or just an abstraction? Is it reversible? Does it pass? Do we experience it directly? Is it relative or constant? 
Does it exist? There were papers, panels, workshops and a curated stream of performances and exhibitions 
presented at several venues.  
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live, mediatised performance insist upon a rigorous investigation of temporal experiences: the 
experiences of spectators conducting analysis. To not include the temporal dimension of 
experience in a study of aesthetic play would result in an impoverished asymmetrical study 
emphasising only the spatial dimensions of our experience. Phenomenological analysis must 
consider both these dimensions of experiences as they relate to the moment of participation in 
the given object-event. The essential structure of events relating to live and mediatised forms 
at play with spectators in selected performance contexts are disclosed in and by a form of 
reflective attention to the spatio-temporal aspects of the spectator undertaking the 
phenomenological investigation. Moreover, the spectator’s spatio-temporal experience is an 
embodied one: an investigation of spectatorial embodiment in their receptive turn of regard 
toward external phenomena. 
 
Embodiment of Spectator-Analyst: preliminary remarks 
To return to my former question, how, then, does a spectator occupy the dual role of 
researcher and immersed audience member without inhibiting or diluting the experience? A 
caveat for this dual occupation is that these experiences are adversely affected by specialised 
research methods that undermine the findings the investigation is attempting to reveal. In 
phenomenological studies, the experience of and reflection upon phenomena are instances of 
the production and imposition of a method: degrees of constraint on the observer in the 
opening toward phenomena to ascertain a certain type of evidence. In this respect, the 
research experience is one that is mediated by a particular method that encourages the right 
attitude for radical reflection. Once a chosen access to experience is formulated, reflection is 
proposed to be adequate, despite the limits of language and conceptualisation in description. 
Since Descartes’ constitution of the personal pronoun ‘I’ on the basis of an irreducible ego 
that thinks, the question of self-identity, person, and more recently, self-awareness has been 
problematised by thinkers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions. Self-awareness is 
a major theme for phenomenology given that intentionality, consciousness about some object 
in the world, is its central doctrine. The question for phenomenology since Husserl has been: 
how does consciousness reflect upon itself in intentional consciousness? I see the squirrel. I 
hear the car screech to a halt. I smell banana bread. How do I reflect on the seeing, hearing 
and smelling? More fundamental to this self-awareness of intentional consciousness are the 
questions: how do I know that this sight is mine, that ‘I’ in fact am the hearer of the  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screeching metal and rubber, or that the olfaction smelling the sweetness is mine? Moreover, 
how can I be aware that I am the subject ‘I’ referred to in statements such as ‘I am hungry’, ‘I 
think . . .’, ‘I believe . . .’? What forms of reflection provide certitude and access to this self-
awareness? And finally, is it even possible to adequately account for self-awareness? Dan 
Zahavi argues that  
 
the subject-use of “I” never misfires, and that we consequently can never be mistaken when we claim 
to be self-aware [. . .] [i]n contrast to every fallible object-identification, the reference of “I” in first-
person experience ascriptions is immediate, noncriterial, and noninferential (Zahavi 1999, 5). 49 
 
The mediation of a particular method is common in other disciplines that attempt to 
understand aspects of empirical, social, and political experiences. Given the object of study 
for this dissertation is aesthetic phenomena, bodies in relation to technological media need to 
be experienced in such a way that the researcher is not an outside, detached observer, but a 
spectator having a direct and/or originary experience. For Husserl, “[n]atural cognition begins 
with experience and remains within experience” (Husserl in Welton 2000, 82), and for Kant 
there is no doubt “[t]hat all our knowledge begins with experience” (Kant 1982, 1).50  
 In order to intuit, describe and analyse, the researcher must reflect upon their 
experiences for the eventual process of communicating this understanding and disclosing the 
shared essential structures of the phenomena under investigation. It is a phenomenological 
requirement. An external researcher never observes the spectator; the spectator is the 
phenomenologist. Hence, they experience a double call to attention, as audience member and 
analyst.  
 It is my conviction that through regular practice, the method and techniques of 
phenomenology in the ‘performance stages’ of the event will be concomitant to immersed 
spectatorial attendance. I expect that the techniques for understanding particular phenomena 
will become absorbed by the researcher in an embodied way over time. Consequently, 
researchers involved in the phenomenology work will become less conscious of and anxious 
about the dual responsibility of immersive receptivity and conducting the phenomenology. 
My embodied absorption of method may be likened to specific systems of technique                                                         
49 For an excellent overview of this discussion see Zahavi (1999). For earlier arguments refuting the possibility 
of experiencing self-identity through the use of first-person pronoun, see Shoemaker (1963). 
50 I must note, that in the processes of imaginative variation within eidetic analysis some experiences are 
hypothetical and not given from an originary experience; they may be fictional, or loosely based on one or 
another's experience. I attend to this in Chapter 7. 
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embodied by dancers who use their technique as a resource for accessing and creating 
movement content. Closer to this idea is the embodied work of Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, 
who developed a system of exploratory exercises for dancers, physical performers, people 
with disabilities, and those disciplines interested in the moving body. Her research involves 
the intense mapping of early moving experiences derived from a somatic understanding of 
the body’s discrete systems, both isolated and integrated (e.g. skeletal, organ, muscle, fluid 
and endocrine).51 Bainbridge’s studies relate to the everyday moving body, and the elite body 
within specialist fields of sport and dance. This “framework for perceiving change in the 
moving body, [involving] a state of mind that allows for a spontaneous and open perception 
to our bodily mind”, is called Body-Mind Centering (BMC) (Bainbridge Cohen 2008, vii). In 
the foreword to her book Sensing, Feeling, and Action: The Experiential Anatomy of Body-
Mind Centering (2008), Bainbridge Cohen explains. 
 
BMC merges the conceptual and experiential, shifting between observing and embodying. From this 
union arises an understanding, from the inside out and the outside in, of how an individual is doing or 
being anything, from batting a ball to arguing with your child (Bainbridge Cohen 2008, vii). 
 
BMC requires the participant to be intentionally aware of the body moving in sensation. 
Exercises involve the direction of breath and creation of mental imagery around a changing, 
dynamic anatomy. Voluntary and involuntary movements—even at the level of organ and 
cellular function—are paid attention to by directing one’s sensing capacities. Parts of one’s 
anatomy are felt and able to be taken into action.52 The role of spectator is significant to 
understanding a work of art. Thus, to consider the essential structures of selected forms in 
relationship, the researcher as spectator needs to develop an adequate framework for being 
present in audience, like the BMC practitioner’s intentional awareness of somatic systems.                                                         
51 The following definition of somatics by Thomas Hanna considers the first-person subjective and third-person 
objective perspectives of body perception. 
 
Somatics is the field which studies the soma: namely the body as perceived from within by first-person perception. When a 
human being is observed from the outside—i.e. from a third-person viewpoint—the  phenomenon of a human body is perceived. 
But when this same human being is observed from the first person viewpoint of his own proprioceptive senses, a categorically 
different phenomenon is perceived: the human soma (Hanna 1995, 341). 
 
52 I believe that the techniques like BMC counter, or at least explore ways in which to counter, Drew Leder’s 
observation that the body is “absent from experience” (Leder 1990, 69). For Leder, the body and its everyday 
perception is generally one of “being away”, “absent”, a body of “dys-appearance”. Interestingly he argues that 
the phenomenological experience of body reinforces the problematic body-mind distinction. There are many 
examples of movement practices and ‘body work’ that attempt to overcome our experiential disembodiment, 
including authentic dance styles, yoga approaches, Alexander Technique and Feldenkrais.  
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Such a framework is by no means fixed, nor easily defined. We can begin with a proposed 
method and a set of guidelines for approaching the phenomenological task at hand; however, 
the techniques practised within the unfolding of an experience inevitably change as they are 
more comfortably absorbed and embodied as one’s own. Like learning any new skill, the 
methods of phenomenology become structural aspects of the ‘doing’ person’s consciousness. 
By and large, it is through phenomenology that we find the most flexible and open approach 
to understanding the complex structures and relations of all experiential aspects of a 
mediatised performance event. 
 In this chapter, I have considered the possibility for an ontology of art where the 
aesthetic forms are in complex interactive relations with spectators in a performance context. 
Rather than restoring ontology as I originally set out to do, I raised a number of issues with 
philosophical ontology through Heidegger, and an approach combining logic and applied 
science with Jacquette. I also recognised my position to be similar to Auslander and his 
program to de-ontologise the debate between live and mediatised forms. Acknowledging that 
we arrive at a similar perspective, we do so by theoretically distinct means. My turn to 
Gadamer and his concept of play reinstated audience in the phenomenological understanding 
of these aesthetic forms, a role that takes on the dual occupation of both spectator and 
analyst. To understand bodies and technologies in complex relationships without the burden 
of ontology, I methodologically pursue phenomenology in a narrow sense, as a 
“phenomenology of constitution”: “Phenomenology in the narrow sense as a phenomenology 
of constitution. Phenomenology in the wide sense as something which includes ontology” 
(Heidegger 1982, 2). A phenomenology of constitution enables the experiential study of 
objects given in the world, and within events. From this understanding I undertake a 
phenomenology of encounters occurring within an object-event. 
  The following chapter provides a theoretical background to transcendental 
phenomenology, leading towards my practical use of this approach. 
 
 
       
  73 
CHAPTER 3   THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL GROUND 
 
Before developing a phenomenological framework for examining interactions 
between bodies and technologies in dance performance to be outlined in Chapter 5, I will 
take some time to introduce Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In order to do this, I 
will look closely at some basic tenets of his philosophy drawn from the breadth of his works, 
and seek assistance from leading commentators on his phenomenology, including Anthony J. 
Steinbock, Klaus Held, Robert Sokowlski, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, and Donn Welton. 
 
 
§2.3.1   TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY   
 
Phenomenology describes the essential structure of objects and how they are 
experienced in the world. These objects of experience include physical, concrete things that 
are independently given in the world; and mental acts experienced as thinking, remembering, 
expecting, imaging and imagining. The givenness of an object or mental act is the way in 
which something appears, and is inextricable from actual perceiving; the perceived thing and 
perception cannot be separated.53 Phenomenology considers how something is constituted. 
The existence of an object is secondary to the multiple ways in which something appears to 
us in experience.  
  Phenomenology is a broad practice and has, since Husserl, evolved and moved in 
many different directions. As a result, there is a marked variance in concepts classically 
associated with phenomenology across the work of different scholars.54  
 The purpose of the following chapter is to introduce concepts that are relevant to 
developing and informing my particular working method in phenomenological aesthetics. I 
will begin by taking a brief look at the structure of intentionality and the phenomenological 
and eidetic reductions, I then discuss three different, though closely related, methods in 
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as identified by Anthony J. Steinbock: the static, 
                                                        
53 See also Husserl (1983, 7, 35, 36, 43, 48, 79, 126, 127, 129, 191, 254, 282, 298) for specific characterisations 
of givenness in respect to Husserl’s development of transcendental phenomenology.  
54 My time as a research fellow at the Phenomenology Research Center under the directorship of Anthony J. 
Steinbock has deepened my understanding of phenomenology, and clarified areas of initial confusion. My 
methodological approach has been greatly influenced by his scholarship. 
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genetic, and generative; and raise well-known issues and countenances relating to Husserl’s 
philosophy, including the often-raised critique of Husserl as an essentialist. 
 In the introductory section to his Ideas I (First Book), Husserl invites the 
phenomenologist of any discipline to actively turn toward their specific interests in a similar 
manner to that which he outlines. “Applied phenomenology”, by necessity, “determines the 
ultimate sense of the ‘being’ of its objects” (Husserl 1983, 142). I will now explicate 
Husserl’s ‘manner’ before turning that manner to my own specific, aesthetic interest. 
 
 
Intentionality 
Husserl’s thesis of intentionality is central to phenomenology.55 Intentionality belongs 
to consciousness, such that consciousness is always directed toward some object. Within acts 
of perception, intentionality’s tripartite structure of act, content and object underlies the 
relationship between a perceiver, their perceiving and the perceived. The perceived is 
constituted in several ways by many individual constituting consciousnesses, and may be a 
physical or mental object, such as that tree before me, or, to cite psychologist Franz Clemens 
Brentano’s famous example of an inexistent, the idea of a unicorn. The intentional structure 
of perception describes the natural world in readiness for a phenomenological reduction, and 
the positing of a more immanent field of pure consciousness.  
 Husserl formulated the three-part intentional structure in response to the problem of 
non-existent objects in perception. Preceding Husserl on this matter, Brentano (1838-1917) 
attempted to solve the problem of inexistence with his relational model of intentionality, 
worked out in his text Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (1911). Brentano was 
curious as to how to account for thoughts about objects that do not exist in external reality: 
the case of intentional inexistence. His relational theory accounts for existent and nonexistent 
objects. There is, Brentano argues, always an object, whether physical or mental, in relation 
to the mental act itself. The problematic raised with regards to these two types of objects 
proceeds with the following questions: if I am having a mental act (perception) about the tree 
in my backyard, is this mental act ‘different’ to my imagining of a unicorn, which does not                                                         
55 Throughout this document, when I use the terms ‘intention’ and/or ‘intended’, I am exclusively referring to 
intentionality. I will use the term ‘motivation’ when talking generally about a person’s intention to do 
something. 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exist independent of the mental act itself? How can we adequately account for thoughts about 
inexistents? What methods are available for such an inquiry? Brentano’s most famous 
passage from Psychology highlights the historical problem of intentional inexistence. 
 
Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly 
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here 
as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in 
judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on 
(Brentano 1973, 88, italics mine). 
 
For Husserl, however, inexistence was no problem at all. His tripartite structure of 
intentionality supports the idea that all intentional states are always ‘about’ existent or non-
existent things—such as mental phenomena—but are not strictly relational in the manner that 
Brentano had proposed. Husserl’s intentionality extends to entities and statements of belief 
where there is no object in relation to the mental act, such as ‘Santa Claus lives at the North 
Pole’. Every thought is always ‘consciousness of something’ and for Husserl, it is the 
structure of this directedness that is of primary significance.  
 The fact that there is no evidence that Santa Claus (the rotund individual in a red suit 
with a white beard who manages to fly around the globe in a single evening and deliver 
presents to every good boy and girl) physically exists in like manner to the tree in front of me 
offers no exception to Husserl’s understanding of the structure of intentionality. The act is my 
perceiving of something; the content is the “structural feature or property of the act” that 
verifies that the state of affairs obtains, or not, or that the object exists, or does not. The 
object (existent or not) is that which the intention is about, that of which we have 
consciousness (Christensen 2001, 11). The content will verify whether a belief is right or 
wrong, a desire is fulfilled or unfulfilled, or if a perception is veridical or non-veridical. For 
Husserl, intentional states do not simply refer to existents. The layers inherent to a 
consciousness about something—when I perceive that thing before me, or my own conscious 
mental acts—are temporally and structurally complex and cannot be adequately accounted 
for by a science concerned only with the perceived (physical sciences), or with the mental 
acts involved in perceiving an objectified phenomena (empirical psychology). 
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Rather than living in the perception, adverted to the perceived in considering and theorising they 
[empirical scientists] do not manage to direct the regard instead to the perceiving, or to their own 
peculiarities of the mode of givenness of the perceived, and to take what is offered in analysis of 
something immanent with respect to its essence, just as it is given (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 87).  
 
Husserl was motivated to account for this fundamental mediating relationship between 
subjects and objects in the world. He called this descriptive science phenomenology.  
 Phenomenology in this specific, technical sense pays close attention to the structure of 
intending experiencing from within experience itself. All intending experience is about 
something external or internal to perception: I intend that apple to eat; I intend that thought 
about an apple I will eat later when I am hungry; I intend that mountain to climb; I intend that 
goal of surmounting Mount Kosciuszko one day in the future; I intend that person to love; I 
intend someone who has intelligence and humour to fall in love with. The qualitative scale of 
differences between these statements of intended experience invite a rigorous method of 
description to illuminate how they are given in experience, and the distinctions and 
connections structurally inherent to these phenomena. However, they are emphasised: eating, 
apples, hunger, climbing, mountains, Mount Kosciuszko, that person, our relationship, love, 
or the emotions more generally.  
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The Phenomenological Reduction 
 
 The ego meditans is born from a double reduction:  
 the transcendental of the being of the world  
 and the eidetic reduction of the factual ego.  
   
  Paul Ricoeur 2007 Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology (108) 
 
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology involves a radical method of exclusion to arrive at 
a field of pure consciousness (Husserl 1983, 134). Just how far the exclusion goes depends 
upon the type of investigation undertaken. Husserl’s project was to methodically critique the 
natural sciences and their corresponding transcendental objectivities in order to describe the 
immanental consciousness-formations. Immanence presupposes all transcendent activity, and 
through phenomenological reductions this distinction between transcendence and immanence 
becomes delineated. It is not without some confusion that the terms transcendence and 
immanence differ markedly between philosophers. Husserl uses this distinction in a very 
specific and complex way and is a necessary feature of his phenomenology, without which 
the reductions, as an analytic enterprise, would not function.  
 Immanent objects—such as our lived experiences—are originally self-given and 
require no exclusion (Husserl 2001, 577-581). That which gives itself to internal perception 
(such as a self-perceiving consciousness) may be described as belonging to the world in an 
immanent way, whereas for something to be given external to perception it belongs to the 
world in a transcendent way. A transcendent object “feigns to give the object completely 
[one-sidedly] in every appearance”, while in actual fact, it is given in many ways to different 
perceivers. “There is always more (from the side of the object)” to what the perceiver can 
seek meaning from (Steinbock 1995, 23). A transcendent quality goes beyond the singular 
appearance of the thing perceived; there is always something extra, a plus ultra of that 
perception. Our ‘non-immanent’ intuiting of a transcendent object fails to posit that thing as 
existing. Hence, since it can be otherwise, it has a dubitable existence. To save the world 
from a transcendental collapse, Husserl posits that immanence (the indubitable absolute with 
non-perspectival objective sense) is always already the ground for transcendence. Immanence 
and transcendence are formulated in an inextricable relation. Husserl reasons that in 
perceiving an object, the perception (the lived experience of that perceiving) is itself an 
immanent object, while the thing perceived could either not exist (we could be having a 
hallucination about that thing), or that it could be perspectively otherwise in appearance.  
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 This object that has been given to consciousness does not give itself as an immanent object, and it is 
 nothing less than contained in an intimately inherent manner in the percepi. To be sure, one says with 
 good reason that despite the fact that they are perceived, perceptual, bodily things do not have to exist: 
 It could turn out later that the perception was a deceptive one (Husserl 2001, 579).  
 
Salvaging immanence from the dubitable rubble of transcendental objectivities is a priority 
for Husserl, and is sought through a transcendental reduction. 
  In his earliest positing of the phenomenological reductions in Ideas I56, Husserl goes 
almost all the way with his radical technique of suspension or epoché (also referred to as 
parenthesising or bracketing), and peels through the layers of objective transcendencies to a 
positing of immanence, the pure ego. These transcendent objectivities include the natural 
world, the “physical and psychophysical world” and “all sorts of cultural formations [. . .] the 
technical and fine arts [. . .] aesthetic and practical values of every form [. . .] actualities as 
state, custom, law, religion [. . .] all natural sciences and cultural sciences” (Husserl 1983, 
131). Second to this rudimentary suspension of the natural world in which intentional 
experience of objects takes place, Husserl questions whether pure ego—once the human 
being as person in association with society is excluded—can escape this process of exclusion. 
It escapes, insofar as, it is not constituted. Only when pure ego is immediate and given 
inextricably and inherently along with pure consciousness, can it be included as 
phenomenological reduced datum (Husserl 1983, 133). Thus, all theories about pure ego that 
are non-immanent suppositions are excluded. Next to go in this method of exclusion is God. 
All rationalising grounds that identify “an extra-worldly divine being” as spiritual originator 
of constituted consciousness and are transcendent of both the natural world and absolute 
consciousness are bracketed along with posited divinity, whatever its form. 
 Following the phenomenological reduction of the natural world, human beings, non-
immediate pure egos and every version of God, Husserl wonders just how far he can go: “let 
us attempt the maximum possible exclusion of the eidetic and consequently a like exclusion 
of all eidetic sciences” (Husserl 1983, 135). With this move, all universal objects of essences 
are excluded, as they are “transcendent to pure consciousness [. . .] [and] not to be found [. . 
.] inherent within it” (Husserl 1983, 135). Interestingly in Husserl’s method of doubt, the idea 
of pure consciousness, or the sense of what it possibly could be, is founded upon that which it                                                         
56 I will continue to use this shorthand title when referring to Husserl’s First Book (Ideas I) and Second Book 
(Ideas II) of the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.  
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is not. Up until now, exclusion of the material objectivities that we know of as denoting 
world are suspended momentarily (albeit, not eradicated) in order to be able to stand before 
the world with others (being-in-world for Heidegger; moving-in-world for Merleau-Ponty) 
and see it for how it is from within the experience. It is a revelatory stance that brokers the 
distance between things in the world and their perceiver, and in the case of aesthetic 
experience, between the perceiver, the art work and their re-presentations: “memory, 
expectation, phantasy (or imagination) and image consciousness” (Brough 2005, XXX), but 
more on this later.  
 Returning to what counts as material eidetic sciences—and furthering the narrative of 
what needs to be excluded by the phenomenological reduction—“algebra”, “theory of 
number” and “theory of manifolds” are precluded in this transcendentally cleared field; they 
are of no use to phenomenology since the investigations of pure consciousness are 
presupposed by “a descriptive analysis which can be solved in pure intuition” (Husserl 1983, 
137). This final flex of the reductive muscle will be enough to carry out investigations 
without the occluding yoke of transcendent objectivities. Husserl contends that:  
 
[i]f we intend to develop a phenomenology as a purely descriptive eidetic doctrine of the immanental 
consciousness-formations, the occurrences in the stream of mental processes which can be seized upon 
within the boundaries drawn by phenomenological exclusion, then no transcendent individuals and, 
therefore, none of the “transcendent essences” belonging within those boundaries are included 
(Husserl 1983, 137-8).   
 
  80 
Eidetic Reduction 
As has been shown, the transcendental-phenomenological reduction (epoché) is the 
excavation of “brute fact” that contributes to a particularised view of the world, whether 
scientific, mystical or bleak, and may be observed as our natural attitude.57 What happens in 
this first-stage reduction is an initial parenthesising (mental exclusion) of that which could be 
otherwise. Dubitable contingencies included in this exclusion (to reiterate) are physical 
objects (existent and non-existent), human beings, non-immediate pure egos, God, and 
theories of the material-eidetic sciences. This initial reduction presents to the 
phenomenologist a transcendentally-cleared field of phenomena for engaging a second stage 
reduction known as the eidetic reduction (sometimes called eidetic intuition or eidetic 
variation).  
 The eidetic reduction is the practice or method of acquiring insight into the essence of 
a constituted thing and an experiencing consciousness. It is the necessary step in a 
transcendental phenomenology to “identify fundamental structures, rules or conditions for the 
possibility of sense-emergence” (Steinbock 1995, 14). For the universal to be freed from 
contingencies inherent to the empirical, a volitional process of free variation within 
imagination must be run through (like a cartoon flip book) in order to seek the original image 
that is retained. This is the original image (or general essence) to the “multiplicity of 
successive” images that we move through in free variation, and to which “all the variants 
coincide”: we call this the eidetic invariant (Husserl in Welton 1999, 292-3).   
The relationship between imaginative free variation and eidetic invariance are 
important features of my phenomenology of bodies interacting with technologies in live, 
mediatised events, and is evidenced in my later analysis of participants’ writings in Chapter 
7. I view the textual accounts (language of experience) to be involved in this process of free 
variation. The significance and technique of an eidetic reduction is best understood through 
practice. 
                                                        
57 From Ricoeur (2007b, 26). It is worthwhile noting here, that the natural attitude can only be identified from 
within the phenomenological attitude. 
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§2.3.2   PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 
 
In the preceding sections I stepped through the most basic tenets of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, considering briefly intentionality, the relationship between 
immanence and transcendence, Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological reduction, and 
hinted at the processes of free variation within his second stage eidetic reduction. Presenting 
a methodology in a discipline other than philosophy is a difficult undertaking. I do not build 
upon Husserl’s phenomenology or any one of his concepts as a Husserlian scholar would, by 
forensically sifting through his manuscripts, translated or not from the German.58 Rather, my 
project should be viewed as a pragmatic exercise in developing Transcendental 
Phenomenology in application. By delimiting this study to an aesthetic domain, some 
findings may raise ethical questions of a cultural and/or political nature. In the event of such 
extrapolation, my phenomenological analysis will move closer to what Steinbock identifies 
as generative analysis—a third regressive method in Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology, to be discussed in an upcoming section.   
 Digital haptics, for example, is one area that my research illuminates from within an 
aesthetic context. Haptics is a field of study that considers ‘touch feedback’ and has 
traditionally been centered upon human touch. In my project, the significance of touch is 
nowhere presupposed other than in the evidence of an encounter of touch. It is through 
phenomenological investigation that the experiences of touch are eidetically seized. Each 
moment is delicately unpacked by flicking through multiple embodied imaginings 
communicated through the language of experience: a process of free variation. The essential 
structure and/or connections are identified through textual analysis, and further elaborated 
upon in terms of their generativity or historical development.  
 Where a dancer interacts with their digital double in a multi-dimensional comingling 
of the corporeal and virtual, this relationship becomes not only restricted to the possibility of 
the co-generative creation of new material (movements/choreographies emerging between a 
dancer in a duet with a digital representation of themselves as digital double59), but leads to a                                                         
58 The Husserliana Manuscripts are stored at the Husserl-Archives in Leuven. The manuscripts are indexed from 
A-R, Volumes 1- 40 and have mostly been translated from German to English. The following volumes remain 
untranslated: 13, 14, 15, 26, 27, 29 (The New Crisis), 32, 33 (Time papers), 35 (Introduction to Philosophy), 38 
(On Attention), 39 (On the Lifeworld). For more on published sections of the Manuscripts see Husserl-Archives 
Leuven, International Center for Phenomenological Research http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/hiw/eng/husserl/.   
59 A digital double in performance is a “technological reflection of a live body [. . .] a digital image that mirrors 
the identical visual form and real time movement of the performer or interactive user” (Dixon 2007, 250). 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questioning of the distinctive qualitative experiences of touch and touching between humans 
and digital technologies.60 It is not the task of this dissertation to understand why an 
experience of touch might be significant beyond the aesthetic domain, or beyond the 
performance itself. Philosophically I am interested in elaborating the relationship between 
bodies and technologies through an eidetic analysis of their essential structure. However, I 
am cognisant that non-aesthetic-based discussions will emerge as a development upon my 
more preparatory and methodological enterprise. An interest in the being of these forms 
delimited by selected case studies within an aesthetic context does not prevent me from 
hinting at the ethico-cultural dimensions of the encounters that are thematised 
phenomenologically during the investigation.  
 My study does not take the experience of the dancer as its primary interest; rather, it is 
focused upon understanding the relationship between the dancer and his/her mediatised other 
from the perspective of audience.61 Here, we strike quite different results, and so my 
approach to phenomena becomes distinctive. Were I attempting to work from inside the 
relationship between the dancer and their digital double it could be argued that I was 
attempting to understand the relationship from a third-party perspective. The difficulties—if 
not impossibility—of a third-person attempt to know other minds or describe their experience 
prevents me from orienting the investigation from this place within the encounter. Central to 
perspective, however, are the shared experiences from within audience outside and/or 
alongside the immediate and qualitative relationship between a dancer and their 
technologically produced partner. These shared experiences are communicated through 
writings about the experience of the encounter: say, a dancer stepping inside their digital 
double’s holographic skin. The role of audience is central to the constitution of the event as 
aesthetic.  
 Cases of digital touch presented in this dissertation are not arrested from their 
aesthetic context or considered beyond their purpose as performances. As has been                                                         
60 Here I avoid the blanket term Technology with a capital T, as Paul Verbeek recognises in What Things Do: 
philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design (1970). Technology is “the specifically modern, 
“science-based technological devices of the sort that began to emerge in the last century” (Verbeek 2005, 3). For 
the most part I refer to the types of digital technologies that are used in performances, where visual or sound 
objects are invariably manipulated, modified or mediated through a computer. However I will be specific 
whenever analogue equipment or techniques are used such as a classic slide projector or analogue data from old 
camera equipment. For stylistic considerations I use the terms digital technologies, technologies and dance 
technologies interchangeably. 
61 For very good reason, most phenomenological studies are undertaken from the dancer’s perspective that is 
oriented towards their experience of moving, relations to space, time, other dancing bodies, technologies, and 
/or the audience. See here Sheets-Johnstone (1984), Fraleigh (1987), Kozel (2007). 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suggested, to inquire into their ethical, social or political dimensions is an entirely different 
project that would need to consider the interactions between humans and technology within 
the everyday.62 Empirical or philosophical studies of human computer interaction are useful 
in the more restricted discussions about performance phenomena, but are no substitute to 
undertaking direct phenomenological study of audience within an aesthetic context.  
 As I have suggested, Auslander locates this discussion within a notion of cultural-
economy as a strategy of de-ontologisation, but is unable to apprehend these forms, in and by 
themselves, or in their meaningful and structural relationship with audiences. As already 
discussed, I extend this discussion beyond a historico-cultural study of theatre and television, 
and beyond the debate between those who venerate the live and those who see no distinction 
between the live and mediatised, and focus upon the relationship rather than the distinction 
between bodies and newer technologies in performance contexts. I do, however, use the 
debate as a point of departure for this phenomenologically constructive elaboration. As 
Badiou would recognise, I am “deliciously isolated by amorous constructions” in my attempt 
to understand the being of these forms in their essential relationships (Badiou 2005, xv). 
  
 
                                                        
62 Studies that consider interactions between humans and computers investigate (non-exhaustively) the 
following technologies and their impact on everyday human subjectivity: computer wearables— mobile 
telephones, smart phones, blue-tooth technologies; game technologies—televisual and hand-held devices; web-
based and social networking technologies—the Internet, facebook, twitter, chatrooms, blogging sites, Second 
Life; and home digital entertainment—televisual devices, home projection, Blu-ray and sound systems.  
  84 
§2.3.3  GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
The phenomenology of transcendence is an experiential analysis for understanding 
dynamic possibilities in the way the world takes on sense. The three methods in Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology identified by Steinbock are the static, genetic, and generative. 
I will now discuss each in turn. 
 
Static Method 
Husserl’s static method describes that which is immanent in negative spatial terms. 
How does he do this, and what is missing in this description? Throughout Ideas I, Husserl 
accounts for the primary and secondary qualities of objects in spatial terms. He describes the 
motility of perception when walking around a table: the perception (appearance of the table) 
continues to change while its factical existence remains unchanged (Husserl 1983, 86). The 
spatial adumbrations of the table in the continuity of perception or in a completely new 
perception of the same object (following a moment of closing one’s eyes) are given in an 
entirely different way. For Husserl these are non-immanent features that are dubitable and 
susceptible to being excluded. Immanent objects of perception do not spatially adumbrate 
beyond themselves because they are always already adequately given. They are characterised 
in non-spatial terms to avoid attributions of transcendency: systems of adumbration that point 
beyond necessity. Steinbock notes that in Husserl’s earlier figurations of immanent objects, 
they are not described in “positive” temporal terms (Steinbock 1995, 30)  
 
Genetic method: active and passive synthesis 
What is methodologically significant in the temporal reckoning of immanent objects 
and individuals is the dynamic movement from stasis to genesis. Static phenomenology is 
delimited by (1) constitutive analysis: the way or how something is given, and by (2) eidetic 
analysis: the structural possibilities of an object and its essence. Both (1) and (2) occur 
without examining how the phenomenon originates or develops in the processes of the 
perceiver, which is always already a temporal movement (Husserl in Steinbock 1995, 39) For 
Husserl, the importance of the constituting subject in static phenomenology is limited to how 
the subject emerges in and through the constituted. When the relationship between 
constituted and constituting is static, the phenomenological description does not inquire 
beyond this experience to the origins and shadings of a self-temporalising subject. In the 
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1905 Lectures, Husserl acknowledges a complex process of becomings in any single 
experience without developing the genetic structure of self-temporalisation apparent in his 
later works.63 The distinctive architecture of genesis for individual egos is not the abstract 
model of time consciousness found within Husserl’s earlier text; rather, it is a 
phenomenology of “primordial phenomena” and their associations.64 Primordial phenomena 
include “motivations, apperception and affective association” (Steinbock 1995, 41).  
 Constitutive and structural eidetic analyses are methodologically important for 
considering the interactions between bodies and technologies in phenomenological terms. 
Even though these encounters may be qualitatively described more simply as a co-relation 
between the constituted and constituting in static analyses, my appeal to a non-foundational 
transcendental phenomenology situates this project, for the most part, in genetic 
phenomenology. 
 The genetic and self-temporalising dimension of Husserl’s philosophy is a vast 
system of complex conceptual distinctions. To proceed with explanation would lead me 
further from the task at hand. Instead, the following points summarise the main tenets of 
Husserl’s genetic analyses and highlight concepts from his system that directly assist my 
inquiry: 
 
1)  Genetic philosophy (genesis) is understood as the self-temporalising character of 
 lived experience. 
 
2)  There are three levels of genesis: (i) passive (ii) passive—active (iii) and active.  
 
Working backwards: 
 
3)  In active genesis (iii), a subject will constitute both ideal and real objects through 
 “rational acts” in the form of mathematical judgments, deduction,  predication and 
                                                        63 The genetic structure of consciousness in temporal terms is most worked out in the time manuscripts that 
form the translation Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic 
(Husserl 2001). 
64 In the 1905 Lectures on Time, Husserl elaborates time experience through his model of time consciousness 
presented as a system of temporal modifications that describe transitions between now-points. These 
modifications account for present impressions; the past as a particular style of “run-off” (memories, 
remembering, recollection and representifications), and the future as a system of protentions (expectations and 
phantasy). See Husserl (1964). 
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 the formation of objects that constitute culture, such as books, works of art, galleries, 
 theatres and so on (Steinbock 1995, 41). 
 
4)  The relation between passive and active perception (ii) is a transitional becoming; 
 objectifying acts of attention are raised from states of passive affectivity.65 We pay 
 attention to the affect of becomings in the transition from passive to active perception, 
 like when we hear a loud noise and retro-actively turn towards its origin. 
 Mathematical theorems or geometrical shapes originate in the experience of spatial 
 shapes; number and sense connections are the “the founding layers of validity” in 
 mathematical judgments (Steinbock 1995, 43).  
 
5)  Passive genesis (i) occurs in aesthesis: the vague territories of bodily sense and 
 sensation. Steinbock identifies two aspects of passive genesis that are useful guides 
 for grasping activity occurring in these most basic states of  passivity. For an object 
 given under passive genesis we consider our kinesthesia: “the modes of orientation of 
 space and time” in relation to the lived-moving-body. What are the proximal and 
 positional relationships that we sense in relation to constituted objects in perception? 
 
                                                        
65 In Ideas II, Husserl identifies three distinct objectifying acts within lived experience: theoretical, valuing and 
willing. Theoretical acts (as ‘spontaneous acts’) are already preceded by objectivities, which are pre-given in 
consciousness. Objectifying theoretical acts (doxic-theoretic) are active intentional acts of representing, judging 
and thinking. Categorial objectivities are antecedent and “constituted in the precedent theoretical acts” (Husserl 
1989, 7). These prior laid objectivities are caught in the temporal concatenation of constituted theoretical acts 
and are pregiven for every corresponding new act: “objects which for the first time will become theoretical are 
already, in a certain manner, laid out there in advance” (Husserl 1989, 8). Valuing acts take place in the 
affective sphere and include positions of being pleased or displeased. To live in rapture, delight or pleasure of an 
object is an objective valuing-act. “We can look at a picture with delight. Then we are living in the performance 
of aesthetic pleasure, in the pleasure attitude, which is precisely one of delight” (Husserl 1989, 10). Valuing acts 
occur prior to a theoretical ‘grasping’ of an object that then describes the object in terms of this or that art 
tradition. Pregiven objectivities relating to value-acts are spontaneous products and are originally constituted 
within the synthesis of the specific-act itself. For example, while watching Israeli choreographer Hofesh 
Schecter’s work Political Mother (2010), I became kinaesthetically absorbed with a movement motif of raised 
arms and wrists limply floating above the dancers’ heads in a soft, swaying unison. I experienced bodily 
warmth, a thickening in the throat, and empathetic sensations in my armpits and wrists; I felt pleasure; or, as 
Husserl would identify, I was in the “active abandon of the being-occupied-with-it-in-aesthetic-pleasure, in the 
aesthetic enjoyment, understood as act, the object is, as we said, the object of delight” (Husserl 1989, 10). This 
value-reception of feelings occurs before any kind of aesthetic judgment. As a dance critic and choreographer, I 
aesthetically judge the movement with reference to the idiom and traditions of contemporary and folk dance. 
The value-act as a distinct form of objectifying act from the theoretical is a region in Husserl’s phenomenology 
of great interest. Certain aspects emanating from the sphere of feelings, in their vague, non-theoretical, pre-
judged dimension, inform analysis in my study of encounters between bodies and technology in performance. 
For more on willing as an objectifying act, see Husserl (1989, 8-9). 
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It has sense for me by being near or far to my lived-body, left or right, above or below, in front or in 
back; it can be in motion or rest by virtue of my lived-body as a point of orientation, which is to say a 
zero-point of sense givenness (Steinbock 1995, 42). 
 
Through genetic analyses it is possible to see the world as possessing a “depth structure” 
(Steinbock 1995, 42). This non-prescribed, but described depth structure is an important 
feature in the spatio-temporal relationship between the lived-moving-body as audience 
perceiver and the various constituted dimensions of the mediatised performer who may 
vacillate between being flattened in two-dimensions or brought in a holographic form to 
three.  
 In the Primacy of Movement, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone asserts self-movement as the 
epistemological locus of our true experience of the animate world, and does so through a 
phenomenology of the moving body. In the opening paragraph of her book, Sheets-Johnstone 
states her purpose: 
 
 [t]his book is about movement [. . .] It is about how movement is the root of our sense of 
 agency and how it is the generative source of our notions of space and time. It is about how 
 self-movement structures knowledge of the world—how moving is a way of knowing and 
 how thinking in movement is foundational to the lives of animate forms  
 (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, xv). 
 
With this focus, Sheets-Johnstone remedies Husserl’s failure to provide an adequate account 
of kinesthesia in Ideas II and III.  
 
 Husserl does not actually consider self-movement as such; he considers only movement with 
 respect to external perception, that is, with respect to perceived objects in the world. His  
 estimation of kinesthesia is clearly restricted [. . .] A descriptive account of the sheer 
 phenomenon of self-movement as it is experienced kinesthetically is distinctly by-passed 
 (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 140). 
 
What is distinct about my approach is being able to account for kinesthesia in external 
objects, relations outside of the embodied perceiver, that are empathetically or imaginatively 
describing a body ‘over there’ from a position ‘here’. Thus, an adequate account of 
kinesthesia for both the constituted and constituting is required. In saying  this, I incorporate 
Sheets-Johnstone’s thesis of self-movement and attempt to extend Husserl’s descriptive 
account of kinesthesia in external perception. The following chapter on embodiment will 
develop this position further. 
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 The second aspect of passive genesis to note is kinesthetic motivation: the 
transformations for movement.66 To take an example: if while cycling I see a short, steep 
ramp ahead of me, I can inquire into my understanding of this ramp with the assertion that “I 
can” cycle to the top. My assertion correlates with a process where  one movement motivates 
another to steer the bike and conquer the ramp, rather than an intellectual reasoning of 
whether I could/could not, should/should not.67 Here, in the act of cycling, I intend the ramp 
differently in my motivation to get to the top. It also differs from the perceptual experience of 
walking past the ramp and seeing it as a feature of the raised landscape. In Husserlian terms, 
this unfolding motivation within movement is an aspect of apperception.  
 
(i) Apperceptions are intentional lived experiences that are conscious of 
something as perceived, but are themselves not self-given in these lived-
experiences (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 316). In the original perception of 
lived experiences, such as that tree before me, apperceptions are not self-given 
in the immediacy of perception as it appears as a tree over there, but 
determines new features in the temporal unfolding of my motivation towards 
the tree, such as the tree becomes possible to climb, to chop down, or to move 
around because it is an obstacle.  
 
(ii) The law relating to apperceptions in motivation concerns future possibilities: 
“a possible continuation of the stream of consciousness, one that is ideally 
possible” (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 316). With the example of cycling to the 
top of a ramp, I intend the ramp futurally and apperceptively in the ‘I can’ of 
my kinesthetic motivation, and this is based upon past experiences of 
surmounting ramps with a similar gradient.   
 
                                                        
66 See  “The Aesthetic in their Relation to the Aesthetic Body” in Ideas II (Husserl 1989)  
67 This is not to say these deliberations do not go on, especially in the experience of the new rider who may be 
more intellectually engaged with their riding while negotiating the terrain. 
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6)  There are particular laws regulating activity in genesis. These Laws of 
 Association regulate the “sequences of particular events in the stream of lived 
 experience” (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 316). Prior to becoming objectivated in sense-
 constitution, objects are sensuous data forming a field of sense. A field of sense as an 
 articulated-unity-of-sensuous-data is never taken as an object in itself. Take for 
 example the optical field of sense and our experiencing of colour. When I look at a 
 painted red wall, I see white patches  on this  background. In the unity of experiencing 
 this immediate perception, both the red wall and white patches are visual data. This is 
 the homogeneity thesis of a field of sense. The white patches contrast with the red 
 background, “but with one another they blend without contrast” (Husserl 1973, 73). 
 What Husserl means is that in immediate perception the colours are similar to one 
 another as visual data; however, on closer inspection, we realise the white  patches are 
 not spots of colour but light reflections. Thus, a difference is found within the 
 associations of the perception, rather than a second-order association of similarity that 
 they are both colours. An important aspect of the overall synthesis of visual 
 perception is that there is no “complete likeness” in  this experience.68  
 
 But all immediate association is an association in accordance with similarity. Such 
 association is essentially possible only by virtue of similarities, differing in degree in each 
 case, up to the limit of complete likeness (Husserl 1973, 75).  
 
 A field of sense possesses a determinative structure: “one of prominences and 
 articulated particularities” and is not a nebulous sea of unstructured 
 discontinuities (Husserl 1973, 72). Sense data are united into homogenous  groups or 
 unities of identity heterogeneous to each other, and are “already the product of a 
 constitutive synthesis” (Husserl 1973, 73). For the earlier Husserl,  an even lower 
 level of passivity understood as time-consciousness  presupposes this field of sense.69                                                         
68 Interestingly, ‘differences in similarity’ contrasted to a ‘complete likeness’ is a useful law of association to 
consider in the debate about whether there are ontological differences between live and mediatised forms. Used 
in response to Auslander’s claim that there is no ontological distinction because they participate in the same 
cultural economy, these laws of association indicate the surface play that takes place in his theoretical attempts 
to de-ontologise. The phenomena are already presupposed by a particular understanding of the cultural-
historical condition of these forms, reified in a particular light and never experienced or described in their 
genesis as sharing ‘differences in similarity’. At the level of association, it seems that Auslander is too quick to 
view these forms at their “limit of complete likeness”. 
69 By identifying a generative method in Husserl’s phenomenology, Steinbock acknowledges a more founding 
level to time consciousness and affective allure in passive activity: the inter-personal relation of being struck by 
another. Max Scheler identifies this underdeveloped aspect of Husserl and reinstates emotion as the source of 
value in feeling, steering phenomenology away from the rational aspects of human existence (Scheler 1973).  
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 Leaving aside the much larger discussion of  time-consciousness, we can proceed by 
 considering the two universal laws of association in genesis: succession and 
 coexistence. These two laws relate to earlier understandings of perception in Husserl 
 where a field of prominences  affects an allure on the perceiver. From my cycling 
 example: let us say I steer the bike toward the ramp not because that is the direction I 
 need to go, but because the ramp exerts a force on my attention.70 
 
7)  Consider the following example for the law of succession: I am cycling at  night 
 through the woods and happen to see a skunk crossing the road. The skunk visually 
 represented as (S) emerges as an enduring object of primal  impression in my initial 
 perception. S then runs into the woods as headlights (H) emerge on the bend coming 
 towards me. The skunk is no longer a primal impression, but recedes into the past as a 
 primary memory or retention. The headlights H now become constituted as enduring 
 object until the car passes and the headlights move off into the distance. What has 
 occurred here is a non-causal relationship of succession in the primary impressions of 
 S followed by H. We can in the freedom of our consciousness tie the two impressions 
 together as a successive event in the every expanse-of-a-presence: S followed by H, 
 S-H. Not only do we have consciousness of these two impressions in a temporal 
 process receding separately, we have consciousness of the succession: the S-H event. 
 We can freely re-present the event memorially, but  not simply as a memory of S then 
 a memory of H, which would be a relationship of S’ then H’ both isolated in re-
 presentation. Rather, to have a memory of the consciousness of the succession S-H, 
 the formulation would be S-H, (S-H)’, possibly S-H, (S-H)’, (S-H)’’ and so on as the 
 event of succession recedes further (as a “run-off” modification to use time 
 consciousness jargon) and as we continue to re-present through memory. 
 
 Above all the succession is a succession of experiences: the first is the original constitution of 
 the succession [of S-H]; the second is the memory of this succession [(S-H)’]; then the same 
 again [(S-H)’’], and so on. The total succession is originally given as presence (Husserl in 
 Welton 1999b, 197).  
 
                                                        
70 Husserl understands “the phenomenon of attention not simply an initiatory subjective act, but as correlated to 
the affective force exerted on the part of the matters themselves” (Steinbock 2004, 21). 
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8)  The law of co-existence regulates the bringing together of two objects, images or egos 
 in a temporal unity. At the level of passivity, a retentional memory of an object may 
 appear as “enduring side by side” with that very object in its concrete apprehension. 
 For example: if there are two images of a table separated by objective time—one 
 occurring before the other in perception—the law of co-existence brings these two 
 temporally separated images (the memory-image and the actual table before me) into 
 the same space. As an activity within passive genesis, they are brought together in the 
 same temporal field. 
  
 Here it does not matter that the remembered table in itself “belongs” to another objective  time 
 than the perceived table. We have a unity of “image,” and this is the image of a present, of a 
 duration with a coexistence to which pertains a spatial unity. Thus, we can spatially 
 “bring together” objects belonging to different fields of presence together by transposing them 
 to one temporal field (Husserl 1973, 181). 
 
9)  The synthesis of association and their correlative laws (discussed in 7 and 8) 
 occur at the level of passive genesis. These laws regulate intentionality: the 
 sense-constitution of all objects in the world including self-temporalising  subjective 
 processes. These laws regulate more deeply the sense-forming unities: the relationship 
 of primal forms “prior to the products of activity” in intentionality. Association 
 “designates a realm of the innate apriori [sic], without which an ego as such is 
 unthinkable” (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 315). Association occurs at the most 
 fundamental level of intentional consciousness, but can only be caught sight of in the 
 concrete (Husserl 1973, 75). It describes the many-leveled structures of a constituting 
 ego in the activity of passive- active genesis. The decipherability of this realm is a 
 forensically complex task.  
 
The laws of association are finite in Husserl’s account, but the concretising connections 
themselves are infinite. These multiplicious connections are where phenomenological 
description becomes possible. The subject is posited as “an infinite nexus of synthetically 
congruous performances” in genesis (Husserl in Welton 1999b, 315). Such an infinite nexus 
implies the possibility that inexhaustible connections emerging from the passive realm of 
sense-forming unities may be described and made understandable for the subject. Husserl is 
adamant that such understanding can only be achieved through a phenomenology of genesis. 
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Eidetic analyses of concrete phenomena in their temporal formation performed at the level of 
passivity reveals the essential structure of these most basic sense-forming connections.  
 
Generative Method 
To mollify concerns that Husserl’s entire project leads to an irreducible and 
‘foundational’ pure ego, I turn again to Steinbock’s contemporary scholarship, which has 
viewed Husserl’s transcendentalism as non-foundational. When a philosophy propounds 
certainty, validity or the constitution of sense in the world through the essential structures of 
an individuated experiencing consciousness, it is naturally open to attacks of Cartesianism, 
sometimes Kantianism—and irredeemably—solipsism.71 Once Husserl begins to describe the 
complexities of perceiving the natural world, and the ensuing radical method of exclusion 
forming the phenomenological and eidetic reductions, it is difficult to see how the world and 
other beings have been preserved as independently given and stable enough for the 
perception of anything to take place. This is more evident if the Ideas I is read in isolation 
with little attention to his thought as it developed in later texts. Husserl’s phenomenology 
taken as generative (Generativ) defends these easily and often made misinterpretations.72 
Acknowledging a generative move in Husserl’s phenomenology is a further guide for 
building toward a phenomenologically informed aesthetics.  
 Husserl’s transcendentalism has been a commonly held concern due to the 
implications of a radical subjectivism whereby the world and its contents are reduced to the 
                                                        
71 The charge of solipsism (in the extreme Berkeleyian sense that table, chairs and rooms no longer exist when 
we turn our backs) is a difficult one to make in relation to Husserl’s theory of perception. If anything, the 
independent world of physical objects is what remains stable; they, unlike perceptions, do not change. Objects 
continue to exist without being perceived. Husserl is very clear in §41 of Ideas I about this point. What is in 
continual flux is the way in which the object appears and this includes what traditional empiricists distinguish as 
primary and secondary qualities. For Husserl, the primary qualities attributed to an object by the physical 
sciences are still “contents of the perceived physical thing” (Husserl 1983, 84). Husserl’s key term adumbration 
helps to describe the many ways in which an object may be given: the colour of a physical thing in any given 
moment of its perception will be continually changing. “The same colour appears “in” continuous multiplicities 
of colour adumbrations” (Husserl 1983, 87). Similarly the spatial shape of an object, given to a person as one in 
the same shape, appears continuously, but always “in a different manner”, in different adumbrations of shape.  
72 To take one example, there is a degree of skepticism towards the use of Husserl in dance phenomenology, 
which is why Merleau-Ponty, with his citing of the body in the Phenomenology of Perception is the preferred 
philosopher. Many scholars take up these criticisms of Husserl as a Cartesian Solipsist without reading the 
corpus of his works. They fail to move past Ideas I, which is a seminal text in relation to Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality, and is the most developed introduction to his phenomenological method. However, the role of the 
body and kinesthesia is most emphasised in his Ideas II. Noteworthy exceptions include Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone and Anna Pakes, two dance phenomenologists who rigorously engage with Husserl’s corpus of 
writings in relationship to dance, movement and the body. See Sheets-Johnstone (1984, 1999, 2009) and Pakes 
(2011).  
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sense-constitution of an irreducible foundational ego.73 This is not a problem until his 
phenomenology is asked to consider the social world, otherness, its relation to history, 
political life, ethics, gender, ecology, and shared aesthetic experiences (Steinbock 1995, 2).74 
 In Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl (1995), Steinbock 
traces Husserl’s methodological considerations from the static to the genetic toward 
generativity (Generativitat). Husserl (not unlike Descartes) was methodically involved in a 
project that “recalcitrantly reduce[d] [the] structures of meaning and sense to a purely 
subjective foundation, to the so-called ‘transcendental ego’” (Steinbock 1995, 2). There are 
issues for Husserl’s thesis of intersubjectivity if it continues to be read only in relation to the 
genetic and static phases of his philosophy (Steinbock 1995, 7). As Steinbock illustrates, 
there are problems inherent with egological and foundational perspectives if attempting to 
solve problems in social life. Questions of “identity and difference”, amongst other features 
of social life, become problematic if we attempt to reduce meaning to a foundational, 
transcendental ego (Steinbock 1995, 3). When the emphasis is on consciousness alone, the 
question of where the constituting and constituted subject is situated in relation to world 
history and its social life becomes problematic. Addressing this commonly held problem in 
Husserl’s philosophy, Steinbock argues that transcendental phenomenology can be taken as 
regressively non-foundational. Rather than progressing in a Cartesian way from the simple 
relation between the subject and object of their perception in sense-constitution to the 
temporalising features of the constituted and constituting tied to the other in intersubjective 
relations, the study begins from the natural world working back from the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt) to the ego. It is a regressive procedure in phenomenological method (Steinbock 
1995, 171).75                                                          
73 Constitution or sense-constitution is an account of how something takes on sense: the world as constituted is 
an account of how the world is given in the way that it is given. It is not a positing of its existence. I continue to 
use the terms sense-constitution and sense-constituting throughout the rest of this section. These terms assist in 
making clear the distinction between static, genetic and generative method.  
74 Steinbock does not include ‘aesthetic experience’ in this list of social world experiences that a transcendental, 
foundational phenomenology is incapable of addressing. Rather, he leaves the list of social world experiences 
open with the words “and so forth” (Steinbock 1995, 2). For a discussion about the increase in scholarship 
within phenomenological aesthetics and emphasis upon aesthetic experience see Sepp & Lester (2010). 
75 Husserl uses the term lifeworld as early as Ideas II.  
 
The term lifeworld is used here to characterize the personal communicative world, the natural world, the intuitive world, and the 
aesthestic world of experience, all of which are placed in contrast to the naturalistic or objective worldview peculiar to the 
natural sciences (Steinbock 1995, 87). 
 
By the time of The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl presents us with a world full of experienceable objects, 
perceivers, communities, theoretical objectivities, sciences, cultures and histories. He presents a version of the 
world that the phenomenological reduction had earlier bracketed in order to claim the transcendentally purified 
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 Generative phenomena (along with the processes of static and genetic methods) may 
be taken as particular leitmotifs in the overall “sense-constitution” of world, and so opening 
Husserl’s phenomenological analysis toward social, political and ethical issues. The 
identification of a generative method in Husserl’s philosophy has developed a strong interest 
in his work from political, social and moral thinkers. I believe this interest will extend to 
scholars of performance, especially those concerned with the level of abstraction that his 
phenomenology presents, and the upfront bracketing of the world’s transcendencies that the 
reductions follow. 
 
Generativity and Intersubjectivity in Performance  
 The generative phase identified in Husserl’s philosophy ties the subject to others in a 
framework of intersubjectivity. In a performance context, it is rare to find a performer alone 
without an audience co-constituting the event. In some cases of performance art or ongoing 
installations, performance may occur without an audience present. Durational performances 
often find the performer alone for hours in the absence of audience. However in almost all 
cases, an audience is intended by the performer in some measure whether during or following 
the live event. If a performer is alone during a performance, they will continue to perform in 
the anticipation of more audience. Where a performer makes a video recording, the audience 
is posited after the event; during the recording process, the camera is posited as an external 
viewer.   
Intersubjectivity is an essential structure of performance. Performance presupposes 
audience in its constitution. A potential problematic for the intersubjectivity thesis is the case 
of a performer who claims performing for performing’s sake: a for-itself, rather than a for-
others. A for-itself performance entails no intended external audience, thus no performer-
audience relation. In this atypical scenario, what can be said of intersubjectivity as a basic 
structure of performance? Considering a hypothetical example, a gender-bending artist may 
perform in solitude to develop an intimate relationship with a particular character or gender 
alterity. It is a performance of subjectivity as fluid identity. In this preparatory performance 
the self is taken as another to form a relational pole of self–self. Following Ricoeur, the self is                                                         
ego. It is a picture, now, turned upside down, and which methodologically takes intuitable and experienceable 
life—the lifeworld—as a pregiven foundation to regressively inquire back from, remaining as an inquiry into 
the things themselves. See Husserl (1970). 
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seen as another in this performance, so in a relation of audience to performing self (Ricoeur 
1992). The performance now functions as a ‘for-others’ rather than a ‘for-itself’, and so 
reformulates the intersubjectivity thesis in a unique way. I do acknowledge, however, that 
working through more examples of possible ‘for-itself’ performances could challenge this 
suggestion. Having questioned the intersubjectivity thesis with the possibility of a ‘for-itself’ 
moment during performance through one example, I now ask: what kinds of experiences 
constitute an intersubjective relation for the performer prior to the execution of performance?  
 To tackle this scenario, I consider arguments for solo-collaboration in dance practice. 
Solo-collaboration posits that solo practice is always a case of collaboration with some other 
or others.76 A solo artist may insist that they work alone, evidenced by the simple fact that no 
other psychophysical being is directly external to them in their creations. They may argue 
that in solo production, choreographic investigations are based in one’s own moving body 
where feedback is self-circulatory: re-attending embedded information accumulated in the 
lived moving body over time. And yet, while engaged in a process of historicising their acts, 
they move referentially to their history, intending some historical other or tradition. For 
example, any of the early modernists of dance who worked alone in a studio had the tradition 
of ballet to challenge or reinvent. This may have been in the form of a particular teacher’s 
methodology or incumbent style that, in the spirit of invention and reactionary progression, 
they were collaborating with an absent rival to instigate change.  
 Solo-collaboration expands traditional notions of collaboration and solo practice. Solo 
making, seen as a collaborative act and not a hermetic practice, transcends collaborative art-
making associated with models of group devising. The temporal nature of collaboration can 
be seen in one’s investment to engage with our embodied histories from our very first pliè to 
drawing on specific aspects of dance history. Dancing with historic figures (the great 
choreographers of the past) and their ideas as posthumous moderators is a mode of 
collaboration. Reflection and generation of new material through antithetical or interpretive 
devices imposed on these ideas rejuvenated from history creates complex relationships not to 
be underestimated in creative formulations. A collaborator does not need to be an 
individuated bodily presence corporeally before you in the here-and-now. Rather, these 
spectral figures of history provide reference points and influence choices just as any second- 
or third-person perspective may offer in a studio-based collaboration.                                                         
76 I work with Heddon and Milling’s definition of collaborative creation, which “insists upon more than one 
participant” in a creative process (Heddon &Milling 2006, 2). Unlike these authors, however, I am interested in 
expanding the ontology of what and who those participants could be.  
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 Solo collaboration supports the claim that intersubjectivity is an essential structure of 
performance, before, during and after, and is evident despite claims to absolute solo making 
or performances performed in the absence of audience. Intersubjectivity as a basic structure 
of performance implies a historical, generational and traditional condition in the constituting 
processes of the performance—in its being as performance. Identifying and/or responding to 
some figure or tradition of practice within performance or dance history implies a community 
or nexus of others beyond and in relation to the individuated subject. Performance as an 
always-in-relation-with-other, where other is historically located or forms a tradition, requires 
a generative analysis. If my investigation was isolated to describing the community, history 
or tradition of a particular performance practice—say digital dance practices—a generative 
analysis would be more fitting to this task. However, to methodologically begin analysis in 
this particular lifeworld of digital performance practice would mean working back from this 
more developed enunciation of a cultural world.  
 My analysis will start from the complex moment of relation between phenomena: the 
shared experiential encounter of a fleshly body meeting a band of light. From here I will 
inquire into constituted phenomena, which are always already in inextricable relations to the 
constituting processes of the perceiver and shared intersubjectively amongst audience 
members. I will focus upon the genetic aspects of the experience, presupposed by the 
generative matter of a co-relation between performer and audience, as always-already-
historical. My statement of methodological procedure starts with the genetic while accepting 
the pregivenness of a cultural lifeworld.  
 Admission of a pre-given lifeworld, the world of digital performance practices, does 
not support Auslander’s strategies for a de-ontology which is based on the premise that live 
and mediatised forms are not, and can never be, ontologically distinct because they 
participate in the same cultural economy. In Auslandian terms, these phenomena are not 
distinct because they are meaningful together in this reified lifeworld that he proposes as the 
cultural economy. A Husserlian lifeworld does not presuppose such conflation or 
subsumption of phenomena, especially not without attendance to the experiences in and by 
themselves, and not without working regressively back through static and genetic analyses. 
 To avoid any contradictions in my statement of procedure, my approach to 
transcendental phenomenology is best described as a vacillation between genesis and 
generativity. While I place a microscope on the moment of shared perception, I continue to 
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maintain a sense of history, community and generation in the disclosure of the structure of 
relating phenomena.  
 
A Transcendental Aesthetic 
 A study of passive genesis is a concern for a transcendental aesthetic. It is important 
to note that Husserl, like Kant, pursued a transcendental aesthetic in order to understand 
(amongst other things) the lowest structural levels of human receptivity occurring in the 
sensuous—aisthēsis. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant was concerned with the spatio-
temporal properties and relations of things at the root of human knowledge. His goal was to 
put forth an alternative theory “radically distinct from the nativist, empiricist, and sensationist 
accounts of space-and time cognition [….] of the theory of visual perception”, and to analyse 
the relations and forms of intuitionism informing the cognitive faculties (Falkenstein 1995, 
xv). However, Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic differs from Kant’s. It resists reduction to 
any posited relation or law-like structure by an overarching architectonic system prescribing 
a schema of categories.  
 In Husserl, a transcendental aesthetic helps ameliorate human existence in its 
description of the movement of thinking itself. From cognition (active genesis) back towards 
receptive experience (passive genesis), Husserl describes this movement with an arboreal 
tracing of synthetic activity (genesis) to the origins of logic: “even at its most abstract, logic 
demands an underlying theory of experience, which at the lowest level is described as 
prepredicative or prelinguistic” (Churchill 1972, xxi). To orient one’s enterprise in a 
transcendental aesthetic is to philosophically reflect upon the dynamic and processual nature 
of the sensuous in the lived-moving-body.  
 It will be my task to pursue through genetic analyses the sense-forming associations 
occurring in the receptivity of phenomena and ‘value-reception’ of the constituting ego. To 
reiterate, the receptivity of the ego is the lowest level of activity in the synthesis of active and 
passive genesis within perception. The receptive ego in relation to objects that affect our 
attention is the region for analyses. I intend to concentrate upon various associations—the 
connections and disjunctions—arising from the different fields of sense: the visual, aural and 
kinetic. The orientation of space and time perceived in an embodied way by the audience 
member experiencing the object-event externally or from within the performance (immersed 
in an installation) will be examined through dimensionality: the tempo-spatial relations 
between two dimensions and three. Individual kinesthesia and the inter-kinesthetic are to be 
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examined through the various texts produced by participants and other sourced literature, as 
their writings describe the complexities of embodied imaginings in a poetics of reception. 
 
Tracing Kinesthesia in Reception 
 My case studies in the research project that formed the basis of my study—a case 
study I have called the Poetics of Reception Project—posit audience in two ways: (1) as 
distant co-constituting viewers constrained physically by the auditorium chair; and (2) as 
roaming audience participants in an installation environment interacting directly with 
performer and technology, and integrated into the event itself. Understanding kinesthesia for 
the constituted and constituting in (1) is an intersubjective relation of bodily empathy. 
Empathy, in kinesthetic terms, is a parasympathetic and imaginative experience; while in (2), 
the kinesthesia of a more spatially entwined audience member relating or interacting with the 
performer and their technology is not only empathetic (as in 1) but is isolatable to the 
individuated audience member participating more actively (and passively) in the object-
event.  
 Scenarios (1) and (2) provide distinct experiences of individuated kinesthesia and the 
inter-kinesthetic in this relationship between performer, technology and audience. Describing 
from an audience perspective what is external to the perception and reflecting upon their 
constituting acts in genesis reveals a very different structure of kinesthesia than what we find 
in accounts of performers experientially analysing their relationship with technology in 
practice and/or performance. Dance phenomenology takes up Sheets-Johnstone’s call for 
understanding kinesthesia from self-movement. From the point of view of the dancer, we 
gain first-person, introspective insight into their co-extensive relationship with space, time, 
other dancers, objects, technologies, and music; and we are granted embodied reflections 
about how and why they move or don’t move. Dance phenomenology invariably presupposes 
movement as the locus of knowledge and the foundation of life. Studies oriented in the 
experience of the dancer privilege self-movement, and invariably describe embodied 
sensation, feeling, or intended action.77 Audience kinesthesia understood primarily from a 
phenomenological perspective is less readily found within dance literature.78 Philosopher and                                                         
77 For dancer-centric studies of self-movement see Minchinton (1994, 45-51), Nelson (1996, 4-15) and Potter 
(2008, 444-465). 
78 Studies within dance performance and choreography that foreground audience perspectives are proliferating 
in the areas of cognitive science. The main problem facing this mode of inquiry in the arts is the reduction of 
experiences to a type of measurable evidence that fails to provide meaning related to lived-experience. That we 
can map brain activity, describe a physiognomy or explain sensory processing in the body as a response of 
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dancer Phillipa Rothfield does, however, offer a critical analysis of universalist approaches to 
corporeal phenomenology that reduce non-balletic, non-modernist forms of dance to the same 
set of kinesthetic sensibilities in the watching and subsequent valuation of dance. She 
suggests a Foucauldian-inspired practice of phenomenology, whereby the genealogical 
history of corporeal constitution in the observer is taken into account in order to “retain a 
certain sort of universalism whilst recognizing a differential field of manifestation” 
(Rothfield 2005, 43).  
 The structure of kinesthesia for a chair-bound audience member takes on primary 
importance in my study. It is only through the constituting (or co-constituting) that the 
constituted may be described in terms of its essential structure. Despite the vagaries that the 
processes of passive genesis presents, to privilege the visual and cognitive over the felt or 
kinesthetic is to rob the inquiry of arriving at a fully fleshed account of the relationship 
between bodies and technologies.  
 
The kinesthetic correlates of perception—what Husserl calls “the kinestheses”—are hence not practical 
perceptual affordances . . . They are, in their own right, perceptual experiences, the most fundamental 
of perceptual experiences, and as such are at the very core of the constituting I, that is, of 
transcendental subjectivity (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 139). 
 
What is significant for my study of aesthetic processes is the perspective that mediatised 
forms are already part of a particular lifeworld and historical process. Features of experience 
engaged in a continual process of becoming, changing and developing differently across 
cases, require iterations of a framework to compliment their dynamic nature. By 
concentrating on genesis through eidetic analyses of the object-event, the essential structure 
of these co-constituted encounters, the self-temporalising features of these constituting 
consciousnesses, and the intersubjective and inter-kinesthetic relations within audience, will 
be more readily disclosed. The purpose of my next chapter will be to develop the role of 
embodiment in the practice of this disclosure.  
                                                          
sadness and/or laughter to certain events is interesting. However, such analyses extricate the phenomena from 
contexts of experience in representations that fail to adequately develop the depth, structure and associations of 
aesthetic encounters. Cognitive science that methodologically lacks concern for individuated and intersubjective 
experience rapidly approaches it limits in aesthetic practices. For more on burgeoning studies in cognitive 
science, neuro-aesthetics and its criticisms within Dance Studies see Shusterman (1999, 299-313); Hagendoorn 
(2003, 221-27; 2004, 79-110); Brown, Martinez & Parsons (2006, 1157-67); Merino, Jola, Glaser & Haggard 
(2008, 911-22); Sheets-Johnstone (2009); Hagendoorn (2011, 513-529).  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CHAPTER 4   EMBODIMENT   
 
 If then we want to bring to light the birth of being for us, 
we must finally look at that area of our experience which clearly has significance and 
reality only for us, and that is our affective life  
 
   Maurice Merleau-Ponty 1962 Phenomenology of Perception (178) 
 
Embodiment is both elusive and self-evident. Taken prima facie, the question of 
embodiment is not, here, an existential or ontological problem: there is no denying that we 
have bodies, or in fact, that we are our bodies. The following discussion does not attempt to 
argue towards the existence of bodies per se. Rather, the matter of embodiment becomes a set 
of epistemological questions within a phenomenology: Can we know our bodies? How do we 
know our bodies? To what extent can we describe our bodies? Provoking inquiry from what 
we know and can know from experiential limits, I will proceed somewhat heuristically from 
certain concepts and debates found within the traditions of phenomenology, embodied 
cognition, and dance studies. 
 Throughout this chapter, I draw upon the theoretical aspects outlined in Chapters 2 
and 3 to build towards a methodology for understanding the structural relationship between 
bodies and technologies—live and/or mediatised—and the experience of the spectator as 
analyst within performance.79 An account of the spatio-temporal structure of receptivity for 
the spectator will be central to my investigation. I intend to grasp this structure through an 
analysis of descriptive writings derived from my own application of the phenomenological 
framework to be described in Chapter 5. These writings will facilitate the communication of 
experiences between selected participants involved in the same object-event and/or across 
events. I will understand these phenomenologically-produced texts in light of other writings 
pursuing similar methods investigating performer experience in mediatised performances, 
including Susan Kozel’s phenomenology of performing in Paul Sermon’s Telematic 
Dreaming (Kozel 2007). 
Before establishing the practical nuts and bolts of my methodology, I present here a 
supportive ‘conceptual relation’ that builds succinctly and purposefully upon the individuated 
kinesthesic and inter-kinesthetic dimensions of a spectator participating as a player in play,                                                         
79 In the previous two chapters, I used the term spectator-analyst to indicate the special kind of audience 
member who undertakes phenomenology in the act of audiencing. From this point onwards, I will discontinue 
the use of this bulkier term and simply refer to them as a spectator. I will use the term audience member or 
audience to indicate those who are not doing phenomenology. 
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collaborating in the formation of these aesthetic events. These will be elaborated with 
theoretical relevance to Husserl’s approach discussed in the previous chapter on 
phenomenology. I will use the conceptual relation embodiment—embodied imaginings—
writing embodiment to organise various concepts identified in the literature on embodiment. 
This relation will also afford a departure point or opening for understanding bodily 
experience at a structural level in relation to selected phenomena. This is a non-procedural, 
non-linear relation that orients both the spectator doing phenomenology, and my textual 
analysis of the writings and documentation. Embodiment—embodied imaginings are non-
discrete constituents of experience that bear a strong relationship in terms of their generative, 
interwoven structure, but should not be taken as a presupposed deeper a priori structure of 
bodies in relation to technological media. The point of a phenomenological investigation is to 
disclose what these essential structures are through an eidetic analysis of diverse experiences, 
actual and imagined. Ultimately this relation turns the spectator’s attention toward 
phenomena (active turn of regard) and towards their description of experiences, including the 
perception of an external object, their constituting consciousness, embodiment, kinesthesia, 
and movement. In this sense, the relation should be treated as a methodological aid, not as a 
positing of fixed assumptions about embodied consciousness in mediatised performance 
experiences. In the process of thinking, research and writing, this relation has functioned 
heuristically as a revelatory device or practice. The writing of a phenomenological approach 
is itself a phenomenology.  Sustaining this relation throughout the phenomenological process 
will inevitably clarify, elaborate, and extend the ideas, questions, limits and debates 
forthcoming. I will return to aspects of embodiment, movement, imagining, temporality and 
the writing of these experiences again in the closing chapters. 
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§2.4.1   PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF EMBODIMENT 
 
There are many different conceptions of embodiment describing bodies, the senses 
and affect in experience. While recognising the diversity of cultural perspectives of 
anthropologies focused on embodiment in performance contexts, and the limitations of a 
Western philosophical treatment of the body, I will construct my relation in accordance with 
the phenomenological canon that seeks the structures of experience.80 
Within the phenomenological tradition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty is credited with the 
most celebrated study of embodiment. In the Phenomenology of Perception (1962) he 
addresses the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in an experiential account of 
the body.81 Prior to the phenomenological movement, ‘the body’, qua object, was effectively 
relegated to secondary consideration in philosophical thought as a major consequence of 
Descartes’ systematic doubt; a systematic doubt that might be described as a deconstructive 
epistemological method, rendering the physical body and its senses open to existential 
deception and uncertainty.82 Later, the subject/object problematic was taken up by Husserl 
through his thesis of intentionality and the constituting, constituted territory of consciousness. 
A thesis on embodiment is rarely attributed to Husserl. Scholars, such as Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone, have reread key Husserlian texts, revealing a sensing, sensating and lived 
body to argue that his work on consciousness does not preclude the body: rather, for Husserl, 
the body is central to all perception and the constitution of things in the world. In Ideas II, 
Husserl writes: 
 
                                                         
80 Besides Merleau-Ponty’s and—even earlier—Husserl’s account of the lived body (Leib) in his Ideas II, 
contemporary feminist scholars working within phenomenology have questioned the neutralizing of bodies 
through transcendental phenomenology, which is argued to be a philosophical exercise reducing all bodily acts 
to a form of intentionality. On this account, the notion of embodiment conceptualised by transcendental, and 
existential male phenomenologists overlook gender and race. 
  
 It does not, then, seem to be bodies that one finds in Husserl, but a living body (Leib) that is defined eidetically,  within invariable 
 parameters. At worst, the body Husserl describes is accidental and external to consciousness, at best  it is the body of a 
 transcendental and universal subject (Al-Saji 2010, 16). 
 
Al-Saji considers both the limitations of Husserlian phenomenology and what it can offer feminist theory 
through an exploration of sensings and touch (Al-Saji 2010,13-38). For an intercultural perspective of 
embodiment in performance see Sklar (2007, 38-46). 
81 First published in French in 1954 by Gallimard, Paris. I am working from the Colin Smith translation 
published by Routledge Classics, 2002.   
82 See Descartes ([1641]1996). I use the term deconstructive in a non-Derridian sense, whereby the existence of 
all things are subject to radical doubt. 
  103 
 
The Body is, in the first place, the medium of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is 
necessarily involved in all perception . . .When it touches objects, the hand slides over them. Moving 
myself, I bring my ear closer in order to hear. Perceptual apprehension presupposes sensation-contents, 
which play their necessary role for the constitution of the appearances of the real things themselves 
(Husserl 1989, 61). 
  
Following the body’s exclusion from the activities of the epoché in Ideas I, as a 
transcendency of the natural world, Husserl reinstates the body in his arguments for bodily 
constitution and self-awareness in the reconstitution of material nature in Ideas II, making a 
fundamental distinction between the lived-body (leib) and the physical body (korper). Bodily 
self-awareness is made possible through the lived experiences (Erlebnis) of our sensings 
within the occurrence of touch. Sensings are prior to any objectification of the body 
constituted as mine but may be reflected upon through directed phenomenological reflection 
towards these instances of touch: a body in perpetual contact with its world. 
 The body and bodily experience, however, are dealt with more thoroughly by 
Merleau-Ponty, particularly in his description of the problems of body–image and bodily 
constitution in his approach to perception. In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty demonstrates the physiological and psychical as non-amalgamated, non-independent 
entities. Thinking is the body, enacted through individuals’ projects within the world of 
things and with other persons. Rather than view Merleau-Ponty’s treatise on embodiment as a 
conceptual mediation between mind and body/subject and object, it is more accurate to 
understand his explications of the bodily as an integrative move that centralises corporeality 
as the phenomenon with which our existence is expressed constantly. 
 
In this way the body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that 
existence, but because existence realizes itself in the body (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 192). 
 
Merleau-Ponty did not foreground the body simply to counter mind-centered philosophies; he 
was foremost an existential philosopher concerned with the meaning of Being, analysed 
through instances of bodily experience. Existence is a “perpetual incarnation” of “abstract 
moments”, deemed to be, the body, mind, sign and significance (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 192). 
As I suggested in Chapter 3, for Merleau-Ponty the body is neither in space, nor in time, nor 
is it in the world as an operating system determined by psychophysical connections enacting 
toward external objects, and described in abstract or objective terms. Rather, “the union of 
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soul and body [. . .] is enacted at every instance in the movement of existence”.83 The body—
like other objects—inhabits the spatio-temporal given world. Merleau-Ponty elegantly 
describes what it is to ‘have’ a body. 
 
To have a body is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of perceptual unfolding and of all 
those inter-sensory correspondences which lie beyond the segment of the world which we are actually 
perceiving. A thing is, therefore, not actually given in perception, it is internally taken up by us, 
reconstituted and experienced by us in so far as it is bound up with a world, the basic structures of 
which we carry with us, and of which it is merely one of many possible concrete forms (Merleau-Ponty 
in Welton, 1999a, 174). 
 
On this account, a working concept of embodiment should never privilege the body or 
physical over the mind or what is traditionally constituted and separated as consciousness: the 
‘I think’. On the contrary, it should show their relationship in a dynamic interplay of peculiar 
emphasis between thought, action, sensing, remembering, imagining and emoting in the 
body’s interrelated boundedness with the world as horizon.84 These changing permutations of 
enactment correlate to the way that we as psychophysical beings are of the world in our 
horizonal push toward others and objects.  
 In the next section, I will focus upon conceptions of embodiment and bodily 
constitution in Merleau-Ponty, Shaun Gallagher, Donn Welton and Brian Massumi. Particular 
themes will emerge from this careful, though brief, survey, helping to form a guiding 
conceptual framework for developing and applying my phenomenological method. 
 
 
                                                        
83 Part quote by E. Menninger-Lerchenthal from Das Truggebilde der eigenen Gestalt found in “Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty: selected readings” in (Welton 1999a, 154). 
84 What I describe here as an interplay of peculiar emphasis on psycho-physical modes of enactment takes the 
Gestaltian shape of a foreground emerging from or disappearing into a background. The Gestalt movement is 
found as a deeper perceptual structure in both Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception and Heidegger’s ready-to-
hand concept in our everyday ‘concernful dealings’. See §16 “How the Worldly Character of the Environment 
Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world” in (Heidegger 1962, 102-7). 
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§2.4.2  BODY SCHEMA AND PROPRIOCEPTION 
 
Notwithstanding Merleau-Ponty’s description of embodiment as a process of 
unfolding in and with the world, it is claimed by some theorists that the human body moving 
in relation to its environment is organised at a deeper non-consciously-apprehended level. As 
a phenomenologist working in the field of embodied cognition, Shaun Gallagher refers to this 
system of organisation as a body schema (Gallagher 2005, 18).85 In doing so, he makes a key 
distinction between this term and the closely related term ‘body-image’ in his conception of 
embodiment. Literature from psychology, philosophy and medicine, Gallagher argues, 
confusedly posits these two terms as substitutable, and conflates them on the basis of sharing 
a few characteristics. Gallagher’s conceptual separation remedies this confusing conceptual 
ambiguity, all the while acknowledging that body image and body schema are "different but 
closely related systems". On the one hand, body image “consists of a system of perceptions, 
attitudes, and beliefs” that you possess about your body (Gallagher 2005, 24).86 For example, 
I can have a belief about my body’s shape or size, picture this in a mental image, and 
consequently make the judgment that I will fit through a particular doorway. On the other 
hand, body schema:  
 
[i]s a system of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual 
monitoring . . . [it] involves certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and constrain 
movement and the maintenance of posture (Gallagher 2005, 24).  
 
In the absence of having a belief or mental representation of my body shape or size, I may 
pass through a doorway without consciously judging whether I will fit through or not. My 
body organises itself within an environment at a more or less pre-conscious level with 
marginal bodily awareness (say, if I scrape my arm on the frame). Usually, in these instances, 
I do not think about my movement or reflect on my body as I pass through an unfamiliar 
doorway. Even if this doorway leads into a traditional English cottage, I automatically bend                                                         
85 Gallagher’s approach for a theory of ‘embodied cognition’ engages with the fields of phenomenology and 
philosophy of mind, psychology, medicine, and cognitive science. He empirically and philosophically draws on 
all these areas to conceptually build towards his thesis that the ‘body shapes the mind’. In order to describe how 
embodiment helps us understand cognition, Gallagher insists on a shared vocabulary and framework of concepts 
consensually reached across these fields. See Gallagher (2005). 
86 I find this distinction compelling and useful for future research on my Tiny Worlds Project. A project that 
considers kinesthetic perceptions of scale: the constitution of bigness and smallness in relation to aesthetic 
objects, nature and the built environment. See initial findings in Chapter 7, pp 258-261 and discussion in my 
conclusion, pp 280-281. 
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forward and slightly crouch to organise my body to fit through the small opening. If I 
believed myself too wide (even if this were not the case) body image has come into play over 
and against body schema. Gallagher insists that in our experience of embodiment they each 
work together; in healthy embodiment, body image and body schema interrelate at points of 
awareness to integrate the moving body with its perceptions. This relationship can be 
dysfunctional in certain neurological disorders, such that one’s body image works against 
their body schema, or vice versa.   
 On Gallagher’s account, to have a full awareness of the moving body is impossible 
due to the hidden, dynamic processes of bodily-schemata.87 By and large, the function of a 
body schema is a limit to bodily self-awareness. However, some of our bodily-schemata can 
be brought into perceptual awareness: 
 
[t]o the extent that one does become aware of one’s own body, by monitoring or directing perceptual 
attention to limb position, movement, or posture, then such an awareness helps to constitute the 
perceptual aspect of a body image (Gallagher 2005, 26).  
 
Gallagher seeks clarification of the body schema system through his use of a further concept: 
the prenoetic performance of the body. The prenoetic performance of the body involves those 
habitual postures and movements that are not conceptualised, visualised or emoted (as is the 
case with body-image). The prenoetic is where the body “acquires a certain organisation or 
style in its relation with its environment”, but which is not readily brought to consciousness 
and includes the non-conscious aspects of proprioceptive activity (Gallagher 2005, 32).88 
Prenoetic movements help to structure consciousness and the perceptual field within which 
they are entwined.  
 Theorists of embodiment wish to understand the extent to which bodily-schemata are 
at play in structuring consciousness. Indeed, the prenoetic or hidden body schema imputes a 
limit to absolute bodily and self-awareness, a matter for much discussion by both 
philosophers and scientists. While the latter focus upon empirically-derived data, my position 
on how to address such limits to bodily attention in the receptive experiences of audience 
needs to be elaborated.                                                         
87 Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher persist with the term ‘body schema’. Welton and others (including myself) refer 
to the body’s schema as bodily-schemata. The latter term denotes a multiplicity in two ways: first, in the sense 
of there being more than one body schema for bodies; and second, that there is a plurality of kinesthesias and 
proprioceptions that form the basis of muscle contraction and our posture as we move within intentional actions.   
88 Proprioception will be discussed more specifically in relation to other authors later in this section. 
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The system that is the body schema allows the body actively to integrate its own positions and 
responses and to deal with its environment without the requirement of a reflexive conscious monitoring 
directed at the body. It is a dynamic operative performance of the body, rather than a consciousness, 
image or conceptual model of it (Gallagher 2005, 32). 
  
Gallagher’s recasting of the concepts ‘body image’ and ‘body schema’ offers a compelling 
and coherent delineation of embodiment. Particularly striking in Gallagher’s conceptual 
distinction is the idea that both body image and body schema are experientially involved in 
dynamic reciprocities of interaction. Nonconscious, unreflected awareness of the prenoetic is 
interrupted or overcome (depending on how you view this debate) in those moments where 
an explicit awareness of the body occurs because of pain (Leder 1990), fatigue (Gallagher 
1995, 33-4), an activity going wrong (Heidegger 1962), or in the practice of a technique that 
expands bodily attention to focus at a subtle scale upon the more explicit regions of bodily 
activity.89 Gallagher demonstrates this reciprocity in his assessment of dancers and athletes 
who can improve the performance of their body schema.  
 
The dancer or athlete who practices long and hard to make deliberate movements proficient so that 
movement is finally accomplished by the body without conscious reflection uses a consciousness of 
bodily movement to train body-schematic performance (Gallagher 2005, 35). 
 
My own area of inquiry might, then, be described as the prenoetic performance of a spectator. 
What are the clues for prenoetic activity in an audience member reacting to their encounter 
with a moving performer, technologies and their representations, and other audience 
members? Before considering how to frame attentional bodily awareness that understands a 
reciprocal interaction between body image, bodily- schemata, and movement, I will firstly 
explicate two alternative definitions and descriptions of proprioception (Massumi’s and 
Welton’s) and its relation to bodily awareness. 
 
                                                        
89 Some dance, martial art and yoga practices attempt to access the hidden prenoetic organisation of the body 
through movement, training and experiential bodywork. For more on this see my discussion of Bonnie 
Bainbridge Cohen’s Body-mind Centering (BMC) approach in Chapter 2, pages 68-69. Or see Bainbridge-
Cohen (2008). 
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Proprioception: Several Cases 
Here I am taking up both Gallagher and Welton’s elaboration of bodily-schemata in 
relation to my phenomenological investigation in order to develop a point of departure and a 
set of questions for deepening spectatorial attentional awareness. Embodiment is something 
to grapple with in description, and problematic to conceptualise without limiting or reducing 
these experiences to a set of concepts, thereby undermining these deeper structures that are 
recognised within studies of embodied consciousness and cognition as elusive. However 
ineffable or inexplicit kinaesthesias are, I am bound in this dissertation to communicate 
adequately and openly with language a thorough description through reflective bodily-
awareness.  
 The proprioceptive system organises bodily disposition and the way we bear our body 
parts, carriage and movement. Most basic to bodily-schemata are the lived vectors that orient 
the body in spatial relations to itself and other objects: “head-foot, side-side, and rear-aft [….] 
top-bottom, left-right, back-front, near-far”, or more dynamically “upward-downward, 
leftward-rightward, closer-further” (Welton 2004, 14-15). They refer to the same hidden 
domain of the body’s organisational structure. 
 In Parables for the Virtual: movement, affect, sensation, Brian Massumi argues that: 
 
[t]here is a sixth sense directly attuned to the movement of the body: proprioception. It involves 
specialized sensors in the muscles and joints. Proprioception is a self-referential sense, in that what it 
most directly registers are displacements of the parts of the body relative to each other. Vision is an 
exoreferential sense, registering distances from the eye (Massumi 2002, 179). 
 
In a telling anecdote, Massumi describes a moment of disjunction between visual perception 
and the experience of proprioception: his realisation that the actual street below his office 
window is different to—in fact bears no resemblance to—the street he thought he looked out 
upon everyday. Once this confusion is brought to his attention, Massumi is unable to draw, or 
map with two-dimensional lines, the exact pathway from the entrance/exit of the building to 
his office door, but is able to retrace his daily route by physically ‘back-forming’ the spatial 
route. Massumi understands this ongoing confusion of orientation to be the result of bodily 
memory having more of an impact than visual memory on his experience. He accounts for 
proprioception as a positive misperception, rather than as a deeper, non-conscious structure 
informing our embodiment, and attributes this orientation (or disorientation with the way the 
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geometries of the building were visually mapped) to proprioceptive information. He 
concludes that: 
 
 [t]he proprioceptive self-referential system—the referencing of movement to its own variations—[is] 
 more dependable, more fundamental to our spatial experience than the  exoreferentialvisual-cue system 
 [. . .] Its role in human orientation has significant implications for our understanding of space because it 
 inverts the relation of position to movement. Movement is no longer indexed to position. Rather, 
 position emerges from movement, from a relation of movement to itself. Philosophically, this is no 
 small shift (Massumi 2002, 180). 
 
Donn Welton considers the structure of proprioception, identifying three distinct types of 
sensations involved in the act and action of touching another object. At the level of bodily 
self-awareness he argues that we can be either tacitly or explicitly aware of our intentional 
acts when touching objects. These acts are invariably and non-exhaustively “qualitatively 
differentiated” acts of “seeing, hearing, smelling, loving, hating, etc. objects” (Welton 2004, 
7). Preferring to see this awareness as a reflexive, rather than a reflective act, Welton avoids 
the problematic issue of introducing a third act of reflection on a second reflective act, which 
takes the initial intentional act as its object for reflection. The prospect of a third act 
reflecting on the reflection begs—like the second act—to be accounted for, thus setting up an 
infinite regress in an absurd chain of reflections. Welton argues that if self-awareness is 
possible, then by viewing self-awareness in terms of reflexivity, our self-awareness of an 
intentional act attends to the intentional act itself in the moment of having that act: it is a 
lived-through experience (Erlebnis) and not a chain of second, third, or fourth acts of 
reflection, ad infinitum (Welton 2004, 5). At this point, he makes a distinction between the 
“explicit awareness of objects and the implicit or tacit awareness we have of our experiences 
of objects” (Welton 2004, 5).  
 Condensing Welton’s argument, let us take an example where touch is involved. In 
the unity of experience these acts could be nested amongst others in what Merleau-Ponty 
describes as a “nexus of intentionalities” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 484).  For instance, if I grab 
the handle of my coffee mug and begin to lift it toward my mouth; I feel its smooth, shiny 
texture, and its rigid contours that allow me to grip and lift its contents. What occurs here in 
reflexive awareness is an explicit tactile sensation created by the action of picking up the 
mug. In terms of touch and touching, I am aware of the mug solely through tactile sensation. 
Following the initial intention of wanting to drink coffee, I intend a second act through touch 
of the particular object I know from experience to be my coffee mug (for argument’s sake, 
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say I am staring at the computer screen—another, though different act occurring 
simultaneously in the nest of intentionalities within the unity of experience—and reach for 
the mug without looking). The variety of tactile sensations I experience from picking up the 
mug (its smoothness, warmth, roundness) helps determine profiles of it, as the object ‘mug’: 
the presenting intentional act of that object in the experience of drinking coffee. Tactile 
sensations are the first kind of sensations involved in the structural awareness of touching. 
They give objects a thematic awareness. We do not need to attend to this part of the act with 
any type of reflection: “[e]xplicit awareness is really attention and it is truly lost in the matter 
at hand” (Welton 2004, 5).  
 This kind of attention, however, does not “exhaust the scope of [our] awareness” 
(Welton 2004, 5). Implicit or tacit awareness about our experiences are precisely where two 
other sensations come into play. Returning to our example of the coffee mug, if I happen to 
close my eyes while holding the mug there is a tacit awareness of me touching it, and the 
mug touching me, not just the explicit awareness of the mug as an object. Feelings are 
centralised in the fingers, the point of contact between the mug and me. Noticing this contact, 
I feel the weight and contraction in my joints, the warmth and smoothness on the skin. I have 
localised feelings from the surface area of the mug making contact with a region of skin. 
Internally, I feel sensations radiating from my fingers, through my hands and wrists, up to the 
shoulder joint. My “fingers undergo sensing or sensuous feelings” in a localised way. 
Without these fingers holding the mug the act of touching “would cease and, as a 
consequence” the mug as a touched object would disappear (Welton 2004, 11). The 
distinction between tactile and sensorial feelings is important to maintain in understanding 
affective awareness. Affectivity places all intentional acts and their objects in the world, but 
not in the sense that, say, “a cat is in a box”; rather, perceptual objects are subtended by other 
experiences that “pervade [….] them all” (Welton 2004, 9). In all perceptual experiences 
there is: 
 
 a certain openness to what surrounds those objects, to a background, even atmosphere, from 
 which they emerge. Like air on a thick, humid day, this atmosphere soaks the whole of experience with 
 an inescapable weight that permeates all that we see or feel. Let’s speak of this as affectivity (Welton 
 2004, 9-10) 
 
Sensorial feelings make possible a self-awareness that attends to the touching and not just to 
the object. The body is included as both the basis and as a participant in what Husserl calls a 
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circular intentionality: the touching-touched-touching. Sensorial feelings are the root of 
reflexivity for Welton; they “place the act in the body touching” (Welton 2004, 12), and so 
form the second set of sensations for bodily awareness in cases of touch.   
 A third set of sensations is the kinaesthesias, or proprioceptive system, which form 
Gallagher’s system of body-schemata informing the position of the body in relation to itself, 
other objects and the surrounding world. This is the basis for how the muscles contract (the 
organisation of my fingers as they close around the mug in relation to my shoulder joint), and 
our posture as it moves within all intentional acts, constituting our body capabilities, framing 
our more explicit tactile sensations by integrating “the actions of the body with the acts of 
touching” and so provide us with the possibility for movement (Welton 2004, 14).  
 Welton and Gallagher argue that kinesthesias are not accessible to conscious 
awareness. As capacities they are within the realm of the possible; they are futural, and not 
explicitly available to our lived experience. Rather, we live through them. Despite the 
unreflected nature of bodily-schemata, Welton maintains that in cases of touch the 
organisation of our tactile sensations and sensorial feelings are undoubtedly presupposed by 
our bodily-schemata that coordinates and “establish[es] the spatial maps of what is explicitly 
experienced”. They are responsible for that which is sensorially and perceptually explicit 
within our lived experience (Welton 2004, 15). Critically, identifying the body’s senses at 
this more defined, but hidden structural level, Welton raises the question as to whether 
bodily-schemata can in fact tell us anything about the structure of consciousness, asking what 
methods are available to us if phenomenology and philosophies depending upon reflection 
cannot reach these prenoetic or nonconscious structures. 
 Gallagher and Welton’s analyses raise a methodological dilemma with respect to 
phenomenological description and the possibility of complete bodily awareness. Welton 
attempts to overcome this problematic in a Merleau-Pontian manner by extending reflexivity 
and affectivity to all intentional acts, not just to cases of touch. Thus, a thesis of reflexive, 
unreflective affectivity accepts self-consciousness as body-consciousness. 
 
What is in play here is not a reflexivity that ties self-awareness to intentionality but one that reaches 
deeper and connects reflexivity to our preconscious being-in-the-world. We are calling it affectivity. In 
affectivity we share the flesh of the world (Welton 2004, 17). 
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Welton further proposes that “[t]he difference between touch and the other senses might give 
us a key to the aesthetic dimensions of conscious life and the link between self-consciousness 
and body-consciousness” (Welton 2004, 16). 
 It is not the business of my project to identify or determine a list of preconscious 
structures, or to demonstrate that these other senses might be a bridge between self-
consciousness and body consciousness. Even though these problems are philosophically 
pertinent to my project, any further participation in the debate would steer me further from 
the task at hand. From the perspectives presented here, however, bodily-schemata can be 
understood as the deepest organisational structure of the body that we know within our 
culture and time exists, and of which we cannot be completely aware.90 For Gallagher, the 
prenoetic performances of the body can operate “without the requirement of a reflexive 
conscious monitoring directed at the body” (Gallagher 2005, 32). However, for the 
epistemologist of the body—the philosopher, scientist, artist, et al.—who wants to know with 
some level of certainty or to have an awareness of these deeper so-called hidden structures, 
are these explanations adequate? Are we to accept that we have met our reflective limits with 
bodily-schemata? (Welton 2004, 22)91  
 My contention is that by working within the tradition of practical phenomenology, my 
spectators will develop a degree of reflective and reflexive involvement with their bodily 
responses, opening upon the deeper workings of their bodily-schemata with embodied 
attention. Moreover, this approach will help participants avoid the trap of providing non-
bodily, non-sensuous accounts of their experiences, and referencing with shallow, readily 
formed concepts of how bodies move on stage. Taking a simple example, the kick or swing 
of a leg may be elaborated beyond the common conception and description of this movement 
as an isolated action: a description of embodiment that temporally enfolds being with world. 
If we are not open to pushing towards describing the deeper structures of bodily constitution, 
bodily-schemata may remain dormant, and movement limited. In performance and dance 
studies, kinesthesia, sense, and affectivity are described in a diversity of ways.92 My project 
suggests one method that addresses the experience of embodiment from within audience. 
                                                        
90 Again, I acknowledge that my research is delimited by the Western canon, and thus alternative conceptions of 
embodiment may seek deeper structures beyond bodily-schemata that are only identified through the lens of 
cognition and intentionality.  
91 For more on bodily-schemata and the limits to self-bodily awareness, see McNeilly (2011). 
92 See articles in Banes & Lepecki (2007). 
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 Accepting bodily-schemata as unreflected, nonconscious activities structuring 
consciousness raises the following questions: 
 
1)   Do we only focus our attention on what we can reflect upon? What and  
  how can bodily-schemata be brought to consciousness?  
 
2)   Is it still phenomenology if we do not engage in a reflection of our   
  bodily awareness? What are the limits to a phenomenological approach  
  when it comes to the hidden structures of consciousness? 
 
3)   If we accept that there is something deeper—perhaps ‘a preconscious  
  being-in-the-world’—can we choose to ignore it and be satisfied with  
  that which is prima facie?  
 
4)   If we begin by paying attention and describing our phenomenal   
  consciousness—what can a detailed description reveal about prenoetic  
  bodily-schemata in experience?  
 
5)   Is there a method of attention that penetrates the “dynamic function of  
  the body in its environment” and promotes a language of description  
  that goes beyond our usual conceptions that refer and reflect body   
  image? 
 
6)   Could this language of description be a form of poesis that does not  
  explain but elucidates and extends our reflexive and affective   
  attention? 
 
These questions deepen and nuance our understanding of the experience of embodiment and 
its description, framing (and framed by) the problems associated with theories on reflection 
and inaccessibility of bodily experience; I hold these questions in mind as I undertake my 
phenomenology. 
 
 
  114 
§2.4.3   KINESTHETIC EMPATHY 
 
Within studies of embodiment, kinesthetic empathy is a significantly complex 
phenomenon of movement, occurring at the level of intercorporeal and interkinetic relations 
between bodies. In performance, the role of kinesthetic empathy as an experiential 
phenomenon between performer and audience member has motivated rigorous scholarship 
utilising and combining various approaches including psychology, sociology and 
neurophysiology. The most recent publications and research within dance studies on this 
topic emerge from author Susan Leigh Foster (University of California, Berkeley 2010), 
mentioned in my Introduction, and members of the project Watching Dance: Kinesthetic 
Empathy (The University of Manchester, United Kingdom, 2008-2011).93 In her book 
Choreographing Empathy: kinesthesia in performance (2010), Foster provides a thorough 
genealogy of concepts historically associated with “the experience of feeling what another is 
feeling” (Foster 2010, 129). Empathy (Einfühlung), sympathy and sensibility are examined in 
relation to kinesthesia following an equally thorough study of this latter experience (pp. 126-
173). Foster summarises various moral and aesthetic theories from psychologists, 
philosophers, and medical scientists from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century that 
explain the processes and connections between the body, mind, spirit, imagination, and 
emotions of an individual in relation to feeling how others feel. The body, its processes and 
relational transference are discussed at a mechanistic, atomistic and neural level. Empathy 
within aesthetic experiences is also discussed in relation to how an individual feels the inner 
structure and movements of objects, artworks and architecture. Foster emphasises a post-
colonial, socio-cultural perspective that views the phenomenon of kinesthetic empathy as a 
critical means for exposing specific power relations between races and genders, including 
past events of slavery and torture by British colonialists (Foster 2010, 142-7). The works of 
dance historian John Martin and choreographer Ivar Hagendoorn are cited to demonstrate the 
relevance of dance and watching dance as a cogent and meaningful approach for exploring 
the phenomenon of kinesthetic empathy, especially aesthetic dance practices in relation to 
later theories emerging from a phenomenological understanding of empathy and the role of 
the body in the work of Edith Stein (1913) and Merleau-Ponty (1962).94 The studies of                                                         
93 Since the writing and examination of this dissertation there has been a published compilation of essays on this 
work. See Reason & Reynolds (2012). 
94 Foster points to the various terms used within dance history to explain the experiences of kinesthetic empathy 
when watching dance. John Martin refers to this experience initially as ‘metakinesis’ the Greek definition for 
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neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese in the late 1990s provide a neural explanation for the human 
propensity to feel what another is feeling. Mirror neuron-networking evidences at a biological 
level how we “share actions, intentions, feelings, and emotions with others” (Gallese in 
Foster 2010, 165). ‘Resonance’ and ‘embodied simulation’ are key indicators of neural 
networking.  
 
 This “resonance” does not necessarily produce a movement or an action. It is an internal  motor 
 representation of the observed event which, subsequently, may be used for different functions, among 
 which is imitation (Gallese in Foster 2010, 165). 
  
Foster draws out two important points from Gallese’s speculations: first is the capacity for 
physical empathy based on mirror neuron networking to form our sociality; and the second, 
that our mirror neurons are based on a unique and individual history of experiences (Foster 
2010, 167). She does not, however, provide further evidence regarding the role of individual 
historical experiences in the functioning of mirror neurons during empathy. This raises the 
question: what meaningful information does an empirical study of mirror neurons contribute 
to our experiential understanding of kinesthetic empathy?  
 Members of the Watching Dance: Kinesthetic Empathy consortium conducted 
research from 1 April 2008 until the summer of 2011 on the role of kinesthesic responses in 
audiences. The objectives of the research were to understand different levels of audience 
experience and the potentials for cultural enrichment, to connect the disparate fields of 
“motor physiology, affective neuroscience and social neuroscience”, and to further clarify the 
relationship between mirror neuron activity and human emotional and visual perception. The 
workshops included qualitative methods including “semi-structured interviews” and creative 
techniques used in conjunction with neurophysiological methods.95 There was a strong 
conviction amongst the consortium to empirically prove that spectators of dance are not just 
motionless, myopic onlookers preoccupied with the visual. The neurophysiological study of 
brain activity in relation to sensation and emotion in stimulated responses gives physical data                                                         
the “overtone of movement”; then later as ‘inner mimicry’: “[i]t is the dancer’s whole function to lead us into 
imitating his actions with our faculty for inner mimicry in order that we may experience his feelings” (Martin in 
Foster 2010, 156-7). Yvonne Rainer describes her experience of a solo performance of Ramayana’s character 
Nala, where for the first time in years she responds kinetically to the dancers hand gestures (mudra) which 
“[f]elt very powerful and quick as though I could actually do it”, but was unable to read them like the facial 
gestures (bahva). Rainer terms this experience ‘kinetic empathy’ (Rainer in Foster, 162). 
95 See details of the group’s method on the Watching Dance: Kinesthetic Empathy website:  
(http://www.watchingdance.org/research/index.php); (http://www.watchingdance.org/research/fmri/index.php); 
(http://www.watchingdance.org/research/tms/index.php).  
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to support the feelings we have when we watch others move. Due to the cumbersome 
equipment used for brain imaging and testing, it is important for researchers to triangulate 
their methods with these aforementioned qualitative approaches. My Poetics of Reception 
framework offers a qualitative approach (with an outcome of qualitative data) for 
understanding kinesthetic empathy at a structural level of reception.96  
 The results of my analyses, discussed in Chapter 7, clearly promote phenomenology 
as an approach for understanding and elaborating (within the phenomenological tradition of 
embodiment) the essential structure of kinesthetic empathy as a key experiential aspect of 
watching digital performance. Rather than tracing this phenomenon as a historical concept, 
the work permits me to identify the varying modes of relation between performer, audience 
and technological media at the level of a shared corporeality and kinesis from within the 
language of experience itself.  
 
                                                        
96 For an excellent study utilising a semiotic phenomenology on spectators’ cinematic experience, see 
Sobschack (1992). 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§2.4.4   MOVEMENT & KINESIS 
 
Merleau-Ponty recognised that “[i]t is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body 
is brought into being, and an analysis of one’s own movement should enable us to arrive at a 
better understanding of it” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 117). 
 
To the question “[h]ow does the body understand itself?”, he responds:  
 
[t]he body belongs to the world, so like understanding ones external world through an experience of 
movement, it is the body’s involvement with worldly objects, being body qua body, that access is 
possible (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 484). 
 
Movement is primary to any description of embodiment and must not be overlooked in 
audience receptivity. As difficult as it is to describe the movement we experience while 
sitting and watching a performer, many of our sensations can be understood as an elaboration 
of the kinetic. Take for example, my description of a dancer: “he raises his body like a 
platform on one arm, tilts to the side and rolls away”. I capture this complex external 
movement not only as a visual image, but as a kinetically-elaborated sensation; I feel the 
brace and the release of the roll. These descriptions in relation to audience-based kinetic 
sensations—central to the study of kinesthetic empathy—are significant in dynamically 
moving bodily-schemata from becoming a static condition, referred to once during 
performance.  
 
It is through empathy as the experience of oneself as an other for the alter-ego that one gains a 
viewpoint of one’s own embodied being beyond the first-person singular perspective (Thompson 2001, 
19). 
 
Key aspects for attending to movement and the kinetic structures of an experience during 
performance include: 
 
1)  The dynamics of a spatio-temporal depth structure including dimensionality: 
  permutations of conversions in two- and three-dimensions;97 
                                                         
97 See my section on ‘The structure of relations between live and mediatised forms and their receptivity’ in 
Chapter 6. 
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2)  Kinesthetic motivation: the apperceptive function of the “I can” in  movement 
  from an audience perspective. Thus, forming a structural aspect of kinesthetic 
  empathy; 
 
3)  The interkinesthetic dimensions of receptivity: relational movement between 
  spectator, performer, kinetic technologies, objects, and audience members. 
  
In my workshops, each participant was asked to provide a nuanced account describing the 
performers moving with technology and the kinetic qualities of the technology as two-
dimensional representations, audio output, or material objects; and to consider their own 
motion, or kinetic response in both roaming and seated performances. Creating a framework 
for embodiment that only addresses a corporeal, three-dimensionally live person is 
inadequate for understanding the relation between bodies and technologies. It is necessary to 
develop it in relation to the use of technology in performance. The following section attempts 
to integrate my working conceptual relation in light of this. 
 
Bodily-schemata, Movement, and Technology in Performance  
Neurologist Henry Head’s observation that “a body-schema can extend to the feather in a 
woman’s hat” directly captures how embodiment and bodily-schemata might extend to 
technologies mediatising bodies in performative contexts (Gallagher 2005, 32).98 
Embodiment, in this sense, extends beyond the boundary of the skin. Head, writing in 1920, 
was referring to the then-current fashion for hats. My own experience of watching women 
walking the streets with feathers in their hats follows a day at the races in Randwick, the site 
of one of Sydney’s racecourses. By early evening, the streets of nearby Paddington crawl 
with inebriated women donning (ironically like proud peacocks) an array of feathers eagerly 
attempting to fascinate, (in fact, these decorations are named ‘fascinators’, presumably for 
their hypnotic role in race-day mating rituals) bobbing, jiggling and swaying upon their 
stiletto points. One need only watch the feather to ascertain the effect of several glasses of 
champagne on the constitution of their bodily movement. My point here is not to focus 
attention exclusively, or even primarily, upon the movement of the feather, but to suggest that 
technology can extend the human body visually, sonically and kinetically. If feathers or                                                         
98 Reference found in Gallagher (2005, 32), also in Arbib (2003, 994): “a woman’s power of localization may 
extend to the feather of her hat”. 
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costume are material extensions of the human body, technological extensions (i.e. 
projections, shadows, amplified sounds) present supra-extended embodiments, a describable 
feature of experiences for performers and audience in digital technology events. Inspired by 
Merleau-Ponty, Susan Broadhurst writes: 
 
 [i]n digital practices, instrumentation is mutually implicated with the body in an  epistemological sense. 
 The body adapts and extends itself through external instruments. To have experience, to get used to an 
 instrument, is to incorporate that instrument into the body. The experience of the corporeal schema is 
 not fixed or delimited but extendable to the various tools and technologies which may be embodied 
 (Broadhurst 2009, 9). 
 
Don Ihde goes further: 
 
 [i]f I am right about the secret norm of a here-body in action, it should also be noted that such a body 
 experience is one that is not simply coextensive with a body outline or one’s skin [. . .] One’s “skin” is 
 at best polymorphically ambiguous, and, even without material extension, the sense of the here-body 
 exceeds its physical bounds (Ihde 2002, 6). 
 
In Closer: Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology, Susan Kozel re-evaluates the claim 
that in studies of virtual technology the body ‘disappears’ or is ‘substituted’ by technology. 
She describes several experiences of dancing with a range of new technologies in 
performance contexts. For Kozel, the physical body in most instances is extended by 
virtuality in a new kind of relationship with its body variations, an embodiment she describes 
in terms of the “electric body” (Kozel 2007). The body corporeal and its bodily-schemata 
ground the virtual body in a system of dependency, rather than displacing it. According to 
Kozel and theorists of virtual reality Randall Walser and Myron Krueger, the body’s frontier 
is “no longer fixed, but highly flexible and constantly changing” (Kozel 2007, 101).99 Walser 
and Krueger claim that most virtual reality experiences alter human perception because what 
is experienced as an ‘out of body’ or ‘disembodied’ experience—I see my body or parts of 
my body spatially and aurally extended elsewhere—is inevitably followed by a ‘return to the 
body’. This returning movement to the body from a virtually supra-extended embodiment 
promotes a “lasting effect” as a direct consequence of the “outward motion on the reunited 
body” (Walser in Kozel 2007, 101). For Kozel, when viewing your moving body or limbs                                                         
99 Also see Walser in Helsel & Roth (1991, 51-65)  
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streamed live in real time onto a screen or through a monitor, that image’s sudden 
disappearance from the wall or from within the frame entails a return to the body that 
constitutes an awareness of the consistent physical presence of your own flesh, no longer 
supra-extended. This return effects an altered embodiment. In game technology use, virtual 
reality experiences, and wearable computer technologies, Kozel’s position combats the 
widely held conviction that we become disembodied users only experiencing technologically-
induced mental images. She understands embodiment within digital art practices as a genuine 
moment and movement between the material and immaterial. Drawing on the concept of 
‘flesh’ in the later writings of Merleau-Ponty, she describes this vacillating movement as an 
alternate space where “[a]ll states of being and interaction swirl and encroach in a fluid play 
of degrees of materiality” (Kozel 2007, 125).100  
 Seeking the deeper structures in instances of live mediatised events: 
 
[t]he body schema functions in an integrated way with its environment, even to the extent that it 
frequently incorporates into itself certain objects—pieces of the environment that would not be 
considered part of one’s own body image (Gallagher 2005, 37). 
 
With this in mind, the relationship of moving bodies with technology—along with the 
spectator who moves in empathetic responses—makes our experience of the body more 
complex and diverse. The relationship offers a unique pathway to understanding these deeper 
bodily structures in relations of reciprocity with reflected experiences of phenomena. Part of 
these deeper bodily structures within the spectator is the role of imagining in receptivity; it is 
to be understood in both an embodied and temporal way. 
 
 
                                                        
100 “The flesh we are speaking of is not matter. It is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the 
tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing 
and touching” (Merleau-Ponty in Kozel 2007, 125).  
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§2.4.5   EMBODIED IMAGININGS 
 
Imagining is itself an embodied process. Within the domain of aesthetic 
representation, the myriad layers of perception in the reception of phenomena suggest that the 
spectator and the analyst pay attention to the role of imagining in these experiences. Rather 
than provide a static image of what imagination produces (e.g. a dog with three heads and a 
flaming tongue), the process of imagining should be rigorously described in the attending of 
the object-event: its emergence, its stable and shifting morphologies, its duration and 
associations, and its kinesthetic and kinetic qualities. 
 In aesthetic production, the acts of receptivity by an audience member or perceiver of 
an artwork plumbs—in a myriad of different and shared ways—the limits of that artwork’s 
being, or more specifically, its ontological moment of presentation. The role of imagining is 
found in all intentional perception of objects, whether actual or inexistent. When the thing in 
question is aesthetic, imaginings may expand exponentially beyond an object’s perspectival 
adumbration in normal perception, bloating that thing in rich and complex variation toward 
different determinations of buried invariance.101 This is what I consider to be imagination in 
fantasy. And it is arguably more prevalent in aesthetic experiences.   
  
Consciousness that is not bound to the factual perception of individual situations is called fantasy; such 
consciousness can think up all sorts of examples for itself (Held 2003, 16). 
 
In marking out the specific experience of a spectator, embodied imaginings are dynamically 
entangled with memories, and other intentional acts that provide a fuller picture of not only 
individual and intersubjective experiences constituting the phenomena of performance, but 
provide leading clues to the essential structures of the constituted objects towards which our 
attentions are directed, and by which they are seduced. For Edward S. Casey,                                                         
101 For example: I look at my coffee cup on the kitchen bench from a particular perspective. I register its shape, 
the well-defined contours of its handle, its colour, red, and that I experience it as my coffee cup. At a different 
time, the cup sits on the windowsill with a fresh cutting from the garden hugging its side. It gives itself with a 
different appearance even though it is the same coffee cup. The shape is different and the handle has almost 
disappeared, along with its previous purpose for holding coffee. The light from the window softens the redness 
to a pinkish colour, and the sides now appear white. These observations of perception involve a degree of 
imagination, and what is called in phenomenology the free variation of imagination: the phenomenon in all its 
variance adumbrating in perception one-sidedly with a possibility of many-sides (perspectival adumbrations). 
However, in registering these quite simple adumbrations of the thing’s appearance, I have not expanded my 
embodied imaginings to bloat the object beyond its identity in fantasy. A distinction must be drawn between 
imagination as free variation and imagining in embodied fantasy. The former plays a role in my 
phenomenological method and will be discussed in the upcoming section outlining methodology.  
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[i]magination as a fixed faculty is indeed dead, eviscerated in the “objective” accounts of many modern 
thinkers. But imagining is very much alive, its potency as an act manifesting itself in daily feats of 
fancy as well as in the production of poets (Casey 2000, 3). 
 
In Imagining: A Phenomenological Study, Casey examines the experience of imagining, 
taken as a synonym for imagination, but delimited “in accordance with an intentional 
analysis” to remain phenomenological (Casey 2000, xxv). From rigorous descriptions of 
firsthand experiences of imagining, Casey eidetically uncovers the three-paired structure of 
“spontaneity/controlledness, self-containedness/self-evidence” and “indeterminacy” and 
“pure possibility” (Casey 2000, xii). In Husserl’s posthumously edited text Phantasy, Image, 
Consciousness and Memory (1898-1925)102, the essence of phantasy (imagination) is 
considered in its fundamental form as a ‘re-presentation’ along with memory and imaging, 
and is unlike the presentation of objects in normal perception.103 The object of phantasy is 
something that does not exist, is unstable, and like the object of memory, “is seen as if 
through a veil or fog” (Brough 2005, xxxvii). Phantasy is “inventive”. The thing of phantasy 
does not exist as concrete and individual, like the unveiled one-sided appearance of an object 
in immediate perception. Imagination as phantasy is not hallucination. Where hallucination 
“masquerades as a perceived object”, phantasy is understood to be phenomenally different to 
perception in its structural aspects and inactual giveness (Brough 2005, xxxviii). In cases of 
phantasy we are aware that our imagination is at play and not in conflict with normal 
perception. 
 
When we are absorbed in phantasying, we are not focused on the null character of the phantasy object, 
but as soon as we relate the phantasy object to present reality, we become aware that it is null, that “it 
is nowhere at all, not in any space, not in any time, and so on” (Brough 2005, xxxviii). 
 
Casey is critical of Husserl’s structural understanding and null characterisation of phantasies 
coming to mind without any related sensation in their givenness. In this parochial positing of 
inactuality, imagining is taken only as an “image world” (Casey 2000, 2). By surveying 
everyday imagining, rather than the more phantastical imaging of a unicorn, Casey is able to                                                         
102 This is the translated text of the Husserliana series Volume XXIII originally edited by Eduard Marbach and 
which pulls together Husserl’s writings over thirty years on ‘perception, phantasy, image consciousness, 
memory and time’. 
103 There is no conceptual difference between phantasy and fantasy, only the spelling. To keep with the tradition 
of Husserl, I will continue to use phantasy in my discussion.  
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distinguish the success of imagining as a mental act from other mental acts prone to 
fallibility, such as: if I don’t want to imagine a big black hairy spider, in the very act of not 
wanting to imagine, I imagine a big black hairy spider. Following Casey, my contention is 
that by focusing upon the experience of imagining (acts of imagining) rather than upon 
imagination as a mere mental image or picture devoid of sensation or movement, the role of 
embodiment as an intercorporeal relation surfaces more readily.  
 In accordance with receptive empathy within a performance context, the genesis of 
imagining can be either externally prompted by another person, an object, or technological 
representation (genesis one); or start from one’s own emergent embodied imaginings (genesis 
two). The second genesis may then bear upon that which is constituted in perception, 
prompting further imaginings as an operation of genesis one. These two modes of genesis 
must not be taken as a priori structures, or determinative of imagining in a performance 
context. Positing two modes enables me to discuss imagining as embodied. My project 
requires an adequate method that takes into account the breadth of experience, including 
those veiled, absent or forgotten aspects, and those that resist phenomenological reflection. 
By and large, these hidden mysteries tend to be located in and through the body.   
 In genesis one, for example, the visual perception of a performer’s hand gesture lit in 
a particular way moving on a variety of planes, at times suspended in a momentary stillness, 
changing shape through finger movements to represent (choreographically or as 
improvisationally emergent) something other than a mere hand moving in space. In 
accordance with Edith Stein’s view of how we experience another as an embodied other, I 
might feel the morphological structure of this image empathetically and correlatively in 
sensation. For Stein, we first recognise the experience of another, and distinguish this other 
from other objects in sensual empathy. Second, we delve:  
 
[i]nto the content of the Other’s experience. If this happens, then there is a movement from empathy as 
the passive association of our two lived bodies to empathy as the imaginative transposal of myself to 
the place for the Other: ‘my hand is moved (not in reality but “as if”) to the place of the foreign one 
(Stein 1989, 27).104 
 
From visual and sensorial experiences of a hand gesture, our process of imagining may blow 
the image and our sensations into something more phantasmagorical. A creature, no longer a                                                         
104 Edith Stein was Husserl’s student and wrote her dissertation On the Problem of Empathy under his direction 
in 1916. Her main thesis is that we experience others as a unified whole through empathy.  
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moving hand (nor a hallucination) is presented from this empathetic relation between 
performer and spectator. In the case of external genesis, the imagining process is not a mental 
image that pops into the mind without a visual and sensorial prompt. The prompt could also 
be aural or the stimulation of our olfactory processes, for example, the burning of incense in a 
performance may cause the imagining of a creature like the Hindu god Ganeshas.105  
 Genesis two is where imagining occurs without an external visual, sensorial, tactile, 
aural, or olfactory stimulus. I may form a process of imagining that begins from the senses, 
where they are not reflectively in the process of a perceptual act. Bodily orientations (and 
disorientations), proximities, levels, and positionality at a proprioceptive level in the 
spectator may generate embodied imaginings that affectively extend their external perception 
of objects. Pushing absurdity to make this point clear, if I am upside-down experiencing a 
performance, perceived objects may morphologically transform, generating imaginings 
beyond those perceptively formed in an upright position.106 Rather than seeing three people 
suspended by their feet dancing upside down, I might see three dancing goats. By and large, 
the genesis of imagining is affected by this modification in embodiment. The three dancing 
goats may further affect the genesis of new imaginings that no longer relate to this 
proprioceptive disorientation.  
 Rather than abstractly determine two forms of genesis and their relationship to 
external perception and embodiment—explicit and/or tacit—I will attempt to describe and 
expand upon this relation from the phenomenological findings themselves. These two modes 
of genesis for imagining are not separable events. In the unity of experience, and in the speed 
of imagining, they (and possible other modes) are informatively entwined. I hope to draw out 
such modes in the interpretive work following the application of my method. 
 
                                                        
105 For more on olfactory senses in performance see Banes in Banes & Lepecki (2007, 29-37). 
106 One might question the physiological limits to being upside-down for long periods of time, but anyone who 
has attempted inverted postures in yoga, trapeze, hung upside down from a horizontal bar in a park, or simply 
hung their head backwards off a couch or bed, can attest to enduring an upside-down posture.   
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Temporality & Imagining 
I have at several times indicated that temporality looms large as a feature of this 
study. In order to consider the development of the conceptual relation embodiment—
embodied imaginings—writing embodiment, I must acknowledge two aspects of temporal 
experience informed by the phenomenological tradition and by my earlier work on the 
temporality of audience experience during improvisational performances.107 The first is the 
spectator’s self-temporalising style, and the second is the ‘past-futural’ schema for 
interpretive analyses of written texts to be discussed briefly in this section. 
 In Husserl’s 1905 lectures on time consciousness, the structure and content of 
consciousness itself is a temporal relation between “two lines of continuity” relating to the 
perception of an immanent object that is stable in perception. A piece of chalk is a stable 
object of perception and has ‘duration’ outside of its perception. If I look at the chalk, then 
close and open my eyes, there have been two perceptions of the same piece of chalk. It has 
temporally changed in terms of my lived experience: there is “temporal apartness” in the 
phenomenon, but no separation in the object itself because it has duration (Husserl 1964, 27). 
The duration of the temporal object in consciousness is a horizontal line that continuously 
advances with the perceptual experience of an object. The advance has a ‘run-off’ nature of 
the enduring object in original perception. The modes of running-off (or modifications) of an 
enduring immanent temporal object in this horizontal direction have a source point in ‘primal 
impression’. Husserl refers to this as the ‘just-now’. The ‘just-now’ of an impressional 
                                                        
107 In my Honours thesis entitled A Call for Presence: a phenomenological investigation of audience-oriented 
temporalities in improvisational performance (McNeilly 2006), I attempted to understand the structure of my 
own internal time consciousness as an audience member during improvisational performance by adapting 
Husserl’s model of internal time consciousness to these experiences. Despite problems created by carrying out 
the practical phenomenology as an isolated observer on the one hand, and ignoring objective time as a co-
constitutive aspect of time on the other, I was able to (in part) develop a method for undertaking practical 
phenomenology; intuit, describe and analyse my experiences through a specific style of writing; and to 
understand audience-centered time in relation to memory and imagination. I was rigorous in bracketing out 
commonsense notions of time experience understood as ‘objective’ or constructed ‘measured’ time. In these 
instances I was only interested in paying attention to my own internal time consciousness. I found this to be 
problematic for many reasons, and on reflection, found that time constituted in the everyday (time in its 
common sense usage) should not be bracketed from the overall experience of the temporal, especially when 
considering performance-based phenomena. This particular shortcoming in the phenomenology of time 
experience is noted by Heidegger: 
 
[b]ut what matters in the question concerning time is attaining an answer in terms of which the various ways of being temporal 
become comprehensible; and what matters is allowing a possible connection between that which is in time an authentic 
temporality to become visible from the very beginning (Heidegger 1992, 7E). 
 
And elsewhere he suggests that “[w]hat we need first of all is a many sided orientation toward the time 
phenomenon, following the clue of the traditional time concepts” (Heidegger 1982, 230).  
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perception, expands a ‘continuity of pasts’ that uniformly sinks downwards into the depths of 
the past (Husserl 1964, 48-50). The horizontal phase, or first temporal phase in Husserl’s 
model, presents the objective or measured order of time “whose function is to measure 
appearing times and time-relations against one another” (Husserl 1964, 26). From within an 
audience, we may express these apprehensions of objective time by looking at our watches 
and making measured calculations using a clock system relevant to our culture. Time 
experience might also be expressed in the apprehension of ‘how long’ something feels, 
relative to measured time. A performance can often create a feeling that time is either moving 
quickly or slowing down, or has stopped altogether. The significance of this is in the 
difference between sensing how time passes relative to measurable time. A simple example is 
the experience of a quick first half and slow second half, despite equally measured temporal 
periods. These commonsense insights into time perception deal with the experience of time in 
a seemingly rudimentary and relativistic way. However, it is this naïve apprehension of how 
time passes that provides the fundamental clue to disclosing the structure of our internal time 
experience: the primordiality of embodied consciousness.  
 This brings us to Husserl’s second temporal sequence, that of subjective time. 
Subjective, or ‘internal’ time consciousness is the overlooked temporal sequence that, along 
with objective time, co-constitutes Husserl’s model of time experience. The primal 
impression which constitutes the now moment in ‘present’ consciousness on the horizontal 
axis passes immediately into a ‘retentional’ mode. This downward vertical phase is the 
second line of continuity in Husserl’s model. Each of these retentions involve a continuity of 
retentional modifications “which, so to speak, bears in itself the heritage [Erbe] of the past in 
the form of a series of shadings” (Husserl 1964, 51). This means that retentions do not 
undertake a modification after each new primal impression; rather they are a continuous 
modification of the original perception. When a perception is over, retentions involved with 
the continuity of this duration are shoved back into the past from the original temporal field 
to a memory field of ‘imperceptibility’. This region is constitutive of primary memory, and 
the further that a retentional phase is from a ‘just-now’ point in perception, the further it is 
shoved back into the past.  
 The temporalities of individual perceptions relate to this second line and it is the 
temporal structure of consciousness in intentionality that matters for Husserl in all lived 
experiences. Similarly for me, it is the system of intentionalities—the misty horizons—that 
directly relate to something present to my consciousness while observing as an audience 
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member in performances, that which constitutes my temporal style. All experiences involve a 
complicated myriad of intentional memories, impressions, expectations, and imaginings. On 
Husserl’s account, imaginings are ‘quasi-actual’, having “no connection in their objective 
relations either among themselves or with perceptions” (Husserl 1973, 168). Imaginings are 
not like past and present experiences. They are happenstance to the unity of experience: “it is 
not part of their essence that they must appear in a continuous enchainment” (Husserl 1973, 
170). For example: my perceiving a hand tremble, then imagining a three headed dog (the 
recombination of real existents), followed by the immediate perception of the person whose 
hand is trembling, are all distinct acts of consciousness with respect to their relative temporal 
position. However, the existing objects of hand and person that I perceive have “strict 
localisation of position” in objective time; they have duration outside of my perceiving.  
 These ‘run-off’ phenomena of consciousness in Husserlian terms may only be 
captured as isolable rich slices in the overall unity of a particular marked moment. The goal is 
to explicate the process and movement of imaginings as both embodied and self-
temporalising.  
 
Language, Temporality, Imagining 
In earlier research, a pattern of verbs emerged within my phenomenological language 
that described the corporeal, spatial and kinetic qualities of my internal time consciousness 
whilst watching improvisational performance. The sensations and movements that 
accompanied the temporal journey of memory, impressions, expectations, imaginings and 
other mental acts that I experienced were termed verbs of kinesthesia. I discovered that:  
 
[c]orporeality and spatiality are implicitly coeval to internal temporality. Their unity is manifested in 
my embodied sensations while traversing my internal time-consciousness at these events. In several of 
my observations there occurred a disjuncture between my body’s “postural schema” of ‘audiencing’ 
(turned attentively towards the performance) and the actual sensations of my embodied traversing 
(Lingis 1994, 13-14). Influenced by Husserl’s analytic language (Husserl 1964), these latter 
experiences have been captured in the descriptions [. . .] through the following language use: dips 
backward, drags forward, ripped out of/away, flung into, restored back, drops away, holding in, sinks 
downward, leaps ahead, pulling back, shoots to, jerk forward, lean back-away, and shoved back 
(McNeilly 2006, 55). 
 
This earlier research lacked the intersubjective dimension of embodied self-temporalising 
styles—something I address in my current project, but do not take as the primary object for 
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phenomenological examination. By identifying an embodied self-temporalising character in 
imagining, the structures of experience will be brought to attention in my design and 
application of the method, and subsequent textual analyses.  
 
 
§2.4.6    WRITING EMBODIMENT  
 
Writing from the new is writing from the void, and it amounts to a writing from our own bodies, from 
the moment to moment of our own existence (Kozel 2007, 8). 
 
Susan Kozel writes phenomenological descriptions of an entwined embodiment while 
performing with new technologies. In describing events where she as performer interacts with 
low-tech and high-tech technologies, Kozel employs a particular style of first-person 
description in her phenomenological approach. She is influenced by the later work of 
Merleau-Ponty (The Visible and the Invisible 1968) and his concepts of chiasma, “flesh, 
reversibility, the invisible, and disequilibrium”, and the concepts of “reverberation, resonance 
and repercussion” in Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space 1969 (Kozel 2007, 24, 32). 
Kozel takes issue with the subordination (if not the exclusion) of first-person subjectivist 
descriptions by third-person objectivist language within interdisciplinary research. 
Methodologies from a range of disciplines “biology, psychology, philosophy, performance, 
mathematics, media, literature, cybernetics, visual art, music, architecture, and engineering” 
are appropriated and combined at a nexus of theory and practice in this style of research 
(Kozel 2007, 9-10). The body and its sensorium as experiential phenomena become a key 
problematic for finding a shared language and fluid system of conceptualisation and Kozel, 
along with many authors (to whom she alludes in her book Closer 2007), recognises and 
attempts to address this pertinent issue of first person description versus third person 
explanation. I too raise this issue in my discussions about reflection, self-awareness, body 
awareness and expressions that constitute some kind of self. However, I hold no expectation 
that my approach can solve this proper aporia within studies of consciousness. The most I 
can do is observe the issues and make a choice that is suitable to the task of firstly describing 
the shared object-event, then eidetically identifying the essential structures of the relationship 
between bodies and technologies from spectators’ experiences. In the spirit of 
phenomenology as a descriptive science, I have—unlike Kozel—taken the more Husserlian 
path of eidetic analyses. Nonetheless, Kozel’s elegant work is a landmark reference for my 
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study since she directly addresses embodiment, new technologies, dance, performance and 
the role of poesis in description.  
 There is no single method for phenomenological description. Casey argues that: 
 
[w]hat is sought in the implementation of such a method is an accurate description of a given 
phenomenon as it presents itself in one’s own experience, not an explanation of its genesis through 
reference to antecedent causal factors. The phenomenologist’s basic attitude is: no matter how 
something came to be in the first place, what is of crucial concern is the detailed description of the 
phenomenon as it now appears (Casey 2000, 9). 
 
A detailed description of phenomena as they appear to us in experience demands an adequate 
language style. In addressing Kozel’s concern with third-person description as explanation, I 
agree that causal language should be challenged if it dilutes or ignores the gamut of 
experience, particularly where the body and its sensorium are concerned. And yet I wonder 
what we can learn from third-person narratives that describe experiences as though the one 
experiencing were an absent other, or where the personal pronoun ‘I’ becomes an object 
within description. What can we gain from accepting the experiencing ‘I’ as a ‘she’, ‘he’ or 
‘they’?  
 A language that neither wholly expresses the body as a non-experienced objectivity, 
or collapses the body as an ego-saturated “I think” or “I feel”, would be a language that 
expresses the constituting and the constituted; whereby that which is constituted (the object 
for all intent and purposes) discloses something of the constituting. By and large, objectivity 
in experience is the other half of the experience, correlative to all subjective intending acts.  
 To challenge objectivist rejections of writings emerging from insider perspectives, 
Kozel directly asks “what if the object wants to speak?” (Kozel 2007, 133). Indeed, the ‘I’, 
the constituting individual of experience, is an object always in any reflection on that ‘I’s 
experience. Her question is a good one, and I can understand the pointedness and direction of 
it. However, putting this debate aside, I would like to focus upon what style of language the 
object uses to speak. Kozel is aware of the ‘biased’, ‘narcissistic’ and ‘solipsistic’ tendencies 
to which autobiographical writing is vulnerable; however, she demands that the 
dancer/performer voice no longer be silenced by the hegemonic words and opinions of critic 
and editor alike. In seeking Emmanuel Levinas, her call is an ethical one. And yet, it is not 
clear how positing an ethics that recognises a relationship between ‘self and other’—not only 
in the space of the theatre, but between bodies, technologies and the marketplace—
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ideologically salvages a preference for the ‘I’ expressing these experiences (Kozel 2007, 132-
35). 
 In contrast, the phenomenological work and writings of Anthony J. Steinbock 
promote a more objectivist and formal language for expressing first-hand experiences of the 
moral emotions. The Husserlian and general philosophical language of analyses emerges 
from structuring experiences in their ‘modality of Being’, ‘temporal orientation’, ‘temporal 
meaning’ and ‘self in relation to other’. The group sessions at the Phenomenology Research 
Center rely upon discussion, everyday examples, thinking that minimises presuppositions, 
remembering and the hypothetical imagining of instances. Unlike an experiential 
autobiographical approach, this method elaborates upon non-immediate experiences of the 
moral emotions such as guilt, pride, shame, and hope. Steinbock’s approach is eidetic. His 
purpose is to disclose the essential structures of the experience of a range of moral emotions. 
The language is formal and technical. 
 
While a retention may retain, say, a sense of pain (I twisted my ankle stepping off the curb or ruptured 
a tendon), and while a remembering may recall the past pain, guilt is an experience of terrible 
unpleasantness, sorrow, grief, e.t.c. in the new experience of guilt. This negative experience is 
“original” in the guilt and not necessarily contained in the past experience. There is an original 
contribution in guilt in relation to a remembering-experience that re-signifies the past, as it were, and 
this in part constitutes it as a new act (Steinbock 2008, 1). 
 
This excerpt from preparatory notes sent to participants before the group meetings 
demonstrates how a subjective experience is to be probed in relation to the past. In this 
example Steinbock is attempting to show how guilt is unlike pain, in that it is not a retention. 
Some participants in the research group are familiar with the language of Husserl and his 
model of time-consciousness. When they are not, it is through the experience of participating 
in a shared language system over time that they become familiar with Steinbock’s particular 
phenomenological approach and language style. My phenomenology examines a similar 
terrain of experiences to Kozel, but is oriented from within audience. My method proposes a 
synthesis of styles in phenomenological description from a review of current excursions in 
the writing of phenomenology from within studies of dance and technology (Brown 2006 and 
Kozel 2007) for example, and the philosophical examination of moral emotions from my 
experiences as a participant in the research group led by Steinbock. In the comfortable 
adoption of a Merleau-Pontian style of fleshly poetics, Kozel offers “images, metaphors […] 
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and a dynamic flow that transcends the words and speaks physically” (Kozel 2007, 126). In a 
phenomenology of her improvisation with iVisit technology, she writes: 
 
 I’m aware of my body in a poised and anticipatory posture, for a moment it seems as if I am 
 living through my eyes, scanning the hesitant and unpredictable offerings of the windows my [sic] 
 center exists somewhere between my body and the computer screen, between my screen  and theirs—
 where is the locus of my movement? (Kozel 2007, 136) 
 
Her approach lends itself to the type of phenomenological method that is less concerned with 
the eidetic structures of variance and invariance in the experiences of the performer. She also 
prefers the “non-void flux of finitudes, as a syrupy substance that contains and composes all 
our movement and perceptions” in a somewhat sticky and seductive slide to metaphor (Kozel 
2007, 126). My own textual descriptions invite language to be a provocative player in play: 
language revered through an abuse of its rules. It would be interesting for Kozel’s studies to 
ascertain the intersubjective-corporeal phenomenologies between a community of players 
that she acknowledges to be dynamically entwined in her performing experience (Kozel 
2007, 113). A disjuncture between performer and audience experience is evident in the one-
sided accounts that create Closer. My work suggests the possibility of a wider, multi-
‘fleshed’ attendance of dancing with digital technologies. And yet by only focusing on 
audience receptivity, I am equally open to a one-sided negligence. This suggests that a more 
inclusive phenomenology involving artist, performer and audience should take place at a 
future point in my research. 
 
But for now, toward and from within the audience, I turn. 
 
It is paramount to avoid shallow phenomenological description, that is, textual accounts that 
are left analysed as mere “scattered descriptive remarks” (Casey 2000, 9). To identify the 
essential structures of the relationship between live, corporeal and mediatised forms means 
approaching the language of variance with systematic rigour. Variances offered from a 
community of players gathered together, writing and discussing their experiences of the same 
object-event. The language of variance can be poetic, somatic, detailed, incoherent or 
coherent, partial or complete, metaphoric or literal. At least for my purposes, it is the eventual 
examination of these writings that move my phenomenology towards structural invariance 
and rigorous phenomenological understanding.  
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The Language of Receptivity 
 As human beings we communicate our experiences predominately through language. 
Phenomenology is constrained by the fact that language fails to express all of our thinking. 
Husserl was aware of the limits of language for thinking: “[t]he human being does not 
express all of his psychic life in language nor can he express it through it” (Husserl 2001, 13). 
This raises the question: what other modes of expression can be sought to communicate this 
understanding? Kozel suggestively asks:  
 
[c]an phenomenology take the form of a dance? of visual or sonic media? The question relates to how the 
act of hyper-reflection, where concepts begin to be elaborated in and through experience is materialized 
into form. Most frequently it is written form, but the question raised is whether other expressive forms 
such as choreography, images, or music can also be phenomenological documents (Kozel 2007, 28). 
  
Recognising that I am unable to move beyond language in the production of a dissertation, 
the idea that a different kind of language may be sought to communicate experiences comes 
to the fore. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty desired a new language of Being in their 
phenomenologies of Being and perception respectively. In performance, it is the language of 
receptivity that I am most curious about: the multiple shadings of many consciousnesses 
sharing in the every expanse of a presence, held then sprung from a ‘determined there’ into 
an infinite indeterminability (Husserl 1989, 52). Apposite to this notion, Erin Manning in 
Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy discusses the relationship between thought, 
language and movement. For language to be expressive there must be a constant return to the 
realm of pre-articulated thinking. 
 
When movement converges into its taking-form, or when thought converges into words, very little 
potential for creative expression remains. This is not to suggest that language cannot express creatively. 
It means that to remain post-iteratively creative, language must continue to express itself in a realm 
where thought remains prearticulated, where concepts continue to evolve. We must conceive of language 
as the eternal return of expression in the making (Manning 2009, 4-5). 
 
Casting a more Husserlian light on this idea, language results from a movement between 
passive and active perception. The synthesis is itself a movement. When Husserl promulgated 
phenomenology as a fundamental science to philosophy, he referred to it as a ‘new world’, ‘a 
new style of attitude’.  
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To move freely in it without relapsing into the old attitudes, to learn to see, distinguish, and describe 
what lies within view, require, moreover, peculiar and laborious studies (Husserl 1983, XIX). 
 
Interestingly, there is an implicit embodiedness to Husserl’s statement. “To move freely in it” 
suggests phenomenological thought as an embodied imagining: the movement of 
phantasising a new world, rich in perspectival variance, and deep in the peculiar. This is the 
choreography of a man who perhaps never danced on his feet, but only with the articulated 
rhythms of consciousness. Possessed with the desire to describe the immanent formal 
structures and movement from objective grounds, Husserl was tied to the possibility of 
describing the multi-storied architecture of a constituting consciousness, in the first instance, 
then turned to dance with others in the world in his more generative elaborations. 
 In an example of writing expressing the movement of embodied imaginings and their 
extensions of corporeal experience within digital performance, choreographer and New 
Zealand-based Academic Carol Brown interprets the freedom of dancing with her interactive 
camera-based system spawn.108 
 
In dancing with creatures of code it is tempting to suggest that we are no longer confined by our 
bodies’ volume, weight, gravity and matter, that we are free to choose the extension of ourselves, to 
dance amongst the starfish of different skies (Brown 2006, 97).  
 
Brown understands the potential of the imaginary in mediatised spaces. It is an imaginary that 
goes beyond the bounds of normal embodiment and challenges the dominant cultural forms 
inscribed in our gestures.  
 
One of the important aspects of going to see live performance is to be bought into proximity with 
embodied histories and to be inspired by the invention of new movement memories [. . .] Within the 
technological theatre, the imaginary has a space to play and create that has not as yet always been 
written upon by the globalizing tendencies of mainstream art practices and the imperializing gestures of 
the past, including the dominance of the mainstream (Brown 2006, 95). 
 
Brown’s writings suggest virtual agency and a widened range of possibilities for the 
performer to create movement and choreographies that embody new sensations, external and 
internal morphologies, speeds, and textures that are generally restricted in non-virtual spaces.                                                         
108 The visualisations for this system were created with architect Mette Ramsgard Thomsen. For more on Carol 
Brown’s reflective and critical writings as a performer in virtual spaces see Brown (2006) and website (Brown 
2008). 
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The performer’s consciousness becomes adumbrated in new ways whilst entangled with these 
external virtual systems. A certain materiality of the virtual is palpably met through the 
dancer. Brown and Kozel solely focus upon the dancer/performer and choreographer’s 
relationship to technology, but in widening this perspective towards receptive empathy within 
audience, the object-event can be described in terms of the fluxing, temporally embodied 
imaginings experienced by the players at play in the co-constituting of events. As argued 
through Gadamer in Chapter 2, audiences are equally responsible for the ontological status of 
an object-event. Thus to intuit, describe and analyse the essential structures of an object 
event, a phenomenology of “bodies, thought, imagination, memories, [and] material 
conditions of life” must reorient to include experiences from within audience (Kozel 2007, 
5).  
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Paying Attention to Embodiment in a Mediatised Object-event 
To demonstrate the relevance of the formulation embodiment—embodied 
imaginings—writing embodiment in relation to my methodology, I present fourteen 
preliminary questions that have helped to refine my method for future application in research 
and practice109 (Chapter 5 and 6) and directly assisted in my analysis of writings from the 
Poetics of Reception Project (Chapter 7). 
 The questions outlined below became a means for me to analyse participants’ writings 
eidetically. They inquire into the bodily constitution of a spectator while attending 
performance, and are questions not requiring answers, but an orientation. Participant 
experiences were presented to me as prose, literal description and poetics. The personal 
pronoun ‘I’ used in these questions represent the spectator’s perspective, and what I 
eventually asked of their texts: 
 
1)  How aware am I of my body? What can I consciously reflect upon?  
  How can I describe it? 
 
2)  At what points during the performance do I become aware of my   
  bodily experience?  
 
3)  Can I describe the limits to bodily awareness? At what point does the  
  body disappear in my awareness? 
 
4)  Is being aware of my embodiment a case of felt ‘sensation’? Where is  
  this situated? How can I describe these sensations? 
 
5)   Are there any clues for prenoetic activity: the kinesthesias or   
  proprioception? Are they felt or imagined? Is there something different  
  in my movement and stillness that I am aware of?                                                          
109  I intend to develop this ongoing refined model as a method for new dramaturgy in digital performances. 
Chapter 6 discusses the iterative nature of my phenomenological method through two case studies where I 
experimented with my approach to phenomenology in different contexts. These case studies were not directly 
part of the workshops themselves, but have informed the manner in which I practised phenomenology over the 
last four to five years.   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6)  What movements, sensations, proprioceptive activities are repressed in  
  receptivity? If I could move, how would I?  
 
7)  How do I visualise my body during receptivity? 
 
8)  Where am I temporally? What memories, expectations or imaginings  
  am I having while attending as audience? Can I describe my self-  
  temporalising style? Is there a connection between images and   
  sensations? 
 
9)  Can I indicate a genesis for imaginings in the body? Is it an external or  
  internal genesis? Does it express prenoetic activity?  
 
10)   How does a live body performing affect my temporal embodied   
  imaginings? 
 
11)   How does a virtual/screen body or image affect my temporal embodied  
  imaginings? 
 
Extending these questions to consider the interkinesthetic dimensions of an experience, I then 
asked on behalf of the spectator: 
 
12)   What aspects of the live performer in their movement and potential  
  movement affect my actual and imagined movement?110 
 
13)   What aspects of the screen/virtual performer in their movement and  
  potential movement affect my actual and imagined movement? 
 
                                                        
110 The distinction between actual and imagined body finds a close terminological synonym with Ihde’s VR 
body (Virtual Reality), also referred to as the ‘image-body’ or ‘over-there body’. The actual body corresponds to 
his RL body (Real Life) or ‘here-body’ (Ihde 2002, 3-15). 
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14)    What aspects of the interaction between live bodies and screen/virtual/  
  mediatised elements in movement, affect my actual and imagined   
  movement?111   
 
My purpose in this chapter has been to draw attention to the felt, imagined and lived body of 
the spectator in instances of phenomenological study. The essential structures and relation 
between phenomena are understood only through a close examination of the body entwined 
and engaged at a deeper level of organisation (bodily-schemata); a more passive, sensorially 
felt and moving body interacting with other persons, such as the performer and other 
audience members (inter-kinaesthetic); and a body comprised of felt imaginings with its own 
memories and futural protentions (self-temporalising style). These preliminary insights into 
embodiment help to narrow the experiential gap between the perceiver and the perceived. 
Perceiving objects or other persons in the world always involves variegated relations of a 
spatial, kinesthetically felt, temporal and imagined kind. In this chapter, I considered how we 
might become aware of these bodily experiences, and how we might talk or write about them 
with a degree of veridical integrity. I proposed that writing embodiment involves expressing 
the bodily experience of the spectator—whose experience we are foregrounding—and their 
description of external bodily phenomena such as the movement and presencing of 
performers and their virtual partners.    
 To conclude, the relation embodiment—embodied imaginings—writing embodiment 
provides a conceptual framework for first, designing a method for phenomenological 
investigation; and second, for analysing the written expressions of embodiment within the 
participants’ texts more responsively and with responsibility towards persons that are 
ambiguously both objects of reception and unique, constituting subjects in their own right.                                                                    
111 Mediatised elements may include non-human, real-time or pre-recorded projections of moving grid lines (or 
other geometric, rhizomic patterns) affected by the interactivity of the performer. 
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SECTION 3 
CONSTRUCTING 
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CHAPTER 5   PRACTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
 
 Writing in the latter half of last century, Herbert Spiegelberg outlined the problem of 
defining phenomenology in the opening chapters of his text The Phenomenological 
Movement (1971).112 He identifies phenomenology as a “moving discipline” . . . “a 
‘movement’ of several phenomenologies, where the common point of departure for early 
thinkers did not necessitate the same “predictable joint destination” (Spiegelberg 1971, 2). 
Motivated by his desire to identify what was essential to the movement, Spiegelberg 
proposed and later implemented a practical method in a series of workshops conducted at 
Washington University, Missouri, documented by Edward S. Casey in his article “Sym-
Phenomenologizing: Talking Shop”.113   
Spiegelberg’s historical and contextual writings on the movement are an invaluable 
starting point for outlining the design and implementation of my method, a method that 
attempts to ascertain phenomenologically the relations between and the essential structure of 
bodies and technology in live, mediatised performance. It is a method that begins with the 
description of experienced phenomena in a series of workshops, in which participants employ 
a style of Husserlian reductionism—“phenomenology in the strictest sense” (Spiegelberg 
1971, 6). The method further examines the essential structures of the selected phenomena 
through an analysis of written descriptions of experiences produced by participants of the 
workshop.   
 In Chapter 3, I closely traced the development of Husserl’s own work from a static, 
constitutional philosophy to a genetic and generative approach. In this chapter, I will 
synthesise the relationship between the processes of constituting object phenomena and a 
genetic analysis of the self-temporalising aspects of an experience, with the practical aspects 
of an applied method in the study of performance phenomena, namely the object-event. 
Given my already lengthy expositional glance at phenomenological theory, I will avoid 
                                                        
112 Spiegelberg first traces this development firstly in The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical 
Introduction (1971), then ten years later in The Context of the Phenomenological Movement (1981). 
113 “To do phenomenology in a workshop is to do it together; it is to engage in what Husserl once called, in a 
postcard written to Herbert Spiegelberg in 1935, “sym-philosophizing” (Casey 1997, 171). 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making a potted history of the phenomenological movement and its expansion within and 
outside philosophy.114   
To begin, I will briefly discuss the phenomenological approach of Herbert 
Spiegelberg and group practice more generally. I will then introduce my research project for 
examining the relationship between bodies and technology: A Poetics of Reception: 
phenomenological writings from within audience. The aims, outcomes, background 
information for participants and initial design of the project’s method will be outlined and 
discussed in a retrospective analysis of each stage in its implementation over a four-year 
period. The stages of the workshop for live mediatised performance include: (I) preparation 
(II) attending (III) the writing workshop and (IV) an informed written account. This 
evaluative outline will permit me to discuss the constantly changing, iterative nature of 
phenomenological method experienced as experimental design. 
 My practice of phenomenology has a strict groundedness within transcendental 
phenomenology. The concepts of Husserl combined with the ‘beyond the theoretical 
armchair’ practices of Spiegelberg, frame this experimental methodology in order to examine 
experiences communicated through the written word. Contemporary scholar of the human 
sciences Max van Manen identifies six different orientations within phenomenology, two of 
which are towards the transcendental and practical.115 Van Manen’s generous taxonomy of 
the different styles of phenomenology accords with Spiegelberg’s positive capitulation of 
phenomenology as a movement, and is useful in understanding the various approaches of 
scholars within the history and current epoch of doing phenomenology.116 As a common 
departure point each of these approaches advocate direct intuition and description of 
phenomena while claiming special insight into their essential structures. However, it is 
through differing systems (i.e. language, perception, being, and interpretation) and an 
ordering of these intuited aspects that philosophical problems may be solved in their peculiar 
way. 
 By combining a transcendental approach with a practical method it is possible to seek 
a more thorough understanding of the relationships between corporeal bodies and                                                         
114 Outside of the philosophical discipline, phenomenology has had a major influence on fields such as 
psychiatry, nursing, non-behavioural based psychology, and pedagogical research. See Giorgi (1970 & 1985), 
Thomas & Pollio (2001). 
115 Van Manen champions the application of phenomenology in pedagogical studies and the health sciences. The 
six orientations he identifies include: transcendental, existential, hermeneutical, linguistic, ethical and 
experiential (phenomenology of practice). See http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/inquiry/1.htm 
116 Van Manen refers to these orientations pluralistically as ‘movements’, rather than as a single movement. See 
also Van Manen (2002). 
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technological forms, relationships that current approaches caught in the crossfire of the live 
and mediatised debate have struggled to conceptualise. My task in this section is to introduce 
the design and implementation of a practical method applied from within audience; the 
development of my practical method results from a confluence of ideas and experiences that 
include readings of Herbert Spiegelberg (1971, 1981); my participation in the 
Phenomenology Research Group on the moral emotions led by Anthony J. Steinbock (2008, 
2010-11); written documentation of phenomenology groups by Edward S. Casey (1997); the 
transcendental phenomenology of Husserl; the experimental phenomenology of Don Ihde 
(1977), and previous work undertaken by myself and other researchers from the Department 
of Performance Studies at the University of Sydney (2005-6).117 
 
 
§3.5.1   ESSENTIALS OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
In mapping out the main tenets of the phenomenological enterprise, Spiegelberg also 
outlines “[t]he essentials of the phenomenological method” (Spiegelberg 1971, 653-701). His 
seven steps include: 1) investigating particular phenomena; 2) investigating general essences; 
3) apprehending essential relationships among essences; 4) watching modes of appearing; 5) 
watching the constitution of phenomena in consciousness; 6) suspending belief in the 
existence of phenomena; and 7) interpreting the meaning of phenomena (Spiegelberg 1965, 
659). He claims that the method makes it possible for the practising phenomenologist to 
follow Husserl’s famous formulation to ‘get back to the things themselves’ and see the 
‘many-sidedness’ of constituted things. Questioning the “originality” of phenomenology, 
Spiegelberg indicates the uniqueness of this kind of analysis with regard to approaches such 
as those of the discipline of psychology and the empirical sciences, which also employ 
techniques to observe, intuit and describe phenomena. What is particularly special about 
phenomenology is that all phenomena and objects are given in a manifold of ways; that is, 
despite appearing to us one-sidedly, there are infinite ways in which the object could appear 
and be apprehended. By acknowledging this premise, we are already affording for the 
phenomena or object a rich and open-ended variance, a variance that is traditionally truncated 
by the sciences through reductive approaches. Sciences, observes Spiegelberg, tend to start                                                         
117 I am indebted to Dr Stuart Grant for introducing me to the practice of phenomenology in a Performance 
Studies context. 
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“with simplifying abstractions and end with a minimum vocabulary of scientific concepts” 
(Spiegelberg 1965, 658). The many possible perspectival shadings of an object pose for any 
study a more diverse manifold of structures to make manifest. By and large, practising group 
phenomenology—where the experiences of more than one phenomenologist are taken into 
account—maximises the potential variance of an object or phenomena in the pursuit of their 
finer structures. 
 Phenomenology takes into account a matrix of experience rather than the 
phenomenon or object in isolation; it is concerned with the entire environment in which a 
particular activity or process occurs or develops. Consequently the matrix of experience 
should not be elided at the outset by a singular perception of an object in its primordial 
objectivity. Rather, we must ‘build up’ the phenomenological picture from a constitutional 
procedure that takes into consideration the more founding genetic structures of passive and 
active perception within the experiencing ego: our self-temporalising style and embodied 
imaginings. The structural aspects of experience along with the constituted object-event are 
brought into greater relief through the applied techniques of a phenomenological and 
attentional reduction and the subsequent generative writing process of written description. 
 In my method, generative writing is a process that takes an experience from its 
immediate description to a meaningful interpretation and understanding of the artwork in 
terms of its receptivity. It requires that the writer (spectator/analyst) participates in 
specialised workshops to slow down their interpretive processes. Artificial constraints are 
then imposed upon the immediate experience and writing sessions following performance. 
The French Literary Group Oulipo (formed in 1960), in their search for an alternative to the 
surrealist movement in literature, placed a range of constraints (some mathematical) on 
writing methods in order to spark new ideas and promote invention in their “Workshop of 
Potential Literature”.118 This method of placing constraints on the structure of writing to free 
the language (a freedom-constraint paradox) influences my approach to the writing of 
experiences. The act of broadening through limitations in the Poetics of Reception workshops 
attempts to achieve openness by ‘focusing’ and ‘bracketing’ during the attendance and 
writing stages. The latter is a transposition of the ‘bracketing’ and ‘suspension of judgment’ 
strategies required in the earlier stages of attending. 
 
                                                        
118 See Consenstein (2002). 
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§3.5.2   GROUP PHENOMENOLOGY   
Spiegelberg pioneered practical phenomenology workshops in the latter half of the 
Twentieth Century in a University context, involving faculty, other students and visiting 
scholars. Group phenomenology continues under the direction of Anthony J. Steinbock in the 
Phenomenology Research Center, where I was located as a research scholar for fifteen 
months (2010 to 2012).119 In Performance Studies, Dr Stuart Grant conducts group 
phenomenology on comedy and laughter with students at Monash University, Melbourne, 
Australia.  
 In “Sym-Phenomenologising: Talking Shop” (1997), Casey describes Spiegelberg’s 
five summer workshops at Washington University between 1967 and 1972. Each day would 
proceed with a group meeting for “common practice studies” in the course of which they 
were asked to describe their experiences in written form. These notes would be compared in a 
group discussion. In the afternoons they would retire to their rooms for a longer write-up of 
the morning’s practice. The type of phenomenon to which they attended varied from static 
architectural objects to such things as “listening to silence” (Casey 1997, 175). Casey notes 
that the topics chosen often varied, with single topics continuing throughout the week to be 
repeated the following year.120 The most significant aspect of the group’s discussion process 
for Spiegelberg was the attempt at “group attunement” of dissonant experiential accounts. 
This is likened to the tuning of instruments in a band or orchestra to rule out instances of 
playing out-of-tune. Spiegelberg notes that with “discrepant accounts” of experience it is a 
case of attuning the language. 
 
 Mutual exploration may reveal that the instruments of description are out of tune, and that a 
 readjustment of the linguistic tools can clear up some of the discrepancies  
 (Spiegelberg in Casey 1997, 176).    
 
I noticed in the Poetics of Reception workshops that the language style in descriptions varied 
noticeably between accounts. This occurred despite the fact that everyone attended the same 
event, and received exactly the same information and examples of how they were to proceed                                                         
119 I elaborate upon my experiences and the more influential aspects of the study group with Steinbock from my 
first visit in late August 2008 in Chapter 6.  
120 In comparison, Steinbock’s phenomenology research group focuses upon one theme over two semesters. For 
the past nine years, Steinbock has been concerned with the moral emotions. In 2008, I was introduced to 
Steinbock’s method on the moral emotion of guilt. The Fall and Spring semesters of 2010 and 2011 were an 
examination of pride, following the 2009-10 theme of shame that I followed by reading each session’s notes 
sent by email. 
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with phenomenological description. The process of readjusting the linguistic expressions to 
ascertain the invariant structures of phenomena that the language in its great variance refers 
to will be demonstrated in Chapter 7. Hints for undertaking this analytic process are not 
readily found in Spiegelberg’s writing, or in Casey’s documentation of these original 
workshops. Spiegelberg was committed to furthering phenomenological description in the 
workshops from the unexpected and constantly changing results of the many experiences. 
Casey notes that “[d]oing phenomenology is doing something that is recursive in character” 
(Casey 1997, 176), an experience of sym-phenomenologising that I too have encountered. 
 Even though my method is inherently recursive and emergent in nature, its foundation 
has precedence in the historical work of Spiegelberg and my exposure to other methods of 
group phenomenology, and develops in accordance with my practice of the method over four 
years.   
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§3.5.3  POETICS OF RECEPTION PROJECT 
 
I have distilled Spiegelberg’s seven steps into three informing the various stages of 
the Poetics workshops (1) intuition and receptivity (2) description and (3) examination and 
relations. Over the remainder of this chapter, I will present a time-line of my research design 
detailing the aims, expected outcomes, recruitment of participants and what was required of 
them; and explain the original ‘info-pack’ through a reflective process of documentation. 
 
Aims of the Poetics of Reception Project 
 
 (1)   To conduct a series of writing workshops with recruited participants in order 
  to investigate the phenomenologically elaborated experiences of live,  
  mediatised performance while being in audience.   
 
(2)   To refine a practical method for group-based phenomenology in the discipline 
  of Performance Studies.  
 
(3)   To investigate the immediate data of experiences through the descriptive and 
  phenomenologically treated language of written accounts.  
 
(4)   To approach an understanding of dance performance through non-critical  
  based systems of inquiry, and to trial and develop a method of ‘generative  
  writing’, which is a process that takes an experience from its immediate  
  description to a meaningful interpretation and understanding of the art work in 
  terms of its receptivity.  
(5)   To undertake group phenomenology through writing rather than solely  
  through discussion. Writing liberates the communication of thought and  
  experiences from any shyness or anxiety that verbal discussion between  
  members of a group can promote. Group discussion can often be dominated by 
  confident speakers who unintentionally prevent the expression of those who 
  find speaking about their thoughts difficult. What is missed in discussion is 
  found more readily in written accounts.   
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(6)   To generate data in the form of a diverse collection of un-edited written  
  accounts for the eventual identification and analysis of essential aspects  
  common to being within audience at selected events. These aspects will be 
  further analysed to elaborate upon the interactive relations between corporeal 
  bodies and technological forms in performance.  
 
Expected Outcomes 
It was proposed that this study would:  
(1)   Facilitate a more rigorous experiential based means for understanding the  
  relationship between live and mediatised forms in performance.  
(2)   Develop and refine a practical method for ‘writing dancing’ from within  
  audience while resisting a critical and evaluative process. Establishing a  
  systematic phenomenological approach to writing performance reviews. 
(3)   Address the problem of the ‘immediacy’ of writing about experiences of  
  performance while being within audience. 
(4)   Expand the attentions of an audience member to account with finer  
  distinctions their embodiment and the embodiment of performers experienced 
  in the object-event. 
 
Recruitment of Participants 
 Initially, I anticipated that two separate groups, consisting of four participants, would 
attend two live performances each. I was interested in recruiting participants with diverse 
conceptual and theoretical backgrounds that informed their work, field of study, artistic 
practice, intellect, their everyday and/or spiritual life. I thought this would diversify the 
written accounts in the later stage of the process and demonstrate how different systems of 
knowledge assist or resist phenomenological reduction.  
 I made a shortlist of suitable participants, decided upon a public dance performance 
that involved live dancing and interactive digital technology, and then wrote a letter of 
invitation by email. Once I received positive responses from four participants (indexed as P1, 
  147 
P2, P3 and P4) ‘Group A’ was formed; we then coordinated a suitable date and time to view 
the performance. I booked tickets and a venue for the workshop and prepared material for the 
session. My plan was to have four sessions with two separate groups (two sessions each) 
completed in an eight- to twelve-month period. 
 I had difficulties in engaging participants with very different backgrounds. All 
individuals for Group A had some kind of professional performance experience, were tertiary 
educated (two with PhDs), and were well-known to me as colleagues or friends. I realised 
very quickly that by pursuing a research project with no funding, my pool of participants 
would prove to be limited. Despite covering ticket costs, transport, and providing snacks, the 
motivations for participation varied: doing me a favour; interest in the practical application of 
phenomenology; writing in a workshop scenario; and wanting to see the performance. From 
responses received in this first session, I realised the criteria for making future invitations 
should be formed from these motivations. If I had external funding for the project, engaging 
participants from diverse occupational and cultural backgrounds may have been possible. 
And yet the results were not compromised by the fact that every participant in the three 
workshops and two pilots had some kind of performance background. They had a diverse mix 
of educational, cultural, spiritual and occupational experiences—including their differing 
approaches to performance practice. Incidentally, I had to work harder in guiding the groups 
to suspend their preconceptions, critical evaluations and quick to form interpretations about 
phenomena experienced in a context they knew very well.     
 
What was required of the participants? 
On accepting their invitation to commit to two public performances, participants were 
sent a Poetics of Reception Information Pack (‘info-pack’) to read before their first session. 
The pack provided a brief background to phenomenology and outlined procedures for 
practising the method in this specific research context. It contained the following documents: 
“Background to Phenomenological Method as Practice: the innocence of first seeing”; “Top 
Tips for a phenomenological and attentional reduction during performance”; “Top Tips for 
Writing Phenomenological Descriptions”; “Directives for take-home Writing Task C”; and 
“Samples of Phenomenological Writing” from individual and group-based work conducted 
over the last two years. My main objectives were to make the information accessible while 
not losing the theoretical import of the research project. Phenomenology was not a foreign 
term to participants, insofar as they had all heard of this philosophical discipline before. The 
  148 
practice was new to most, however, and I was careful to make each feel confident in their 
abilities to undertake the proposed activities and contribute to the analysis that I was 
intending to make. The procedural aspects of the document were somewhat didactic. The 
workshops were sessions to teach participants how to do phenomenology. After piloting the 
method with one participant prior to the first workshop, I understood that there were issues 
with communication, and consequently isolated what was unclear or unnecessary. The first 
pilot session allowed me to rewrite some of the documents. This background information and 
the procedure of the method were improved after several applications. Some of these changes 
will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Information sent to participants as a preparatory guide for the workshops121 
The document opened with the following equation:  
An Algorithm for first seeing: 
    Opening = bracketing + focusing 
 
The observer and writer must bracket out any judgments that may colour or close down their 
experience in a critical way. They must strive to break with their habitual view of the world 
and attempt to shut-out preconceived ideas of every sort and consider at the most passive 
level of their experience the actual contents of the performance perceived in their immanent 
relationships with each other. Secondly, this study is interested in the overall structure of a 
perceiving consciousness. By paying attention to the constitution of phenomena in embodied 
consciousness through our perceptions and the related complicated myriad of memories, 
imaginings, and expectations, we are mapping the temporalising aspect of what it is to attend 
or be-there-with at a performance event.122 This is paramount to understanding the artwork in 
its receptive constitution of which my overall research hopes, in part, to disclose.     
 
A Phenomenological Reduction: To Bracket 
My engagement with phenomenological reductionism in this research project is primarily 
practical. My approach is to take on the ‘task’ or ‘process’ of this supposedly 
presuppositionless ‘grounded science’ and enable access to a more primordial experience of 
the event: the very first place of contact for participants. 
 
                                                        
121 The text below is as it appeared in the first workshop information pack for participants attending GLOW 
(2007). By the third workshop, the text became more streamlined, less theoretical with certain terms clarified as 
a result of specific questions and confusions from participants. See Appendix A for the updated info-pack 
distributed to participants for the third workshop in 2009. 
122 At the time, I was reading a lot more Heidegger than Husserl. My term being-there-with describes our being-
in-the-world in a specifically delimited event: the performance, with other audience members, performers and 
objects we co-constitute. My eventual departure from Heidegger’s thought did not dispense with this term, as it 
was never a problem for participants to understand or feel the sense of being-there-with the performance 
phenomena and other audience members. 
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Treating the phenomenological reduction as a practice and not an epistemological strategy 
per se, I believe the bonds of cultural thinking and theoretical judgments that reify and  
condition phenomena into concepts and expressions far from their essential nature as 
experienced can be challenged. At least by disclosing our attendance of these events and the 
phenomena toward which we make our inquiry we can get closer to an understanding of the 
performance as it is revealed to us in its immediacy: in our live reception of it. The process of 
bracketing requires the participant to actively suspend prejudices in order to open onto the 
phenomena in a more intuitive way. This act of suspension can be understood as shelving 
regions of knowledge: putting aside those concepts and theoretical systems that help us 
account for our experiences in the world to describe this immediate contact. These 
knowledges can then be pulled off the shelf at a later phase of writing and reintroduced with 
the experience of this phenomenologically reduced account.  
 
Performing an Attentional Reduction – To Focus 
To perform an attentional reduction one must possess an active turn of regard towards 
specific objects of concern. This requires a heightened mode of attentional focus on 
phenomena and their relationships than is practised in the everyday.  
The postural disposition for an active turn of regard equates to the simple bodily 
comportment of facing toward the performance as a seeing, hearing, thinking, imagining, 
reminiscing (perhaps even dozing) audience member in active reception.123 In perceiving the 
stage/performance area contained of elements both live and virtual in complex relationships 
of performative play, we are also required to pay attention to the structures of our own 
relationship to the perceiving of these phenomena such as our ‘style of comportment’ 
(emotional, cognitive, instinctive and kinesthetic) and our overall presence: the being-there-
with. 
The following scenario was written to provide attendees with a concrete example of what to 
do if they were to become distracted during the performance.                                                         
123 This is not an exhaustive account of the possible ways that an audience member in their “postural schema” 
attends (Lingis 1994, 13-14). However, most events (including interactive systems) involve a turning toward the 
place(s) of performative action constituting an interface between audience member and performer or 
performance object. 
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A simple everyday scenario of becoming attentive: dealing with the ‘losing touch’ 
It may be the case that we are paying attention by listening to the news on the radio: the 
content of what is being said, while allowing thoughts, images and ideas to grow within that 
frame of attention. Our attentional focus may be widened to include other phenomenal 
features like the announcer’s voice, radio static, the surrounding interior architecture of the 
room, our bodily relation to other objects, and the mental images or thoughts that form and 
disappear. It may be the case that this flow or unity of perceptions where listening is 
engaged—though withdrawn from our actual awareness—is interrupted/distracted by a 
person walking into the room asking a question. This may break our attention momentarily as 
we are forced by this rupture to listen to what is new to our hearing, even if we do not want 
to. Interested in the continuity of the news report, we might then seek to regain that active 
turn of regard toward listening by redirecting our attentions to the newsreader’s voice, the 
words spoken from the radio, rather than the voice and words of the interrupting family 
member. We do this by assembling our bodily comportment actively toward the radio in a 
listening embodiment, which brackets out the perceived distraction that is still heard in the 
background.  
Similarly, in paying attention to the phenomena at hand during the performance we may be 
distracted or interrupted from attending. This is of course part of our overall experience, but 
in the spirit of reduction and placing constraints on our attendance we must try to bracket out 
these distractions that lure us away from the selected elements and relations significant to the 
inquiry. 
 
 During the second performance with Group A, a young boy was noisily eating chips 
in a seat nearby. The little performance endured for an entire packet. We were all drawn from 
our attentions of the main performance intermittently and spent some time laughing about it 
in the workshop. This was much to one participant’s chagrin, who wrote: 
 
 [s]hoot the kid eating chips—shit what an inconsiderate crap mother—you are not allowed to feature in 
 this [P2, E]. 
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As previously mentioned, the three steps synthesised from Spiegelberg’s seven are discussed 
below. Step three will be further elaborated in the closing section of this chapter as it informs 
the textual analysis demonstrated in Chapter 7.  
 
1. Intuition + Receptivity  
 
 Intuiting phenomena is not a mystical, unconscious operation; it is a deliberate 
attempt to access phenomena at a more passive level of perception before the thinking really 
starts.124 Our intuition into what unfolds seeks support in the structure and constraints of the 
bracketing and suspension of preconceptions and prejudices. It is not a case of ‘registering 
[phenomena] by sense organs to explain the ‘whatness’ or causal nature of an object in 
relation to another object or our own perceptions of some event (Spiegelberg 1965, 660-661). 
Rather, the receptivity involves an awareness of your whole being in the embodied 
‘experience’ of the thing. The mind in its thinking can very quickly enumerate and 
extrapolate away from the experience to satisfy familiar modes of understanding. This creates 
an ontological distance. Such a closure on access to the things themselves is what we seek to 
avoid by employing these simple yet tough techniques. 
 
 Intuiting consists in the methodical inspection of entire series of phenomena with a view to 
 discovering the “manifold structural similarities” between them. But it also pays careful attention to 
 their subtler differences (Spiegelberg 1965, 670). 
 
 
2. Description 
 
 Phenomenological description is difficult and appears to undermine the notion of 
approaching phenomena from a ‘pre-predicative’ place. “A description presupposes a 
framework of class names, and all it can do is to determine the location of the phenomenon 
with regard to an already developed system of classes” (Spiegelberg 1971, 673). In other 
words the system of language we use will always permeate our descriptions. However, it is 
possible that a new language exists which allows the phenomenological description to “serve                                                         
124 It is not expected that in laying constraints upon and paying strict attention to our normal perceiving we can 
access and articulate in language with any certainty the most passive layer of perception. However, in our 
attempts at ‘bracketing and opening’ to look at performance phenomena, we will be closer to “remaining 
faithful to them before even thinking about them” (Casey 1997, 179). 
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as a reliable guide to the listener’s own actual or potential experience”, or less conservatively: 
writing towards a new poetics of reception (Spiegelberg 197, 673). 
The following quote both typifies and mitigates through acknowledgment the difficulty of 
such an approach.  
 
Phenomenology begins in silence. Only he who has experienced genuine perplexity and frustration in 
the face of the phenomena when trying to find the proper description for them knows what 
phenomenological seeing really means (Spiegelberg 1971, 672) 
 
 
3. Examination + Relations 
 
 By bracketing and focusing while being intuitively receptive we can isolate the 
phenomena under investigation and make apparent what is essential to their inherent 
structures. As Spiegelberg noted “it does not in any sense demand dissecting them into 
separate parts. [Description] comprises the constituents of the phenomena as well as the 
exploration of their relations to and connections with adjacent phenomena” (Spiegelberg 
1971, 670). 
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The Workshop Plan 
 
Stage One: Preparation 
 
Before the first workshop, recruited participants were provided with instructions on how to 
perform attentional and phenomenological reductions during performance. I made the 
document’s title playful in order to mitigate the serious sounding directives of the procedure. 
The steps were presented in point form as follows, and discussed with participants prior to 
the performance. I will provide a commentary below each point. 
 
Top Tips for a Phenomenological and Attentional Reduction during Performance 
1) Enter the performance with ‘little to no frame of expectation’ about what is to be 
 performed. Like a child, expose your sensing receptive self to the world of 
 phenomena as it shows itself. DO NOT READ THE PROGRAMME 
  
 I make use of Gay McAuley’s suggestion for how to approach a performance when 
conducting semiotic analysis: with ‘little to no frame of expectation’. As a student and 
teacher of McAuley’s method, I found this to be very close to practising a style of 
phenomenological reduction: bracketing beforehand any expectations one  may have of the 
performance which may lead too quickly to interpretation, or close  down understanding. The 
methods for a semiotic and phenomenological analysis are  not that dissimilar, but their 
analyses aim at different things. Semiotics of performance wants to construct a contingent 
thread of interpretation from the material and narrative aspects of the production in order to 
arrive at some meaning(s); phenomenology wants to get back to the things themselves: their 
invariant essential relations and structures.125  
Bidding the participant to view the performance like a child is intended to help 
establish an innocent, open, and presuppositionless attitude. Children represent the capacity 
for this openness and naivety that a practice of non-mystical “intuiting” requests. Spiegelberg 
notes: 
 
  [t]here is little that the beginning phenomenologist can be given by way of precise instructions 
  beyond such metaphoric phrases as “opening his eyes,” “keeping them open,” “not getting 
  blinded,” “looking and listening,” etc (Spiegelberg 1965, 660).                                                          
125 See McAuley (2001, 5-19) and McAuley (1998). 
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These “Top Tips” are rhetorical, insofar as they attempt to persuade participants in letting go 
and adopting a new attitude toward phenomena in a world  that they know very well: the 
world of performance. Thus it was necessary to interweave readily understood concepts, or 
well-known phrases, with phenomenological language that was new to most participants. 
Reading the information, then taking it into practice, quickly synthesised our learning and 
theoretical understanding of the main principles of phenomenology.  
I instructed the participants to not read the programme. Often the Director’s Notes 
explain the meaning and purpose of the performance. I did not want participants to 
foreground any story or meaning expressed in the programme in their descriptions. However, 
any meanings emerging from their experience of the performance and communicated in the 
writing were not entirely disregarded, but bracketed to be elaborated upon in the second and 
third writing tasks. 
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2) Begin to bracket out thoughts which relate to any kind of evaluative judgment 
 such as prejudicial likes and dislikes, judgments of whether the performance is 
 failing or going well, aesthetic appreciation and disappointment. Avoid 
 technical/dramaturgical assessments that will lead you down the path of 
 criticism.  
 
 I used a very simple analogy of an isometric muscle contraction to explain the 
practice of bracketing to participants. This image and sensation was very helpful in 
describing the use of reduction from the moment of performance through to the writing 
stages A, B and C, and communicating how overtime this practice can shape the contours of 
a phenomenological seeing in their development as phenomenologists. I wrote:   
 
  [i]t’s like squeezing a muscle as tight as you can (try it!), then  releasing it (drop it!). The  
  muscle still retains an echo of the initial action, its effect a dissipating sensation, inscribed 
  now in  memory, still informing. Over time, and if done enough, there will be an  
  inevitable shaping of that muscle from this isometric approach. 
 
For all participants, Tip 2 was an important point to stress. Each possessed a high 
degree of knowledge and experience in many aspects of performance as practitioners or 
academics. Their critical minds were sharp and quick to know what they found agreeable or 
disagreeable. The phenomenological reduction was a challenge, entailing a whole new 
attitude to the receptivity of performance. Some felt more comfortable than others with this 
activity. Most participants concurred that they found something new, or focused upon aspects 
that they would not usually. In some cases, a participant overcame their initial dislike of 
something when the writing and discussion began. The critical mind did seep in on occasion, 
but there was incredible vigilance in the activity of bracketing. Participants who had the 
opportunity to do it more than once found it easier as their bracketing ‘muscle’ strengthened. 
 In retrospect, practising with informed participants in a performance context 
demonstrated the true efficacy of phenomenological bracketing. It is logical that if there were 
few presuppositions or judgments to bracket, then it would matter less to practise the 
reductions.  
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3) Make quiet the analytic mind. Allow such thoughts to enter momentarily, 
 pushing them aside with an active turn of regard back to those objects and their 
 relations within your field of embodied perception. 
 
It was important to stress the embodied nature of perception in the practice of 
phenomenology. Within the tradition of group phenomenology there is little precedence of 
the body foregrounded in the reflective awareness of the cognitive and emotional aspects of a 
perceiving constituting subject. This does not exclude the possibility that phenomenology 
group practices are taking embodiment as a critical aspect of description; but I have not been 
privy to such practices. As I have mentioned earlier, in phenomenology more generally, 
Merleau-Ponty is responsible  for thematising the body in the motility of perception, as is 
Edith Stein in her unification of lived body sensations with a pure intending consciousness in 
her treatise on empathy in 1916. But practical phenomenologists tend to sit around looking at 
objects or discussing phenomena without reflecting on the embodiment of  their practising: 
constituting the constituted as it appears to them. This makes sense, insofar as, the event of 
phenomena may be in the past or only given hypothetically, in that, it belongs to someone 
else’s experience or is fictional. Under these conditions we examine phenomena that are not 
directly experienced first-hand with our bodies. What is striking about conducting 
phenomenology from within audience on actual performance phenomena is that the objects 
are being constituted simultaneously with the act of phenomenology itself. In this respect 
one’s embodiment can readily become a theme.  
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4) Try active visualisation techniques to shelve/suspend thinking and ideas that 
 should be bracketed. Always come back to the body, how the feet feel on the 
 floor, the weight and contact of the body on the seat. 
 
I provided participants with a line-drawing of a person putting books on a shelf to 
suggest a simple visual to reimagine during the process of bracketing. Each critical, 
evaluative and interpretive thought that coloured the experience could be placed on a shelf, 
like books, and given some significance to attend to in later discussions or worked into their 
later writing tasks. First, I wanted to give the impression that the procedure was possible, and 
not as radical as the methodological doubt of Descartes’ ‘res cogitans’ and Husserl’s 
establishment of a ‘pure ego’. I was aware of the concerns with such intellectual procedures. 
My participants were rightly suspicious of selectively suspending thoughts in a method 
claiming acute descriptions of their experiences: are we not undermining the depth and truth 
of experience if we attempt to muffle aspects of it? I wanted to stress the bracketing 
procedure as a simple, momentary movement that was possible in practice. The reduction is 
an approximating task that can be done with no absolute certainty. Husserl was well aware of 
this.126 Second, the books on shelves as a metaphor for suspended thoughts provided a 
positive valuation, rather than a deliberation about what thoughts were right or wrong. The 
shelving picture represents a sorting and separating activity. It was important to insist that the 
phenomenological reduction practised in this context was not an abrogation of thoughts or 
thinking. The reduction for Husserl was to clear the path toward a pure field of 
consciousness: the territory of a pure ego standing behind or within consciousness. Like 
Descartes, his suggestion was to suspend certain dubitable forms of existence and to arrive at 
something more foundational: something that could not be doubted. My point here is that the 
use of reductions in this group practice does not require the same radical exclusion as 
Descartes or Husserl, but it is the intellectual and embodied movement of putting aside 
critical and evaluative judgments while attending to specific performance phenomena. 
 
                                                        
126 I follow Steven Galt Crowell in his suggestion that the reduction is an approximate “task”: 
 
 [t]he idea of a presuppositionless, radically grounded science is thus implied as a task, one that can be taken up explicitly, 
 motivated by the idea of ultimate scientific responsibility…nothing taken for granted on the predicative or pre-predicative level 
 can function as an unquestioned ground of knowledge; instead, only the scientific process of grounding has “timeless” 
 significance and validity (Crowell 1999, 47). 
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5)  Open all your senses toward the performance, the audience around you, the 
 theatre/performance space and your own embodied consciousness. Use your 
 breath to reorient yourself when focus on performing the reductions becomes 
 obsessive. Try not to think about what you are going to write. Allow yourself to 
 be completely immersed, paying attention to where your attention is. If you start 
 to feel overwhelmed, drop the reductions for a few minutes, TAKE A BREATH, 
 take another one and attend to the performance as you normally would. Resume 
 when you feel comfortable again. 
 
The breath exercises were an important bodily anchor for participants when the 
processes of phenomenology overwhelmed them. Coming back to the breath reengaged any 
wandering attentions from the practice of reductions or the performance more generally. One 
participant observed her breath several times and commented that it would have been 
impossible to activate the method if this bodily-based anchor had not been suggested. 
 From my own experiences of applying this method, the effort of a  phenomenological 
and attentional reduction can be exhausting, sometimes causing mental confusion and a total 
inability to experience the performance in anyway. However with these simple devices—a  
mental image of putting books on shelves, coming back to the breath, sensing posture, and 
making bodily contact with the chair and floor—I could reengage with the procedure more 
easily. The more performances I attended, the less I ‘dropped out’ of experiencing the 
performance as a consequence of anxiety. In one participant’s account they described a 
moment of ‘dropping in’ and a moment of ‘dropping out’ of watching. They were acutely 
attentive and reflective about their experiencing of conducting the phenomenology. They 
wrote: 
  
  [s]oon the audience settles and my attention is drawn in. Until that point I’m not  really  
  engaged. I can see the performance has been going on, but for me it has not started. But I  
  settled in tune with my gaze...I find myself reaching to this [sic]—I’ve seen it before. But I 
  stop myself from this judgment & referencing—or try to. It has disconnected me from the 
  experience [P1, G]. 
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6) Tonight’s attentional focus will be directed toward: live bodies, technological 
 media: audio-visual material (a screen presence), music/sound, lights, stage, 
 props, other audience members, auditorium, where you are in consciousness 
 (your memories, imaginings, anticipations) and how you feel. Pay particular 
 attention to the relationships and connections between these. 
 
For a discussion of selected phenomena, please see explanation for Tip 7. 
 
7) Most of all ENJOY! There is no right or wrong answer. It is just a process that 
 takes a long time to feel comfortable in doing. 
 
Conducting analysis during a performance may appear to dilute the joy of what is 
intended to be an enjoyable experience. I wanted to relax participants as much as possible in 
their first attempt at practising phenomenology. Concerns were raised as to whether they 
were approaching the method correctly. I tried to mollify these fears with assurances that 
whatever writing we ended up with, my purpose was not to ascertain an indubitable truth 
through the ‘perfect’ application of a method. The tips were to guide an approach with 
optimal outcomes, but the expectation was never that each stage would be conducted 
flawlessly. At this early stage of collecting  participants’ written experiences, I was not 
concerned about what aspects of the text were relevant or irrelevant. My final-stage textual 
analysis and transcription of discussion would sort through these without exposing 
participants in any negative way. Comfort and encouragement were key approaches to 
guiding this style of experiencing. The group discussion and reading of each other’s writings 
aloud proved invaluable to the shared development of techniques. I am indebted to my 
participants for sharpening my skills in both teaching and conducting phenomenology. The 
two writing tasks were designed for a more analytic progression (discussed below), but ‘Task 
1’ often functioned formatively as a practice for participants who felt self-conscious or 
unhappy with their writing from the first round. By the third workshop I became aware that I 
was undertaking analysis too early in the process and expecting more from participants than 
was reasonable. Despite these earlier issues, the discussions of the performance and writings 
across all workshops and pilots equally provided potent leading clues for my final analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 7.  
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In the first workshop, Group A followed all seven tips. By the second performance I 
made amendments to point (6), and added point (7) and (8) for further clarification.  
 
6) Tonight’s attentional focus will be generally directed toward: live bodies, 
 technological media: audio-visual material (i.e. projections), music/sound, lights, 
 stage, props, other audience members, auditorium, where you are in 
 consciousness (your memories, imaginings, anticipations) and how you feel.  
 
 
7) Tonight’s attentional focus will be specifically directed toward: the relationship 
 between the LIVE and MEDIATISED elements. For example: the live dancing 
 performer, their screen presence, or other AV sound/image included within the 
 composition.  
 
I found it necessary to make the distinction between a more general attention toward 
the entire performance, and a specific attention toward the phenomena under investigation. 
After the first workshop, I realised that the relationship between the live performer and the 
technological media needed to be highlighted as it became confusing and too wide an 
attentional focus for participants to take in everything. But,  I also did not want participants to 
ignore other elements of the mise-en-scène or performance space, such as  the auditorium and 
other audience members. I found drawing this distinction clarified the attentional procedure, 
and the writings became more directed towards the relationship as the research intended. By 
the second pilot workshop, more direction was possible due to the fact that I had collaborated 
in its design to set the conditions for the phenomenological work. This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
  162 
8)  Attempt to pay attention to when, where and how your attention shifts between 
 the live and mediatised elements. Be open to the ‘structure of your attentional 
 focus’ without analysing (less a why) or thinking of reasons for this movement. 
 For example: When, where and how do I switch my attentions from the live 
 dancer to the  mediatised element? Am I open to both?  
 
The addition of tip no. 8 demonstrates how the design of the method became more 
refined as the workshops took place. I felt more confident to seek specific relations and ask 
participants to pay attention to them. The switch in attention between bodies and the media 
addresses the root of the relationship. To direct attention ‘there’ and to describe ‘when’ it 
occurred, ‘where’ it occurred and ‘how’, without asking why, I would be closer to getting at 
the essential structure of this relationship through the variance of experiences. Interestingly, I 
was beginning to find a preparatory method for undertaking textual analysis through the 
interface of the experience. I was initially concerned that the method for textual analysis 
would be introduced and imposed from the outside: an ancillary method that might 
compromise the intuiting and descriptive phases of the method where the experience was 
more immediate and less mediated. There is more than one way to analyse the descriptive 
work of phenomenology.  
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Stage Two: Attending 
For the first performance, participants were asked to convene in the foyer at least 15 
minutes before it began to discuss any concerns with the first stage of the method. As stated 
already, they were asked to not read program notes but also to avoid any review-based 
material on the event in order to minimise contaminating the process with preconceived 
meanings and already formed external judgments and criticisms from reviewers. Immediately 
following the performance, they were driven to the workshop for the writing session. 
Participants were asked to avoid discussing the performance with each other or any other 
audience members whom they might bump into in the foyer—an inevitable encounter given 
the contemporary dance and performance community within Sydney is small and familiar.127 
 
Stage Three: The Writing Workshop 
 
The Revivification of Attendance: addressing the problem of immediacy 
On arrival at the workshop venue, participants were asked to lie down or sit with their 
eyes closed. I conducted a short, spoken induction to help them focus their attention and 
memory back to the performance attended. The inductive technique revives the past 
performance event in a visual and embodied manner. I used simple descriptions to walk the 
participants into the auditorium and to encourage their memories of the event taking place 
only an hour or so earlier. I call this mnemonic technique the “Revification of Attendance”. 
Its purpose is two-fold: firstly, to address the problem of immediacy; and secondly, to 
reinforce the method of bracketing while enabling the reflective writing of experiences. 
Phenomenological description presents a temporal gap between direct experience, what 
Gertrude Stein calls the primordial experience, and the experience of remembering the 
originary experience: the non-primordial content of that experience (Stein 1989, 7-9). Given 
the context of phenomenologising performance phenomena, there is by necessity a temporal 
gap or problem of immediacy in the practice of description.128                                                          
127 All participants showed excellent restraint until the writing tasks were completed some hours later. One 
participant was bursting to discuss what they liked and didn’t like about the performance, but demonstrated 
excellent bracketing skills by avoiding such evaluations in the writing task.  
128 Stein describes a difference between the present “I” experiencing the past “I” of the original experience. It 
involves a representational “I” remembering as its primordial experience an “I” who is no longer a body there, 
but a body here, now remembering:  
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I did not want participants to write during any of the performances, not even during 
the third workshop where conditions were supportive of such impositions. Besides the ethical 
problem of impolitely interrupting the performer-audience relation with a row of bobbing 
heads and scratching pens, I did not want to break the unity of the participants’ experience 
any further with the added distraction of writing. The phenomenological reduction and 
attentional focus were complicated enough procedures to incorporate. As a result it became 
necessary to deal with the problem of immediacy during the workshops. 
 That the writing of experience is an act of memory representing the “I” of a former 
experience, the mnemonic tool (aid to memory) needs to also revivify the bodily experience 
of the event. Bodily memory does not necessarily accompany visual memories of an activity 
or event. Naturally this is because the body is no longer in the past; it can only concretely and 
primordially be present in one place at one time; thus in our practice of phenomenology, the 
body localises itself as a body remembering. However, the body and its senses can revivify 
the contents of a past event more readily than actively retracing it from mental pictures 
alone—like watching oneself in a movie, or viewing a scene like a camera audiencing one’s 
own experience. The meditation style induction was intended to visually and kinesthetically 
orient the participants’ memory to the former shared context. We were all there together in 
the same place at the same time with a diverse set of experiences and attentions. The 
workshop’s purpose was to ascertain these overlapping experiences in their rich variance, and 
so required a style of guidance that could connect participants more closely with their 
embodied memories. By the writing stage, not more than two hours out from the 
performance, we all suffered from varying degrees of forgetfulness. By first relaxing 
participants with a breath-based body scan, I asked them to remember the moment they 
walked into the auditorium, took their seats, waited for the performance to start, the lights 
going down and the opening stage image. Wherever participants chose to start writing was up 
to them, I made no restrictions. Describing this starting image was a helpful access point. 
Most of the written accounts began with an experience of the opening image and digressed 
from there. Some accounts were accurately chronological, varying in detail on select 
moments.   
 The second purpose of the embodied induction was to reinforce the bracketing 
process. That the attentional focus was successfully maintained during the performance was                                                         
 [t]he memory of a joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-
 primordial... not bodily there (Stein 1989, 8). 
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no assurance to counteracting the processes of evaluation and pre-edited writing post-
performance. I needed to ensure that in the anticipation of writing, participants did not lose 
this intuitive openness to describing phenomena. From my own experiences, I often 
formulate beforehand what I want to write, how the text might be structured, and what needs 
to be included. It was necessary to discourage such anticipatory concerns, and to maintain the 
bracketing of presuppositions, judgments, evaluations and premature interpretation. The 
transition from the embodied induction to writing was made quickly. Before participants 
opened their eyes, I instructed them to do nothing else but to get up, collect their writing 
material, find a comfortable space in the room, and to write until I told them to stop. 
 The induction for the revivification of attendance from the first workshop was given 
such positive feedback that I made two further additions to the method in the second and 
third workshops. I introduced a similar style of induction prior to attending the performance. 
We all congregated earlier in the workshop space and ran through the breath-based body 
scan. Rather than revivifying an experience that had not yet occurred, I used this technique to 
hone their bracketing and attentional focus. I worked with a somatic exercise that switches 
attention between external noises furthest away, sequentially hearing back to those sounds 
closest to us (internal).129 The preparatory induction reiterated steps 1-7 for attending the 
performance in a more embodied way. Participants returning to the project were favourably 
responsive, commenting that the process proved a lot easier with this preparatory embodied 
induction. Phenomenology is a very specific kind of attitude, and requires time to reorient our 
entire being from its everyday comportments. Approaching the reductions by engaging the 
body in unison with the activity of an intellectual reduction in a warm-up scenario proved 
invaluable.  
 The second change was to include the possibility of moving, sounding, talking and 
drawing during the post-performance induction. Rather than revivify these embodied 
memories as a locked-in, motionless body, I gave participants the opportunity to respond 
through one of these modes. Some chose to move a little, but most became very relaxed in 
their supine positions. I decided that by relaxing the mode of response, participants might 
connect with their memory of the experience more easily if given the opportunity to express 
this more freely. I did not see this as an alternative to writing experiences. Such expressive 
modes would require further representation with verbal or written language, hence creating                                                         
129 I am indebted to Sydney-based improvisor and performer Tony Osborne for teaching me this exercise. 
Osborne prepares his students with a range of somatic exercises up to an hour before improvisational tasks and 
performance practice. 
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more distance from the originary experience. I intended the elaborated responses to increase 
the mnemonic potency of the induction.  
 
Writing Task A 
Participants were provided with their own exercise book to keep and return to me 
once the session was completed. In this book they were asked to write their first account 
under a time limit of 30 minutes. Participants were asked to describe their experience of the 
performance with respect to the particular attentional relations of the selected phenomena: 
live corporeal bodies dancing with technological media, whatever the output (visual and/or 
sonic, grid lines, projections, and/or televisual representations). They were asked to pull back 
from any analysis or reasoning informed by their background knowledge systems, and to 
avoid evaluative language that approved or disapproved of the performance. Participants 
were reminded that it was not a critical review or response, and to remain open to their 
intuiting of the event. Prior to the performance I provided the following Directives for 
Constraints to participants in their “info pack”, and we read through Writing Task A before 
commencing the induction.  
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Figure 2: Original Document from first Workshop 
 
 Swapping Accounts: Reading and Discussion  
On completion of Writing Task A, each participant swapped his or her account with 
another. One person suggested that each read aloud their account to the group. This proved to 
be very beneficial, provoking a range of responses directly from the writings. The purpose of 
the discussion was to have the group ask questions, clarify what was said, and consider for 
themselves any ‘congruencies’ and/or ‘dissonances’ between accounts describing the same 
event. There was to be no argumentation as to whether one person’s account was more 
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accurate or inaccurate than another’s, or whether a particular interpretation could lead to the 
overall meaning of the performance. I wrote: 
Allow yourself to be influenced, open to the other person’s style. You may also be 
reminded of an event in the performance to write more about. The other person’s 
questions may encourage you to elaborate, and expand upon your previous description. 
 
 
Writing Task B   
Here, I asked participants to continue adhering to points 1 through 8 from writing task 
A and to remain mindful of the discussion while writing a second account of the same 
performance. I suggested that they might like to add to the account, deepen their description, 
write of new experiences prompted from someone else’s descriptions, or start again.  
 The difference with this task was to allow one word, term, statement, idea, question or 
description to ‘spring forth’ from the writing (as they wrote), or what had been revealed in 
the previous task and discussion process. By initially working with the metaphor of putting 
on the shelf or ‘suspending’ ideas that might close down the inquiry too soon, I asked 
participants to now relax and “take one off the shelf”, but only as far as there is one thought 
or theme considered which tends towards making sense, meaning or signification from the 
experience. This one thought is considered to be an essential distillation of the experience, 
and the departure point for bringing their account toward some kind of interpretation. I 
impressed the inchoate quality that I expected from this writing task, promising development 
and more polished attendance in Writing Task C.  
 To demonstrate how to ‘take one of the shelf’, I included the following example of 
generative development over the two writing tasks: 
 
In the first pilot workshop of the research project, participant 1 wrote the term 
‘precision savagery’ in both writing tasks. There was no elucidation of what this term 
exactly meant, but was a repeated linguistic motif suggesting something essential 
(eidetic) or deeper in their experience of the performance. 
 
My initial aim was to have participants develop further writing on a reoccurring theme with 
no restriction to interpretation. This became a motivation for Writing Task C. 
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Stage Four: An Informed Written Account 
 
Writing Task C 
For this task, I asked participants to take this one aspect revealed as significant from 
the former two accounts and develop the writing in whichever way they liked. Participants 
were permitted to relax all previous constraints and develop the writing with their previously 
suspended knowledge and conceptual systems to produce a more polished account. Their 
interpretation had the opportunity to deepen associatively beyond the performance. For this 
task I was interested in the moment where the bracketing ceased and how the writing in its 
generative movement would develop this one aspect from previous accounts written under 
imposed constraints. In a sense this task became a reversal of the phenomenology. In relaxing 
these constraints, I had two questions in mind: does the phenomenological attitude persist to 
preserve the experience as it was intuited and described while observing the reductions? Or 
does the reintroduction of our knowledge systems erode the foundational work? If one 
considers the constructive phase of Descartes’ radical doubt after we are left with an 
indubitable ego (which thinks and so is: ich bin) the suspension of all that exists but the 
thinking ego (and God who never faces this same exclusion) is relaxed and the picture of our 
surrounding world is rebuilt on the basis of the remaining cogito. Our questions for this 
intellectual process of bracketing are: what is the world like now? Is it the same? Or do we 
have a different picture of the world as a result of this systematic doubting? 
 During the development of my research project I started to review dance for Sydney-
based performance magazine RealTime +Onscreen.130 I took this opportunity to practise the 
method on my own, flexing the phenomenological muscle required for the workshop groups. 
I found all the stages helpful in attending to the performance with an openness that I would 
not usually have. Writing a critical review demands a different approach to the attentional 
relations specified in the project; rather than focusing upon select phenomena and their 
relations, the entire performance is a foregrounded feature of phenomenological attention. 
Moreover, the writing itself is required to move beyond description into a more critical and 
polished account of the experience. Critically developing writing from description to 
evaluation by and large interprets the meaning of performance, along with the value of the 
performers and the production; and the contextual aspects of the artwork in its historical and 
                                                        
130 Access to the online version of this magazine is at: http://www.realtimearts.net/.  
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contemporary milieu. Review writing using phenomenological method motivated my third 
writing task C.131  
 Task C was to be a take-home exercise due to time constraints during the workshop. 
But for several reasons it never worked as a final stage in the research. Besides the 
impossibility of asking participants to do more work outside of the sessions, I realised by the 
third workshop that any more writing from participants caused my analysis to move away 
from ascertaining the essential structure and relations of phenomena, and reach towards an 
interpretive analysis of the meaning context of the performance. I concluded that rather than 
place the onus of interpretation upon participants during the workshops, the fourth stage of 
analysis would need to be the eidetic examination of all the texts taken together once the 
workshops were completed. Such a narrative demonstrates how the design of my method 
developed in close contact with the experiences of its application, and in direct response to an 
evaluation of its successes and failures.  
 
Reflections on approach to the writing  
The language style of descriptions produced by particular constraints on participants’ 
writings demonstrated an unfolding within events, from more passive modes of experience to 
higher order acts of judgment. This is the result of the method itself. Participants approached 
each task differently, and their writing styles distinctly reflected the unfolding of these modes 
within the structure of their thinking. Access points to more passive states of reception were 
found in participants’ more poetic moments, and appeared more readily accessible from the 
conjunctive point of reception (I saw or imagined x when y grabbed my attention). Active 
modes of reception were foregrounded in moments where interpretation crept in. Writing task 
C is a case in point, where the higher acts of judgment may be invited back into the writing. 
In constructing the Poetics framework a primary concern for me was to design a writing 
approach that was sensitive to the fullness of an experience in its genetic unfolding: a writing 
method producing a new language that calls up the more passive, background shades of 
experience, and which foregrounded embodied attention.  
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the influence of different phenomenological 
practices on my design process by presenting case studies of performances where I was a 
research participant, observer, or audience member. This will be closely followed by my final 
section, Discovering, where I undertake an eidetic analysis of the events through an                                                         
131 For a good discussion on modes of review-based writing See Banes (2004).  
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examination of the written texts of participants. From this analysis, I have, at the very least, 
made invaluable insights and conceptual clarifications of the essential structural relations 
between bodies and technological media in a performance context. With a method of eidetic 
variation, the cultural-relativist skirt is lifted in order to reveal the phenomena’s “invariant 
and unchanging structures, irrespective of their layered on cultural senses” (Steinbock 1995, 
96). 
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CHAPTER 6 PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: A CASE OF ITERATIVE DESIGN 
 
In his translation of Husserliana XXIII, John B. Brough comments on Husserl’s 
struggle with the changing character of phenomenological analysis: 
 
As [Husserl] writes in his 1904/05 lectures, phenomenological analysis has the “peculiarity” that 
“every step forward yields new points of view from what we have already discovered appears in a new 
light, so that often enough what we were originally able to take as simple and undivided presents itself 
as complex and full of distinctions” (Brough 2005, xxxii).132  
 
Over the course of Husserl’s life, his phenomenological work on ‘re-presentation’ 
phenomena yielded a vast amount of writing.133 Husserl’s texts demonstrate how his position 
dramatically shifted over the years in his ongoing determination and reflections on the 
complex structural relations of such phenomena in consciousness. Identifying 
phenomenology as a movement rather than a philosophical school, Herbert Spiegelberg 
argued that a “philosophical movement can inspire the sense of philosophy ‘in the making’, 
thus avoiding the rigidity of a philosophical system, without being anti-systematic, but rather 
pre-systematic” (Spiegelberg 1983, 296). In discussing the movement and limits of 
philosophical method, Paul Ricoeur notes that: 
 
[t]he consciousness of the validity of a method is never separable from the consciousness of its limits. 
It is in order to give full measure to this method, and especially to allow myself to be instructed by it 
that I will seize hold of it in its movement of expansion, starting with an indisputable core, rather than 
taking it at its final stage, past a certain critical point where perhaps, it loses its limits (Ricoeur 2007b, 
30). 
 
Taking these three positions into consideration, my method for the study of performance 
phenomena has also been an experience of a non-static, responsive, and expansive 
framework, which changes shape following its application at each workshop meeting. These 
changes are due to feedback from the participants’ experiences of practising each step of the 
method (from induction to the written stages); and as a consequence of my ongoing learning                                                         
132 Husserliana XXXIII draws together sketches and lectures of Husserl’s work on the phenomena “that fall 
under the heading of Vergegenwärtigung, or ‘re-presentation’” (Brough 2005, xxx). Translation of these 
particular manuscripts from the Husserlianan forms the work Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 
(1898-1925).  
133 Re-presentation phenomena include memories, expectations, phantasies, and image consciousness. 
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and development as a phenomenologist through my participation in group phenomenology 
sessions, and as an audience member. Problems identified in executing my method during the 
workshops have led to slight variations to my initial approach as presented in the previous 
chapter. I see this as a refinement upon the overall process. As a dissertation concerning itself 
with developing and presenting an experimental methodology for phenomenological 
aesthetics in performance studies, thorough explanation, documentation, reflection and 
evaluation are essential. The design process has been an important aspect of my research. The 
method shaped itself in relation to the demands of the phenomena and the needs of the 
participants. Moreover, the preparatory analyses in this chapter provide a number of valuable 
clues for disclosing the structures and modes of the relational phenomenon found in the final 
section. The case studies provide a small taxonomy of technological media used in dance 
performance—particularly those that have had an impact on my method. Rather than 
presenting a ‘shopping list’ of performance technologies, I describe each in relation to their 
set-up, use and reception. But before concentrating on the different case studies, I would like 
to briefly discuss phenomenology as a creative practice.  
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§3.6.1  EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: A CREATIVE PRACTICE? 
 
After my first visit with Steinbock in 2008, along with other discoveries within the 
literature describing phenomenological methods applied within non-philosophical disciplines, 
it was apparent that these steps and stages were not strictly causal, but contingent, and so 
open to manipulation and modification. Media theorist Vilém Flusser defines design as a 
verb: “‘to concoct something’, ‘to stimulate’, ‘to draft’, ‘to sketch’, ‘to fashion’” (Flusser 
1999, 17). My ventures into other styles of phenomenology showed the potential for 
designing a method for approaching phenomena in more interesting and creative ways, 
without compromising the rigour required for analysis. The design for the Poetics project is 
iterative in its repeated use. As Spiegelberg points out, phenomenology is a fundamental 
change in attitude “which [gives] access to an entirely new dimension in the world of 
everyday experience” (Spiegelberg 1971, 29) The way in which this fundamental change in 
attitude is taken up can be a creative and experimental process: a process that in and by its 
very nature describes what is essential about experience—and the experiencing of that 
experience—from a non pre-ordained perspective. In practising phenomenology we open 
onto the thing/concept of interest. But how we come into contact with the phenomena, or how 
we communicate these experiences and the very structure of our embodied perceiving is an 
open affair. Communication of these experiences may be verbal or written, visually 
represented or exchanged through gesture. It is the task of the phenomenologist to develop an 
equally fluid system of consistent analysis that does not close down the meaningful 
dimensions of experience, otherwise the task of phenomenology has failed.  
 Practising phenomenology as an experimental method might, in some regards, be 
viewed as a form of creative practice. Steven Bindeman acknowledges that phenomenology 
is the most appropriate philosophical method for the study of human creativity “because its 
focus is on the immediate, ordinary experience (meaning the experience as it is lived)” 
(Bindeman 1998, 69). In the field of architecture and design, the word phenomenology is 
often thought synonymous with “creative spontaneity or with indeterminate feelings 
associated with sensually stimulating locales” (Wang & Wagner 2007). Don Ihde sees 
phenomenology and art (music, visual arts, dance) sharing a “common ground” in their 
commitment to a “realm of the possible” (Ihde 1977, 135-152). Phenomenology is a practice 
of variation: a sifting through of possibilities, real and imagined, in its pursuit for the 
essential. Art too is a practice in variation, and an exploration of the possible. Ihde goes so far 
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as to say that “it is possible to see the practice of the artist as latently phenomenological from 
the outset” (Ihde 1977, 135-152). Since the practice of phenomenology is thought appropriate 
for the study of creativity, is used as a method in creative processes (design and architecture), 
and methodologically shares variation within a realm of possibility with art, what is unique 
about understanding phenomenology as a creative practice or discipline?  
 Phenomenology is creative insofar as the pursuit of understanding things in the world 
(including concepts) employs a range of different approaches and devices to describe the 
variances of any single or shared experience. What kinds of experiences or objects can we 
creatively approach with phenomenological practice? For the most part, all given phenomena 
are open to creative methods. Phenomenology permits us to go beyond the prejudices and 
disposition of the self to understand a range of things both given and not given in the world. 
Experiences that go beyond ordinary perceptual fulfillment in their grasping include many 
found within the aesthetic domain. Technological events in particular evoke experiences not 
given in the usual mode of presentation. Mediatised experiences within art events have been 
traditionally understood through a number of critical frameworks, from mid-twentieth 
century modernist methods of formalism to their rival, postmodernism; the latter has tended 
to offer only counter-attacks on modernism, rather than a rigorous investigation of the 
complex embodied experiences involved in these art events (Jones 2006, 8).134 
 The following sections provide documentation on different approaches to group 
phenomenology that have questioned or altered the method presented in the previous chapter. 
In acknowledging these experiences, my overall design has become iterative in its structure, 
and will change in light of my exposure to other approaches as I continue to develop as a 
phenomenologist in the creative arts. The significance of pointing out the non-static, dynamic 
character of my method is to demonstrate the malleability and rigorous nature of 
phenomenology applied within performance studies. It is a style of comportment best suited 
to moving with and beyond the complexity and limits to our experiential understanding of 
phenomena.   
                                                         
134 Formalism is associated with New York-based Art Critic Clement Greenberg, writing in the 50s and 60s. A 
Marxist in his political orientation, Greenberg was ideological about separating the five senses in order to 
“produce isolated sensations abstracted from the bourgeois body [that was] always ordinated by site” (Jones 
2006, 8). Greenberg insisted that experiences of artworks needed to be ocular: “a sense capable of producing the 
most ‘distance’” from the bourgeois body: a disarming critique of an interfering body of undifferentiated, 
irrational, and disorderly senses (Jones 2006, 8). Formalism perpetuated the modernist, machinist aesthetic of 
the body in its fetishisation of sight.  
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§3.6.2  CASE STUDIES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY IN PRACTICE  
 
 The four case studies in this section include: 1) a description of my engagement in an 
alternative method for practising phenomenology—Phenomenology of Guilt; 2) my 
examination of a research project involving live bodies interacting with Second Life 
technologies and shadow play in experimental ways—A Mixed Reality Project and Rosi tanz 
Rosi; 3) documentation of performances attended by workshop participants, Our Brief 
Eternity, Glow and Erection; and 4) a description of my final workshop Transmission 
Laboratories, a collaboratively devised work between a media artist, dancer, and me. My 
purpose for devising a live, mediatised performance as the final workshop was to, firstly, set 
the appropriate conditions for conducting the phenomenological work with more time and 
focus; and secondly, to draw specific attention to relations of interaction between the 
corporeal body, technologies, and audience. Beyond any methodological gains, many insights 
into the relationship between these forms were made in the design and refinement of the 
method itself. Documenting these case studies has clarified a unique set of relations that I 
considered while conducting the phenomenological and attentional reductions in and after the 
workshops for my Poetics of Reception Project.  
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Case Study #1: The Phenomenology Research Group 
Phenomenology of Guilt (session 2) 
Date: 2 October 2008, Fall Semester, Southern Illinois University Carbondale 
Location: The Common Ground Café Carbondale, Southern Illinois 
Time: 8.30am – 10.30 am 
Group Led by Professor Anthony J. Steinbock 
Present: Ben Craig, Christina Gould, Daniel Guentchev, James McKain, Jodie McNeilly, Fabricio Pontin, 
Nicholas Smaglio, Jessica Soester, Seth Vannatta 
  
The group convenes at a local café outside of the University every other week during 
session. Professor A. J. Steinbock has organised two meetings to take place during my stay in 
Carbondale. The present focus of the group is the phenomenology of guilt, a theme which 
follows previous gatherings on the moral (or interpersonal) emotions: hope, despair, trust, 
betrayal, repentance and forgiveness.135 The Phenomenology Research Group (PRG) emerged 
in Fall 2002 from a seminar taught by Steinbock. The group was formed in response to a 
student’s question:  how do we do phenomenology? This was a significant question because 
traditionally scholars are engaged with interpreting the works of particular figures within the 
phenomenological tradition with little investigation of the matters themselves.  The meetings 
began informally in a café with a focus upon moral emotions, and have continued 
uninterrupted for the past nine years every other week for each consecutive semester. Each 
year the group inquires into a different emotion. Each year the students and faculty from a 
diversity of disciplines (philosophy, architecture, engineering, anthropology, communications 
and performance studies) return. Over the years the Research Group has been comprised of a 
number of international scholars from several countries, including Slovakia, Bulgaria, China, 
Iran, Israel, South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, United States, Norway, Australia, France and 
Canada.  
Guilt was taken as the theme for phenomenological investigation in the previous 
academic year. The results were not as pleasing to Steinbock as they had been with the other 
moral emotions. Despite each emotion presenting a level of difficulty, Steinbock felt that 
guilt did not seem to be providing the opportunity for the same level of insight. To me, in the 
two meetings that I attended, the problem did not seem to be a lack of examples of 
experiencing guilt (something that pride presented in the 2010/11 group). For a third semester                                                         
135 Since guilt, the group worked on shame (2009-2010), and pride for the 2010-2011 academic year. In May 
2009, the research group formed into the Phenomenology Research Center (2009) located on Campus at 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. The Center hosts international scholars from any discipline to 
undertake independent research in phenomenology within a collaborative environment. 
www.phenomenologyresearchcenter.org/   
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on this theme, the structure of guilt was being considered in terms of its temporal dimension: 
the relationship between an experience of guilt in the present, its retentional past, and toward 
its futural significance. The model of temporality used to explicate guilt in phenomenological 
terms was that of Husserl’s genetic self-temporalising model, a model that revised his more 
static model presented in the 1905 lectures on internal time consciousness.136  
Before each meeting, Steinbock sends through the previous session’s notes. These 
notes are very useful as they allowed me to understand how the meetings might proceed. The 
temporal structure of guilt was worked out “in relation to the simple epistemic character of 
our temporal experience” (Steinbock 2008). The group focused firstly upon the past, the past 
as a retention whereby our memory (remembering) of it took place in the present. 
Accordingly, the retention has no intentional structure to it. “It retains the past as past and 
allows for a continuity of experience to unfold in a harmonious (concordant or “normal” 
manner)” (Steinbock 2008).  
I was surprised how structured the phenomenological examination was with respect to 
the temporal explication of themes. Despite my concerns about how to reflect upon my 
method for the Poetics Project, I was delighted that temporality was emphasised. Having 
read and adopted Husserl’s model of internal time consciousness from his earlier lectures for 
my Honours thesis, I was reasonably familiar with his model of retentions, immediate 
impressions and protentions as they are worked out as a particular ‘temporal style’ in this 
study of the moral emotion, guilt.  
The matter of ‘reproduction’—as distinct from remembering—was prominent in 
Steinbock’s notes. I wondered how this affected the ‘original’ or ‘new’ experience of guilt, 
when the conditions for that guilt were the same (such as eating chocolate more than once 
during Lent, and feeling guilty each time in relation to God). I then posed these questions: are 
the subsequent experiences of guilt, say in the series of guilt related to eating chocolate 
during Lent, mere reproductions or are they ‘fresh’ experiences of guilt? And where new 
experiences of guilt are considered as a ‘rupture’—where guilt intervenes in the ‘natural’ 
unfolding of events and calls into question what occurred or (in some cases) what may 
occur—would it be possible to say that they are new experiences of a reproduced kind of 
guilt? If so, does this suggest that the experiences of guilt following the original guilt 
experience dissipate or intensify? Steinbock argued that each time we eat chocolate during                                                         
136 See my earlier chapter “The Phenomenological Ground” for more detail on the methodological shift in 
Husserl, §2.3.3, pp. 81-98. 
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Lent they are new experiences of guilt, not derivations, even despite the guilt-event being 
exactly the same. Each time we eat chocolate and there is an experience of guilt, it is an 
original guilt that emerges spontaneously, with a new set of intentions associated with the 
event and feeling guilty. It is not a degraded or intensified guilt; nor is it regret or repentance. 
Steinbock insists that we must ‘attend to’ these other moral emotions separately. By the 
second meeting it had been argued (with the help of the group) and noted by Steinbock that 
“the rupture-quality of guilt is so peculiar to the experience that we can designate it as an 
essential feature. Accordingly, if the emotional experience fails to have this rupture, then it 
will not be guilt” (Steinbock 2008). 
The major differences between Steinbock’s approach and mine is the type of 
phenomena under investigation (concepts versus objects); the way in which phenomena are 
given; and the method used: a reflective discussion-based method as opposed to a post insitu 
textual one. My phenomenological examination is conducted simultaneously with the co-
constitution of external objects within ordinary perception in the shared world of 
performance. Even though there is a temporal lag between the immediacy of the experience 
and the writing and discussion stages, the phenomena have been co-constituted in a shared 
experience. Moreover, we attend to a performance that occurs independently in the world for 
us to bear witness to as audience members. Steinbock’s workshops are focused upon the 
intersubjective experiences of the moral emotions. We have to make a special case of these 
emotions through remembering a past experience, thinking of hypothetical examples, and 
drawing upon examples from history, philosophy, film and literature.137 The givenness of any 
phenomenon is not immediate. We cannot feel guilt without an experience of guilt; moreover, 
we cannot feel shame in attempting to describe the experience of shame, unless someone is in 
fact experiencing guilt or shame at the precise time of the session. However it is 
phenomenologically possible to remember an experience of guilt in order to reflect. Eidetic 
analysis is immediate in Steinbock’s method. The process of imaginative variation—flicking 
through the various examples to see what remains essential (invariance)—happens during the 
discussion and in between each group session while Steinbock interpretively writes up his 
notes. These notes are the basis for the next group discussion; thus, a hermeneutical process 
is involved as these notes between sessions begin to take a more formal shape as a conference 
paper, article, or chapters for a book.                                                          
137 Steinbock often referred to examples from literature and film to examine guilt more deeply. Characters from 
existentialist novelists such as Dostoyevsky, Kafka, and Sartre were favoured. 
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Interestingly, at one session a member of the study group admitted that he was feeling guilty 
about missing another lecture to stay with us at the café. The structure of this moment for him 
was described as “a guilt between two goods”. In his mind, the session and lecture were both 
goods (McNeilly 2008, 8). At that moment, I wanted the student to describe or write exactly 
what he was feeling, attending to his bodily movements and sensations associated with the 
experience. Was there bodily heat, perspiration? An antagonised distraction: looking away 
with downcast eyes, a feeling of withdrawal in physical posture from the shared discussion? 
Or was he kinesthetically torn in his paradoxical motivation: moving away while at the same 
time towards—an embodied twisted torque action, like the wringing of water from a towel? 
In guilt there is a retreat from constituting an absolute presence to appropriate others in a 
situation (like in pride).138 We move away, rather than towards in our resistance of others. Is 
guilt, then, the converse of pride in a bodily sense? How does a guilty thought dominate your 
embodied consciousness? Do you crave other thoughts to avoid these feelings? The bodily 
experience of guilt was raised as a consideration in the following session. Steinbock asked: 
  
[w]hat does it mean to look guilty? That is, how is guilt expressed in an embodied manner? Does one 
look at others as if they are accusing? Am I timid, withdrawing in their sight? If I am guilty and don’t 
want to be caught, am I even more perceptually aware of who is looking or might be looking – 
heightened sensitivity to being seen/accused such that all other looks are implicit accusations? 
(Steinbock 2008, 4) 
 
Following up on the embodied experience of guilt, Steinbock proposed to me that if I had to 
choreograph guilt, how would I do it? My immediate response was to describe withdrawn 
gestures in the torso, a collapse inward through a deep upper chest contraction; and an 
uncomfortable shirking from others, a shrinking of the front body into the back body, 
initiated by the heart in a movement of retreat. The eyes’ focus would be widened to see all, 
with the intention of not being seen. On reflection, the movement overall could derive from 
the score: “to see all, but not be seen”.139  
                                                        
138 Pride is essentially intersubjective. The self in pride may be bedazzled by its absolute uniqueness, but it never 
leaves the interpersonal sphere. Pride is a resistance to otherness. 
 
 In pride, I am given to myself as if first among others, either “before” others could intervene, or as if their givenness or 
 contribution to meaning were non-integral to my experience or as insignificant (absolutely or relatively) (Steinbock 2011, 1). 
 
139 In this context, a score is a set of parameters or constraints that a performer will adhere to in the act of 
improvising. A score can be quite simple or rather complex. They may be pre-set, or emerge during the act. A 
score offers a structure, and base anchor point of return in an exercise that is otherwise without limits. It is a 
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In guilt, one stands accused by another, this other can also be oneself.140 The 
formulation of the score could be extended: “to see all, but not be seen by others, including 
yourself”. This example lends itself to the creative potential of phenomenology, a method for 
creating scores in the practice of choreography. Moreover, deriving the score from thinking 
in creative movement terms about an emotion—the body in a hypothetical, representational 
instance—provides insight into the essential structure of that moral emotion. Rather than 
gaining such insight into essences from psychological instances, the body is foregrounded as 
an imaginative variant both in memory and fictitiously.   
In the sessions I attended in 2008 on guilt—and many more since on pride and 
humility (2010-2011)—the use of hypotheticals or possible instances of experiencing these 
moral emotions have been a predominate aspect of the method for Steinbock. Initially I was 
confounded with how a phenomenology could proceed if the experiencing of phenomena was 
not immediate and direct—as was the case with the object-oriented practical phenomenology 
of Spiegelberg and Casey, and my study of being-there-with at an object-event. But I soon 
realised that an abstracted emotional experience was still representational of an experienced 
emotion. The most fictional or hypothetical experiences can contribute to instances of 
imaginative variation within eidetic analysis. As Sokolowski reminds us: 
 
[o]ur imagination takes us beyond the restrictions of actual experience; we contrive examples we have 
never and could never encounter in the world: “We stand then in a pure fantasy world, so to speak, a 
world of absolutely pure possibilities” (Sokolowski 1974, 62-3). 
 
Steinbock’s method influenced my Poetics of Reception Project in many ways. During his 
sessions, participants are asked to consider a past, fictional or hypothetical experience in a 
guided discussion about the particular moral emotion under investigation. They open onto the 
phenomena with shared enthusiasm, driving the inquiry into previously un-articulated 
                                                        
very useful device for choreographing and for providing a coherent framework during improvisational 
performances.     
140 To take oneself as another has its philosophical roots in Descartes who inquires into the foundations of 
subjectivity and existence. In this very inquiry, Descartes posits both an identity of the subject—the ‘I think, I 
doubt, I am’ (cogito), and an identity of the concrete ‘I’, the one that is destroyed with all other physical bodies 
in his systematic method of doubt. Paul Ricoeur in Oneself as Another (1992), suggests that there is a third 
‘who’, or other of self, that indeed asks the question of ‘who’ is doing the doubting? The hermeneutics of a self-
inquiring of its self and its activities, posits oneself as another. This otherness is of a kind that is constitutive of 
selfhood.  
 
 Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one 
 cannot be thought of without the other (Ricoeur 1992, 3).  
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territory, while rigorously drawing limits to irrelevant ideas that deviate too far from the 
matter at hand. The discussion method works with indirect, non-immanent experiences of 
phenomena. It is a useful method for considering both concept and object phenomena. A lot 
of discussion had taken place in my earlier groups, but I had not considered the contents of 
the discussion as a variant within the technique of free imaginative variation until having 
contact with the Steinbock model. I had understood the process of eidetic analysis to occur 
only once the workshops were complete. Since allowing the phenomenology to take place in 
the group discussions between the Writing Tasks, I purchased high-quality recording 
equipment for the group meetings.  
Steinbock’s work also provided clues for how to proceed with the textual analysis. It 
became clear that the final stages of analysis should not be undertaken prematurely, or by the 
participants themselves (as initially attempted with Writing Task C). I came to understand the 
value of my participants’ written texts as primary sources and/or raw data for ongoing 
interpretive analysis. It was clear that as instances of imaginative variation these texts would 
be a valuable resource for examining questions beyond the structural understanding of the 
relationship between bodies and technologies, just as the examples of shame from the 
research group continue to be a resource for Steinbock in his philosophical elaborations on 
differing topics (i.e. Shame and Agamben; Shame and erotic perception in Merleau-Ponty).  
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Case Study #2: Mixed Reality Performance as Research  
 
Project 1: A Dance and Virtual World: mixed reality performance  
Date: January 2009 
Location: Critical Path, Sydney, Australia 
Producer/choreographer/filmmakers: Physical TV (Richard Allen & Karen Pearlman) 
Collaborators: Guy Hayes (MUVEDesign) 
 
Following completion of my first two workshops with Group A, I observed Physical 
TV Company’s research project A Dance and Virtual World: mixed reality performance as 
part of Critical Path’s 2009 Responsive Program. I was particularly interested in the 
collaboration between Physical TV and Gary Hayes of MUVEDesign in their development of 
an immersive and interactive adaptation of Physical TV’s feature dance film Thursday’s 
Fictions (2007) in Second Life.141 I arrived halfway through the project’s two-week residency. 
By this stage, the dancers were working through sixty different avatar representations 
designed by Gary using pre-choreographed and improvised movements.142 The dancers were 
spatially composed in direct relationship to the prefigured moving avatars projected onto a 
large single screen in the background. Directed by Richard with pre-choreographed phrases, 
the dancers openly interacted with each other and the moving avatars. All this was filmed 
from a fixed tripod. The interactions between the dancers and avatars were of primary 
importance to Gary who would eventually map the dancers’ physical responses and creations 
onto the avatars for more interesting movement in Second Life. Screened in one-minute 
loops, the movement of the avatars was originally appropriated from figures found in other 
realities in Second Life. The movement of avatars is generally programmed in one of two 
ways: either through motion capture techniques, where the movement of a human body is 
mapped directly onto the avatar, giving the avatar a much smoother and fluid facility for 
moving; or by working algorithmically to move limbs from point to point, which instead 
                                                        
141 For more on Physical TV Company and their projects see: 
http://www.physicaltv.com.au/HomePageThePhysicalTvCompanyRichardJamesAllenAndKarenPearlman_491_
1071_3_0.html. Second Life (SL) is an online virtual community of gamers who live an expanded existence by 
taking on an avatar identity different to their First Life  (one's everday corporeal reality). Second Life provides 
an alternate space of communication and interaction within a mediated environment, one that nearly mirrors the 
real world in almost every way (Johnson 2010, xii). For a phenomenological study of embodiment and the 
intentional structure of the Second Life world, see Veerapen (2009, 105-114). 
142 An avatar is a “graphical stand-in for the human body within virtual worlds” (Dixon in Carver & Beardon 
2004, 25). The term derives from the Sanskrit Avatara, which is a mythical being or deity that has been sent 
down to the material world. It is another form of digital doubling occurring usually in-world within Second Life. 
Avatars can also be found outside of Second Life, often projected in 2-dimensions, or represented as newly 
created virtual identities or digital doubles of well-known figures. 
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promotes a more jerky and angular movement quality.143 By filming the dancers, the mixed 
reality project was focused upon motion capture techniques to eventually animate the 
prefigured avatars with more fluid movement possibilities for visitors assuming an avatar 
identity in Second Life.    
 The pre-choreographed phrases were built upon the qualities, shapes, motion and feel 
of the projected avatars; the dancers were arranged in relation to the projected activity on 
screen, and what emerged spontaneously between their dancing bodies. Richard’s 
choreographic decisions, however, were made through the camera’s viewfinder.144 His overall 
intention for the final reception of this relation was mediatised. I had the opportunity to 
switch between observing ‘unaided’ the live perspective of the dancers in front of the screen, 
and observing their movements ‘aided’ through the viewfinder. The frame of the viewfinder 
instructed Richard to compose how, where and when the dancers moved. The dancers also 
improvised their movements at times, either by cutting up phrases, repeating a particular 
motif or generating new material. The more improvised the scene, the more interactive and 
connected the dancers appeared to be with the avatars. Some of the fragments presented quite 
elaborate virtual environments with unusual scenes, mytho-poetic in their landscape and 
choice of avatar. Some of the avatars were ‘warlord’-like characters, morphing from an 
unidentifiable moving mass to a menacing warrior. Others were tall, thin, busty women 
floating within a black box. The architecture was not rectilinear in the more rendered spaces. 
The avatars in all environments tended to float and spin on any plane, suddenly flying out of 
the frame in a horizontal direction. Their bodies rubbed back and forth in small arcs as 
though they were desktop objects being manipulated externally through a mouse interface. 
Physical TV’s Second Life project allowed me to consider more deeply other possible 
relations between corporeal bodies and mediatised representations in contexts involving 
dance and on-line technologies. As has been noted, the previous two performances attended 
by Group A brought to the fore a lack of clarity on my behalf, I had not pointed out the                                                         
143 Motion Capture “involves measuring an object’s position and orientation in physical space, then recording 
that information in a computer-usable form. Objects of interest include human and non-human bodies, facial 
expressions, camera or light positions, and other elements in a scene” (Dyer, Martin and Zulauf 1999). On the 
dancing body, points may be placed on the joints or other parts of the body that are then tracked by a camera or 
wireless sensory system (as with Mark Coniglio’s MidiDancer) and translated into digital signals and 
transmitted to a computer for interpreting. Through multi-mediatic devices, the output may be visual 
(projections), tactile (projections on the skin) or sonic (audio). See Broadhurst (2007, 99-130). 
144 Richard choreographed from the tiny frame of the camera’s viewfinder, rather than from a field monitor. 
Once the rushes are digitised for editing, the true frame of the shot is different to that which is observed through 
the viewfinder. What looks to be out of frame on the viewfinder often will be in shot once digitised, and vice 
versa depending on the camera. The only way to avoid this (given cameras and their aspect ratios are different) 
is to know the precise distances that a body or object needs to be in relation to the perimeter of the frame.    
  185 
relations that participants would selectively be attentive to. I had generically picked out live 
elements such as bodies, set, costumes, props; and for the mediatised elements: sound, 
lighting (old media), projected images or representations on two-dimensional screens 
including scrim fabric, a range of surfaces, and monitors. Participants were asked to simply 
consider these in isolation and/or in relationship. Since then, I have identified more relations 
to consider during the workshops following my attendance as a non-analyst audience member 
to live, mediatised performance, dancing in research projects prototyping movement initiated 
interactive systems, and observing case studies like the mixed reality research project where 
the technology is made transparent from concept to construction.145  
 In its presentation, the Physical TV research project did not offer suitable conditions 
for implementing my poetics method because of its stop-start rehearsal quality. Richard and 
Karen’s aim was to “explore the ideas, aesthetics and narrative potential of the meeting of 
live and virtual dancers” (Allen and Pearlman 2008, personal communication). It was 
impossible to conduct ‘group phenomenology’ under such conditions; but I was still able to 
reflect upon some of the attentional relations for the next Poetics of Reception workshop. 
 Without undertaking any phenomenological work, my first impressions of what I 
experienced between the dancers corporeally in three dimensions and their mediatised images 
(streamed in real-time, thus live) were astoundingly different. These differences will be                                                         
145 In 2008, I was a participant for interactive designer Lian Loke’s PhD research, which considered movement 
scenarios within immersive systems.  
 
 The study explored ways of inventing and choreographing movement for use in the design of motion-sensing technologies.  
 The results of the studies were examined to identify an emerging set of methods and tools to enable designers to work with 
 movement  and felt experience in the context of movement-based, interactive technologies (Loke and Robertson 2010, 1). 
 
I also participated in New Zealand based choreographer and academic Carol Brown’s SeaUnsea project hosted 
by Critical Path in 2008. The project is described as: 
 
 [a] real-time interactive performance and installation in a constantly evolving virtual sea. Set under the wave-like ceiling of 
 the Siobhan Davies Studio, the movements of audience and performers impact on the environment becoming entangled in a 
 synthetic seascape. Captured within these fleeting forms the performers play and explore, attracting, repulsing and entwining 
 their actions within the evolving patterns of a swirling hypnotic sea. The event runs in cycles during which time visitors are 
 invited to  ‘play’ in the installation, watch the performance, then once again inhabit the space 
 (http://www.carolbrowndances.com/archive.php). 
 
I was fortunate to work with both Brown and programmer/architect Mette Ramsgard-Thomsen in this system, 
which premiered in 2006. I was able to be involved in their conceptual, movement and programming processes, 
performing to a small audience in an end of workshop presentation. The following text is my documentation of 
how the system worked. I elaborate more upon these experiences in my paper “Bodily-schemata and Sartre’s I 
and me”: 
 
 My movements recorded by an infra-red camera were drawn in realtime as abstract visual representations by virtual agents 
 within the  specifically designed software. These agents were either attracted or repelled by light and dark. In my case, the agents 
 were coded to be attracted to dark. Dressed all in black, except for my hands, feet and face, these agents attracted to my live 
 recorded image were manipulated through predetermined algorithmic scripts to draw the pathway of my movements as lines 
 dynamically folding and unfolding in geometric origami like patterns. Earlier I had folded paper representations as movement 
 stimulus for working with the shape of this visualization (McNeilly 2011, 15-16). 
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elaborated upon over the next paragraphs. When the live, three-dimensional bodies were 
dancing in front of the large screen, I found that the projected avatars lacked prominent form 
in this relationship; they appeared as vague, floating forms not capturing my attention like the 
live, fleshly bodies dancing in close proximity to me. The dancers appeared awkward and 
disconnected in their interactions with the avatar projections, which were spectral images 
haunting the background like moving wallpaper. There was little spatial or temporal 
coherency between bodies or the screen representations. At first I was confused, and then 
convinced there was a major problem with this arrangement. However, when observing this 
same movement sequence against the streamed projections through the camera, the avatars 
came to life. More visibly and viscerally prominent, the avatars now shared the space with 
the dancers. The timings, speed and rhythms between the live bodies felt more connected and 
reactive to the images looping on screen. Even though the avatars were not interacting 
directly with the dancers who were being directed through the lens, my aided reception 
revealed an entirely different experience to my unaided reception of the dancers moving 
against a flat screen. The dance possessed a spatio-temporal coherency in its overall 
interaction.  
 The Mixed Reality Project revealed two structural relations in receptivity: a 3D + 2D 
3D relationship and a 3D + 2D 2D relationship. There are striking differences to be 
found in the reception of each given the same combination of a live body interacting with a 
projected 2D object onto a 2D surface. In the first instance, receptivity is live and three-
dimensional and in the second two-dimensional and live with the potential to be temporally 
manipulated. In my experience of the Mixed Reality Project, reception of the second 
instance, a live, mediatised event seen through the viewfinder or lens, provided a more 
connected relationship between the corporeal bodies and avatars. The dance between bodies 
of code and bodies of flesh co-created a more meaningful world in its two-dimensional 
reception. 
 
The dimensional relations of receptivity between bodies and technologies 
It is important to acknowledge the various dimensional distinctions in receptivity 
before explicating the eidetic structures of bodies and technologies interacting within 
performance. The same interactions—say, bodies dancing in relationship to screened 
avatars—can produce many different dimensional relations in receptivity, depending upon 
the object-event’s layers of technological mediation in reception. Experiencing a work in 
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performance tends towards the end stage of a dramaturgical process.146 Receptivity as an 
audience member is (arguably) always live—whether we are watching filmed content, or a 
performer breathing and sweating in their three-dimensions before us. But in investigating the 
relations between bodies and media, we are required to pay attention towards the complexity 
of reception of each forms’ dimensions.  
 Without conducting group phenomenology on the Mixed Reality Project, I was still 
able to identify different dimensional relations in receptivity. As a result, a ‘genealogy of 
reception’ from the original moment of interaction can be traced and formulated. For 
example, if we take the reception of bodies dancing with screened avatars in presentation, we 
have a 3D and 2D relation in reception. 
 
PRESENTATION = Bodies dancing (live in 3D) + Avatars (prefigured in 2D); RECEPTION = 3D (live, 
non-mediatised) + 2DD [Computer and Screen] (live, mediatised)147 
If the receptivity shifts, and the performance is seen through the viewfinder (as was my 
experience of the Mixed Reality performance) the bodies dancing becomes a 2D relation, 
converting the reception of bodies dancing from 3D2D, and the avatars into a live, 
mediatised 2DDD relation. The number of two-dimensional mediations in reception is 
represented accordingly by the number of ‘Ds’. The following may represent this experience:  
 
PRESENTATION = Bodies dancing (live in 2D) + Avatars (prefigured in 2D); RECEPTION = 3D2D 
[viewfinder] (live, mediatised) + 2DDD [computer, screen, viewfinder] (live, mediatised) 
 
This Mixed Reality Project was an interesting case insofar as the receptivity of the bodies 
dancing with avatars were ‘live’ in both the mediatised and nonmediatised formulation. 
Looking at the avatars through the viewfinder is a case of 2D liveness in receptivity. The                                                         
146 In his celebrated text Between Theater and Anthropology, Richard Schechner recognises that most scholars 
only pay "attention to the show, not to the whole seven-part sequence of training, workshops, rehearsals, warm-
ups, performance, cool down and aftermath" (Schechner 1985a, 16). I too agree that performance involves many 
stages that should be accounted for in analysis, but have deliberately delimited my study, for the most part, to 
the end-point of performance. I found this to be an easier access point from which participants could begin their 
descriptions, and a guarantee that interactions between bodies and technologies would occur. My future research 
on phenomenology as a method for new dramaturgy will hermeneutically account for all the stages of the 
performance process, weaving with equal emphasis between the stages of conception, creation and presentation 
in a non-linear way.  
147 This shorthand representation summarises the experience of different presentations and their reception in 
terms of screen mediations and dimensions. I believe that when working with an interaction designer in live, 
mediatised events, such shorthand representations would be useful for communicating these relations. Further 
abstraction and denotation is possible, but unnecessary to develop here. 
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prefigured, looped avatars are observed in real-time as the interaction between 3D and 2D 
occurs. If, for example, I were to view the avatars and dancers on a monitor at a later time 
(during the editing phase perhaps), whereby the presentation of bodies dancing from origin is 
a conversion from live bodies in 3D2DD [viewfinder + pre-recorded], this would produce 
a non-live reception, as opposed to a live, mediatised reception seen in the earlier 
formulations, for the dimensional conversion itself is not experienced.  
The following represents the string of mediations from the very first instance of 
possible reception through to the presentation of the edited event viewed on a computer:    
 
PRESENTATION = Bodies Dancing (non-live 2D) + Avatars (non-live 2D); RECEPTION = 3D2DD 
[viewfinder, computer] + 2DDDD [computer, screen, viewfinder, computer] (non-live, mediatised) 
 
The string of screen mediations and/or conversions in the dimensionality of reception helps 
us understand the experience. For example, when the avatars appeared on a computer screen 
they are 2D. When they are projected onto the flat screen they are 2DD, but while the 
receptivity continues through the viewfinder they become 2DDD and then played back 
through the computer monitor, 2DDDD. However, it is important to point out that the 
experience of this latter relation may also claim liveness in reception. In fact, it could be 
argued that the receptivity of any object whether corporeal and materially presented three-
dimensionally, or mediatised and presented two-dimensionally, will always be a ‘live’ 
experience. But this only holds true if the history of the relationship between the 2D and 3D 
forms under investigation are not taken in their original givenness. What I mean here is that 
the relation or interaction in their original givenness is not a live experience if we are 
watching the object-event in any form of playback, such as on a computer screen during the 
editing phase. Despite viewing this in a live sense—that is, the ‘viewer’ is always live 
corporeally—the presentation in relation to reception has to be taken into account, along with 
the underlying genealogical string of mediations within receptivity that structures the object-
event overall. 
 During the POR workshops, there was never any need to inquire into the origin or 
genesis of receptive relations beyond the immediate moment of experiencing the interactions 
in performance. The moment of performance was the absolute source of participants’ 
descriptions. The question now was: by isolating these receptive relations in terms of their 
historical givenness, should my analysis reach beyond the audience encounter and investigate 
how the performance was made? An investigation into the making processes prompted by 
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moments of performative interaction could lend itself to a dramaturgical process. However, 
identifying the genesis of receptivity from a performance encounter in a research 
environment is less difficult than attempting to ascertain these from pubic performance 
events. 
 The Mixed Reality project has influenced my methodology in two ways. First, I was 
able to effectively engage in a process of imaginative variation by reflecting upon the 
dimensional relations in presentation and reception during the eventual analysis of texts. The 
following formulation was derived from these earlier insights from the Mixed Reality 
Project:  
 
PRESENTATION = DIMENSIONAL FORMS; RECEPTION = [DIMENSIONAL RECEPTIVITY 
Genealogy of Screen Mediations] (AUDIENCE RECEPTION (non)Live/(non)Mediatised) 
 
 Secondly, the project helped me identify dimensional relations informing the devising 
of interactions between a dancing body and various forms of technology (leitmotifs for a 
digital dramaturgy) in my own performance research project to be discussed later in this 
chapter (Case Study #4). It also helped establish the performance conditions for 
phenomenological study. I found that designing sites of interaction for research purposes 
directs the attentional focus of participants for longer, producing fuller descriptions that are 
impossible in the fleetingness of public performance. In research contexts where performance 
is utilised as a mode for its own study (performance as research), directing a spectator’s 
attention to a specific relation does not dilute a bonafide performance experience for 
performer or audience alike.  
    To further these insights on the role of dimensionality in reception, the following 
performative instance contributes additional relations between bodies and non-digital media, 
and demonstrates through experiential description, the role dimensionality plays in 
distinguishing forms when both are cases of live reception. 
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Project 2: Rosi Tanz Rosi – SODA/Critical Path Residency Exchange 
Choreographer: Susanne Martin (Universität der Künste, Berlin)  
Date: February 2009 
Location: Critical Path, Sydney, Australia 
Collaborator: Margie Medlin, Director Critical Path (lighting designer). 
 
Susanne Martin was an exchange scholar from the SODA (Solo/Dance/Authorship) 
Masters program at the Universität der Künste, Berlin. She was visiting Critical Path in 2009 
to develop her solo work Rosi Tantz Rosi. The work was exploring through improvisation the 
female solo performer, and the role of narrative on the theme of aging in that relation. 
Martin’s moving corporeal body was projected as two shadow silhouettes onto a screen and 
surrounding stage walls during a live showing of her performance. These projections changed 
scale depending upon the position of the body in relation to the lighting by Margie Medlin. 
They gave the impression that the aging Rosi was not alone. Alongside her reminiscing frame 
of a body that dwells more in the past than in her present skin, we were reminded of how she 
used to be in the shadow forms of her entire figure projected on the screen and surrounding 
walls. A latex mask, loosely attached—wrinkled, bloated and masculine—transformed her 
face. Her tightened lips were non-expressive in the absence of speech. Her nose was an 
exaggerated escarpment dividing this rugged face, awkwardly scaled to her diminutive body 
shape. We saw the years, the hardships and wondered: what had happened to Rosi?  
 The clear outline of the dancer’s silhouette extinguished the folds of skin. A youthful 
portrait stood reflected. As I watched, I waited for the silhouette to take on its own life, to no 
longer be attached to the three-dimensional figure swinging, clasping her flesh and laying out 
limbs. The projected image appeared to me as Rosi’s former memory, a bodily reminiscence 
communicated to us through her spoken monologue. I deciphered a temporal disjunction 
between these younger silhouettes dancing on walls to the real-time presence of Rosi’s body. 
The younger Rosi danced to a different tune across time and surfaces. 
 My reception of the two dimensional presentations of Rosi created a temporal and 
spatial separation between the performer and her shadows. There were moments when I 
perceived the silhouette as an entity unto itself, an entity ontologically distinct in shape, 
movement, size and character from the performer. How is a separation of such meaningful 
proportions between the object and its shadow possible? Don Ihde’s experimentation with the 
following example from the teachings of Don Juan assists here.  
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 The old wizard advises Carlos [Castaneda] to go out and look at a tree, and instead of seeing it in the 
 usual way (the natural attitude), he instructs him to look at the shadows, so that  eventually, it is the 
 shadows that he sees as primary. The wizard is trying to get Carlos to reverse the dominant and 
 foreground and the recessive and background, so that the ordinary tree/shadow appearance becomes a 
 shadow/tree appearance, a shocking reversal (Ihde 1977, 128).   
 
After the experiment, Ihde contends that the tree within its natural context “shows a different 
and radically reversed perceptual possibility” (Ihde 1977, 128). This experiment illustrates 
how the practice of an attentional reduction can affect a Gestaltian (figure/ground) reversal in 
our perceptual attentions. However, it also suggests something significant in respect of my 
Rosi experience, and the “perceptual possibilities” that digital projections and silhouettes can 
bring to bear on the performer as the object responsible for this two-dimensional form.  
 The narrative of Rosi evoked various stages within the life of the aging dancer. The 
masked performer reminisced about these former times. The lighting design co-constituted 
the story with visual incarnations of Rosi in two dimensions, figures that were further 
elaborated by my embodied imaginings. Structural analysis of this dimensional relation from 
one performative instance highlights the aspect of spatio-temporal separation. However, the 
temporal separation that I have discussed here (the silhouette being the reflected, and 
reflected upon, younger character) is elaborated through her narrative. What could I say 
temporally (when the temporal is taken in the phenomenological sense) about this 
relationship if I were to bracket the narrative—the story of an ageing Rosi—from what I 
experienced? My reception of the performative instance did not involve a phenomenological 
reduction, and there was no group to share in the examination or discussion of this particular 
object-event. As a result, it is difficult to bracket the significance of the narrative from the 
structural aspects to establish spatio-temporal separation as an eidetic invariant of the 
relationship between a three-dimensional body and its projected form. Establishing 
invariance at this stage could have been possible if I had made further descriptions of the 
object-event (something I never intended), or had similar instances to reflect upon. 
Nonetheless, this reflection has provided insight into the essential structure of this particular 
phenomenon: a three-dimensional body in relationship with its two-dimensional shadow, and 
by extension, a three-dimensional body in relationship with its digital projection. Both can be 
conceptually considered cases of the performing object in supra-extension.148 In cases of 
supra-extension, the structural aspect of spatio-temporal separation provided a leading clue                                                         
148 See page 118 Chapter 4 for a discussion on supra-extension. 
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to further structural analyses of performative instances described. Indeed, the Rosi analysis 
contributed to the examination of interactions within my Poetic of Reception project.  
 In summary, the dimensional relations of receptivity demonstrate that it is never 
simply a case of the ‘live’ being distinct from the ‘mediatised’, or a collapsed, conflated 
phenomenon. Each interaction involves complex layered distinctions that underscore 
meaningful experiences. By questioning back from the instance of performance to the 
genealogical structure of dimensional mediations we consider the object-event outside of a 
phenomenological reduction. It must be noted that the relations are not imposed upon the 
phenomena from outside; they describe what already is.  
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Case Study # 3: The Poetics of Reception Project  
 
As explained in Chapter 5, The Poetics of Reception workshops took place between 
January 2007 and May 2009. A pilot session comprising two participants (myself included) 
preceded the first workshop in order to identify problems with communicating and executing 
the method.  
 The pilot was significant for refining directives for Writing Tasks A and B, and how 
to proceed with the textual analysis. This was my first time communicating the method; I was 
not entirely sure the method would work. It was also my participant’s first time practising 
phenomenology and so the reductions were somewhat difficult to sustain. There were 
moments of interpretation in the text, but these were not overly developed. It was as though 
they would become aware of making interpretation, and pulled back to let the description 
issue forth.  
 
Pilot Workshop#1/Performance #1: Our Brief Eternity 
Company: The Holy Body Tattoo 
Location: Canada 
Choreographers: Noam Gagnon and Dana Gringas 
Music: Jean-Yves Thériault 
Film Director/Editor: William Morrison 
DOP: Adam Silwinski 
Lighting Design: James Proudfoot 
Performers: Susan Elliott, Noam Gagnon, Dana Gringas 
Venue: Playhouse, Sydney Opera House 
Program: Sydney Festival 2007, About An Hour 
Season: January 8-12 
Performance Date: Monday 8, Jan 2007, 8:30 PM 
Type: Four Dancers with moving image projections (Poetry & Apocalypse) 
 
 
The expressed intention of Our Brief Eternity was to explore the bodily resilience of 
humans in their struggle for individual identity when facing immanent erasure in the Age of 
Information. Four dancers moved with growing intensity against a backdrop of shifting large-
scale projections.  
As previously mentioned, text from P1’s ‘Task A’ revealed a repeated linguistic motif 
for describing the movement of the dancers, and the writer ascribed this same motif to the 
meaning or motivation behind the movement and costume style, constituting what the 
participant saw as “a new form” of the cultural body [P1, BE_P, 4]. 
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Motif: precision savagery; savagery in precision 
 
 I occasionally looked for readings of the movement, which does not come easily to me when it is 
 precision savagery more abstract, as I found the early sections [P1,BE_P,2] 
 
 The donning of boots, what new form of culture they ask will emerge, aggressive, savagery in 
 precision, the sensual sweating body [P1,BE_P,4] 
 
When queried on this repeated motif in Task A, the participant was unaware as to why they 
had written “precision savagery” and “savagery in precision”. I took this as a potent 
possibility for transitioning from Task A into Writing Task B. For Task B, I was interested in 
developing upon one word, term, statement, or theme that had issued forth with some 
significance from Task A.149 I saw the term “precision savagery” as pointing toward 
something essential (eidetic) in my participant’s experience of the performance; and thus a 
motif to be elaborated. 
 I became excited by the emergence of this motif, which helped me to refine the 
directives for each Writing Task, A to C. It was clear that phenomenological analysis was 
operating in the movement from one Task to the next: the hermeneutic nature of the method 
was being revealed in application.150 The results of the pilot were methodological. Little was 
revealed in relation to my project’s main concern: understanding the relationship between 
bodies and technology in live, mediatised performance. At this stage, I was pleased to 
establish the basis for refinements, and to acknowledge that it was possible to communicate 
the method.  
From this first pilot, I was quick to realise how phenomenological method operatively 
suspends judgments of like and dislike in the experience of a performance. Mechanical as the 
method of constraints seemed in application, it was retrospectively apparent that our thinking 
was opened by the experience of the performance in a manifold of ways. Our aesthetic 
experiences are often undermined by judgments of liking or disliking some aspect, which 
then close down opportunities for the deeper articulation of an experience. On the one hand—
if we accept the Kantian line of aesthetic disinterest—the immediate reflex of what strikes us 
as either ‘ugly’ or ‘beautiful’ parochially determines a certain limit to understanding the                                                         
149 Over the course of the workshops I found that the issuing forth of a word, term, statement or theme occurred 
at different times for each participants. Often Task A would be a writing warm-up for participants.  
150 See the opening pages to Chapter 7 for a description of the hermeneutical aspects of the analysis. 
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artwork. On the other hand, an aesthetic approach using phenomenology reunites the 
fractured tripartite system of artwork, artist, and receptivity, and places greater emphasis on 
reception for revealing the essential structure of the artwork as it is experienced. The latter 
mode is a more generous alternative to a ‘Kantian-inspired’ closure, particularly when the 
elements of performance are foregrounded as phenomena for study. By the writing phases of 
the pilot it was evident that the method was responsible for a shift in aesthetic understanding. 
Tacit to mine, and my participant’s understanding, was a strong Kantian calculation of liking 
or disliking the performance: we both had to admit that we did not like many aspects, 
suggesting a failure in our bracketing. However, this shifted as we persisted with the method 
into the writing and discussion stage, exposing aspects of the performance heretofore 
unnoticed. The method had awakened a new way of seeing.  
 
Workshop#1/Performance #2: Glow 
Company: Chunky Move 
Location: Melbourne, Australia 
Choreographer: Gideon Orbazanek 
Concept & Interactive System Design: Frieder Weiss 
Original Music & Sound Design: Luke Smiles 
Performers: Kristy Ayre, Sara Black, Bonnie Paskas 
Venue: The Studio, Sydney Opera House 
Season: March 21-25 2007 
Performance Date: Friday 23 March 2007 
Type:  Interactive mediatised contemporary dance performance   
 
“Beneath the glow of a sophisticated video tracking system, a love organic being mutates in 
and out of human form into unfamiliar, sensual and grotesque creature states” (Orbazanek 
2007).    
 When I arrived at the Studio, Sydney Opera House, two of my participants (P1 and 
P2) were waiting for me outside the theatre. Both explained that they felt prepared to conduct 
the phenomenological and attentional reductions for the first phase of the workshop. I took 
this as a good sign and hoped that my other two participants were feeling just as confident. I 
provided them with a system card where I had summarised “6 steps to a Phenomenological & 
Attentional Reduction” on one side:  
 
1. NO FRAME OF EXPECTATION 
2. BRACKETING: EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS – LIKES AND DISLIKES 
3. QUIETEN ANALYTIC MIND. ASSUME ‘ACTIVE TURN OF REGARD’ TOWARD 
PHENOMENA & THEIR RELATIONS 
4. VISUALISATION TECHNIQUES (SUSPEND/ SHELVE) 
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COME BACK TO YOUR BODY/BREATH 
5. TRY & NOT THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO WRITE. DROP REDUCTIONS IF 
OVERWHELEMED  
6. ENJOY – NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWER! 
 
and examples of phenomena to pay attention to during the performance: 
 
Investigation: The relationship between live and mediatised forms.  
 
Examples of phenomena: 
 
Bodies                     fabrics                            lights     screen presence               objects  sound objects                     
auditorium                                  digital mediatisation                                holographic presence 
 
P4 called my mobile - unable to find a parking space. There was to be a total lockout from 
the theatre once the show started. I wondered if my first workshop would be a disaster. I 
waited until the very last moment, but P4 missed the bell.   
 Inside the theatre P1 and P2 sit diagonally opposite P3 and me in the upstairs 
mezzanine level of the theatre space. Audience viewing is in the round looking down from 
above upon the white rectangular mat. The configuration of seating and our seating choices 
provide greater difference in perspectives between members of the group, more so than being 
seated in a row facing the proscenium equidistant from each other. Despite the aerial view, 
the overhead angles of the performer (front, back or side) differ with each movement. The 
performer’s face is hardly seen in this piece. We are not asked as audience members to 
experience her facial expressions, as we might be if we were directly opposite her in the 
round. The movement overall is expansive and extended when the performer is upright. 
Perpendicular to the vertical movement is the rolling out of the two-dimensional shapes on 
the square white mat. Small intricate gestures are absent from the choreography. Participants’ 
descriptions substantiate the choreographer’s preference or need for larger movement to work 
with the interactive system. The inextricable relation between sound, performer movement, 
and visual graphic is captured in the following sample of writing.    
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All this time the dancer’s body contacting the floor, sliding, kneading, pressing limbs and body parts 
into the floor. At last standing, and a breathy sound tears from her throat. Later the possession takes 
over. Writhing, shrieking, moaning. Stilled. A brush of one arm and then the other, revealing dark 
traces of angel wings. The body becomes a brush, tracing inky impressions on the floor. To stand and 
the inky stains become ectoplasm. A life of their own, they morph and ooze back into her standing 
body [P1,G,8] 
 
P4 does not make it inside the theatre space. Instead they take the initiative to proceed with 
the phenomenology by watching the small televisual representation of the performance 
streamed live in the foyer. P4’s viewing was an unexpected addition to the study and offered 
an intriguing contrast in perspective: the performance mediatised and framed by the 
televisual, a case of live, mediatisation in receptivity.151 They write: 
 
 bzz, no no lock  
 back thru bzz  
 red  
 bzz n buzz off  
 on in no out  
 yes red abuzz  
 thru slow    then now it is  frame  
 floor is oblique for frame is as frame, as does lens, framed by wall, eyes lens aim by frame  
 no to bzz152 
 
P4’s poetic response describes the noise of the theatre’s lock out buzzer. The red refers to the 
colour of the foyer’s carpet. P4 then begins to describe the frames that dominate their 
reception of the performance: the televison, camera lens, wall, and the eye as frame. The 
floor is “oblique” to this frame. They seem frustrated with the situation, writing “no to bzz”. 
 
 feet like slow funk of pile 
 by low ecologies, strata slow, low sit 
 framed 
 ass of feet, as just legs now and lower legs 
 but all is not as present as the one lens                                                         
151 P4’s difference in perspective and receptivity helps to frame several points of interest in the upcoming 
analysis. Rather than drawing too quick a conclusion on these preliminary insights from the documentation, I 
will consider P4’s account alongside other participants.  
152 [P4,G,7] 
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 focus to locus, locution of frame pixels 
 and life good if eyes read by decay of lit icons 
 eye cadence 
 spirolglyphs absorbing bodys [sic] 
 and pixel pixies picked oblique functions of disfunction to this function 
 
In P4’s account there is an emphasis on describing the experience of the representational 
medium. The framing of the dancer’s body: only the bottom of feet and lower leg present, but 
are all “not as present as the one lens”. Their previous description of the multiple lenses in 
the opening paragraphs of their account (television, camera lens, wall and eye) suggests the 
dominating presence and orientation of different mediums that mediate the body in reception.  
The observer’s eye objectively oriented in this account resonates with Sartre’s 
positioning of the senses in his chapter on the body in Being and Nothingness (1972). Here, 
Sartre takes up Auguste Comte’s statement: “The eye can not see itself” to establish the fact 
that we are unable to know the senses because the body—as Husserl declares in Ideas II—is a 
zero point of orientation.153 The senses, for Sartre, are defined by the world of objects in 
which the body as center unfolds varying distances and orientations in a “system of seen [or 
felt and tasted] objects” (Sartre 1972, 316). The eyes are objects like other objects in the 
world. Epistemologically, the body as existent is (for Sartre), a body being-for-others. In the 
act of sensing objects in the world, the body as objective center is both absolute being, and I 
who am presence to myself as the being which is its own nothingness (Sartre 1972, 318).    
This early moment in P4’s account appears to affirm the transcendental move in 
Sartre that takes the body, or more specifically the eye, as a mediating object like other 
objects that frame the performer’s body. Why is this significant for my present inquiry? On 
the one hand, this preliminary analysis demonstrates a single mode in the overall modus 
operandi of phenomenological method that has already been operating over the last two                                                         
153 For Husserl, the perceiving, sensing body is the reference point for constituting other material things in 
regards to their nearness, farness, being above or below, left or right to the body. “The Body then has, for its 
particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all of these orientations” (Husserl 
1989, 166). The ‘Body’ as absolute center cannot always see itself. Unlike Sartre, Husserl is not prepared to see 
the Body “as a thing like any other in a thingly nexus”. The things of the world are always ‘there’, while the 
Body is incontrovertibly always ‘here’. The eyes functioning as frames alongside other frames (P4) poses an 
interesting problematic for the Body as an absolute zero point, but not insofar as we can see the eye looking. 
The edges of this frame are seen as a border or threshold between seeing an aspect of an object and nothing at 
all. The frames shift their framing possibilities as the head (carrying these frames), and/or whole body moves. 
Objects falling within our vision may be partially seen, cut off by the frame in the shape of an eye. In 
constituting spatial relations between the body and material things in the world, the body is perhaps not entirely 
invisible, or withdrawn. Such a point is verifiable if the body ‘here’ and thing ‘there’ distinction is blurred by 
Sartrean object transcendence.   
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chapters of exposition and documentation; and on the other, my micro-analysis here draws 
out the theme of orientation for further investigation. What is brought to the fore by P4’s 
experience is the issue of the body and its senses in the audiencing of live, mediatised events. 
The eye becomes a lens conflated with the other tools of mediation in P4’s experience. When 
frames of mediation are absent (like screens and lenses) between an audience member and 
the body of the performer, how do we as spectators experience our senses? Are the eyes 
objectively experienced as transcendent lenses or framing devices, or does the body and its 
senses continue to be a zero point of orientation during reception? How does the reception of 
live, mediatised performance (re)constitute our body in relation to such structural questions 
of orientation? These questions will be considered in my upcoming analysis in Discovering.     
 
Workshop#2/Performance #3: Érection 
Company: Compagnie Derniére Minute, Théâtre National De Toulouse France 
Concept, Choreographer, Interpretation, Video: Pierre Rigal 
Conception/Art Production:  Aurélian Bory 
Sound Creation/Music: Sylvain Chaveau, Joan Cambon, Arca 
Program: Future Tense 
Curation: Mikhail Baryshnikov 
Venue: The Playhouse, Sydney Opera House 
Program: Adventures07 
Season:  1-11 August 2007 
Type: Non-interactive mediatised contemporary dance performance 
 
“Inspired by everything from Darwinism to science fiction, Érection tracks the evolution of 
man in a constantly evolving visual feat” (Sydney Opera House, programme notes). A solo 
male dancer on a white mat interacts with line and grid projections that roll out relentlessly. 
He is grounded, low-level, mostly engaged in athletic and explosive movements. He emerges 
over the course of the hour to standing, erect. The projections shift from beating out 
geometric patterns on the mat to replicating the dancer in volumetric digital representations. 
   
Workshop#2/Performance #4: CPY 17 
Company: Korzo Productions, The Hague, Holland 
Choreographer: André Gringas 
Video Design: Fabio Iaquone 
Performer: Kenneth Flak 
Assoc Director/Dramaturg: Sue Jane Stoker 
Set & Costume: Justin Giunta and André Gringas 
Lighting Design: Ben Fisscher 
Type: Non-interactive mediatised contemporary dance performance 
 
Combining theatre, dance, video projection, and on-stage installation, CPY 17 asks 
what our lives would “be like in a world of genetic engineering and super athletes.” (Sydney 
Opera House, programme notes). A solo male performer dances in a rectangular box placed 
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upon the stage. Projections slide along the wall, appearing, disappearing; an amplified voice 
tells us that he is trapped in this condition. He speaks, sits, moves and plays with a variety of 
props.  
 Since this was a double-bill, there was a lengthy intermission period between the two 
performances. Rather than wait to write Task A at the conclusion of Érection we decided to 
use this time to write in the foyer. On arriving back at the workshop venue, I proceeded with 
the “Revivification of Attendance” induction and moved onto Task A of the second 
performance CPY 17. We discussed Task A from both performances; and then I instructed 
participants to write only one Task B on the performance that they were interested in 
developing. The discussion period was longer and more intense with Group B. I attributed 
this to the fact that two group members were participating a second time, and one participant 
who had assisted me on the earlier pilot, a third time. It was immediately apparent that doing 
phenomenology benefited from repeated practice.154 
  
                                                        
154 It should be noted that the Writing Tasks from CPY17 (the second performance) did not yield any interesting 
text for analysis. There was very little mediatisation, only a few projections on the box wall. 
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Case Study #4: Poetics of Reception design project 
 
Pilot Workshop#2 +Workshop#3/Performance#5: Transmission Laboratories  
Dates: Pilot-23 May, 2009; Workshop 3-30 May, 2009  
Collaborators: Ryan Leech, Miranda Wheen and Jodie McNeilly 
Location: AV Studio, Department of Performance Studies, The University of Sydney  
By 2009, I felt the need to do one more phenomenology group to support the previous 
workshops and produce more written data for the final stage of analysis. Faced by a dearth of 
public, mediatised dance performance and very short seasons of one to two performances—
making it impossible to coordinate participants together at the same event—I decided to 
collaborate with media/visual artist Ryan Leech and dancer Miranda Wheen to develop a 
live, mediatised performance.155 A co-devised performance would enable me to set the 
conditions for the phenomenology group and refine the framework even further. The POR 
Design Project: Transmission Laboratories produced a second pilot and third workshop, 
introducing new participants to the practice of phenomenology. The two sessions produced 
for my study a rich diversity of texts and invaluable insights into the relationship between 
bodies and technological media, and demonstrated the practical implications for a working 
model of digital dramaturgy that led to a paper presentation demonstrating these insights for 
the 2011 Dance Dramaturgy Conference I attended in Toronto, Canada.156 
 Identifying the appropriate attentional focus for participants during the first two 
workshops was a recurring problem. Interactions between bodies and technological media 
were random and often fleeting, and/or participants were distracted by other moments over 
the course of the performance. As noted in my previous chapter, step 6 was modified 
following the first workshop to read: 
 
Tonight’s attentional focus will be directed toward: live bodies, technological media: audio-visual 
material (a screen presence), music/sound, lights, stage, props, other audience members, the 
auditorium, where you are in consciousness (your memories, imaginings, anticipations), and how you 
feel. Pay particular attention to the relationships and connections between these.                                                          
155 Dance technology performance events are expensive production pursuits. Time is also an issue for the 
development of interactive systems, often taking years to develop. Most innovative systems are developed in 
research contexts, or institutional environments where choreographers/directors can work closely with 
technicians and designers within a large research project. The Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe, Germany 
(ZKM) is an example of a non-academic institution where choreographers can collaborate with interactive 
designers and programmers in an innovative and experimental research environment. See 
http://on1.zkm.de/zkm/e/about  
156 The Society for Dance History Scholars  (SDHS) hosted their 2011 Annual Conference at the Universities of 
York and Toronto, Canada. The theme: Dance Dramaturgy: catalyst, perspective and memory. See McNeilly 
(2011, June)  
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In a general sense, the attentional focus extends to cover a broad range of possible live forms 
and those that are mediatised. The directive requires elaboration of the phenomena in 
isolation from each other and in relationship without being too prescriptive. For example, a 
single body may become mediatised over time during a performance, developing from a live 
body immersed in the same here-now spatio-temporal space as the audience into a body 
being projected onto a screen. This process of mediatisation presents an excellent opportunity 
for a phenomenologically reduced ‘focus’ on a body undergoing the transition from a non-
mediatised form to a mediatised representation. However, there are two possible problems 
with the group attending to this moment and utilising the method in this way: first, if they are 
over-prepared to the point of waiting for particular moments to occur—say if I had seen the 
performance beforehand and directed them to pay attention to this particular moment—they 
would be carried away by anticipation and expectation; second, imposing upon their 
attentions from outside of the subject’s own experience raises the possibility of missing other 
moments of interaction that they would be drawn to within their attentional field. I see two 
possible solutions to these problems. One is to remove all expectation and anticipation in 
instances of live public events. This was my approach in the two previous workshops, but 
also the genesis of my problems in regards to the participants’ attentional focus on the type of 
phenomena and interactions that were conducive to my research. The other solution is to 
create the conditions for a mediatised performance so that the spectator can be directed to the 
relations between bodies and the technology in a measured and dynamic way. For example, 
the following attentional relations (non-exhaustively) could be scripted for participants 
before their experience of the performance to mitigate any anxiety caught up with searching 
for the right relation to focus upon.  
 
1) A live body becoming mediatised 
2)  A screen body: projected on a monitor (scale) 
3) A live body in relationship to its live-feed image 
4) A live body in relationship to its pre-recorded image displayed as film/video 
5) A live body in relationship to other projected media 
6) A live body interacting with projected media 
7) A live body’s interaction with a system affecting other media 
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These proto-relations informed the approach to my final group and the set-up between the 
media, dancer and space for the performance installation. In the end the set-up itself 
(described below) modified these preliminary suggestions. Participants were prepared in the 
same way as before, receiving a revised information pack (See Appendix A) and a short 
induction before the session. A door separated the workshop and performance space, 
providing convenience, uninterrupted togetherness, and minimised the gap between the 
preparatory embodied induction, experiencing the performance, the writing phase and 
discussion period.  
 The pilot and workshop took place in the Audio-Visual Room at the Department of 
Performance Studies, The University of Sydney over two weekends in May of 2009. Ryan 
and I spent some time discussing the set-up and type of technology that would create the 
highest number of opportunities for interactivity between the dancer, media and audience. It 
was a set up well within our budget and easy to bump in and out of the space. I decided the 
performance should possess no pre-intended theme or concept; the choreography was also 
not set. Miranda was free to create whatever movement emerged for her in the moment. Once 
the design of the installation was established with my collaborators, I developed a script for 
mediatisation to organise the format of the workshop. The script triangulated specific 
‘attentional relations’ for Ryan, Miranda and the roving spectators to follow during the 
performance stage of the workshop. Initially the script was developed to direct attentions 
toward selected interactions—an opportunity not available in a non-installation based public 
performance—and to provide duration of a specific interaction within the experience of the 
spectator/analyst. The script and time given to each individual interaction provided insight 
into what worked as a relationship between the dancer, media and audience, indicating the 
potential for a digital dramaturgy from such methods. Setting the conditions for research 
permitted me to investigate specific relations of my choosing, and created the possibility for 
the emergence of new ones.  
 The set up for Transmission Laboratories included a small toy electric train with 
microprocessor for serial delay that moved in a forward and backwards motion on a circular 
track, diameter 130cm. The train carried an on-board processor which interprets serial 
language (an off shoot of the common language known as C) sent from a computer. The 
microprocessor onboard the train, the ‘decoder’, decodes messages and creates actions 
relating to audio, steam, lights, motor speed and direction. This is achieved by a series of 
relays activated and deactivated with power and signal control sent/received through the 
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tracks. Placed on the periphery of the square performance space (3m x 4m), the track was 
within two meters of the operating desk where Ryan controlled the train and the live mixing 
of streamed and playback images. A Sony HD camera was placed over the circular track, lit 
by a single overhead light feeding the activity within this fixed frame into one of the two 
computers. This was the only site of visual input. Two wireless operated cameras were 
attached to the train’s two carriages, pointing upwards and downwards at roughly a 45-degree 
angle to capture Miranda’s upper and lower body (respectively) when positioned inside the 
circle track. This was one site of interaction. The recording would occur while the train 
continuously moved in either a forward or backwards motion. The speed of the train varied in 
the open play of interaction between Miranda and Ryan. Operating the train from a nearby 
desk, Ryan could either watch the interaction in three dimensions, or streamed live as a two-
dimensional image picked up by the camera and displayed on the monitor as video input for 
mixing. Ryan uses Isadora software, a graphic programming environment designed by digital 
performance maker Mark Coniglio, the inventor of the midi dancer.157 Interaction is key to 
most live digital performance events. Coniglio is interested in the live, and not the recorded, 
the unpredictable, rather than the pre-determined. Isadora enables real-time manipulation of 
digital media that is captured live during a performance, or taken from a library of 
prerecorded images. It is not a ‘plug-in-and-play’ program; rather, it offers the media artist a 
mixing palette of actors—the Isadora term for building blocks, or modules—which structure 
the media (video, audio or MIDI) in relation to the kind of system or context that the artist 
wants to create, such as playback video or as an interactive response. 
  
                                                        
157 Mark Coniglio co-founded the arts organization Troika Ranch in 1994 with choreographer/media artist Dawn 
Stopiello. Based now in Portland, Oregon, Troika Ranch creates “hybrid artworks through an ongoing 
examination of the moving body and its relationship to technology” (http://www.troikaranch.org/about.html). 
The midi dancer is a system of flexion sensors that are wirelessly attached to the joints of a dancer’s body. This 
movement information is fed back to a computer for visual and/or audio output within the same performing 
space. Coniglio provides interactive control to the performers “as a way of imposing the chaos of the organic on 
to the fixed nature of the electronic, ensuring that the digital materials remain as fluid and alive as the 
performers themselves” (Coniglio in Carver and Beardon 2004, 5-12). 
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Figure 3: A snapshot of the Isadora application window showing the relationship between inputs and outputs, 
along with how the treatments on all outputs are mixed live. 
 
Another site of interaction was located in the opposite corner to the train track. 
Footage from the overhead fixed camera recording the inside of the track and the dancer 
when she entered was streamed onto this other area of the space through a projector placed 
overhead at a right angle to the floor.158 This site was one of two output points. The malt-
toffee colored parquet floor offered a grainy texture that warmed the image of the dancer 
dressed in white. Miranda would appear then disappear from the circle of projected light as 
she stepped inside and outside of the track at the first site of input interaction. Miranda’s 
digital double gave participants the impression that she was standing in a hole when looking 
up at the camera, or crouching in a hole when squatting. This provoked different “hole” 
related images for participants that were never intended (some were reminded of the torture 
and prisoner abuse in Iraq’s Abu-Ghraib Prison in 2004, or of Alice, down the rabbit hole in 
Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland). The performance was created with no theme or 
narrative. Discussions and descriptions about interactions emerging from this site indicated to 
me how the structure (perhaps even content) of audience experience could be beneficial in a                                                         
158 During the pilot session the projector overheated, causing the lamp to burn out. This was due to the projector 
being placed upside down at a perpendicular angle to the floor. The fan was unable to cool the device at this 
angle. For the following workshop, the projector angle was modified using a mirror to reflect the image onto the 
floor. The effect was exactly the same, with the resolution of the image only slightly softer due to the mediation 
of the mirror.   
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dramaturgical process for digital performance, especially in the triangulated design of 
interactions between performers, the media and audience. The simplicity of projecting an 
overhead image onto the floor; the dancer’s relationship to the vertical (looking up and 
crouching down); and her play upon the periphery of the frame, including exits and 
entrances, present several moments for analysis from within the experience of the audience 
embodying the corporeal and projected form of the dancer within real and recorded time. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A sketch by Ryan of the room set-up for Transmission Laboratories. The sketch shows the three sites 
of interaction 
 
The final site of interaction was a single screen (standard 4:3) suspended to the left of 
Ryan, enclosing the stage space as part of its perimeter. Projections from Ryan’s visual 
mixing on Isadora included real-time footage, play back and text. The screen was split into an 
equal top and bottom half, referencing outputs from the two separate wireless cameras 
attached to the top of the rear train carriage. The top and bottom frames sometimes shared the 
same image of Miranda, images from earlier footage, or an immediate real-time streaming in 
the top half, while the bottom displayed images in playback. The split frames wove the 
temporal dimensions of past, present, and future with the presence of the corporeal dancer 
moving in the space. The temporal manipulation of video distorted the overall immediacy of 
the live performer and her live capture. Both a complexity and depth in the temporal 
reception of Miranda’s corporeal and digitally extended body became apparent when the 
entire installation was perceived together, a perspective that included the screen images, 
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corporeal dancer, train and floor projections. Despite including playback footage, the images 
on the screen maintained a sense of immediacy and connectedness to the live dancer, train, 
projections and audience members. While standing in the space amongst these sites of 
interaction, the group were often seen reflected in the screen image, either captured and 
streamed live, or from a moment past and replayed. The only sounds to be heard in the 
performance were the noises of the train in motion: speeding up, slowing down and coming 
to a halt, and the breath from Miranda’s efforts. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The split screen projected image of Miranda’s feet recorded from the Transmission Laboratories 
Workshop and presented in playback during a second research-based installation of the project at the time · 
transcendence · performance (TTP) Conference, Monash University, Caulfield, 1-3 October 2009.  Photo by 
Heidrun Löhr. 
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   Figure 6: The micro-processor train. TTP Conference 2009. Photo by Heidrun Löhr. 
  
Script for Mediatisation 
The workshop followed a procedure similar to that used in the Poetics of Reception: 
invitation and reading preparation; participants briefed on site to discuss any concerns with 
their understanding of what was expected; and a preparatory embodied induction for the 
phenomenological and attentional reductions. Due to the location of the performance space 
and workshop room, with a door separating the two spaces, the relationship between 
witnessing and writing became more entwined. Initially I imagined discretely set time 
frames, as shown in the original table inserted below. For the pilot, there were two temporal 
sections. In the first, participants roamed freely in the performance installation for ten 
minutes. This was followed by a fifteen-minute writing period.  
 By the workshop, I had decided upon specific attentional relations and time frames 
for attending to the performance and writing. To complement the fluid nature of the 
framework, I allowed the session to establish its own time-frame based on the energy of the 
performance and participants. The table below represents a matrix of relations that involved 
the switching of attentions between Miranda, Ryan and the audience. Miranda and Ryan 
worked with the script, but it was too interruptive for the audience to impose the changes I 
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initially intended. In the first section (ten minutes), I had them experience the performance 
freely, followed by fifteen minutes of writing. In the second section they were free to choose 
one or two relations (e.g. attending to the dancer only, or to the screen, or projection), 
switching when they wanted. Miranda and Ryan moved through the relations by observing 
the script. 
 The table below is an example of how a researcher or practitioner using such methods 
could begin to map precisely the interactions and their reception. I realised the potential for 
controlling the conditions and attentional focus with such a script, an activity that would be 
useful in the staging of interactions. However, I did not take advantage of mapping with 
precision the overlapping instances of scripted attentions between Miranda, Ryan and the 
audience. Instead, I permitted the event to be fluid for the spectator and to not detract from 
their experiencing of the event. Overall, my script was inappropriate for this stage of the 
research, but I felt it indicated a potentially efficacious method for a dramaturgy of digital 
performance.  
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Original Script for Mediatisation: Attentional Relations  
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Figure 7: Original Script for Mediatisation used in Transmission Laboratories, Workshop#3 
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With two pilots and three workshops complete, my method for a Poetics of Reception has 
departed only marginally from the original pilot. The iterative nature of its framework has 
refined my approach (pointing to the possibility of further refinement) and introduced a self-
devised ‘performance as research’ project to avail the possibility of improving the method 
and deepening my insights into the essential structures and modes of the relationship between 
bodies and digital media. In order to further address this relationship, the emphasis now 
becomes textual.  
 From the Mixed Reality Project I was able to identify the dimensional importance in 
the relationship between presentation and experiential reception in live, mediatised events, 
and to trace the genealogy of screen mediations from the point of presentation to its origin. 
From the case studies, I have drawn out the following aspects to consider in the next stage of 
analysis: the dimensional relations of receptivity, the matter of orientation for the spectator, 
and embodiment in receptivity.  
 From my earlier analysis of the performer Rosi dancing with her shadows, I 
demonstrated two directions in analysis that could be taken during the final stages of 
phenomenological procedure. The first direction is the ongoing process of imaginative 
variation that is the engine of eidetic analysis, and describes the present stage of my 
investigation in the case studies just discussed. The second is to stop any further investigation 
of performative variants and take—say with the Rosi example—spatio-temporal separation 
of supra-extension as the invariant without further interpretation, and then elaborate upon this 
aspect either in philosophical terms, or in relation to what others have said in the performance 
studies, communication, or media arts discourses.  
A third interpretive direction is described by Spiegelberg as hermeneutic 
phenomenology, and characterises the method of post-Husserlian phenomenologists such as 
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur.   
 
 Hermeneutic phenomenology must aim at something different and more ambitious: its goal is the 
 discovery of meanings which are not immediately manifest to our intuiting, analysing, and describing. 
 Hence the interpreter has to go beyond what is directly given. In attempting this, he has to use the  
 given as a clue for meanings which are not given, or at least not explicitly given (Spiegelberg 1965, 
 695). 
 
Interpretation that goes beyond the given appears to be in conflict with getting back to the 
things themselves. However, hermeneutic interpretation is phenomenological if it does not 
construct through inference, but unveils hidden meanings by accessing the layers “which can 
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be uncovered” but are not “immediately manifest” (Spiegelberg 1965, 695). I will now work 
through the textual accounts from the Poetics of Reception pilots and workshops in order to 
elaborate with phenomenological distinction the essential structure of the phenomena from 
these investigated experiences expressed through language. The work, now, becomes a 
hermeneutic activity.  
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SECTION 4  
DISCOVERING 
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CHAPTER 7   POETICS OF RECEPTION: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS  
 
An aphorism, honestly cast and stamped, is still some way from being 
‘deciphered’ once it has been read, rather, it is only then that its 
interpretation can begin, and for this an art of interpretation is required. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, 1887 (9) 
 
So far I have problematised a claim within performance studies; discussed and 
reoriented a debate on the relationship between the live and mediatised; and designed a 
method and applied it to a concrete relation of interactions between bodies and technological 
media within dance performance events. I have developed a model for practising group 
phenomenology, and discovered that the practical methods of phenomenology promoted an 
iterative framework that has been continually refined in application over several workshops. 
As a result of this process, encounters between bodies and media have been 
phenomenologically attended to and described, resulting in a rich variance of texts written by 
a number of participants for eidetic analyses. In this chapter, six interactive encounters of a 
dancing body in relationship to various forms of digital media have been identified from two 
of the mediatised public dance performances attended, and the devised installation 
performance/workshop explained in the previous chapter. The poetic contributions of 
participants’ experiences have been divided into what I have called encounters: (1) Digital 
Touch; (2) Moving with Digital Other; (3) Hybridity; (4) Transmorphing; (5) Environment; 
and (6) Expressing the Inner. The function of these encounters is to organise the process of 
textual analysis, whereby the elaboration and schematising of essential structures and their 
distinctive modes take place through a process of eidetic analysis.  
 Before proceeding with a discussion of the encounters that help to organise the 
structural elaborations of the relations given in audience receptivity, I will outline my 
procedure for textual analysis with samples.  
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§4.7.1  TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: PROCEDURE AND LIMITS 
  
In order to understand the experience of corporeal bodies and digital technologies in 
complex performative relationships, my textual analysis seeks to disclose the essential 
aspects of an individual’s account across the writing tasks they produced, and more 
universally across all group accounts. In stage one of the textual analysis, I attend carefully 
and intuitively to the participants’ texts, breaking-up the writing into short phrases. As can be 
seen from the sample below, I transcribe in black text the writer’s words where legible. In 
some of the transcription I have added or taken punctuation away to improve readability.  As 
indicated earlier, participants were encouraged to not adhere to the rules and conventions of 
writing in order to avoid stymieing description. The red text represents my primary analysis, 
and functions to identify encounters and alert me to structures. While conducting this 
analysis, I attempted to stay open to any insights, however ridiculous, contradictory, or 
irrelevant they seemed. Eventually, some of these earlier insights proved to be 
inconsequential and I pursued only threads of logically intuited significance. The blue text is 
where I begin to connect these themes and insights of experiences across tasks and 
participants’ accounts, either describing the same performance, or a different one where there 
was evidence of a similar encounter. The green text illustrates my elaboration relative to 
other texts and ideas with reference to other literature.  
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Figure 8: Excerpt from Stage One of Textual Analysis 
 
During Stage One, I am mostly concerned with the repetition of linguistic motifs, 
emergent themes, patterns, and points of difference in descriptions of the performance that 
the language illuminates in its rich poetic variance across the single account. I ask questions, 
make suggestions about the meaning of the words and metaphors used. All interpretation is 
intended as revelatory in the hermeneutic sense, and is not used to work out or validate what 
the performance meant in terms of its narrative or overarching intended meaning. 
Interpretation creeps into the participants’ accounts on occasion and is often recognised by 
the writer themselves:    
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 [i]nsisting on taking my head out of the carriage to observe the airy impact of speeding train on 
 cavernous dark. This is a thought that occurs and reoccurs. It is however, subordinated as the surplus 
 of effect and meaning enact upon me. I rush toward interpretation of the images and actions before me 
 just as my epiphanies about my Freudian past arise (no pun intended). To describe. To notice. To see 
 what I see. The dancer, the train, the screen and the projection on the floor [P8,TL,1].  
 
I accept the interpretive, rather than dismiss it, but only when it works towards elucidating 
structures.  
  For the second stage of analysis, I tacked between these typed up transcriptions with 
interpretive notes and a notebook where I began to consolidate connections and distill 
structural themes. This activity enabled me to establish systematic sense from the many texts 
and preliminary insights and to identify six interactive encounters. On these pages (see 
sample below) I was able to disclose eight structural relation and their varying modes to be 
presented in the sections to come. 
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Figure 9: Excerpt from Stage Two of Textual Analysis 
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The overall procedure for textual analysis is intuitive and open to ongoing refinement. It is 
rigorous and fine-grained, requiring diligence and discipline to mine the writing, reveal the 
structures, make distinctions and connections in terms of their modes and numerous case 
sensitive orderings. Only on a structural level are we raised from the particular to generality. 
The process of eidetic variation is richest in the sifting through of variances to affirm 
invariance. The remaining pages of this dissertation demonstrate this sifting and distilling 
process, a process revealing the rough and complex contours of becoming structures. Indeed, 
here, I approach each encounter of interaction non-exhaustively.  
 All abstractions emerge from the textual accounts of participants. I proceed with little 
presupposition and retrieve the encounters from an examination of these accounts, paying 
close attention to what structurally comes to the fore. A logical ordering of distinctive modes 
is not imposed from the outside, but is generated by the emerging system as the analysis 
develops. Such a presentation of results organises and makes accessible the findings for 
reading. Like the encounters, the structures are also inexhaustible. My case studies delimit 
their number.  
 
 
Limits to Phenomena and Phenomenology 
Each written account may be approached more than once to mine for deeper 
structures of the core relation, corporeal bodies interacting with digital media. A particular 
question, theme or problem orients the analysis of the text differently, and delimits the 
elaboration of eidetic structures in a diversity of ways. It is not in the spirit of 
phenomenological inquiry to fix any meaning, or provide a one-sided perspective on 
phenomena. This is often the misconception of a Husserlian inspired phenomenology. The 
pursuit for essential structures or invariants is not the attainment of some static, non-
becoming aspect, even when there are limits to uncovering founding structures. Keeping this 
always in mind, there are two desiderata for a case of limits in my study. The first is the 
‘identity limits of an object’; the second is ‘the imposed limits to structural elaboration’. The 
first desideratum can extend to account for the second; I intend to explain how over the next 
few paragraphs. Klaus Held observes that: 
 
 [w]hen we run through the variants of an object, we can pay attention to its limits, that is, how far can 
 we go before the imagined object or its comprehending act becomes something else, before it loses its 
 identity (Held 2003, 16-17). 
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I indeed found that participants describing a moment of interaction during performance 
quickly met the identity limits of a form before it became “something else”.  In the reception 
of aesthetic objects that move, and move quickly, the identity limits are met sooner than with 
stable objects of perception, such as that tree, book, or table before me. There is a continual 
modification of the sense of a thing in its constitution. As we move and change in the 
experience, so does the thing. This movement is identified in Husserl as a ‘constitutive-duet’ 
occurring in all perceptual activities between object and subject. In my study, this thing (or 
phenomenon) is a relation between things. This relation is sometimes a new thing (a singular 
form) or continues to be two forms relating in a particular way. Where interactive 
technologies are involved, aesthetic forms accelerate the forming of the formed, and a 
(dis)forming and transforming movement of identity within receptivity.  The “something 
else” transitions are rapid.159 Such speeds were evidenced in all six encounters of the relation 
within the dance technology events attended. Take for example, a participant’s description of 
one form quickly transforming into another: “Boxed, it’s following her”, then, “It’s a great 
labyrinth – Fuck it’s beautiful” [P2,G,2]. Here, I trace three movements of the mediatic form 
‘it’: (1) “boxed” (environment); (2) “following her” (dance with digital other); and (3) “great 
labyrinth” (environment). Moreover, the forms are transforming on two temporal tracks: the 
original track of immediate experience, and the reproduced track for phenomenological 
description. It is possible that other forms were overlooked in recounting the original chain of 
forms, and it is difficult to ascertain the duration of each transformational movement from the 
written work alone. This lends itself again to the inexhaustible and incomplete nature of the 
process. 
 Phenomenological descriptions follow the path of reproduction (memory). 
Remembering can often be accurately chronological in reproduction, but in my workshops 
this greatly depended upon the participant. Discrepancies or partial expressions of a direct 
experience do not detract from the revelatory procedure of structural elaboration.  
                                                        
159 A modification of sense in the perception of everyday objects is not always involved in a rapid change of 
limit identities. However, in cases of ‘doubt’ about the identity of an object the limits of identity may change 
rapidly, say for example the mistaken identity of a black bucket in perception first seen as a skunk, then a black 
cat, followed by a log, but as I move closer (in the space of seconds) the true identity of the object as a black 
bucket is established. Husserl calls this experience a “mode of negation”, a “disappointment” in the synthetic 
fulfillment of an object within perception (“concordance”). This particular modalisation can involve a process 
of what he calls a “retroactive crossing out”. This transforming of identity limits, as I am using it here, resonates 
with Husserl’s complex temporalising schema that to pursue now would lead me away from my own 
phenomenological analysis. For more on this see “The Mode of Negation” in Husserl (2001, 63-72). 
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 The second desideratum relates to limiting the structures themselves. Despite 
reducing the experiences to six types of encounters, the structures and modes in themselves 
are inexhaustible. Inexhaustibility requires a further limit to be imposed (unlike perception 
where the very process of an identity limit for a form is its limit). If no limit is imposed (as 
with desideratum one) the relation itself, in a more general sense, may become “something 
else”. In order to not lose the phenomenon under examination, I pause within my 
phenomenology. It is not an arbitrary imposition, but one sensitive to the limits of the relation 
in its shared constitution of meaning in a performance context.  
 
 
Problem of Immediacy  
In Chapter 5, I pointed to the problem of a temporal discrepancy between spectating 
the event and writing descriptions. As an aid to my spectators, I included a revivification-
embodied exercise, taking participants back to the performance through images, and 
motivating their embodied memories of being-there at the event. The objective temporal gap 
between immediate experience and writing in my research is much wider than the examples 
provided by Casey’s documentation of Spiegelberg’s static objects; and narrower than the 
call to experience of the moral emotions in Steinbock’s phenomenology. In my project, 
phenomena are immediately reproduced from a present event; the memory may be 
considered primary, closer to the original event than a secondary memory. As a result, the 
language tense used by participants is mostly in the present. Some passages are written in 
past tense, and in some cases, a shift between tenses occurs.  
 
 Arms and legs stick out an awkward angle, and moving as if in choreography with one another like 
 synchronized dancers. Again the sense of a disconnect from the head [present tense] . . . The head 
 would look around, observing the body moving in this way. His body was nearly never erect [past 
 tense]. Maybe once, almost, when he was going around and around, these backward steps [P4,E,3]. 
 
A movement in the consciousness of the event as a temporal feature of the participant can be 
traced here. While describing, the participant telescopically moves from the detail of the body 
in present tense (“stick”, rather than “stuck”) and then draws out from this pinpoint focus to 
take in the horizon of the performance as a means to compare one moment with others: “his 
body was nearly never erect”. The participant seems to create a distance between themselves 
and the event when using past tense. This indicates the quickest path from description to 
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interpretation and/or abstraction. It appears that their recollections are elegantly bridled from 
a raw poetics of immediacy.  
 
 Her eyeline searches—different level down, reptilian strong lines rolling, whipping, shifting 
 torso mapping floor dragging face. Melting, bubbling, conditioning wiped away clean—nothing there 
 now, slate clean but screamatic sound—a trace [CI,G,2]. 
 
 Amoeba—Escher world—fall into the black vertigo—precision spinning [P2,E,1]. 
 
Writing in the present tense helps to retain the memory of an image in its original richness, as 
though the senses are still experiencing the event. All accounts shift between past, present 
and future tenses, but in most cases are written as though occurring in the immediacy of the 
present.160 My phenomenological approach does not favour one tense over another, nor do I 
see one tense offering more of what Riffaterre (1981) identifies as “verisimilitude”, 
“accuracy” or “verifiability” of reality in this pursuit for essential structures (107). Strict 
reference to, or the “verifiability” of reality in receptive figurations of embodied imagery is 
not causally necessitated. A given world of objects is presupposed; this is a condition of 
phenomenology. The interactions along with the spectator-analyst co-constitute image 
perceptions within the temporal flow of an attentive consciousness. As unreal as imaginings 
may seem, they pervade our lived reality.  
 
                                                        
160 The tenses in the writing of experiences are discussed at length in ethnography, literature and 
phenomenology. Anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup defends the ethnographic present in a postmodern era, and 
views the present tense in writing as “not solely an accidental temporal mode”, but a constructed one 
“preserving the reality of anthropological knowledge” (Hastrup 2009, 45). Edward S. Casey considers the use of 
tenses in the relationship between literary description and philosophical description, providing examples from 
Proust and Merleau-Ponty. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions, Casey notes that there are:  
 
 [n]o evidential clues to the effect, that this description might be the reconstruction of some actual scene . . . The present tense is 
 not even the historical present of fiction—which it has been argued, is itself not present at all—but what we might call a 
 philosophical quasi-present, a permanent present which is essentially tenseless (Casey 1981, 179). 
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Players in Play: a note on terminology within analysis 
Who are the players in aesthetic play? Drawing on the tripartite model offered by 
Gadamer discussed in Chapter 2, the core players include the performer, audience (spectator-
analyst), and media objects (technology). The interaction between bodies and media 
triangulate with audience. Maintaining a sense of aesthetic play in triangulation is extremely 
significant for preventing mediatised performance events from being understood only in light 
of critical frameworks that certain theories in the philosophy of technology and art offer 
when contemplating the relations between machines and bodies, and the impact of 
technologies on persons and world. The audience is indicated in several ways as a player in 
the co-constitution of the object-event. As individual spectators writing descriptions, they co-
create the interactions. An experience of triangulation is identified by each writer, but 
described differently.  The object-event is constituted by a nexus of players beyond the 
individual; we, our, us moments are described as: ‘shared’, ‘intimate’, ‘together’, ‘open’, and 
‘at one’.    
 To vary the language without repetition, I use several different terms as proper nouns 
to describe the same experience or thing, thus ensuring that there are no slippages in terms. 
As a phenomenologist, it is not the concepts or terms that are being examined. Rather, it is 
the experiences and players co-constituting the interactions that become significant. The 
following list will help to consolidate synonymous terms (both singular and plural) in order 
to indicate the triangulation of three core players. 
 
MEDIA PERFORMER AUDIENCE (PLURAL) 
LIGHT CORPOREAL BODY/BODY AUDIENCE MEMBER 
(SINGULAR) 
(DIGITAL) 
TECHNOLOGIES 
FLESHLY BEING/BEING SPECTATOR-ANALYST 
PROJECTION DANCER SPECTATOR 
MEDIATIC (QUALITY) SUBJECT PARTICIPANT 
LINES  WRITER 
  PERCEIVER 
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Eidetic Analysis of a Complex Relational Event in Representation 
In his Phenomenology, Jean-François Lyotard states that when psychologism posits 
“no ultimate truth independent of the psychological workings” of conceptual principles, 
“truth becomes belief reinforced by success” (Lyotard 1991, 37-8, italics my emphasis).161 In 
the phenomenological investigation of aesthetic based representations, the objective ideal of 
experienced forms—such as the hybrid (“cyber being”, “electric body”, “angel”)—that 
phenomenology seeks to affirm becomes problematised. The momentarily identified form 
(‘before it becomes something else’) appears to provide no criterion for truth by way of an 
objective ideal, that is, the phenomenological type of objectivity (its noematic core) that 
clings to all subjective variations run through in the forming of knowledge about that thing. 
For example, consider the simple mathematical shape of a triangle. Depending on the 
different perceivers’ predications of that triangle identified in its subjective variants: red, 
small, shiny, “all triangles are, by their essence, convex” (Lyotard 1991, 39). Now in seeking 
the invariance of a relational event in the domain of representation, as I set out to do, the 
objective ideal (to employ Lyotard’s term) is in fact the revealed structural processes and 
modes co-constituted by the spectators. These variances of experience are not nonessential 
variants, but understood to be invariants of the phenomenon. For in the absence of these 
structural processes and modes, the interactions themselves would cease to exist. To clarify 
this point, let us consider Lyotard’s discussion of the rectangular triangle.  
 
 Even a rectangular triangle possesses an ideal objectivity in the sense that it is the subject of a 
 collection of predicates [made by the perceivers], inalienable on pain of losing the rectangular 
 triangle itself (Lyotard 1991, 39). 
 
                                                        
161 This is precisely the “skepticism” of truth that Husserl challenges with phenomenology in his project to 
overcome empirical psychologism: the crisis of a positivistic approach bearing upon the humanities in regard to 
questions and issues about human existence. See “Part I: The crisis of the sciences as expression of the radical 
life-crisis of European humanity” in Husserl (1970, pp. 3-16). 
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§4.7.2  INTERACTIVE ENCOUNTERS 
 
From a first and second stage analysis of participants’ writings, I identified the 
following six encounters listed above. To reiterate: (1) Digital Touch; (2) Moving with 
Digital Other; (3) Hybridity; (4) Transmorphism; (5) Environment and New Worlds; (6) 
Expressing the Inner. I will briefly describe each encounter in turn; consider their ordering 
and transitional movements as they appear in the experience of interactions; and then outline 
the co-constituted structures and modes of interaction revealed by the phenomenology. The 
presentation and organisation of the revealed structures will weave the discussion back 
through each of the encounters such that the interactions are understood more deeply in terms 
of their structures and distinctive modes.  
 The nature of a descriptive science, with imperatives to understand the things in 
themselves, prevents fixing an absolute schematic with neat contours and isolable 
categories—such as one might find in the great systems of classification by Charles Sanders 
Pierce in philosophy (1839—1914), or Francis Bacon in the physical sciences (1561—1626). 
However, for the purpose and ease of communication, I have done my best to clearly show 
connections by schematising these experiential findings into a coherent picture, resisting as 
much as possible the imposition of a logical ordering or sytematising that entirely abandons 
the dynamic movement of the interactions. These encounters of interactions triangulate the 
relation between performer, media and audience and take place in the syntheses of embodied 
perceptual receptivity. They strike an allure on one’s entire sensorium, experienced, then 
expressed through a rich and varied poetic language. 
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1  DIGITAL TOUCH (DP) 
The interaction of digital touch involves a close spatial, surface and multi-directional 
penetrating relation between the boundaries and thresholds of the fleshly performer body and 
illuminating media. It is a meaningful meeting between a three-dimensional body and two-
dimensional light source. Mixed together, absorbing, leaking, flowing, and blending, the 
intentional act and dimensionality on either side (performer and media) undergoes a range of 
transformations and conversions. It is also a site where instances of a performer and their 
digital image (digital double) in mirror like replication, meet in playful, co-relative and 
violent forms of touch.162 Digital touch emerges from other encounters in a dynamically 
constituted flow of interactions. The modes of touch relative to the structures revealed 
include:  
 
 Extension  
 
 Permeability with directions (media into body; media out of body; body out of body; 
 media with body) 
 
 Possession 
 
 Reversability 
 
 Wearability 
  
 Interference 
 
 
                                                        
162 In Digital Performance, Steve Dixon provides a thoroughgoing analysis to categorise the digital double into 
four different types: reflection; alter-ego; spiritual emanation; and manipulable mannequin (Dixon 2007, 241-
70). He draws on the psychoanalytic theories of Freud (the uncanny) and Lacan; theatre history: Artaud and his 
double; and the skepticism of Baudrillard. He describes a number of performances to explore these different 
manifestations of the digital double.  
  
 All types of digital doubles can be conceptualised as some form of technological reflection of a live body, in our categorizations 
 we are specifically defining the reflection double as a digital image that mirrors the identical visual form and realtime movement 
 of the performer or interactive user (Dixon 2007, 250).     
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2 MOVING WITH DIGITAL OTHER (DO) 
The performer and media move together in a duet, they are together and apart, 
resisting, yielding, and creating complex alterities: a conversation and story between two 
players in play. The relationship occurring within digital other is anthropomorphic, other- 
worldly and often haunting. The solo dancer in collaboration with media invests in a moving 
co-relative, co-emerging conversation where unities and fragmentations draw out many of the 
structures for understanding interactions. Two entities live symbiotically or become active 
rivals in play. They work together to distort the spatio-temporal continuities in their 
triangulation with audience.    
 
3 HYBRIDS (H) 
 A third encounter is the hybrid, where performer and media co-emerge into a single 
being: the ‘Cyber Being’ or ‘Electric Body’. There is an undifferentiated relation between 
performer and media in their hybrid blending. A recombined form composed of human and 
media elements challenges the idea of human as pure, unaffected, impermeable and bounded. 
The ‘cyber being’ described by P3 from GLOW has body rhythms, weightlessness; it is 
gutless, able to scream, and seamless. The writer folds the body corporeal with technology 
into the single term ‘being’. 
 This being was a new kind of being, a cyber being. It was a being made of flesh and light. We know it 
 was a being because of its body rhythms [P3,G,1]. 
Invoking Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm to articulate the seamless gap between 
performer and media in an encounter of hybridity, a hybrid is not a mere rivalry between 
forms, it is a “cofunctioning” unique body “belonging to the same world” (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, 215).163 The hybrid form possesses rationality, the capacity to emote and to dream; “it” 
is genderless.     
 
 
 
 
                                                         
163 Merleau-Ponty’s concept chiasm is that which “makes us belong to the same world.” It is a world that “forms 
its unity across incompossibilities [disjointed existences] such as that of my world and the world of the other . . . 
there is not simply a for-Oneself for-the-Other antithesis, there is Being as containing all that, first as sensible 
Being and then as Being without restriction——” (Merleau-Ponty 2000, 215). 
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 4 TRANSMORPHING (T) 
Transmorphism is an encounter of change and transformation. These encounters are 
forming, formed and disformed events indicating the potential within perceptual syntheses 
that go beyond the human, and which move towards the animal and fantastical. Perceptual 
images in receptivity border on the edge, slip into new forms, and push the limits of identity 
or stable image. Transmorphing is a transcendent movement, going beyond what is—if only 
momentarily—seeking new senses and meaning in the constitution of form. There are weaker 
transmorphisms that reaffirm humanness in their resistance of complete change: resemblance, 
almost replicating; and stronger movements where the form slips entirely into another form. 
Acute morphological shifts occur in such cases of animal kinesis “the fish untangles the net 
of her captor’s flirtation” [P4,G,8], and described through metaphor, similes and analogies. 
Transmorphism occurs in the human whereby their personhood is stripped: “he moved as if 
he were not a person, but a body creating some state . . . Only occasionally did I sense a 
man, cognition, feeling” [P4,E,2-3]. 
 
 
5 ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER WORLDS (E) 
An Encounter of environment and other worlds is a source for co-generating and 
motivating other encounters, combining to create complex orderings organised in a 
contextual way: “a bug caught in the death lights of an insect zapper” [P1,G,1].  It is an 
interactive space, a familiar, fantastical place transcending stage space; it is a realm with 
tangible auras, sometimes with harsh edges, sometimes a fuzzy threshold. Atmosphere. There 
is no continuity with off-stage, all forms emerge within world, on, or inside its borders. It is a 
crucible for new forms, architectural, labyrinthine, a system and/or playing field, a rapidly 
shifting world of worlds, sometimes our nightmare. Narrative time is distinct from time 
consciousness and measured time. Each world carries its own time value, fragmentation and 
suspension: fictive past, present and future: “she lived there behind time inside the surface of 
the floor” [P4,TL,1]. 
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 6 EXPRESSING THE INNER (EI) 
In this sixth encounter, the media projections externally represent our inner worlds, 
marking the mood, thoughts, and reflections of our existence. The invisible is lured to 
visibility; the inner made manifest. The invisible is “the existentials of the visible, its 
dimensions, its non-figurative inner framework” (Merleau-Ponty 2000, 257). In aesthetic 
constitution the relationship to one’s inner world is articulated as a mediatic “hinge” of the 
internal-external. We see what we want to see, however partial. Prompts to self-reflection by 
the spectator are visually expressed; queries are floated about existential freedom or 
constraints: how are we? What is this life? Existential reflections induced by mediatic 
boundaries, boxes, frames and bar codes. These representations are not about the meaning of 
the performance, but show what is stirred by the interactions when one’s inner life is made a 
theme. Mediatic supra-extensions of inner life, co-constitute thoughts, dreams, and emotions 
as moving patterns, lines and forces.  
 
 In the auric realm to watch the thought patterns manifest and live—do I want them back? Too bad 
 [P2,G,5].  
 
The aura of performance extrudes beyond the contained stage space. The external 
representation of the spectator-analyst’s inner world becomes a distal, though proximal 
experience. 
 
 Dark dreams spill like turps dissipating pigment patches to the constraints of pigments tether—the 
 grains split from monochrome homes [P4,G,7].  
 
When are we truly at home with ourselves?  
 
 Then we end in our unsettled sleep [P3,G,3]. 
 
The visual media behave somewhat like text spoken in a play where words and narrativised 
action provoke the audience to inwardly reflect. In a mediatised dance event, the visual media 
can also place such demands on the spectator. 
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Ordering of Interactive Encounters 
There are thus several encounters of interaction that emerge isolated or together in a 
single object-event. Some encounters motivate and support transitions and complexes, while 
others are independently constituted. So far in this research, I have distinguished six types co-
involved in a complex of relations and orderings. There are no established hierarchies 
between encounters, such that one dominates or the others, or is seen to be more 
foundational. However, in tracing the ordering of encounters from participants’ texts, there 
are leading clues that particular patterns and sequencings of encounters may in fact repeat. I 
describe a few of these movements below.   
 To identify that an ordering or sequencing repeats under specific conditions with 
certain structural outcomes remains continuous with the orientation of my research towards 
praxis: to consider how a dramaturgy of digital performance is possible. As a procedure, each 
encounter could be mapped in relation to their genesis, ascertaining if a particular order 
entails a particular result. To date there are not enough examples from my Poetics of 
Reception Project to pursue such a mapping—the project never intended such an outcome. 
For the moment, we can describe an ordering of encounters at a first and second level. From 
these levels a complete transitional movement of one encounter into a different one occurs; 
and/or the creation of a complex whereby the prior encounter remains residually to combine 
with others. Together, they comprise a new complex.  
 
A first-level ordering: 
(i) Transitional:  (1) Transmorphismenvironment  
   Amoeba, Escher world—fall into the black vertigo [P2,E,1]. 
The stage space is abstracted and abstracting, like the artist Maurits Cornelis Escher’s world 
of infinite perspectives: falling down the walls and stairs, teetering on the edge, dimensional 
depths indicating vertigo. 
   (2) Digital TouchHybrid  
   The shape, the silhouette, boldy traced with a white light. The background now dark. 
   The body unfurls, folds, rolls over, limbs spoking. An emission of light shooting out 
   from the living core—the electric body [P1,G,1]. 
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The silhouette of the performer is traced with white light; it is a case of double supra-
extension, first seen as a silhouette of the body, and second as a tracing of that silhouette with 
light. There is an acute descriptive focus upon the body as the media fade. There is a 
transition from one mode of digital touch (supraextension) to a second mode of penetration 
when the hybrid “electric body” forms. 
(ii) Complex:  (1) Digital Touch + environment 
   The Other’s world his to investigate [P2,E,2]. 
This is a moment where the performer has moved into the projected digital double, fitting 
inside smoothly like a glove. The writer identifies a different world for the performer from 
inside this replicated skin. It is an unsettling place; the writer identifies relaxation and rest 
once the performer is no longer possessed by their digital double. 
   Settle back in skin—relax and rest in self [P2,E,2]. 
   Accept that self, resting smaller and quieter [P2,E,3]. 
   (2) Environment + Transmorphism 
   Laser line hit white effervescent glow when rolling out the measure one in folds of 
   white, snow dropped depression in snows, roll, land, arcs, line glacial bunny snow 
   [CI,G,1]. 
   (3) Transmorphism + Environment 
   A bug caught in a the death lights of an insect zapper [P1,G,1]. 
   (4) Environment + Expressing the Inner 
   Down the deep dark hole of the self [P3,G,3]. 
A second-level ordering: 
(iii) Transitional:   There were no examples of a transition at a second-level ordering 
(iv) Complex:  Transmorphism + Environment + Digital Other 
   The fish untangles the net of her captor’s flirtation [P4,G,7]. 
The dancer, now a fish caught in a mediatic net, the captor. 
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§4.7.3  CONSTITUTIVE STRUCTURES AND MODES OF INTERACTIONS 
 
The phenomenology so far undertaken in the Poetics of Reception Project has 
revealed a number of constitutive structures and related modes of interactions, which are 
inexhaustible, dynamic and descriptive. In the following pages, I discuss eight such structures 
disclosed from participants’ descriptions of the aforementioned encounters. There is no 
particular order to these structures, and so the following must not be understood in linear 
terms. These structures never operate independently, but overlap in complex relationships. 
For the purposes of clarity in communication, I consider each independently with a 
presupposed interdependency. In clarifying and elaborating upon each structure and relative 
modes, their overlapping connections make it difficult to categorise them neatly under 
appropriate headings. I have attempted to organise examples and insights in a manner that 
best elucidates the phenomenon of interaction. For the sake of brevity, I present only the most 
relevant findings and examples and not the entire analysis. The eight constitutive structures to 
be discussed include: 
 
(1)  The Relational Structure of Action: acting upon—acted upon 
(2)  Dimensional Conversion Types in Receptivity of Encounters 
(3)  Belief Structure: the ‘Suspension of Disbelief’. Loss of mode of certainty 
 and limits of identity 
(4)  Identity—Presence Structures 
(5)  Language of Description: (a) The Grammar of Interactions (b) Negative 
 and Positive Valences 
(6)  Orientation: embodiment in receptivity     
(7)  Transcendent Movement: potential to go beyond the human form and 
 stage space; perceptual possibilities 
(8)  Receptive Empathy: (a) The Role of Audience (b) The For-Us structure of 
 audience: affirming the triangulation of experience in the co-constitution 
 of the relation 
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(1)   The Relational Structure of Action: Acting Upon—Acted Upon 
 
A relational structure of action, ‘acting upon—acted upon’, is always operating within 
interactions. What seems most basic and shared across the six encounters identified is a 
structure of responsive action with multi-vocal directions and intensities. Of the six 
encounters, digital other is foremost relational and is indicated across all the modes of 
relational action. The hybrid formation of performer and media into a singular being on the 
other hand, resists all modes of the relational structure except for ambiguity. In hybridity, the 
relation between media and performer is paradoxical. The relation between one and the other 
dissolves in the absolute and transcendent union of two forms. They digest each other.  
 The following section outlines three modes of relational action elicited from the 
descriptions of encounters: reciprocal, ambiguous, and one-sided directed. From these, 
further distinctive modes are identified to include permeability and neutrality.  
 
Three Modes in a Relational Structure of Action 
MODE 1: RECIPROCAL 
 Reciprocity implies that body and media have equal importance. A symbiotic relation 
may be indicated where both are independently working together in a synthesis of aesthetic 
formation. The direction of acting upon—acted upon on both sides is differentiated in terms 
of action, but may appear undifferentiated. 
 
 The externally imposed lines. Lines she created for herself. Both undifferentiated. Having the equal 
 importance and visibility [P2,G,8]. 
 
There is a relation of responsiveness. Either media or body resists or reacts to the other, 
recognising and accepting reciprocities of action. They are together. Togetherness is an 
aspect of responsive reciprocity, implying openness toward the other, resisting and or 
reacting in this duet.  
 
 Always together. Haunting her. Absorbing her. Resisting, reacting [CI,G,3]. 
 
In Digital Touch, the mode of permeability demonstrates this reciprocal relational structure of 
action. Permeability describes the moving, porous boundaries and interstitial play occurring 
within thresholds constituted between the skin of body and skin of media, especially in the 
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object-event of digital doubling. Permeability indicates a direction and intention of forces in 
meaningful play.  
 
Media into body: “absorbs”  Acceptance by the acted-upon 
Media with body: “blending”  A mutual meeting of dimensions 
 
In Digital Other, equanimity results in a reciprocity of play between media and performer. In 
these instances the media element is constituted as other. In recognition of alterity the media 
is anthropomorphised with personhood.  
 
 They are play. They intend to have each other, but will any succeed in its belief in each other [P3,E,1]? 
 
As players in play both trapped in a game dynamic, the media is constituted to have 
intentionality with a corresponding and operating belief and value system. Reciprocity here is 
non-instrumental. Instrumentality implies that one player becomes the tool of the other (see 
below). Instead, they are: 
  
 All pulses and impulses. They buzz each other [P3,E,1]. 
 
In Expressing the Inner, the existential is made visible in the constitution of an externalising 
transcendent media. This is an encounter that emphasises triangulation and the constituting 
experiences of the spectator-analyst, where reflections on their life, thinking, dreaming, and 
existence is aesthetically constituted.  
 
 Caught in the matrix—do I really know the patterns I create [P2,G,4]? 
 
Who is acting upon whom? It appears there is a reciprocal action of spectator acting upon 
media as much as the media provides the experience of being existentially trapped.  
 
 I’ve drawn my own box [P2,G,7].  
  
The triangulation does extend to involve the performer in the spectator-analyst’s recognition 
of a similar condition of reciprocity in action with media: 
 
 Because I am trapped in my black box watching them play in their black box. I wonder if  I can escape 
 by falling asleep, but I am trapped in the black box of my mind and cannot [P3,E,2]. 
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Reciprocity can involve instrumentality where either media or performer is taken as a tool. 
This does not preclude responsivity:  
 Not once was he dancing, this body was a tool. Clearly responsive [P4,E,7]. 
 The body becomes a brush, tracing inky impressions on the floor [P1,G,4]. 
 
 
MODE 2: AMBIGUOUS 
Ambiguity results when the ‘acting upon—acted upon’ relation is undifferentiated.  
The origin of direction and intention is difficult to identify. 
 
 Purple haze lines envelop directed by limbs carrying the weight--who directs who [CI,G,2]? 
 
The encounter hybrid draws out the ambiguous mode of the relational action. A hybrid is a 
co-emergence of forms into a singular being that co-functions in a chiasmatic flow. Co-
dependent responsiveness ensues, but points of initiation in action are indeterminable. 
 
 It moved in time with itself—the light and the pattern and the arm and foot extend in mood 
 swings [P3, G, 1].  
 
The recombination of parts are constituted synchronously—conjoined to move “in time with 
itself”. 
 
In the mode of permeability, the movement of media into body is expressed ambiguously 
within Digital Touch as: 
 
Media into body: “inflow”  Penetration that is not one of acting upon   
               Arises out of ambiguity 
 
In an encounter of transmorphism, where performer and/or media becomes something else 
entirely because of the interaction (note that transmorphisms can also occur outside of the 
interaction between body and technology), there is no relational structure of action unless 
there is a transitional movement at either a first-level complex: (i) transmorphism + digital 
other: the human form changes into an animal or insect and enters a relation with the media; 
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or second-level complex (ii) transmorphism + environment + digital other: The fish untangles 
the net of her captor’s flirtation [P4,G,7].  
 
MODE 3: ONE-SIDED DIRECTED  
A one-sided directed relation is when the action of one player is unilaterally directed 
upon the other. When media acts upon the body, the performer’s humanness and/or 
corporeality is brought into greater relief. 
 
 Black globules encroach, hunting, sucking her, drawing, tension, entrapped, engulfed. Spine laid out 
 for all to see [CI,G,5].  
 
 White clean lines shifting, pushing away candles alive [CI,G,5].  
 
When the performer acts upon the media: pushing out the white line [P2,G,1], the relational 
structure of action highlights a second structure of dimensional conversion (see (2) below). 
 
In a mode of permeability within Digital Touch, action as one-sided directed is expressed in 
movements of: 
 
Media into body: “ooze in”  Penetration by the acting-upon, inward 
Body out of media: “pop out of” Explosive outward movement penetrating   
     boundary/membrane of media 
 
In a mode of neutrality, the movement of: 
 
 The committed string-fish your bleeding fathom [P4,G,6]. 
 
Media out of body: “bleeds”  One-sided directed, but not intentional in force 
 
 The demons are now beneath inky her dribbled out [CI,G,6]. 
 
Media out of body:“dribbled out”  The body leaks 
  
 Deeper etchings of a black line. Laying still embolden embossed [CI,G,4]. 
 
Media on body: “etchings”  The media etches 
  239 
     The body becomes embossed with a graphic quality  
 
In interactions of Digital Other, a one-sided directed relation manifests typically on the side 
of media as specter, predator, puppeteer (“The God of mediatisation” [CI,G,2]) and/or 
possessor. The media may be constituted as being a spirit-like entity with a visible aura; or 
experienced as possessing corporeal qualities: weight, density, having the capacity to touch, 
and in itself tangible.     
 
 Zapped by all the imprints that flow back to haunt—the karma of auric traces [P2,G,3]. 
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 (2)   Dimensional Conversion Types in Receptivity of Encounters 
 
There are three dimensional conversion types. The dimensions are spatial and 
temporal in nature. They indicate conversions between 2-dimensional spatial surfaces and 
corresponding light and image based projections; 3-dimensional volumetric objects, and the 
temporal dimensions of consciousness within audience reception: memories, imaginings and 
image formations. The dimensional aspect of audience reception of the different interactions 
between bodies and technologies was identified in the Mixed Reality Project in Chapter 6. 
The following general formulation was abstracted: 
 
PRESENTATION = DIMENSIONAL FORMS; RECEPTION = [DIMENSIONAL RECEPTIVITY 
Genealogy of Screen Mediations] (AUDIENCE RECEPTION (non)Live/(non)Mediatised) 
 
As a result of my textual analysis, it can be shown that the dimensional activity in audience 
reception of interactions transcends the genealogy of mediations traced prior to an experience 
of the research-based projects discussed in Chapter 6. It is now possible to expand upon the 
dimensional activity of audience reception to include three distinct dimensional conversion 
types. These conversions shift in time with new forms constituted in perception of the 
performance. The general formulation now reads to include possible dimensional conversions 
of a spatial or temporal nature: 
 
PRESENTATION=DIMENSIONAL FORM; DIMENSIONAL RECEPTIVITY (GENEALOGY ‘+’) AUDIENCE RECEPTION: 
MEDIATISED/NON-MEDIATISED/LIVE/NON-LIVE; DIMENSIONAL CONVERSION TYPES 
 
Conversion Type 1:  3-dimensions converting to 2-dimensions (spatial) 
The body takes on a graphic quality through the interaction 
 
  Deeper etchings of a black line. Laying still embolden embossed [CI,G,4]. 
 
The body is still and takes on a 2D graphic materiality “embossed” by the etchings of a black 
line. The body is brought into relief in a graphic way. The action is one-sided, directed on the 
body by the media. 
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Conversion Type 2: 2-dimensions converting to 3-dimensions (spatial) 
 
(i) The media is an environment or digital other that promotes the corporeal body to 
 resist or be resisted, to push or be pushed, to be held, penetrated, and imprinted. The 
 media no longer has a spectral projected quality, but is constituted with materiality, 
 corporeality and density. It presents a play of forces: attracting and repelling. In the 
 action of responsivity (Digital Other) 2-dimensions are converted into three. The lines 
 are perceived as weighted with the capacity to be pushed. 
 
  Pushing out the white line [P2,G,1]. 
 
(ii) The media becomes wearable in an encounter of digital touch. The moving body 
 gives the impression that it bears some kind of weight or resistance from the 
 media, pushing, pulling, or yielding. The body behaves as though it wears  something 
 with volume, density, weight and force. 
  
  She yelps with quavering voice downward and upward—off the floor from beneath the lines 
  masking, face masks [CI,G,1]. 
 
  I think of the grid as a cross on his body [P4,E,6]. 
 
(iii)  This type of conversion (2D3D) can be found in cases of ‘digital violence’ 
 perpetrated by the media on the performer (encounters DT and DO), such that the 
 performer becomes vulnerable, visibly retreats, fights to escape, audibly yells, 
 and/or demonstrates fear and pain. The performer is constituted as experiencing a 
 physical threat from the media which could affect their body in a direct way. 
   
 Black globules encroach, hunting, sucking her, drawing her, tension, entrapped,  engulfed 
 [CI,G,5].  
 
 They morph and ooze back into her standing body. The shriek of re-entry is piercing, the 
 dancer’s voice and music warping together. This repeats. There is no escape [P1,G,4]. 
 
 Always together, haunting her, absorbing her, resisting, reacting [P1,G,1]. 
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(iv)  Environments and worlds take on the materiality of an everyday or fantasised  
  world through transference, offering spatial depth. 
 
  A crucible, cradle. Out of which spew exalted, exultant forms [P1,G,6]. 
 
  Amoeba, Escher world—fall into the black vertigo [P2,E,1].  
 
 
Conversion Type 3: Temporalising 2-dimensions and 3-dimensions 
The co-extension of two dimensions and three to express an emotional/psychological state. 
 
  It moved in time with itself—the light and the pattern and the arm and foot extend in mood 
  swings [P3,G,1]. 
 
Co-emergence of media and body into a single hybrid being expresses the  inner form. There 
is a unitary swing; the dimensions collapse to constitute a mood. The “mood swing”, a 2-
dimensional pattern and 3-dimensional limb draws together the gestural and emotional.  
 
Movement of dimensional conversions in the transition of encounters 
 Accompanying a transition of encounters is a transition in dimensional conversions. 
For example, in the performance Eréction the digital doubling occurs first as an encounter of 
digital other. The performer stands next to their holographic other: the other as replicated 
self. The dimensional conversion is of 2 dimensions becoming 3. The digital double occupies 
space with volume proportionate to the scale of the performer. It is his absolute mirror image 
in 3-dimensions. As the performer steps into their digital double, an encounter of digital 
touch occurs (possession and permeability), the dimensions of media constituted in digital 
other as 3-dimensions converts to two to permit the penetration of this holographic other by 
the performer. 
 
  243 
(3)   Belief Structure: the ‘Suspension of Disbelief’. Loss of mode of certainty 
  and limits of identity 
 
 What remains constant across the various encounters within aesthetic play is a 
‘suspension of disbelief’. This is a momentary ‘belief’ to no longer ‘disbelieve’ an illusion or 
the impossible, and is determinately a structural invariant of interactions identified from the 
experience of encounters presented here. A reinforcement of the belief to ‘suspend disbelief’ 
is a necessary condition for the interaction of hybridity (to take one encounter as an 
example): to see the angel; the genderless cyber being; or the electric body, the perceiver 
assents readily to a loss of mode of certainty about the dancing body being lit by a projection 
in a certain way. A belief to no longer disbelieve permits the truth of representation; it is 
essential to constituting meaningful interactions. 
 In 1807, the Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge coined the phrase a willing 
suspension of disbelief. The phrase described the way in which a reader of poetry consciously 
suspended reality to construct a world of make-believe. In a letter to Daniel Stuart, dated 
from 1816, Coleridge draws an experiential distinction between dreaming and the illusions 
we willingly and voluntarily constitute in experiences of art, including the stage. 
 
 It is not strictly accurate to say, that we believe our dreams to be actual while we are dreaming. We 
 neither believe it nor disbelieve it—with the will, the comparing power is suspended [italics added by 
 Ferri], and without any comparing power, any act of  Judgment, whether affirmation or denial, is 
 impossible. The forms & thoughts act merely by their own inherent power: and the strong feelings at 
 times apparently connected with them are in fact sensations, which are the causes or occasions of the 
 images, not (as when we are awake) the effects of them. Add to this a voluntary Lending  of the will to 
 this suspension of one of its own operations (i.e. that of the comparison and consequent decision 
 concerning the reality of any sensuous impression) and you have the true Theory of Stage Illusion 
 (Coleridge, 1816 in Griggs 1959, pp. 641 – 642 in Ferri, 2007, italics added by Ferri). 
 
The film theorist Anthony J. Ferri attempts to retrieve the original meaning of Coleridge’s 
concept “poetic faith” from previous scholarship that has, in Ferri’s eyes, moved away from 
its original intended meaning. In order to examine receptivity in film audiences, Ferri objects 
to perspectives that view a willing suspension of disbelief as involving some “loss of normal 
consciousness”.  
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 Scholars presume that readers, viewers, or listeners of a creative work must engage in some unique 
 leap into the work itself. The willing suspension of disbelief represents a process of senses (cognitions) 
 and imagination (artistic) that occur between an individual and a creative work  (film, poem, novel) in 
 which the reader, viewer, or listener cognitively engages and experiences the work (Ferri 2007, x).   
 
Ferri’s position is akin to my identification of the suspension of disbelief as a unique kind of 
belief structure in the receptivity of new media interactions. There is no loss of ‘normal’ 
consciousness (whatever normal means here), but a different style of synthesis occurring 
within consciousness, and as a crucial aspect of it. Believing to disbelieve is a passive—
active giving over to the trick of interaction, allowing the illusion to seek its optimum and 
necessary fulfillment as illusory. To cooperate with the trick, the illusion as intended, or the 
experience of one’s embodied imaginings resists the call for transparency—the ‘how does it 
work?’ or ‘what is behind the curtain?’ type of interrogations—and the active tracing by 
audience to comprehend causal origins. Not all interactions require this belief structure, 
especially in encounters with a digital other where the media and performer body are co-
relatively symbiotic and do not manifest new forms.  
 The belief act of suspending disbelief supports the generation of new perceptual 
possibilities. If all we see is a moving body lit by projections, and not a “fish caught in their 
captor’s net”, we are deprived of poetic faith. We are not motivated by our imaginations, nor 
able to stir the deeper perceptual structures and associations that enable us to encounter and 
engage with new perceptions. The commitment to the suspension of disbelief varies across 
accounts. Some participants teeter on the edges, vacillating between describing the 
interactions with transparency, sticking to detailed descriptions of the body, or entering a 
state of self-reflexivity: announcing moments of surprise, joy and satisfaction when they 
finally believe to disbelieve.  
 
 I’m blinking and straining and trying to understand what I’m seeing. I like this feeling. Its 
 clever its something new [P4,E,6]. 
 
There are two aspects to this belief structure. The first is the ‘Loss of Mode of Certainty’; and 
the second, an ‘Identity Limit’. 
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Loss of Mode of Certainty  
 Here I draw on Husserl’s modalising description of certainty. Certainty is pure 
certainty; its purity or absoluteness is characterised by the sole fact that something speaks 
only in favour of it. Certainty is also “impure certainty”. Taken non-pejoratively, impure 
certainty points to potential “leeways of possibilities” that entice us away from only speaking 
in favour of one thing such as the predicted outcome of an event (“the raised hammer will 
fall”); or an unequivocal judgment (or conviction) where I can not speak or be enticed any 
other way: “I am conscious of only one possibility” (Husserl 2001, 85-7). The phrase loss of 
mode of certainty relates to impure certainty, an encounter that could be experienced and 
otherwise described (modalisation). It is revealed as a positive and affirming dimension of 
interaction within reception, without which, the performer constituted as slipping into other 
forms would not be possible. 
 
  The slip into other forms. Pushing the boundary of that potential [P1,G,2]. 
 
Transmorphism is a changing movement between forms that function always with this 
modalised sense of certainty. Definite forms are always, and positively, open to the 
possibility of that which they are not. In the aesthetic realm, interactions of morphological 
change rarely remain certain, even if there is an imperative (quest)  for stability. 
 
  This quest for form and definition underpinned by the oscillating light, projected from above 
  [P1,G,2]. 
 
 
Identity Limit  
 Each emerging encounter undergoes an identity limit; they form, then disform, either 
in a full transitional movement, or as a relational complex (see pages 232-233). They are 
continually and dynamically on the verge or edge of becoming something else.164 Identity 
limits are sharpest and operate more rapidly in hybrids and transmorphic forms, but are found 
in other encounters to varying degrees. The identity limit is a function of receptivity and 
comes into play through the belief structure of suspending disbelief. For example, a leg 
moving in a flicking motion initially perceived in primary impression is described as a 
                                                        
164 An identity limit has already been discussed in this chapter (pp. 220-222); however, I elaborate it differently 
here in relation to a belief structure.  
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flicking leg, but as soon as the belief structure of disbelief comes into play, the constituting 
perceiver finds an identity limit with the performer form, and thus the leg becomes something 
else. No longer is it ‘just’ a leg moving; the leg is perceived as a flicking tail. 
 The belief-structure is an essential feature of receptivity in aesthetic experiences. The 
maker of performance can only hope to promote poetic faith in audiences of the work that 
they create; this is also true for intense realist and minimalist forms of theatre. But the 
movement of suspension is largely on the side of the perceiver. If they do not wish to believe, 
then they will hover uncommitted on the edges of a belief to disbelieve.  
 To evidence this point, I noticed weaker and stronger versions of transmorphism 
across accounts. The weaker version is a case of almost replicating: an on the verge of almost 
being like something else. Trembling on the edge of a limit identity, P4 conservatively 
grapples with this movement of suspension. 
 
 Earlier in the work, he rolled around on his head, almost replicating some rap dancer move. I thought 
 about the suit, his costume and the stripes down the side and his sneakers, and about the urban 
 reference. Head tucked under, he began to move in a relaxed shoulder stand, bent arms initiating the 
 movement across the floor, resembling some morphed body with no head and feet in the air [P4,E,3]. 
 
The participant astutely records their experience of transitioning from this weaker version of 
transmorphism: the dancer is “almost replicating” some other identity (still human), to a 
stronger one, resemblance: it then resembles “some morphed body” (vaguely human). This 
movement heralds a complete shift of identity limit, a transformation into something else. 
The belief of the suspension of disbelief fulfilled. 
 
 Many of these movements morphed the body into shapes that somehow changed the body into 
 something else. Only occasionally did I sense a man, cognition [P4,E,3]. 
 
Changes occur on the side of the media or the performer. It is unlike a fusion forming 
hybrids. The immediate perception of a projected image or line, or of the performer as fleshly 
corporeal figure will transform with an identity limit, becoming something else: performer 
now as animal or insect; media as ectoplasm, inky cloud. It is a process of forming and 
disforming, a radical process of becoming.  
 To resist transmorphic transitions is to reaffirm a certainty in constituting the human 
form. As a result the moving body is made prominent.  
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 Play of balance—stretching out stick figure is still human. Fluid jump joy of Being caught at the 
 moment, time and time again, the trick of it [P2,E,1] 
In this resistance, the moving body is described in great detail 
By points—ordered regular blinking . . . he jumps bounds the surface enlargens—widens he is 
unbounded, looking toward us. We can only see in staccato lights—fluoro charm sincere moving us 
taking us out of bounds but only for a moment. Thoughts so strong on man moving [CI,E,2]. 
A transmorphing movement from human form to animal form is a stronger version of this 
encounter, but not as strong as constituting the human form as some fantastical creature, or 
inanimate thing (“candle alive”) far from the human form. From my analyses it appears that a 
transmorphing movement into animal is an easier perception to digest in reception, and more 
readily found in accounts.  
 Allowing the animal all fours graceful and easy query [P2,E,4]. 
Animal kinesis is where the form (media or performer) is described as a moving animal 
within some environment. The phenomena are expressed in written reception through 
metaphors, similes and analogies. Take for instance the morphological shift in this block of 
description: 
The fish untangles the net of her captor’s flirtation, - entranced in the tangle of rhythm as neons follow 
one’s every movement, the gaze of darkness spills as ink blots out the sun with dark butterflies and the 
illuminated weaving of moths [P4,G,8]. 
The moving shape is a fish. It is a fish only in relation to the projected media lines, which 
constitute a net. Within the same sentence the net becomes darkness, it gazes, now an 
ameobic mass; then suddenly, it breaks up into dark butterflies eclipsing the light, juxtaposed 
with an illuminating weave of moths. This image complex demonstrates rolling 
transmorphisms, where the limit identity of each form is rapidly reached to quickly become 
something else.  
 A number of questions are raised in the disclosure of this belief structure, questions 
that are difficult to answer in this current study, but still useful to ask: what are the limits to 
perceptual possibility in mediatised performance contexts? Is it a case of limits in human 
perception: a deprivation in reception? Do we look for recognisable forms, forms that we can 
understand? Or is it a fault in the design of interactions that fail to provoke the essential belief 
structure?  
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 So much living potential, the electric potential of these organisms, of which humans are only one form. 
 The slip into other forms. Pushing the boundary of that potential—This  quest for form and definition 
 underpinned by the oscillating light, projected from above [P1,G,2]. 
What is the receptive potential for interactions to generate more complex forms and images 
like Carol Brown’s creatures of code? (Brown 2006, 86) Are there reconfigurations of form 
through the imagination that our perceptual apparatus cannot cope with? Does perception, 
and/or the phenomenological attitude bridle the potential for complex figurations? My 
analysis here seems to suggest a phenomenological limit. In facing this limit, we are turned to 
expect a greater horizon of possibility.  
Imagining an animal when seeing a performer crouched and walking on all fours is 
not an extreme departure from the human form, it is an “easy query”.  
 
 An organic form on the frame of pure white, folded over, crawling at a slow pace—animal or human—
 crawling, no trawling, along the grid from left to right [P1,G,1]. 
Susan Broadhurst evokes Lyotard’s concept of the figural to describe visual forms in digital 
art that expand our perceptual possibilities. Indeed, the figural are “illusive” and “evocative” 
elements that “present the unpresentable”, conducive to a realm where art defies meaning and 
representation (Broadhurst 2006, 23-26). Broadhurst also considers neurobiological research 
on brain behaviour that demonstrates the brain’s plasticity and interaction in art experiences. 
Both the brain, with its capacity to fire and wire new neural pathways, and Lyotard’s figural 
highlight the capacity for expanding and changing our perceptual structures in digital art 
experiences. Without needing to show how synapses fire—or capitulating to some 
unknowable realm saturated with a phenomenality only disclosed through neologisms—my 
phenomenological analysis of participants’ writings demonstrates how complex aesthetic 
experiences broaden our perceptual possibilities in terms of belief (disbelief) and 
imagination. 
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(4)   Identity—Presence Structure 
 
 I understand presence within receptivity to be the perceptual synthetic process of 
affection and attention. In presence, objects come to prominence by calling upon our 
attention from within our perceptual field of rivaling prominences. Presence is the play and 
force of affection (affective allure from the object on the subject), and responsive attention 
from the subject who yields to affection.165 Positing presence as an activity in perceptual 
synthesis, occurring between the affective allure of a given object and an active turning 
towards by the subject, resists modernist notions of performer presence as an instantiated 
one-sided metaphysical property or quality such as charisma (see Grotowski 1968, Chaikin 
1972). Moreover, presence understood as affection and attention in perceptual synthesis 
further resists deconstructive critiques of a metaphysics of presence that has dominated 
Performance Studies over several decades (see Auslander 1997, Derrida 1976, and Goodall 
2008). 
 Presence is a constitutive-duet, or more accurately, a constitutive-trio within the 
triangulation of performance. In an interactive encounter a form may present with a 
coherency in presence, whereby body and media participate to create a unified world. Rather 
than viewing this unified world as a homogenous whole, all elements are heterogeneously 
and coherently at play. However, an incoherency in presence may occur, such that forms are 
dull to our senses, affecting a somewhat vague allure on our attentions. Incoherency may also 
result when there is an imbalance in presence between the performer and media, but is not 
the one-sided directed mode of relational action that functions with a coherent presence. 
Incoherency due to imbalance occurs when one player inhibits or dominates the other, or 
restricts play within interaction. Such an imbalance may be attributed to a negligence by the 
performance maker/s in their scripting of interactions between bodies and media. In digital 
interactions, the presence of forms within receptivity is the process of affection and attention. 
Presence exposes distinctive identity structures (A-E) fundamental to all encounters and are 
abstractly revealed as: ONE as TWO; ONE of TWO; ONE of THREE; ONE of ONE; TWO 
of ONE. 
 
                                                        
165 By affective force, I mean, a tendency directed toward the ego, a tendency where the reaction is responsive [antwoertende Tätigheit] on 
the part of the ego. That is, in yielding to the affection—in other words, by being “motivated”—the ego takes up an endorsing position; it 
decides actively for what is enticing, and does so in the mode of subjective certainty (Husserl 2001, 91).  
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ONE is to the exclusion of all else. ONE is togetherness, a bond of two or three. ONE world. 
ONE image. P3 playfully alludes to the identity-presence structure in their constitution of a 
hybrid interaction: 
 
 The task of one being to suspend to another being begins now [P3,G,1]. 
 
 To be at one with the technology, or at two? To be or not ‘two’ be? [P3, G1,3] 
 
The following distinctions further elaborate the six encounters in terms of identity and 
presence: 
 
 
STRUCTURE A: ONE as TWO (Hybrids)  
 The ONE form is a combined force of TWO, such that the TWO are still present to 
each other in the singular form. Use of the adverb ‘as’ indicates that both are equally fused in 
the resulting formation.   
 
P1 sees an angel: 
 
 A crucible, cradle. Out of which spew exalted, exultant forms. Am I Angel? Find me in the inky black 
 [P1,G,6]. 
 
This bears the identity structure of ONE as TWO: ONE image of an angel, to the exclusion of 
all else. The performer moves their arms in an extended flapping motion, hands meeting 
above their head, and returning to their side, tracing out black inky patterns; the wings of an 
angel. There is a coherency of presence for this combination of performer and media to be at 
one with each other, move as one together and present no spatio-temporal gap. 
 
 Do we take the seamless apart? Does it tear itself apart? Are we able to see it apart and together at the 
 same time? [P3,G,3] 
 
There is no ‘here’, ‘there’ separation; both are ‘here-there’ together. 
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STRUCTURE B: ONE of TWO (Transmorphing + Digital Other) 
 ONE of TWO is a coherency of dual presences in the forming of ONE form, being, or 
relation. Unlike the hybrid, the performer and media are concomitant in being something else 
entirely (transmorphism), or are two independent entities within a relation (digital other). The 
use of the preposition ‘of’ denotes a derivation of the original source, ‘one of two’.  
 
The following analysis focuses upon the televisual experience of GLOW described by 
P4. Despite their difficulties in experiencing the content of the interaction, some interesting 
aspects of the identity-presence structure ONE of TWO are revealed.  
 
 Focus to locus, locution of frame pixels and life good if eyes read by decay of lit icons [P4,G,2-3]. 
 
P4’s locus of focus is the pixel. They suggest that: “life is good” if “eyes read by decay”.  
The way we watch television is a process of pixel decay and disappearance.166 So far P4’s 
descriptions only focus upon their televisual reception. They indicate that this mediation is an 
impoverished experience of the true content—the live body interacting with projected media. 
The televisual’s pixel pixies rob this experience, rendering it oblique along with other 
framing features like the floor, walls, camera lens, and their eyes: 
 
 Then now it is frame, floor is oblique for frame is as frame, as does lens, framed by wall, eyes lens aim 
 by frame [P4,G,1].  
 
So far the media projections described by other participants (grid lines, patterns, amoebic 
form) have not been mentioned. The participant is overcome by the fragmented presencing of 
many frames. A coherency of presence in relation to the intended interaction on stage is lost 
through layers of mediation. Thinking about this in relation to my experience of bodies 
dancing with projected avatars on a background screen in the Mixed Reality Project, it seems 
that the coherent presence of bodies with avatars, creating and inhabiting a mytho-poetic 
world, required the reception to be mediated and framed by the viewfinder. I am not sure if 
displayed on a field monitor, computer screen, or television—as a further string of mediations 
in receptivity—the same experience or coherency, of dual presences forming one world, 
would have occurred. In the overall cycle of production, the point of reception for me was                                                         
166 For Sean Cubitt "the broadcast flow is . . . a vanishing, a constant disappearing of what has just been shown" 
(Cubitt in Auslander 1999, 43). 
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early-stage research as opposed to performance. However, on viewing a live production of 
the Mixed Reality Project in a small theatre in Sydney, there was still no coherency of 
presence between the dancing bodies and screened avatars. As an audience member, I 
selected to watch either the dancers on stage or switched to watch the screen presentation of 
avatars edited into motion animation. The hoped and intended for ONE of TWO identity-
presence structure in the interaction between live dancers and screened image was a case of 
incoherent presence, establishing instead a TWO by TWO identity-presence structure. 
 Investigating the identity-presence structure through these two examples of incoherent 
presence raises the following propositions as to the intention and efficacy of working with 
dancers and screen projections. How is ‘one world of two’ and/or ‘one relation as two’ 
achieved in the interactions between media and bodies? Such an investigation from within 
reception can assist dramaturgical decisions when specifically staging bodies alongside 
screened media: 
 
• If the intention is to create one world of two (like the Mixed Reality Project 
intended when staged as a live, mediatised event), then a coherency of 
presence in reception will be fulfilled if the interaction is filmed and presented 
cinematically. 
  
• Monumental, a dance piece by Australian artists Ros Warby and Margie 
Medlin, created within my experience a coherent identity-presence structure of 
‘one consciousness’: ONE of TWO. This was accomplished through careful 
decisions about spatial scale and positioning (body, costume, screen, image, 
and lighting).  
 
   We see her reverie; feel the kinesis, shape, textural weave of light, fabric, black, white navy 
  tone. One.167  
 
• From P4’s live-televisual experience, it seems that the interaction was lost to 
the forces of the pixel. The reception for Glow needed to be unmediated by 
screens. Interestingly, Chunky Move’s second interactive production, Mortal 
Engine, was more coherently presented as promotional footage in a YouTube                                                         
167 My notes from Monumental Ros Warby and Margie Medlin, Presented by Performance Space, 
Carriageworks, Sydney, 21 February 2009.  
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clip, rather than as a live, mediatised presentation.168 The work had been 
filmed at a 45-degree angle from overhead, with close-up shots of the dancers, 
and sections of their bodies at crucial moments of interaction. My live 
reception of the performance was largely impoverished due to the constraints 
of the auditorium: a proscenium stage with seating that made it impossible to 
see the bodies on stage and interactions with the media.169 For the most part, I 
was audience to a laser light, sound show. Audience sight-lines were given 
little consideration when staging this production, an unfortunate omission that 
dance technology makers (and/or producers) should pay attention to.  
  
A digital other encounter between media and performer is often constituted in terms 
of a struggle or tension needing resolution. It provides the necessary elements for a dialogic, 
dialectic, and interpersonal dynamic in what would otherwise be experienced as a solo 
performer dancing alongside projected light. An encounter of digital other with the identity-
presence structure ONE of TWO never seals the body and media in a static relation. They 
transition into a different encounter, or become part of a complex. 
 
 Always together . . . or never apart or white clean lines shifting pushing away candle alive 
 [CI,G,5]. 
 
The media is responsible for pushing the performer away; in this push from digital other a 
transmorphing occurs where the performer, seen with “spine laid out”, becomes a “candle 
alive”. She glows. She becomes an inanimate thing, not animal, as many other instances of 
transmorphing forms. 
 
                                                        
168 See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbjOMualLVs 
169 Mortal Engine, Gideon Orbarzanek and Frieder Weiss, Sydney Festival, Drama Theatre, Sydney Opera 
House, 19 January 2008. 
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STRUCTURE C: ONE of THREE (environment) 
  
 The light and the man and the box are all pulses and impulses. They buzz each other. They are static. 
 They are random. They are play. They intend to have each other, but will any succeed in its belief in 
 each other. They are trapped in the game of each other [P3,E,1]. 
 
A ONE of THREE identity-presence structure is the extension of coherency to a greater 
complex of players co-creating some world or environment: the fish in the net; the bunny in 
the snow; the man, the light, the box trapped in a “game of each other . . . a binary system” 
[P3,E,1-2]. 
 
 
STRUCTURE D: ONE of ONE (digital touch in digital double) 
An interaction of digital touch involving digital doubling is a movement of possession 
(body enters media or media enters body) and has an identity-presence structure of ONE of 
ONE: the possession fits like a glove.  
 
 Later the possession takes over . . . They morph and ooze back into her standing body. The 
 shriek of re-entry is piercing, the dancers voice and music warping together. This repeats. 
 There is no escape [P1,G,4]. 
 
In a different description of possession in digital doubling: 
 
 The Helix . . . The H Skeleton of technology—taking over the body of senses—sliding into the second 
 skin pop out of the physical form [P2,E,2]. 
 
The performer’s “body of senses” is taken over: a power over the body ‘acted upon’ by the 
technology. The movement of possession is unusually reversed. The performer enters the 
digital double—as we understand normal possession to operate—but it is the performer’s 
senses that are radically taken over in this occupation. The helix is a spiral. The metaphor 
meaningfully works in two ways: first, it anthropomorphically describes the inner scaffolding 
(skeleton) of the media as possessor at a deep level (DNA of media); and second, it moves 
like a spiral to take over the body.  
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STRUCTURE E: TWO of ONE (digital other of digital doubling)  
 A second identity-presence structure and encounter can be identified in this peculiar 
case of digital doubling. The whole movement begins as an encounter of digital other: the 
performer stands next to a replicated holographic projection of themselves, then, the 
performer enters their image (digital touch), is taken over in this possession (fits like a glove), 
and then “pops out” to reform this identical relation of digital other (digital double). The 
possession (ONE of ONE) ceases, and a TWO of ONE identity is re-constituted until the 
replicated media fades.  
 
 Taking over the body of senses—sliding into the second skin (digital touch ONE of ONE)  pop out of 
 the physical form. The other’s world his to investigate. Settle back into skin—relax and rest in self 
 [P2,E,2]. 
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(5)   Language of Description: (a) The Grammar of Interactions (b) Negative 
  and Positive Valences  
            
 In Chapter 4, I considered the conceptual relation embodiment—embodied 
imaginings—language of embodiment. This relation helped me to increase awareness of the 
role of embodiment in the receptivity of the spectator-analyst who actively co-constitutes the 
object-event. Identifying this relation was especially useful in the final workshops. During 
analysis, what was most striking about the language of embodiment at a structural level in 
participants’ textual descriptions was the unstable use of pronouns to describe the media, 
performer, and themselves as audience members (amongst other audience members). The 
following grammar of interactions informs, indicates and reinforces structural patterns across 
the various texts, and helps to disclose, with deeper elaboration, other aspects of encounters. 
The use of language at an intuitive grammatical level is significant in the identity and 
expression of the movement of constituted forms. Grammar rules were not necessarily 
followed in descriptions and were never encouraged. Participants shared language, but the 
formal rules of English grammar were not always observed in their poetics. The Poetics of 
Reception Project attempts to evoke an embodied language specific to the unique experiences 
of interactions. The following analysis starts from the formal rules of language, and departs 
where descriptions structurally disclose something different in the identification and 
indication of new forms and relations.  
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(5a)   The Grammar of Interactions 
 
Subjective personal pronoun 
  
(i) ‘I’  of audience member/ spectator-analyst 
I want to do that – I want to be able to do the splits [P2, G, 2]. 
   
 Receptive Empathy (kinesthetic): identifying with our own body and bodily 
 capabilities through the movement of the performer: ‘I think’; ‘I feel this 
 subject’; it is an intercorporeal expression. What kind of authority to 
 experience is claimed here? The ‘I’ telescopes out from the particular to the 
 general. The general ‘I’ denotes the encounter as abstract. 
 
(ii) ‘I’  The ‘I-conflation’: spectator-analyst identifying with performer 
 
  Receptive Empathy at a kinesthetic and emotional level as: 
Hybrid: Up there—I don’t want to go up there. Bad things happen [PI,G, 6]. 
 Digital Other: I feel fear, real terror with sound [CI,G,2]. 
 
(iii) ‘she’ The spectator-analyst referring to the performer in experiences of receptive 
  empathy as: 
Digital Other: She feels back body [P1,G,7]. 
When no interaction occurs (on the side of performer):  
Why does she need to talk—mutter [P2,G,1]. 
She’s got it hard—she has to do it but it looks satisfying [P2,G,2]. 
  
(iv) ‘we’ Indicates inclusiveness of all audience members by spectator-analyst sharing 
  in the experience of watching the performance in an encounter of:   
  Digital Other: How perfect we can make it appear [CI,G,6]. 
When no interaction occurs (on the side of performer): Do we hear her, do we ask . 
. . are we privy [CI,G,4].  
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Possessive Pronouns 
(i) ‘our’ This carries the ‘for-us’ structure.  
  A movement from the ‘for-itself’ to the ‘for-us’ is made with the utterance 
  ‘our’. This is a movement from the particular to the  general. The inner is  
  abstracted from an external representation. 
Expressing the Inner: Institute. Always trapped within her own our concern to border “box in” “frame” 
[CI,G,6].  
 
Objective pronouns 
(i) ‘me’ Audience member identifying with performer  
  Environment: Find me in the inky black [PI,G1, 6]. 
(ii) ‘you’ The performer is indicated through direct address by spectator-analyst 
 
Digital Other: What you make follows you? [P2,G,1]. 
Transmorphism: you are the dull throb of street lamps; you are but more inner than inert; 
barely have I seen you then you disappear into darkness and light [P4,G,5]. 
 
(iii) ‘it’ Performer and/or media indicated as the object of a verb. The hybrid is 
 stripped of gender, even as a composite form: woman and media. Objective 
 pronouns are basic to the hybrids; they are constituted as it. These hybrids, 
 however, emote with happiness, anxiety and agitation. They dream, and are 
 troubled by their dreams.  
 
Hybrid: It moved in time with itself [P3,G,1]; This being was a new kind of being, a cyber 
being. It was a being made of flesh and light. We know it was a being because of its body 
rhythms [P3,G1]. 
 
(iv) ‘us’  Promotes a ‘for-us’ structure, the ubiquitous first-person plural. ‘Us’ as  
  audience members co-constituting a shared experience. The triangulation  
  permits an experience ‘for-us’, rather than an event ‘in-itself’ or ‘for-itself’. 
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  “Us” indicates the demarcated relation between audience members and  
  performer. 
  Digital Other: Absorbing her. Resisting, reacting seeing us together [CI,G,3]. 
  Identification of spectator gathered with other audience members. 
  Environment: To react we the horror remind us of a time a place beyond our means  
  [CI,G,8]. 
 
Definite Articles 
(i)  ‘the’ Indicates a specific noun or thing  (performer and media).  
  Hybrid: The shape, the silhouette, boldy traced with a white light. The background now  
  dark. The body unfurls, folds, rolls over, limbs spoking. An emission of light shooting out from 
  the living core – the electric body [P1,G,1].  
  The indicates a definitive existence of the thing as unique, but not familiar.170 
  The definite article the indicates the stability of forms in reception, whereas 
  the use of ‘a’ or ‘an’ indicate a non-specific,  non-particular thing. To write ‘an 
  electric body’ or ‘an animal' would undermine the specificity of a constituted 
  form experienced by the participant. 
 
Demonstrative Pronouns 
(i) ‘this’ Indicates the performer/media/image as an object in the present tense, and is 
  prevalent in instrumental and causal based interactions. Instrumentalism has 
  the relational structure of ‘directed-one sided’.  
  Digital Other: Not once was he dancing, this body was a tool [P4,E,7]. 
  There is a loss of gender and personhood, like in encounters of a hybrid.                                                         
170 The English ‘definite article’ has been classically characterised as ‘familiar’ and/or ‘unique’. An example of 
when an entity ‘the’ is non-familiar and unique: “If you’re going into the bedroom, would you mind bringing 
back The big bag of potato chips that I left on the bed”; an example of familiarity and non-uniqueness: “[To 
spouse, in a room with three equally salient windows] It’s hot in here. Could you please open the window?” See 
Birner & Warn (1994, 93-102). 
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Indefinite Pronouns 
(i) ‘one’ An abstracted expression of the general, offering a movement from a   
  particular personal pronoun ‘she’/ ‘he’ (gendered) to an objective pronoun  
  ‘you'. 
 Environment: Laser line hit white effervescent glow when rolling out the measure of one in 
  folds of white, snow dropped depression in snows roll, land [CI,G,1]. 
 
 
Participants’ use of the Grammar of Interactions 
Distinctive styles are recognised in the participants’ use of grammar. There are two 
conclusions to draw. First, the continual slippage between pronouns may in fact be an issue 
of method. Second—as a consequence of the first—there is a resulting temporality in 
grammar use due to practising the method.   
 
• An Issue of Method 
The grammar of interactions in participants’ written accounts reveal several issues in the 
application of my phenomenological method. P2 uses the personal pronoun “I” in a 
significantly different way to P1. How? For P2, it may be the case that he/she is troubled by 
the paradoxical movement of suspending the ‘I’ from one’s own experience in 
phenomenological description. Even though the phenomenologist is required to keep out of 
his or her own way, the ‘I’ is never dispossessed entirely. In a phenomenology of an emotion, 
the subjectivity of the self is more pronounced. P2 is very honest about their struggle with the 
method, evidenced by meta-reflections on the difficulties of describing their every feeling 
and thought. Tracing the use of ‘I’ in P2’s account indicates an issue with their 
methodological undertaking. This is unlike P1, who linguistically conflates and identifies 
with the performer ‘I’ in receptive empathy. Their use of I is not a reflection, nor expression 
of constituting their own experience, even though the experiencing never ceases. 
 
 Up there—I don’t want to go up there. Bad things happen . . . I feel fear, real terror with sound 
 [P1,G,6]. 
 
However, P2’s non-conflated use of ‘I’ could be seen as a different expression of receptive 
empathy at a kinesthetic and emotional level: 
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 I want to do that—I want to be able to do the splits [P2,G,2]. 
 
A concentration upon the ‘I’ by participants reveals the sixth encounter ‘expressing the 
inner’: 
 
 Caught in the matrix—do I really know the patterns I create [P2,G,4].  
 
That P2 is unable to escape the veritable force of ‘I’ as an expression of self in their 
descriptions, the positioning of participants in relation to their kinesthetic and emotional 
empathy is delineated. 
 
• The Temporality of Grammar Use    
The writers’ constant vacillation between personal pronoun use (‘I’, ‘she/he’) and other 
pronouns and articles (‘it’, ‘theirs’, ‘the’) may be related to a differential in the recollection of 
the event. When a greater distance opens up between the immediacy of the event as first 
experienced and subsequent recall in the writing, does the pronoun necessarily become 
objective? When the memory is veridical are the personal pronouns more readily used? For 
example, the opening scene may be fresher in re-presentation to the writer, than other 
moments in the performance. If the recall is dull, vague, or riddled with lacunae fragmenting 
the unity of the experience, objective pronouns express this distance between now (the 
writing) and then (the immediate experience). The intimacy of ‘she’, ‘him’, ‘her’ or ‘he’ is 
lost. In the third workshop (Transmission Laboratories), there was little gap between 
experiencing and writing for the participants. Interestingly, the dancer was referred to by their 
given name in a number of the descriptions. However, sometimes a slip in reference to “the 
dancer” was made in the very same paragraph, indicating an objective distance in the loss or 
vagaries of recall. When memory is insufficient, the image or movement described is 
associatively and logically completed. For example, if I recall with great clarity and detail the 
way a performer rises from their chair, but am not able to recall what happens in the seconds 
following this movement and their presence downstage, I will logically complete the standing 
person’s movement downstage in order to provide some continuity in the sequence. 
Imagination too plays its part to fill the micro gaps with sufficient content, gaps that are 
caused by lapses in memory or distracted attentions during the original impression. A well-
recounted story described with unity is often an event that is not recounted with perfect 
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recall. Where phenomenological description faces the problem of immediacy, the forces of 
imagination and association are difficult to overcome. Thus, by filling micro-lapses of 
memory and attention with logical and imaginative content, or utilising objective pronouns in 
description, we effectively generate mnemonic devices for remembering the unity of 
experience in the process of descriptive phenomenology. 
 
 The projected body is in the same position as when the work started. Lying on his back. The live body 
 is turned away [P4,E,7]. 
 
Here we see a vacillation from “the body” to a personal ‘his’, then, a return back to an 
objective body “the live body”. The participant’s initial recall associatively seeks an earlier 
memory of a position. The writer retained the opening position in memory. The movement of 
association in retention begins from the original impression of the performer “lying on his 
back”. As the performer turns away there is a return to a more vague recollection of the 
event. The switch between subjective and objective pronouns expresses the snaking in and 
out of veridical memory and vague recollection of the original impression. 
 
   
  263 
(5b)  Negative and Positive Valences 
 
In this context I take valence to mean: “the capacity of something to unite, react, or 
interact with something else”.171 The following negative and positive valences were identified 
during analysis and help to deepen my understanding of how interactions between bodies and 
technologies within receptivity are constituted. A mode of interaction described as having a 
positive valence is not to be valued or prioritised as a higher union over interactions with a 
negative valence. The identification of valences in positive or negative terms helps to further 
articulate structural distinctions within encounters, in particular, the relational structure of 
action. These distinctions are useful terms of interaction within the overall language of 
description.  
 
Negative Valence 
 An interaction described as having a negative valence tends to show a separation, 
distance or estranged relation between the following: bodies and media (as digital other, 
environment, etc); parts of the body in relation to its whole; the performer’s self and their 
body.    
  
(i) Disjunction  
The encounter of environment reveals a disjunction between body and media:  
 They ricocheted wide, then thin and the sound carved through the air on some other frequency. I was 
 thinking of computers and mechanization, and the disjunct between the  body and its environment 
 [P4,E,1]. 
A further disjunction is highlighted by P4. 
 He moved as if he were not a person, but a body creating some state [P4,E,2].  
 Only occasionally did I sense a man, cognition, feeling [P4,E,3]. 
I am suspicious that the writer’s inquiry into the personhood of the performer is an 
ideological reaction to phenomenological method. The method concentrates on the sense 
formation of the performer as an object at a transcendental aesthetic level, rather than their                                                         
171 (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Valence) 
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psychology. The writer (rightly so) resists reducing the performer to ‘mere’ object 
phenomena in their quest for the ‘man’. However in this context, the performer is a body 
constituted aesthetically; it is a phenomenal object external to our perception. In this instance 
of aesthetic understanding, their personhood is stripped.  
 Methodologically we bracket personhood to attend to the spatio-temporal structures 
of the moving, lived body. Alarm bells undoubtedly ring when the dyadic formulation 
‘subject-object’ is used in relation to an audience member perceiving and describing a 
performer. For Husserl, other persons prove problematic. They are not given in the usual way 
that objects of perception are constituted in objectivity. They are ‘limit phenomena’, being 
given in the mode of inaccessibility. So if others, other than me, are not objects in the world, 
how can the performer be acceptingly taken as object?  
 Taking other persons as limit phenomena affirms the impossibility of having access to 
or claiming to know another’s mind. However, as a project of phenomenological aesthetics, 
the performer can be understood as a limit phenomenon while remaining a perceptual object. 
This dual positioning avoids the problem and charge of objectification that my project may 
be open to. Taken as a limit phenomenon, I am (as audience) prevented from accessing a 
performer’s mental states and can give no adequate explanation of how they really are. 
Recognised as other persons, like me and in relation to me entwined in an intersubjective 
nexus, I presuppose a co-relative structure of subject-subject. But in their presentifications 
and representational acts within performance, I have an even more limited access to the 
performer’s person and identity. These are the accepted limits of a static-genetic method in 
this context, and the limits and distancing of one’s everyday self from other in performances 
per se. If I want to attempt a phenomenology of their personhood and identity in the fullness 
of a subject-subject dyad of intersubjectivity, then I need to follow either a phenomenological 
psychology; a Husserlian generative phenomenology; a Levinasian philosophy; or perhaps a 
phenomenology of “saturated phenomena”, as undertaken by Jean-Luc Marion.172 These are 
all possible directions I do not choose to follow here.  
 Once entering the realm of performance, the performer is simultaneously other and 
aesthetic player; their self–identity does not disappear, but in this restriction of access, 
becomes a more mysterious element within the alchemy of performance. For the purposes of                                                         
172 Saturated phenomena (such as the event, idol, flesh and icon) exceed conceptualisation and our capacity to 
constitute them. Our intuition of phenomena, always given, is saturated on the one hand by what is visible 
(seen) and able to be reduced in phenomenality, and that which is invisible or defies decidable reference on the 
other. See (Marion 2002).  
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analysis, it is upon the latter that I conduct a phenomenological aesthetics, addressing that 
which appears—that which is made available. It would be hubris and well outside the 
capabilities of my current method to suggest I can do both. To restrict analysis to media only 
would obliterate the interaction between bodies and technologies, and terminate the purpose 
of the project altogether. The dyad subject-object of a self-other relation is made possible by 
the presupposed recognition of performer object as always already ‘subject’ in this 
constitutive-duet that enables interaction.  
 It is fair to say that in performance the personhood of the performer may be 
deliberately restricted in their presentation, but this is not the case with all styles. In 
improvisational and contemporary performance, the ‘me’ of the performer may be presented 
by direct address to the audience offering no character and no depersonalised physical body. 
In Érection (workshop 2), Pierre Rigal is not interested in presenting ‘Pierre Rigal the 
person’. We are not invited to know or understand him, only to experience his body 
interacting with the media. He wants the audience to engage in the perceptual possibilities of 
their imaginations as intended by the interaction.  
 
  
(ii) Disconnect  
 The square marked out some boundary, some defined space in which this was being created. When he 
 jerked, his chest arching up, it was a disconnect from the rest of his body. This separation between the 
 body and the mind was repeated through the work. His head looked up, as if unaware or unable to 
 confront this freakish and unexpected movement [P4,E,1].  
The writer suggests a mind-body dualism. The performer’s body involuntarily moves 
disconnected from the performer’s intention. Interestingly, in the writer’s quest to find the 
man of “cognition” and “feeling”, and to restore him to a holistic ideal of embodiment—I am 
self aware, I am in control of my movements—they manage to emphasise the performer as a 
limit phenomenon in the classical sense of the problem, an aporia that persists unabated in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and cognitive science (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2009).  
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(iii) Interference 
 A small blip on the grid is moving about, then another blip. These blips are where the thin 
 neon line gets fatter and fuzzier. Only after a few seconds do I realise his body is the interference 
 [P4,E,4]. 
A rhythm of pulsating “blips” is produced. The media appears to be performing alone. The 
performer’s body is not visible for sometime; once the lines are seen to touch the body, the 
interaction is described as interference. It appears to be a case of ‘one-sided directed’ action: 
performer acting upon media. 
 
Positive Valence 
(i) Harmony 
  Unquestioning affinity with surrounds [P2,G,8]. 
Where interactions between all elements are harmonious, there is no disconnect, 
interference or disjunction. There is no separation or estrangement, only coherence and 
unity—all elements working together. 
 
(ii) Intersection 
 The following excerpt is from P4’s Task B:  
 This body is still there, now intersecting more fully with the grid and his presence becoming 
 more obvious [P4,E,5]. 
 Here, they have rewritten the opening ‘interference’ scene described in Task A 
(excerpt in (iii) above). This encounter of digital touch between body and media is no longer 
described as “interference”, it is described in more positive terms as “intersecting”. An 
embodied presence is restored to the performer, highlighting a union with the grid lines. The 
media plays a more significant role in this second account. Presence is too restored in the 
interaction of interference (digital touch) in the transition to an intersecting encounter of 
digital other. This is a reciprocal relational structure of action. 
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(6)   Orientation: Embodiment in Receptivity 
 
 In the first place let us note that orientation is a constitutive structure of the thing.  
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1972  (316) 
 
 My analysis of written accounts has foregrounded the role of orientation in 
understanding embodiment in both the spectator and performer within receptivity. P4’s 
televisual experience of GLOW is a meditation on their visual embodiment, and is captured in 
the following text: 
 
 Eyes lens aim by frame [P4,G,1]. 
 
 Life good if eyes read by decay of lit icons [P4,G,2]. 
 
 Eye cadence spiroglyphs absorbing body’s and pixel pixies [P4,G,3]. 
 
 Square made trapezoidal by way of framed eye minds. I mind caress blots of rawshash [sic] tests but 
 spilled with extra in and strewn wet evaporating before minds ey(I)e blinks [P4,G,4]. 
 
 Mine eyes of their viscous covering [P4,G,5]. 
 
 The drawn eye—beeting of . . . lashes against shadows, the sensors beating lids of circadian rhythms 
 [P4,G,6]. 
 
 I am half aware of your veil covering the eye in which you could be a sensor of me [P4,G,9]. 
 
P4 engages in a rolling poetics about framing (floor, wall, camera lens, and television), their 
eyes become a prominent framing phenomenon to pay attention to in the overall experience. 
When the eyes transcend as a framing device (Sartre 1972), the phenomenological claim that 
the body is a complete zero point of orientation is challenged. To recapitulate this earlier 
discussion, we can see that from this latter perspective that all objects in the world are 
always relative to our body as being left or right, near or far, beside, beneath, or above. We 
cannot perceive our own bodies in the same relative relations of orientation as we can with 
other objects in the world: the table is before me; the moon is above me. The body is 
absolute presence. P4’s experience demonstrates that the eyes are no longer a mere zero 
point of orientation. Their televisual experience brings the eyes (not their vision) into focus 
as a framing device to further mediate their overall reception. This raises the question of how 
we experience our eyes in interactions where there is no televisual framing: do they continue 
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to be objectively experienced as transcendent lenses or framing devices? Or are they 
engaged in another way? Does the eye remain a zero point of orientation in the reception of 
live, mediatised performance? How does the reception of mediatised performance 
reconstitute the rest of our body in relation to structural questions of orientation? 
 A different participant describes their visual embodiment in the performance 
Érection: 
 
 The bars of light created a designed state—the contrast between black and white so stark, as if I was 
 looking at lines in a painting. So black my eyes strained. So white, I had to squint [P4,E,1]. 
 
They are well aware of their embodiment while watching, and describe their visual reaction 
to the givenness of lighting that creates a stark contrast. The description indicates a style of 
orientation: their eyes becoming filters, lenses ‘strained and squinting’ in relationship to 
what they see. Even though the colour causes the straining and squinting of their eyes, I am 
interested in how this experience orients the perceiver in relation to their eyes in the 
continued perception of external objects in audience reception. 
 From these examples, I wonder whether a more concentrated meditation on the visual 
embodiment of the spectator—where their eyes are taken as transcendent objects—might 
reveal important information about interactions for dramaturgical purposes. Squinting, 
blinking, blindedness, or even staring may be framing devices of the eye to be productively 
elicited by particular performance conditions, and/or avoided if vision is not to be obstructed 
by the eyes reaction to certain lighting states, or problematic distances.   
 In the performance installation of the third workshop the audience roams—an 
awareness of their eyes is often foregrounded: 
 
 Other sources of light in the room fade up slowly dragging my lazy eyes away . . .slide back into the 
 gazing. My eyes are dragged to and fro . . . I don’t want to look away [P5,TL,1,2]. 
 
Participants acutely describe the movement of their eyes in the struggles with attention; their 
attention is visually drawn, the eyes described as transcendent objects “dragging”, 
“snapping” and “criss-crossing” their attentions between rivaling phenomena.  
  
 For a moment my eyes snap to the floor [P5,TL,3]. 
 Trapping me to keep absorbing too much of one thing–too much because my eyes are criss-
 crossing in diagonal blown-out highlights [P7,TL,3]. 
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Orientation: digital double as screen presence and spatio-temporal distortions 
 
 On the screen she has no knees, a body, yes. Calves, yes. But a strip is missing. She folds, 
 drops to her haunches. Now the strip is missing from her torso. Maybe she fell between the 
 cracks? [P5,TL,3-4] 
 
Here P5 experiences a corporeal body captured as an image and projected onto a surface in 
strips; the dancer is dismembered and reconstituted as a moving collage. The dancer is now 
in sections with body parts missing. The writer constitutes a geometrically distorted spatial 
world for the dancer to negotiate: she falls between the cracks of her missing body parts.  
 
 Later, she flits into the screen. Now its like she has flung herself out from between the cracks. From 
 between those two planes [P5,TL,4]. 
 
In the following instance of spatial distortion the media acts-upon the dancer’s screen double, 
smashing her image violently: 
 
 Now screen. I can really look at get up close, see its pores, its skin. It lets me in, the screen 
 smashed the dancer, obliterates, violence, disappearance. Splitness. Cotton, a black hole, blue vortex I 
 could fall into, strangely inviting [P6,TL,2]. 
 
There is attraction over repulsion in the structural force of this spectator’s attention. They 
move close and kinesthetically lose their balance in this orientation, the image on screen 
creates a vortex, inviting the spectator into a black hole of wonder. She becomes a giant:  
 
 Looking up at a giant, her feet large, shadows deepen the dimension of her base, the top disconnected. 
 She moves with the room, spins above a spectator in the shadows [P3,TL,3]. 
 
Scalar differentials between the image on screen and dancing feet on the floor promote very 
different experiences for the spectator. In some instances, the large-scale feet are found to be 
discomforting and/or suspicious to the spectator, an image forced upon them by surveillance 
technologies. A style of image capture and manipulation that distorts the corporeal body with 
whom they stand next to, breathing alongside at a one-to-one scale, sharing in a continuous 
space.  
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 Miniature. I felt Tall. Scales starting to feel confusing. Looking around. Large Screen. Large 
 dancer’s feet. Momentum starting to confuse. Checking back looking for the source. 
 Surveillancing—its got to be here . . . where is it? [P7,TL,1] 
 
In one account, the participant retreats from the image and hatches a “plan” with different 
“strategies” to improve their spatial relations with the dancer. They desire to be closer to the 
warm body; they are repulsed by the cold and distant image that distorts their experience: 
 
 I lie down and feel the intimacy inherent in that act. I prostrate myself before the dancer without 
 submission. See more detail on her feet. Enjoy . . . enjoy . . . the light I look up to distorts the edges, her 
 edges. I have become a camera now, but I feel like a dance partner now I’m on the floor [P8,TL,3]. 
 
They focus like a camera, adjusting to the proximities rather than their “social understanding 
of theatrical distance” [P8,TL,1]. The overall immersion of the spectator within the 
installation reveals an embodied play or traversing of proximities: the spectator has the 
opportunity to move closer to feel the warmth, and see the detail; or to move further away 
and take in all the elements and take a perspective that is “more big scale receptive”; an 
experience described as “[d]istant. Colder”, but nonetheless desired [P7,TL,2]. The 
audience’s freedom to move within the space so close to the dancer and the media—also 
becoming part of the performance at times—challenges values of performance proximities: 
how close can we get? Can we, should we touch? These questions extend to the mediatised 
image: does it see or feel me? Can it touch back? 
 
 We all keep our polite distance. Could I poke Miranda? Stick my face in hers? Can’t even put my boot 
 on her image when I want to. So obedient [P6,TL,2]. 
 
 Before she left I sat with her feet—that’s not rude—looking at someone’s feet. I look up at her legs, it 
 feels intimate, too intimate this travelling gaze [P6,TL,4]. 
 
In a moment of touch between the dancer’s digital double and spectator, the urge to touch 
back becomes overwhelming for the spectator. 
 
 She leaves [corporeal Miranda] and I am reacquainted with mediatised Miranda. I like her and we do 
 a duet where she dives over my legs and then under my seated body into disappearance. She comes 
 back quickly, a tiny shock. I want to pat her head. I tentatively  and quickly do it. Transgression
 [P6,TL,4]. 
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In both these examples, the value of considerate, consensually determined distance 
between the performer and spectator continues to be recognised. P6 returns the touch with 
intent only once they are climbed on by the dancer’s digital double. They first experience a 
temptation to poke, pat, interfere or disrupt the distance. The temptation (as desire) to touch 
presupposes a responsibility of ethical response to the other presented as digital double. They 
are faced with the alterity of the performer; to touch their live streamed image is a reaction 
and interaction understood as bearing consequences. For the spectator, they recognise that the 
image double is connected intimately to the dancer’s physical being. To touch back involves 
a meaningful negotiation, rather than an unchecked presumption that there is no connectivity 
between the performer and their digital double. During Susan Kozel’s performance of Paul 
Sermon’s Telematic Dreaming, a male visitor to the installation uses a knife to slash her 
projected digital double, managing of course only to physically destroy the duvet.173 That the 
spectator violates an ethics of responsibility in this performance context without dramatic 
recourse does not entail that this unspoken ethics of responsibility does not exist. The image 
permits a transgression of touch, but this raises the question of what injury, violence, 
stimulation or arousal can touching effect in the performer observing such an interaction with 
their image? It seems in most cases (perhaps Kozel’s examples of violence aside—where the 
spectator does not treat the image as real, or connected to the corporeal performer in any 
significant way) that an encounter with digital other as digital double carries the same level of 
responsibility to not interrupt, interfere with, touch, titillate, or perpetrate violence towards a 
corporeal performer—even if pushing someone off the stage has at some point crossed our 
minds. 
 The spectator’s experience of time is also distorted by the manipulation of spatial 
image.  
  
Tony. This is not the room I’m in that I see up there. The room I’m in is dark and square and straight. 
 The room I see on the screen is high and sloped and towering and is all ceiling. Tony [P4,TL,3]. 
 
Footage recorded in the first presentation is rendered in play-back in the second. Use of 
previous footage captures a participant (Tony) and a section of the room from a momentary 
camera perspective and then replayed. The switch between live streaming and play-back                                                         
173 Kozel is adamant that she felt “uncomfortable” and assaulted during these violent attacks upon her image, 
doubling over when another visitor elbowed her hard in the stomach. For her, the body corporeal is not 
“obsolete” in virtual technology events; “violence enacted” by a spectator upon Kozel’s image reportedly “hurt” 
(Kozel 2007, 96-97).  
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distorts the spatial construction of the room. The lingering orientation of spatial objects to the 
spectator is distorted by its past; the impression given is of two different rooms. Temporal 
distortion through the spatial manipulation of images provokes an unusual spatio-temporal 
experience for the spectator: they become dislocated; their once familiar orientation becomes 
unfamiliar.   
 
 
Orientation: other worlds and environment. Constituting the miniature in kinesthesia and 
imagination 
 
 Finding a way, finding a passage through the shifting shards of worlds [P1, G5]. 
 
Movements of a new bodily logic in imagined worlds are created by interactions of 
environment.  
 
 Coming into being, wrapped, bounded, permeable membranes, explosive potentials, retreating, 
 retracting, reducing to a planar geometry [P1, G5]. 
 
The body does not directly mimic, but emulates the logic of the movement within these 
worlds of moving lines and perspectives. The human body cannot ‘be’ that thing; it is 
ontologically impossible. The body will take on the logic of the movement, like the robotic 
street dancer who does not try to be a robot, but attempts to move like one.  
 
 It’s a great labyrinth. Fuck it’s beautiful [P2,G,5]. 
 
The interactive space takes on complex, architectural dimensions; it is a rhythmically rich 
imagined place.  
 
  
• Wash upon the pixel shores the coral critters, jitters—fluid baubles cascade sideways. Flat 
ocean beyond flat, swelling screens, the reaction of opposites of tone and glare [P4,G,6]. 
 
In P4’s forming of a marine environment in GLOW: ocean, fish, coral, tides, shores, 
nets and ocean swells, the interactive encounter eradicates the transcendent distancing of 
televisual screen that once dominated the writer’s descriptions; the screen now ‘swells the flat 
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ocean behind’. Once discombobulated by their viewing, a ‘coherency of presence’ exists for 
the writer now.  
  
• A grainy circle at my feet—vertigo. I sway backwards and forwards balancing at the edge of 
an unstable floor, flickering, moving, gravity suspended [P2,TL_P,1]. 
   
  Distracted by down projection. Attracted by shifting sensation. I am huge again. I imagine my 
  time in Japan at the pool of water with the crow. Be careful now—I could spend the entire 
  time looking at this in wonder and enjoyment [P7,TL,1]. 
 
A simple light casting a circle onto the floor, sometimes filled with the projected moving 
dancer filmed overhead at another location in the performance space, transforms the 
relationship between a different spectator and their embodied orientation to the floor surface. 
The circle of light triggered a strong place-based memory of staring into a pool of water. The 
circle is not perceived analogically or mimetically as a pool of water. The joyful experience 
of standing at its projected edges drags forth a sensibly felt embodied memory to this 
participant’s present impression. This memory appears to be imaginatively projected, 
transmorphing the circle of light into a pool of water beside the crow of a former experience. 
It is more than a mere mental representation; they sway in their reverie. 
 
• Train goes backwards and forwards like dreams of mini world, attack of the 50ft woman . . . 
Wouldn’t mind running in time to train or riding inside it inspecting big body so close its 
got a sunshine feel to it. Yes, like being in a field [P1,TL_P,1,2]. 
 
Here, the encounter of environment triangulates performer, train and spectator through a 
differential in scale (tiny and giant), sound, tempo and nostalgia. The writer desires to shrink 
in imagination and to run alongside the train, warmed by the sun in an open field. They sit on 
the train, looking out at the 50-foot woman dancing inside the tracks. By shrinking ones body 
and constituting the scene from an imagined perspective (shrunken and inside the train) is a 
transporting and transformational experience at a kinesthetic and spatial level. 
 The performance installation provided experiences of spatial and scalar 
transformations of internal proportions: a shrunken embodiment in relation to the given 
dimensions of an environing space—a little like Alice’s “DRINK ME” experience down the 
rabbit hole: 
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 ‘[w]hat a curious feeling!’ said Alice; ‘I must be shutting up like a telescope.’ And so it was indeed: 
 she was now only ten inches high, and her face brightened up at the thought that she was now the right 
 size for going through the little door into that lovely garden. First, however, she waited for a few 
 minutes to see if she was going to shrink any further: she felt a little nervous about this; ‘for it might 
 end, you know,’ said Alice to herself, ‘in my going out altogether, like a candle. I wonder what I 
 should be like then?’ (Carroll 1962, 30) 
In experiencing the model train, a nostalgic reflection upon childhood shrinks the 
participant’s embodiment taking on a miniaturised perspective, reversing the original 
givenness of their orientation. They are now inside the train. 
 
 Ten minutes to reflect on a childhood fetish, forgotten. The model railway, streams of returning 
 memory of tunnel obsessions and tunnel building. Insisting on taking my head out of the carriage to 
 observe the airy impact of speeding train on cavernous dark [P8,TL,1]. 
 
The perceptual impression of the mini train does more than provoke a specific retention as an 
act of remembering, such as playing with a train-set. The perceiving body in impressional 
perception undergoes a radical transformation in embodied imagining onboard the tiny choo-
choo train. This raises the following questions: how do we encounter the “tiny” or 
“miniature”? What are the structures of embodied imagining in experiences of the miniature? 
How is meaning constituted at the level of kinesthesia?174 The body is involved in a 
movement of scale as it shrinks to immerse in an imaginatively simulated replica of our 
everyday proportionate reality, now, a world of giants. 
 As a child I made sand castles at the beach, big in scale, palatial in design. Entering 
the castle relative to my shrunken embodied self, I would move about rooms rendered in 
opulent detail, experienced visually and sensibly by association. I always dug a deep moat to 
stop an imagined enemy; the rising tide licking at my toes, ready to wash this construction 
away. Its architectural interior was constructed to resemble past, primary impressions of 
castles and palaces encountered in photos, footage and illustrations, the act of imagination 
dragging images from the past into the present, and radically disengaging the body from its 
usual embodiment.  
                                                        
174 I will not take up these specific questions or further these insights here. I hope to pursue the Tiny Worlds 
Project as postdoctoral research.  
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 It is interesting how the model train becomes a collective motif of childhood 
experiences in this performance, even when a participant has never had the experience of 
playing with a train.  
 Suddenly I’m in childhood, caused by train [P7,TL,3]. 
Arguably this could have something to do with constituting meaningful structures in 
childhood experiences of the miniature—whether train, sand castle, doll house or genie 
bottle. On this account, these inaugurating, transformative moments at a kinesthetic level 
continue to inform our encounters with the miniature. As children we shrink and are 
immersed in these tiny worlds. As adults we retro-actively constitute like experiences during 
aesthetic encounters of the miniature, imaginatively feeling our tiny embodiment. My 
untested thesis here is that imagined scalar movements of our entire bodily sensorium are 
somehow structurally retended from childhood, informing our future aesthetic experiences of 
the miniature. A further interesting question relates to how this impacts upon our everyday 
spatio-temporal selves in relation to other objects in the world. Do we inhabit space 
differently? What are the transformative kinesthetic dimensions of encountering the 
miniature?  
 Being on board the train and poking one’s head outside the carriage to look at the 50-
foot woman is immediately recognised as a retentional structure carried forth and recollected 
in an embodied way. My point and motivation for a deeper inquiry (not to be undertaken 
here) is that all experiences of ‘the miniature’ share unique and overlapping structures within 
embodied imagination, and are—most likely—originally constituted in childhood.  
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(7)   Transcendent Movement: Perceptual Possibilities 
 
I account here for a transcendent movement of the imaginary, not absolute 
transcendence—divine or otherwise. Each interaction typified as encounter is a movement of 
transcendence. For example, the hybrid transcends the human form to offer us possible 
alternative forms. The imaginary loosens and pushes the limits of identity beyond the human.  
 
 So much living potential, the electric potential of these organisms of which humans are only one form 
 [P1,G,2]. 
 
A transcendent movement involves dimensional conversions of both a temporal and spatial 
order. Lyotard's figural creates elusive and evocative phenomena, suggesting something 
similar. But what do I mean by transcendence in this context? In receptivity, there is 
transcendence through the imaginary. We go beyond body, light, and stage environment, 
momentarily escaping these immanent confines. There is a co-directional vacillation between 
immanent body and transcendent imaginings: a movement back and forth igniting small 
spacings. In the ‘thereness’ of the performer’s body, we hear them breathe and gasp. 
Auditory receptivity constitutes the corporeal with a fleshly sense. We wait on the edge of the 
white mat with the performer in their preparedness to interact with the media. We experience 
a movement from the perception of corporeal body toward the imaginary, a movement that 
releases us into an irreal realm, a place that is “everywhere and nowhere” (Husserl 1973, 
259). Within this context, the hinge between immanence and transcendence is often digital 
other. Digital other is a separating force that establishes body and media as independent 
entities, but is also an encounter where transcendence swells the imaginary, such as the 
amorphic, predatory ink blob described in participants’ accounts of GLOW. 
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Reversal of Transcendent movements: transcending the hybrid body with voice  
 
 It was a weightless/gutless being that uttered sounds when agitated [P3,G,1]. 
 
A being devoid of bodily substance, or weight bearing materiality to ground it, still utters 
sounds signaling a return to corporeality—understood here in relative terms to transcendence 
as an immanent body. Voice reasserts the body as substance. As substance, the body always 
has the structure of becoming transcendent within reception.  
  
A breathy sound tears from her throat [P1,G,4]. 
 
 Perhaps it was trapped in itself [P3,G,2]. 
 
The performer is vocally heard for the first time; it is a striking moment described by four of 
the participants. Before the scream the theatre was audibly saturated by electronic sound. The 
scream appears to reverse the movement of transcendence: a flight from this being of flesh 
and light (‘cyber being’/‘electric body’) back to the immanent flesh of the performer. The 
voice becomes the transcendent moment of return back to the performer. This is the moment 
when the performer emerges from the floor, escaping the “cradle”, or “crucible” of gridlines. 
The scream, an audible, non-mediatised sound, is a transcendent movement away from the 
interaction of digital othering and transmorphing that takes place on the stage’s surface. 
Voice tears her from the tessellations of body entwined with light. She is stilled momentarily, 
freed from this interaction. Later she is possessed.  
 
 Muffled solidity/you singular bird cry. The fish untangles the net of her captor’s flirtation. 
 [P4,G,8]. 
 
The voice as a reverse transcendent power releases the performer from the mediatic net that 
restrains her as a fish in a transmorphic environment. The performer awakens us through 
sonorous cries; the performer is equally awakened in a return to self.  
 
 Exhausting screech. She yelps with quavering voice downward and upward—off the floor from beneath 
 the lines masking, face masks [CI,G,1]. 
 
More often than not, the transmorphing of performer into animal, insect or inanimate thing 
presents a doubling of encounters and so a double movement of transcendence in the 
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interactions between performer and media. Take for example transmorphing with 
environment: 
 
 A bug caught in the death lights of an insect zapper [P1,G,1]. 
 
 The fish untangles in the net of her captors flirtation, - entranced in the rhythm as neons follow one’s 
 every movement [P4,G,7]. 
 
 You are the dull throb of street lamps. Your pattern making is a suburb of your strange glow [P4,G,5]. 
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Onstage, Offstage 
The unique quality of media is that it never enters from off stage; it appears then 
disappears onstage. The sense formation of media does not occur within the threshold 
between offstage and onstage. As Giesekam (2007) states: 
 
 The treatment of space, time and action often differs radically from dominant forms of theatre, as the 
 camera may introduce action from elsewhere and other times, past, present, and future, or even places 
 and action dreamt of or fantasised. Traditional boundaries between offstage and onstage become 
 blurred, as the stage becomes the meeting-point of many locations, real and fictional, and of fictional 
 characters with filmed real-world figures (10). 
 
There is certainly on or off, but no sense of a world beyond the stage. No sedimentation. 
 
Fade to black pin inky spot shallow fold [CI,G,9]. 
 
 The explosion—and yes the ‘micro dot’ ending leaves me in no doubt I know the plan [P2,G,6]. 
 
The performer often stands at the edge of the playspace waiting for the media to appear, to 
emerge on the edge, come into being, then disappear.  
 
 Emptiness—fluoresence tunes of light criss-crossing the delineated space, a body emerges on the edge 
 of the space [P1,G,1]. 
 
 The last image—the dancer on the edge of the white rectangle, a final glimmer [P1,G,5]. 
 
Space, objective time, and action are contained within the edges of the visible stage space. 
There is no off stage place of representation, no ‘there’ or ‘then’ indications of another room, 
a place of past or future, near or distance, where a spatio-temporal somewhere else melds the 
on and off stage worlds together.175 Time is both continuous (in the sense that is has a 
beginning, middle and end) and discontinuous. Small vignettes in time transcend time, space 
and place. A transition of encounters—say digital touch to digital other—becomes a small 
twist in time.  
 
 An amoebic form morphing off to the outer edge 
                                                         
175 See (Filmer 2006) and (McAuley 1999). 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In GLOW, there is a moment where digital other begins to form as an amorphous cloud 
behind the performer. These formations occur on the edge—an aspect of technological 
transparency, highlighting the limits of where interactions can occur. Most digital forms 
visually experienced within audience are constrained by a stage frame.176  
 
                                                        
176 Stage constraints on the visual do not extend to sound. I am reminded of the deliberate offstage use of sound 
in Australian director Barry Kosky’s Women of Troy (2008). During the production a phone rang multiple times 
and was left unanswered. We were given the impression that there was a room just beyond the onstage/offstage 
border. The sound not only represented another place, but also indicated a caller on the other end located 
somewhere even more remote from the stage. The onstage players were drawn to this place. Our sense of stage 
place bled into the immediate offstage (and beyond) by this nauseatingly persistent offstage sound: who will 
answer the phone? Who is calling? We were required to imagine this place in receptivity without a perceivable 
visual impression.   
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(8)   Receptive Empathy: (a) the Role of Audience (b) The For-Us  
 Structure of Audience 
 
Receptive empathy has emerged as a constitutive structure of interaction within my 
analysis. Receptive empathy (or more precisely ‘empathy in reception’) was the term that 
came to mind when I first assessed the experiences of participants feeling or desiring to feel 
the movement of others.177 I never took empathy as a prerequisite phenomenon to be 
investigated; instances were disclosed during my analysis of the participants’ experiences. As 
a result, I do not draw directly on the literature synthesised in Foster’s genealogy of 
choreography, kinesthesia and empathy, or the work of other projects, which take the 
discovery of kinesthetic empathy seriously, as I outlined in Chapter 4, but I certainly 
acknowledge their importance. My approach to analysis is strictly guided by eidetic and 
hermeneutic disclosure. Receptive empathy is understood as an inter-relational process of 
recognition in the spectator, feeling the moving performer and media. The following pages 
discuss the structural modes of receptive empathy from an experiential basis. Put simply from 
the spectator’s perspective: 
 
(i) audience desires to transcend their normal mode of embodiment. 
 
  (ii)  receptive empathy allows the audience member to transcend (i), thus 
 
(ii) receptive empathy is an imperative for audience to satisfy this desire 
 
As this formulation suggests, receptive empathy facilitates the desire for audience members 
to go beyond their normal mode of embodiment. The desire is at once some measure of 
satisfaction in a performative and fictionally formed context. The degree of satisfaction is 
founded in the language of participants. To begin discussion, I draw upon specific statements 
that relate directly to their embodiment, kinesthesia and imagination during encounters with 
the various interactions. 
                                                        
177 Despite the fact that I speak about similar types of experiences, I will continue to use the term receptive, 
rather than kinesthetic in order to keep my analysis distinct from contemporary studies discussed in Chapter 4. 
The use of receptive is apposite to my emphasis on reception inspired by a Gadamerian aesthetic theory that 
undergirds my phenomenological method. It also allows me to make a distinction between kinesthetic and 
emotional types of empathy, even though the former is not divorced from the latter. 
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(8a)   The Role of Audience 
 
• I want to do what they are doing 
 
There is a strong desire from the spectator to do what the performer is doing, and to 
‘feel’ exactly what they are feeling. There is an awakening of kinesthetic sense in the writer 
by the performer other; the writer identifies a feeling and/or sensation within themselves.  
 
 I want to do that—I want to be able to do the splits [P2,G,2].  
 
The writer views the performer’s physicality and actions as an optimal mode of embodiment; 
they address their own bodily capacity, desiring to ‘do’ like them. Spectator envy is an aspect 
of receptive empathy. The spectator desires the movement possibilities of another. They are 
kinesthetically motivated second-hand. What do I mean by this? The ‘I can’ of kinesthetic 
motivation originates in the performer. The ‘I can’ is not something we cognitively deliberate 
about while performing actions, it is a motivation at the level of the kinesthetic: I can climb 
the very next stair in the enduring action of climbing a staircase, but I do not cognitively 
process an ‘I can’ for each stair. In kinesthetic empathy there is a doubling or supervening of 
kinesthetic motivation upon the performer’s ‘I can’ by the spectator. Motivation in the 
spectator originates in the performer. 
 The ‘I’ in this example undermines the for-us structure of triangulation between all 
players. There is a separation of the participant from other audience members in their 
recognition and identification with the performer. However, this ‘I’ is non-conflated in 
identification, such that the participant is distinct from the performer. A desire for receptive 
empathy is proclaimed: 
 
 Longing to watch and feel and do and feel along with him [P2,E,1]. 
 He rolls—and balances. Rolls and balances. And—splat I want to do that! [P1,E,1] 
 She swoops round sort of doubling body up inside circle want to do that too feel what it may feel like 
 [P1,TL_P,1]. 
 
Interestingly, in the roving performance of Transmission Laboratories, immersed participants 
wrote descriptions revealing less receptive empathy than performances viewed at a distance. 
Descriptions of their embodiment while watching were more prevalent: 
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 I stand nailed to the ground like my legs are two drills whose weight plummets into the earth. I 
 consider moving. Slide back into the gazing [P5,TL,2]. 
 
 Enjoy . . . enjoy . . . the light I look up to distorts the edges, her edges. I have become a camera now, 
 but I feel more like a dance partner now I am on the floor. Feel less dominant demanding perhaps my 
 image now belongs to her more than the other way round which I felt before [P8,TL,3]. 
 
• Feeling satisfaction 
 
  Toes stretch satisfaction breathe burrowing this is good [P2,G,1]. 
 
 Comfort of watching one person exercise it out on behalf of us all [P2,G,4]. 
 
The spectator feels the movement of the performer stretching their toes. In this instance, the 
imperative for receptive empathy is fulfilled. They have transcended their embodiment 
through the movement of another. The stretching of toes, which are not their own, is 
evaluated positively. The movement of transcendence is not a great imaginative leap from 
their normal embodiment. The action of stretching toes is well within the realms of 
possibility. Consequently, a spectrum between the opposing poles ‘close’ and ‘far’ may be 
considered. During experiences of receptive empathy this spectrum represents varying 
degrees of transcendence from normal embodiment. Feeling the stretch of toes while 
watching a performer stretch their toes is something that we have done or could do (close); 
while doing the splits is not necessarily something we have done or could do (far), but could 
imagine in the immanent-transcendence of our embodiment. And yet, doing the splits is not 
as far as the embodied imagining of flying like an angel, or shrinking to be a tiny person 
onboard a model train. All experiences are relative to each other in their identification as 
being close or far. 
 
• I feel their fear 
 
 Up there—I don’t want to go up there. Bad things happen [P1,G,6].   
 
 I feel fear, real terror with sound [CI,G,2]. 
 
 Start again—clean state a psychological terror always with her [CI,G,6]. 
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The sense of fear is very real for both writers in this instance of ‘digital violence’.  This fear 
is expressed through an ‘I-conflation’ between writer and performer, not a second-person, or 
third-person observation. The ‘I-conflation’ offers an interesting perspective on second-
person issues that question how it is possible to have access, or to know another person’s 
mind. In the Poetics of Reception accounts, expressions of the ‘I-conflation’ were revealed in 
terms of their structure, narrowing the gap between self and other in the understanding of the 
other’s experience. This is where performative-based bodily gestures representing feelings 
and/emotions can offer insight into the epistemological gap of knowing others minds. In this 
performative moment, access to the other in receptive empathy is no less truthful than in non-
performative circumstances. The suspension of disbelief is a belief in the truth of the 
performance. Reality is the performative pretence co-constituted in the triangulation between 
performer, media and audience member. Performer and audience member live the truth of 
that representation. By and large, representations can provide leading clues to understanding 
others’ minds.178  
 
 
Receptive Empathy: proximal and futural 
I remember being overcome with fear when the inky black cloud (amoebic form) 
expanded in size and filled the space behind the performer, giving the impression that it was 
about to devour her.  
 
 Tremble she will shiver. Nordic goddess of the right haunted by black globules. I feel fear, real 
 terror with sound [CI,G,2].                                                         
178 Dance, along with other aesthetic-based representational forms such as acting, has provided excellent 
examples to researchers working within neuro-phenomenology and cognitive science. Cognitionists following 
the unobservability principle (UP) claim that it is impossible to see the mental states of other people, while 
others claim direct perceptual access (DP): a belief that some parts of mental processes can be seen in action. On 
this account, bodily actions and gestures express and constitute some mental phenomena. Dancers and actors 
present to the researcher of cognition more possibilities for assessing a range of bodily and facial gestures 
within group interactions than everyday simulations (see David Kirsch’s research on distributed cognition with 
Wayne McGregor’s company Random Dance at The University of California, San Diego, 
http://www.randomdance.org/r_research). For the researcher of cognition, the representational or artificial 
nature of expression or action does not invalidate outcomes informing our understanding of human interaction. 
As with most behavioural research, the conditions in social interaction and cognition experiments are contrived 
or manipulated. The true emotion from the stimulant (versus the respondent) may be artificial, rather than a true 
expression of their emotion or thought. Take for example Dr Edward Tronik’s famous “Still Face Experiment” 
(1975) where a mother quickly changes her facial expression from happy, engaged and playful with their baby 
to one that is blank and non-responsive. Over two-minutes the mother remains expressionless while the baby 
uses all its known interactive strategies to get the mother to cooperate and respond in kind (pointing, smiling, 
making happy noises, screaming, moving their entire body to seek attention). When the mother does not 
respond, the baby rapidly transitions from happiness to tears. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apzXGEbZht0. 
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 In ghostly apparitions following she knows they are there, she feels back body perpendicular to the 
 white [CI,G,5]. 
 
I did not want to look. Chills rippled along my spine, as though this large mass was about to 
engulf me. I felt a contradictory panic: wanting her to turn around and see this pending 
danger and make her escape; and to not turn around, waylaying the moment of shock, pain, or 
possible death. These proximal and futural modes of receptive empathy, on the side of the 
spectator, are what make horror films so successful. For the most part, such experiences are 
associated with the late-’70s/early ’80s slasher genre of horror film, where a killer lurks in 
dark places unbeknown to the victim, or in the American horror film, where a demon or 
supernatural force possesses or haunts, having material effects on its victims. Spectators co-
constitute the horror both proximally and futurally. The spectator feels overwhelming fear for 
the performer who isn’t aware that Norman Bates (to use a well-known and much earlier 
example of suspenseful horror) dressed as his mother and brandishing a large carving knife in 
a ridiculous wig, hovers on the other side of the shower curtain in the Alfred Hitchcock film 
Psycho (1960). At this moment, the horror is all on the side of the spectator, singularly felt 
and heightened by an imagined outcome. The horror is temporally bound in a futural 
expectation—the ‘what-is-about-to-happen’—and is felt proximally, as the fear heightens to a 
peak and the gap closes between the two bodies culminating in (what I will term) the horror 
terminus. Once the performer/victim sees the knife in Norman’s hand, or is engulfed by the 
black inky cloud in GLOW, the receptive empathy of horror ends. Its terminus found in the 
performer’s recognition of the predatory other, whether a knife-wielding corporeal figure or a 
spectral entity. The horror terminus may then transform receptive empathy from an 
experience of the futural and proximal to an embodiment of viscerally felt pain: the plunging 
of a knife into flesh, etc.   
 
• Feeling joy 
 
 Joy in the relentless choreography . . . Look closer does she bite her nails—joy and deep  satisfaction 
 [P2,G,8]. 
 
 How to describe this part—the joyful, ecstatic, spirit, free, leaping. To end here [P1,G,2]. 
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Across most of the accounts there are experiences identified as joyful. Where the spectator is 
confined to a chair in traditional auditorium seating, the joy is described from (1) the 
perspective of the writer: they feel joy to watch another move, or (2): they describe the 
performer as experiencing joy. In (1), joy is felt as a sense of elation, a freedom and 
unbounded pleasure in their embodiment. The ‘I can’ of kinesthetic motivation is again 
supervening in the feeling of this joy. Kinetically they transcend their seated embodiment. In 
(2), the structure of receptive empathy is different. The joy identified within the spectator 
first prompted by the movement of the performer is then projected back onto the performer; 
the performer is described to be moving with joy. In this zig-zagging transference of joy 
between performer and audience member that originates in the performer, does the joy lose 
its intensity?  
 In the Transmission Laboratory performances, the audience moved throughout the 
installation, never bound to the confines of an auditorium chair. The identification of joy in 
most of these descriptions correlates with (1) above. The joy felt by the spectator-analyst is 
described more intensely, often repeated throughout the account, and is related to an 
embodied imagining that takes place in the spectator. In the former examples of watching the 
dancer from the auditorium seat, there is a joy of transcending their bounded embodiment 
through a kinesthetic imagining: feeling the jump, the splits. As roving audience members, 
the constitutions of encounters that would usually be made from a distance become more 
complex for the spectator-analyst at an embodied imagining level. By closing the gap 
between themselves and stage phenomena of interactions, their overall receptivity—from the 
lowest to the highest; from the most passive to the most active—deepens as a constituted and 
constituting part of that world. The experience is transforming and transporting. 
 
 Joyous feeling fantasy world she swoops round sort of doubling body up inside circle [P1,TL_P,1]. 
 The movements really concentrating on fingers my fingers move too, transported, train? Transported 
 elsewhere, child like joy, in tummy and arms and mouth and all around as if this is all for me 
 [P1,TL_P,1-2].  
 
Where joy is experienced in receptive empathy, the constitution of the miniature in 
kinesthesia is deepened: 
 
 Excitement and raised sound when door opens. I am a child with the choo choo train then the images 
 screens floor protected encircled feeling of joy, smiles [P1,TL_P,1].  
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• I want to be 
 
 I want to talk about and be animal/creative/cyborgs—and have unquestioning affinity with surrounds 
 [P2,G,8]. 
 
Such existential expressions further the desire of the spectator-analyst who not only wants to 
‘do’ like the performer but also wants to ‘be’ that which they constitute in receptivity. This is 
a complex form of receptive empathy to satisfy, a complete transformation into the very 
interaction they constitute. Most of the descriptions indicate receptive empathy in expressions 
of “I want to do” like the performer, rather than “I want to be” the interaction I constitute. 
The latter desire is less readily articulated.   
 
• Feeling the thud of other 
 
 I don’t want to look away. Until the sensible (in my feet) audible and breakable thud of bones landing 
 on the ground puts its arms around my attention [P5,TL,2]. 
 
Here we have a case of auditory-based receptive empathy. The dancer lands on the ground; 
their landing is heard and simultaneously felt in the feet of the participant whose visual 
attention is immediately drawn away from the screen. For the most part, visual attention 
dominates experiences of seated performances, especially when there is a distance between 
performer and audience member. Auditory sense is not completely absent in such instances, 
however while immersed within an installation the other senses such as hearing, touch and 
the olfactory senses can be equally heightened. Our entire sensorium can be receptively 
opened and awakened. A spectator can feel the “sensible” in their feet through a performer’s 
thudding land; two bodies are connected through the flesh of the event.  
 
• Like tasting numbers: synaesthesia  
 
Synaesthesia is a confusion between the senses in abnormal associations. 
 
 This is what I see—the map of thoughts—like tasting numbers/seeing sounds/textural emotions. Black 
 imprints—the beautiful disassociation [P2,G,3]. 
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This writer sees thoughts, sounds, and emotions in the graphic and describes their experience 
as a “beautiful disassociation”—synaesthesia: sensory confusion between the five senses. Just 
as one is able to taste numbers, one is able to ‘see sound’ and ‘feel texture in the emotions’. 
The writer sees the mediatic representations and abstracts initially about the performer’s 
(singular), and then (more generally), humankind’s psychological and existential condition.  
 
 The externally imposed lines. Lines she created for herself [P2,G,6]. 
 
 Why does she need to mutter? Trapped in boxes of our own making [P3,G,2]. 
 
The interactive encounter ‘expressing the inner’ is understood through a style of synaesthesia 
and is a feature of receptive empathy between the spectator-analyst and media. The media 
expresses and/or externalises the spectator’s (and/or performer’s) inner world, and is seen by 
the spectator as a map of thoughts. Vision and thoughts become confused. We no longer 
think thoughts we see them. Visual reception becomes a form of synaesthesia. 
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(8b)  The For-Us Structure of Audience 
 
As previously argued, the role of audience in their receptivity of interactions is of 
primary significance in this work of phenomenological aesthetics. The “we”, “us”, or “our” 
identification of being-with other audience by an individual spectator triangulates the relation 
between themselves, other audience members, the performer, and media, and extends towards 
humankind more generally. This triangulated relation elicits an identity-presence structure of 
the ‘for-us’. 
 In the following example we can see a movement from the singular ‘for-itself’ to the 
plural ‘for-us’ structure. Such a movement indicates another expression of receptive empathy 
and appears within the grammar of the language as it makes an immediate shift. The 
observation of the performer’s externalised inner being lifts from the particular “her” to the 
general “our”:   
 
 Always trapped within her own our concern to border “box in” “frame” [CI,G,6]. 
 
With an immediate shift to: 
 
 Always trapped within her own our concern to border “box in” “frame” [CI,G,6]. 
 
Also evident is a traversing movement between the “her” indication, the general “our”, and 
the “mine” “I” identity of the spectator: 
 
 Caught in the matrix—do I really know the patterns I create. Boxed—its following her [P2,G,4]. 
 
  
 To conclude, it seems that the imperative of receptive empathy fulfills the desire of 
the spectator to transcend their normal embodiment (close or far) when: 
 
(i) the performer is involved in some hyper-movement with media: 
 
 The joyful, ecstatic, free, leaping [P1,E,2]. 
 
 Go for gold! Jump for me. Do it more [P2,E,3]. 
 
 I’m only bored towards the end—before the jumping [P4,E,6]. 
  290 
 
(ii) the performer disengages from a specific interaction with the media: 
 
 Accept that self, resting smaller and quieter. The throbbing heart, so prominent and open and essential 
 and overworked and undervalued and unheard [P2,E,3].  
 
(iii)  the performer and media are in a non-interactive relation, and the attention of the 
writer is on the moving performer in either an: 
 
(a) I-conflation 
 
 Heart-beat throbs large, larger than life in this stillness. Is this my body? This throbbing  spasmodic 
 madness, life erupting [P1,E,1]. 
 
 Or 
 
(b) Non I-conflation 
 
 He rolls—and balances. Rolls—and balances. And—splat I want to do that [P1,E,1]. 
 
Or when the spectator desires to transcend:  
 
(iv) media only, at points where the for-us structure in receptive empathy is indicated: 
 Dark dreams spill like turps dissipating pigment patches to the constraints of pigments tether—the 
 grains split from monochrome homes. The binding is unstuck—thinners until as dust we float. The 
 autonomy of particles. I-me-mine-it-the-is-your-you [P4,G,7]. 
 
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, it was necessary to impose a limit to the 
discovery of more structures in the phenomenological analysis of the interactive relation 
experienced in the two public performances and self-devised installation. The work to date 
has elicited many insights into the relationship between bodies and performance 
technologies, and presented the opportunity to follow several diverse threads for future 
research. My forthcoming conclusion highlights the contributions my phenomenological 
aesthetics will make to a positive and constructive understanding of the crucial relation 
between bodies and new technologies within performance.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
My project is irreducible to a single conclusion. As Don Ihde suggests, the practice of 
phenomenology never ends (Ihde 1977, 153). If the phenomenologist faces their project’s 
limit and becomes disheartened, they perhaps asked too much of phenomenology in the first 
place, or strayed from its path; perhaps they never even started.  
 There are, however, several conclusive threads to this research. My phenomenology 
has identified six interactive encounters between bodies, media and spectators, and examined 
the structural and modal constitution of interactions through a textual analysis of audience 
experiences. It will be my task in these conclusive notes to first, if only briefly, recapitulate 
the program of this research, and second, to reflect upon the essentials of phenomenological 
method as practised here before, in my final paragraphs, outlining two potential directions for 
future research towards which the results of my Poetics of Reception Project and 
methodology has pointed. I will end by commenting on the overall contribution that my 
research will make to the practice of phenomenology in performance studies.   
 Phenomenology is practised in many ways. In this thesis I have outlined the design of 
and demonstrated the working of one method for attending to the interactive relation between 
bodies and technologies in a performance context. I set out from a critical examination of 
Philip Auslander’s claim that there is no ontological distinction between live and mediatised 
forms because they participate in the same cultural economy, and looked closely at the 
formation of his arguments against a background of media and communication theories 
(McLuhan, Bolter and Grusin et al.). Considering the various questions and issues raised by 
Auslander and proponents of liveness in the ongoing debate within performance studies about 
the relationship between live and mediatised forms, I reoriented the oppositional figuration of 
‘live versus mediatised’ to the conjunction ‘live and mediatised’ with the explicit intention to 
examine audience experiences of bodies and media interacting during performance.  
 Through my reorientation of the debate, several discoveries were made, including the 
reinstatement of audience in a tripartite aesthetic understanding of an artwork. Drawing upon 
the work of Gadamer, my phenomenological aesthetics emphasises the role of audience 
(reception) as a player amongst other players—including artist and media (producers) and 
interactive artwork (product). I considered closely the practices of philosophical and 
scientific ontology in an attempt to spare my project from any more confusion surrounding 
ontological sameness or differences when examining these forms. By choosing to approach 
  292 
the relationship between corporeal bodies and technological media in these events using a 
phenomenological aesthetics I was able to move beyond the ontological question, settling 
upon a Husserlian-style ontology through the disclosure of essential structures through eidetic 
analysis. Such a perspective makes irrelevant any deliberation regarding ontological 
sameness or difference. At a static-genetic level of constitutional analysis, my overall method 
has been informed by a Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology. Moving beyond that 
level, I have drawn upon the methods of group phenomenology as practised in the tradition 
emerging from North America (Spiegelberg, Casey, Ihde and Steinbock), and Australia 
(Grant). Finally, I undertook a textual hermeneutics in order to arrive at some structural 
invariance within the poetic variance of writings that my phenomenological method elicited 
from participants. The writings from participants were phenomenologically reduced 
descriptions that attempted to suspend all presuppositions and critical evaluation. These texts, 
for the most part, were poetic expressions, imaginatively elaborating upon instances of 
interaction in performance. I identified six distinct interactive encounters from two pilot 
studies, two public performances, and one co-devised installation: (1) Digital Touch; (2) 
Moving with Digital Other; (3) Hybrids; (4) Transmorphing; (5) Environment; and (6) 
Expressing the Inner. From these six encounters, I distilled eight constitutive structures with 
varying modes of interactions that are essential to the relation between bodies and media in 
these performance events. These structures indicate the sense-formation of meaning at a 
spatial, temporal, linguistic and embodied level. Rather than recapitulate each in turn—for 
the previous section did so in great detail—the key question to answer here is: how do these 
constitutive structures and modes of interaction help us gain an understanding of the relation? 
The answer is in two parts. First, by revealing these becoming structures and modes, I was 
able to clarify a number of distinctions about the relationship between bodies and 
technologies, providing a sense of how these players in play (performer, media and audience) 
co-constitute meaning at, variously, a spatio-temporal level (dimensionality), at the 
grammatical level of language, in the formation and presence of identity, in the relations of 
action, and in the expressions of intercorporeal movements revealing the structure of 
kinesthesia in such contexts.  Central to this study was the enactment of an embodied 
imagining as belief structure—that is, the suspension of disbelief within receptivity in order 
to co-constitute the many figurations of embodied imagination—and the role of description 
indicating modes of empathy in reception. My phenomenology has revealed at a structural 
level the sense formation of meaning in the interactive relation of bodies and media in 
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performance events. I like to think that each of the eight structures and their modes are 
leading clues pointing to further insights, deeper investigation and elaboration. This brings 
me to the second point. I believe that each thread of insight pursued from an open and 
intuitive examination of the phenomenologically-reduced texts led me to further possibilities 
for philosophical discussion and and/or engagement with my method in performance making. 
My methodological project has generated two such potential threads, each of which I plan to 
take up in post-doctoral research. Each emerged from my reflections upon the method, to 
which I will now turn. 
 
Reflections on the Essentials of Phenomenological Method  
 From the outset, I declared that my Poetics of Reception project was a methodological 
one. At a time when phenomenology is blossoming in performance studies, cropping up 
amongst scholars and practitioners as the preferred approach to the analysis and 
understanding of performance phenomena, my project is a timely meditation upon and 
application of phenomenological theory to representational phenomena.179 Notwithstanding 
the continuities between aesthetic performance and the performativity of everyday life, as a 
work of phenomenological aesthetics, this study advances no hyberbolic claim to describe 
life beyond the stage. As for the significance of the relationship between humans and 
computers in a performance context, the work uniquely discloses many structural modes of 
this relation not readily found in literature using other perspectives. My phenomenological 
method for performance conducted from within audience is an iterative framework that will 
continue to be refined in relation to its use and mode of inquiry. The following three points 
are further reflections upon specific problems inherent to my method. I was able to attend to 
most issues during the workshops.180 I intend to revise my method for future use with these 
issues in mind: 
 
                                                         
179 During the writing of this dissertation, I co-convened the first International time · transcendence · 
performance conference held at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia in 2009 (mentioned in footnote X, pp, 
X). This has resulted in a co-edited publication with Stuart Grant currently being reviewed by Springer 
Publishers for their Contributions to Phenomenlogy Series. More recently I helped form the Association for 
Phenomenology in Performance Studies. APPS is an international body which preserves, supports and promotes 
phenomenology in the study and practice of performance and the use of performance in the practice of 
phenomenology. We take the terms phenomenology and performance in their broadest possible sense. The 
APPS website is forthcoming. 
180 See Chapter 6 “Phenomenological Method: a case of iterative design” for a more detailed assessment and 
reflection upon the method.   
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1) Contamination within attunement in Task B 
 The swapping and discussion of participants’ accounts following Task A of the 
writing stage is a moment that Spiegelberg (and Casey) refer to as the attunement of 
linguistic accounts (Spiegelberg 1965; Casey 1997). During each workshop I sought 
attunement, but while subsequently conducting the textual analysis became suspicious of the 
procedure. Identifying discrepant terms that describe the same experience and then reducing 
those expressions to one shared term potentially contaminates the descriptive process. That 
is, as the group worked towards finding shared terms or words to describe a particular 
moment of interaction across accounts, rather than describing their singular, independent 
experience in the first place and seeing how it resonated or echoed in another’s experience, 
individual participants risked adopting another’s experience. Often it felt as though, because 
of a lapse in memory, the writer would draw upon another’s written account to flesh out a 
gap. This might be legitimate if the writer is prompted to recall the event by another, but it is 
difficult to know whether in practice, in such instants, the writers were affirming their own 
experience, or that of another.  
 In any future application of the method, I will not concern myself with a second 
writing stage (as was the case with Task C). This was the case for our devised installation; 
Task B was omitted due to reasons other than a concern for the contamination of attunement, 
such as a change in format (experimenting with a script for mediatisation), and time 
constraints.  
 
2) Decay of Reproduction 
As noted in Chapter 6, a participant’s inability to recall details of their experience in 
the later writing stages—the ‘problem of immediacy’—is a difficulty that I attempted to 
overcome with bodily-based mnemonic devices. The embodied induction session before the 
writing stage, and the addition of a second induction prior to the performance to help with the 
phenomenological and attentional reductions, were strategies to deal directly with the 
inability to reproduce the former event in experience. However, the usefulness of such 
strategies was limited. When analysing phenomena in a one-off, isolated attendance to public 
performance, I realise that I have to accept that a ‘decay in reproduction’ will be an ongoing 
issue. Overall, results will be impoverished in these situations. There may be some potential 
to remedy such decay through a more developed use of these mnemonic devices, such as ‘the 
revivification of an event’, which is loosely based on hypnosis, where hypnosis is understood 
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as a form of highly focused attention. Equally, it may be that an increased experience in 
practising phenomenology and the development of new strategies revealed by further 
application of the method will help to address the problem of a decay in reproduction. 
 
3)  Latent Textual Analysis 
The biggest issue with my method was starting the textual analysis too late. I waited 
to complete all workshops, holding off with the idea that more theoretical research was 
required to adequately undertake analysis. I proceeded with some hesitancy as there were no 
real examples to draw upon. Most of the literature discussing phenomenological methods did 
not offer detailed procedures for analysing texts. But as soon as I found a rhythm in the line-
by-line analysis of participants’ writings, it was relatively easy to ascertain the structural 
connections. For future projects I will conduct textual analysis immediately following the 
writing stage. With practice, I believe this could be conducted quite quickly. Immediate 
analysis will also lessen the decay of reproduction or false memories of the event to which 
the textual analyst also falls prey to. A consistent, veridical memory will contribute to a 
phenomenological process that moves us closer to the things themselves. 
 
Phenomenology as Dramaturgy  
Throughout this dissertation I have, on more than one occasion, made reference to 
phenomenology as digital dramaturgy. So far, this has been the richest implication of my 
Poetics of Reception Project as a methodology with practical utility within performance 
making. The basic premise is that phenomenology as a transcendental and eidetic practice 
works in much the same way as traditional dramaturgy: both share an interest in the essential 
structure of, in the case of phenomenology, the thing in itself, and for dramaturgy, the 
production or performance. Phenomenology identifies these structures through specific 
processes of disclosure while dramaturgy is open to varying processes conducted by a 
dramaturg to identify, create and construct a coherent structure. Dramaturgy, understood as 
the weaving of elements at a structural level could only benefit from employing a 
phenomenological method in their attentions to performance construction.181 Moreover, 
making the relationship between bodies and technologies in performance the relational 
                                                        
181 For more detail on this see Jodie McNeilly (2011 June). However, it is important to note that the findings 
from the textual analysis demonstrated in this paper version have been superseded by my analysis presented in 
Chapter 7.    
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phenomenon, the phenomenological work undertaken here directly lends itself to a 
dramaturgy of digital performance.182   
 My script for mediatisation in the Transmission Laboratories installation was the first 
moment when I recognised the potential for phenomenology in dramaturgical work. The fact 
that I could control when (but not how) the interactions occurred, and where attentions should 
be directed (not without resistance), enabled me to see how a notational or recording system 
could operate in conjunction with phenomenological description.183 A script for mediatisation 
could help build towards useful dramaturgical information, taking into account the material 
aspects of the production (media and set-up), the spatio-temporal relations between things 
(recorded as coordinates), and the receptivity of the experience (sense formation of meaning 
expressed through language and poetics).   
 During the final phase of my textual analysis, there were several moments in the 
disclosure of constitutive structures and modes of interaction that suggested dramaturgical 
devices for making. Such a dramaturgy could work backwards from, or contiguously with, 
the production process. If working backwards, the six interactive encounters identified in the 
Poetics of Reception Project would be an apposite starting point. For example, if there is a 
performance using screen projections combined with camera tracking, the results of any 
previous phenomenological work conducted on similar performances could be transposed. 
The dramaturg would begin to build an arsenal of devices to use in like situations. The 
phenomenological group working at the transcendental reduction phase—the suspension of 
presuppositions and critical value making—is open to a range of phenomena that are oriented 
toward dramaturgical concerns. One concern simply being: fluent interactions between a 
moving body and their projection on a screen (digital double). During the stages of a 
phenomenological and attentional reduction, and subsequent textual analysis, the emphasis 
can be on any phenomena, relational or otherwise. Of course there are certain limitations to 
phenomenology, such as knowing other people’s minds. At the level of empathetic reception, 
however, there is the possibility of resonating with the kinesthetic and existential dimensions 
of the performer in performance because these interpersonal dimensions are not deliberately 
                                                        
182 I do not want to rule out phenomenology as dramaturgy for all forms of performance. Future studies will 
address other forms.  
183 One participant is explicit about their discomfort with being told where to look and for how long.  
 
 Terrible like agony, agonizing disruption, oh dear, looking and not looking restrictions. Surprised by feeling 
 suddenly agitated by this as a restriction [P7,TL,3]. 
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hidden within performance. By and large, if the dramaturgy requires something other than the 
structure of an interaction, then the orientation of phenomenological regard can be directed 
towards that very thing.  
 The other approach to utilising the method would take place during the creative 
development and rehearsal stages of a production. In this case, the group phenomenologists 
would need to work ‘on the fly’ to provide immediate feedback to the dramaturg while the 
performance is being constructed.184 The decay of reproduction may be less of an issue with 
this approach as the writing could occur almost simultaneously with the performance, which 
would also be repeated several times depending on when the dramaturgy team was invited to 
observe. My hope is to trial both approaches with a professional company and single group of 
trained phenomenologists over a three-year period.     
 
Tiny Worlds Project: Constituting the miniature in kinesthesia. Embodied imagination in 
Husserl  
 My second thread for investigation stems from an encounter with the miniature in 
performance. This work derives directly from the phenomenological work undertaken in this 
dissertation, and will develop upon my methodology to consider other object-based aesthetic 
experiences. During encounters of the miniature (or tiny), the body is involved in an 
imagined movement of scale as it shrinks to become immersed in a simulated, though 
smaller, replica of our everyday proportionate reality. There are two untested theses that I am 
interested in pursuing with this research. The first is to see how and when we constitute the 
miniature in kinesthesia. An examination of the how requires a phenomenological 
examination of encounters using similar methods presented in this dissertation; the when is a 
little more tricky and speculative. Arguably our adult response and openness to tiny things 
has something to do with constituting meaningful structures in childhood experiences of the 
miniature—whether, as suggested earlier, these are toy-trains, sand castles, doll houses or 
genie bottles. Imagined scalar movements toward a shrunken embodiment of our entire 
bodily sensorium are somehow structurally retended from childhood, informing our 
kinesthetic experiences of the tiny. On this account, these inaugurating, transformative 
moments at a kinesthetic level continue to inform our encounters with the miniature. As 
children we shrink and are immersed in these tiny worlds. Do we as adults, retroactively 
constitute similar experiences during aesthetic encounters of the miniature, imaginatively                                                         
184 Or to the director/choreographer if indeed the dramaturg is the lead phenomenologist. 
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feeling our tiny embodiment? Or is each new encounter a freshly constituted experience, with 
no retention of former structures? Some questions arising from the temporal nature of 
experiencing the miniature include: as adults, are these experiences felt to be stronger at an 
embodied level, and imaginatively richer, if we played with the miniature as children? Bereft 
of any childhood experiences of the miniature, how (if at all) does adult perception encounter 
the miniature? These are temporal questions inquiring into pre-rational embodied memory, 
and perceptual differences between generations.  
 Extrapolating from a constitutional analysis of perception, we could ask how such 
experiences impact upon our everyday spatio-temporal selves in relation to other objects, 
people and spaces in the world. Do we inhabit space differently after experiences of the 
miniature? What are the scalar differentials? How do we feel small/smaller, big, or bigger? 
What are the transformative kinesthetic dimensions of encountering the miniature? And 
finally, how could such aesthetic-based research inform studies relating to socio-ecological 
questions of how we dwell: do we need all that space?185 And the kinesthetic constitution of 
body image: how small or big am I?  
 My second thesis, or orientation, involves a close study of Husserl’s work on 
imagination understood through experiences of the miniature. I am interested in drawing 
together the key concepts of kinesthesia, motivation, apperception, and the laws of 
association (e.g. pairing) from Husserl’s earlier work on self-temporalisation with his 
phenomenology of imagination (Husserl 2001, 2005). By tracing the relationship between 
kinesthesia and imagination in Husserl’s manuscripts that deal with these aforementioned 
concepts, I wish to ask how these connections can deepen a reading of his transcendental 
aesthetic (the spatio-temporal aspects) and perhaps illumine the workings of an analytic for 
investigating the constitution of kinesthesia and imagination in encounters of the miniature 
(aesthetic and child’s play) and other extreme encounters, like monoliths, found within nature 
and the built environment. By developing upon my Poetics of Reception methodology, such a 
study of extreme oppositional scale could, at the level of a transcendental aesthetic, reveal 
new or different aspects of an ego’s relation to others (ethics), or provide a unique 
perspective on an ego’s relation to earth (an eco-philosophy), that a psychological or 
anthropological reflection on egoic life would not.  
 
                                                         
185 This is a leading question of the ‘Tiny House’ movement, which started and continues to flourish in the US. 
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To Conclude 
My phenomenological examination of bodies interacting with technologies has 
hopefully contributed to a positive understanding of this relation. Rather than oscillating 
within the quagmire of debate that persecutes liveness through a denial of its existence 
(Auslander et al.), or critically demonising the role of mediatisation in the valorization of live 
performance (Phelan et al.), my study resisted making ontological distinctions and 
comparisons (only describing differences where an experience indicated) and sought to 
engage with the ontology of relations at the level of their essential structures and modes of 
constitution. These structures were understood through the receptive and embodied 
experiences of audience members engaged in a unique way of attending performance. It was 
through their rich poetic responses to these experiences that I was able to provide a number 
of insights into this relation between corporeal bodies and technological media, a complex 
relation that will continue to develop in the experiences of performer, audience member and 
performance maker alike. 
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